Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-mls-extensions
draft-ietf-mls-extensions
Network Working Group R. Robert
Internet-Draft Phoenix R&D
Intended status: Informational 23 October 2023
Expires: 25 April 2024
The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Extensions
draft-ietf-mls-extensions-03
Abstract
This document describes extensions to the Messaging Layer Security
(MLS) protocol.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/mlswg/mls-extensions.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 April 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Safe Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Safe Extension API . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2. Common Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.3. Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.4. Signature Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.5. Exporting Secrets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.6. Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.7. Extension Designer Tools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2. Extension Design Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.1. Storing State in Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1. AppAck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1.1. Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2. Targeted messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2.1. Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2.2. Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2.3. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.4. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.5. Guidance on authentication schemes . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3. Content Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3.1. Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3.2. Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3.3. Expected Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3.4. Framing of application_data . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4. SelfRemove Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4.1. Extension Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.5. Last resort KeyPackages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5.1. Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5.2. Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1. MLS Wire Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.1. MLS Extension Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2. MLS Extension Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2.1. targeted_messages_capability MLS Extension . . . . . 24
4.2.2. targeted_messages MLS Extension . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.3. accepted_media_types MLS Extension . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.4. required_media_types MLS Extension . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2.5. last_resort_key_package MLS Extension . . . . . . . . 26
4.3. MLS Proposal Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
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4.3.1. Extension Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3.2. Extension Path Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3.3. Extension External Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.3.4. AppAck Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.3.5. SelfRemove Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.4. MLS Credential Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.4.1. Extension Credential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.5. MLS Signature Labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.5.1. Labeled Extension Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.1. AppAck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.2. Targeted Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.3. Content Advertisement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.4. SelfRemove . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1. Introduction
This document describes extensions to [mls-protocol] that are not
part of the main protocol specification. The protocol specification
includes a set of core extensions that are likely to be useful to
many applications. The extensions described in this document are
intended to be used by applications that need to extend the MLS
protocol.
1.1. Change Log
RFC EDITOR PLEASE DELETE THIS SECTION.
draft-03
* Add Last Resort KeyPackage extension
* Add Safe Extensions framework
* Add SelfRemove Proposal
draft-02
* No changes (prevent expiration)
draft-01
* Add Content Advertisement extensions
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draft-00
* Initial adoption of draft-robert-mls-protocol-00 as a WG item.
* Add Targeted Messages extension (*)
2. Safe Extensions
The MLS specification is extensible in a variety of ways (see
Section 13 of the [RFC9420]) and describes the negotiation and other
handling of extensions and their data within the protocol. However,
it does not provide guidance on how extensions can or should safely
interact with the base MLS protocol. The goal of this section is to
simplify the task of developing MLS extensions.
More concretely, this section defines the Safe Extension API, a
library of extension components which simplifies development and
security analysis of extensions, provides general guidance on using
the built-in functionality of the base MLS protocol to build
extensions, defines specific examples of extensions built on top of
the Safe Extension API alongside the built-in mechanisms of the base
MLS protocol, defines a number of labels registered in IANA which can
be safely used by extensions, so that the only value an extension
developer must add to the IANA registry themselves is a unique
ExtensionType.
2.1. Safe Extension API
The Safe Extension API is a library that defines a number of
components from which extensions can be built. In particular, these
components provide extensions the ability to:
* Make use of selected private and public key material from the MLS
specification, e.g. to encrypt, decrypt, sign, verify and derive
fresh key material.
* Inject key material via PSKs in a safe way to facilitate state
agreement without the use of a group context extension.
* Export secrets from MLS in a way that, in contrast to the built-in
export functionality of MLS, preserves forward secrecy of the
exported secrets within an epoch.
The Safe Extension API is not an extension itself, it only defines
components from which other extensions can be built. Some of these
components modify the MLS protocol and, therefore, so do the
extensions built from them.
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Where possible, the API makes use of mechanisms defined in the MLS
specification. For example, part of the safe API is the use of the
SignWithLabel function described in Section 5.1.2 of [RFC9420].
2.1.1. Security
An extension is called safe if it does not modify the base MLS
protocol or other MLS extensions beyond using components of the Safe
Extension API. The Safe Extension API provides the following
security guarantee: If an application uses MLS and only safe MLS
extensions, then the security guarantees of the base MLS protocol and
the security guarantees of safe extensions, each analyzed in
isolation, still hold for the composed extended MLS protocol. In
other words, the Safe Extension API protects applications from
careless extension developers. As long as all used extensions are
safe, it is not possible that a combination of extensions (the
developers of which did not know about each other) impedes the
security of the base MLS protocol or any used extension. No further
analysis of the combination is necessary. This also means that any
security vulnerabilities introduced by one extension do not spread to
other extensions or the base MLS.
2.1.2. Common Data Structures
Most components of the Safe Extension API use the value ExtensionType
which is a unique uint16 identifier assigned to an extension in the
MLS Extension Types IANA registry (see Section 17.3 of [RFC9420]).
Most Safe Extension API components also use the following data
structure, which provides domain separation by extension_type of
various extension_data.
struct {
ExtensionType extension_type;
opaque extension_data<V>;
} ExtensionContent;
Where extension_type is set to the type of the extension to which the
extension_data belongs.
If in addition a label is required, the following data structure is
used.
struct {
opaque label;
ExtensionContent extension_content;
} LabeledExtensionContent;
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2.1.3. Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE)
This component of the Safe Extension API allows extensions to make
use of all HPKE key pairs generated by MLS. An extension identified
by an ExtensionType can use any HPKE key pair for any operation
defined in [RFC9180], such as encryption, exporting keys and the PSK
mode, as long as the info input to Setup<MODE>S and Setup<MODE>R is
set to LabeledExtensionContent with extension_type set to
ExtensionType. The extension_data can be set to an arbitrary Context
specified by the extension designer (and can be empty if not needed).
For example, an extension can use a key pair PublicKey, PrivateKey to
encrypt data as follows:
SafeEncryptWithContext(ExtensionType, PublicKey, Context, Plaintext) =
SealBase(PublicKey, LabeledExtensionContent, "", Plaintext)
SafeDecryptWithContext(ExtensionType, PrivateKey, Context, KEMOutput, Ciphertext) =
OpenBase(KEMOutput, PrivateKey, LabeledExtensionContent, "", Ciphertext)
Where the fields of LabeledExtensionContent are set to
label = "MLS 1.0 ExtensionData"
extension_type = ExtensionType
extension_data = Context
For operations involving the secret key, ExtensionType MUST be set to
the ExtensionType of the implemented extension, and not to the type
of any other extension. In particular, this means that an extension
cannot decrypt data meant for another extension, while extensions can
encrypt data to other extensions.
In general, a ciphertext encrypted with a PublicKey can be decrypted
by any entity who has the corresponding PrivateKey at a given point
in time according to the MLS protocol (or extension). For
convenience, the following list summarizes lifetimes of MLS key
pairs.
* The key pair of a non-blank ratchet tree node. The PrivateKey of
such a key pair is known to all members in the node’s subtree. In
particular, a PrivateKey of a leaf node is known only to the
member in that leaf. A member in the subtree stores the
PrivateKey for a number of epochs, as long as the PublicKey does
not change. The key pair of the root node SHOULD NOT be used,
since the external key pair recalled below gives better security.
* The external_priv, external_pub key pair used for external
initialization. The external_priv key is known to all group
members in the current epoch. A member stores external_priv only
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for the current epoch. Using this key pair gives better security
guarantees than using the key pair of the root of the ratchet tree
and should always be preferred.
* The init_key in a KeyPackage and the corresponding secret key.
The secret key is known only to the owner of the KeyPackage and is
deleted immediately after it is used to join a group.
2.1.4. Signature Keys
MLS session states contain a number of signature keys including the
ones in the LeafNode structs. Extensions can safely sign content and
verify signatures using these keys via the SafeSignWithLabel and
SafeVerifyWithLabel functions, respectively, much like how the basic
MLS protocol uses SignWithLabel and VerifyWithLabel.
In more detail, an extension identified by ExtensionType should sign
and verify using:
SafeSignWithLabel(ExtensionType, SignatureKey, Label, Content) =
SignWithLabel(SignatureKey, "LabeledExtensionContent", LabeledExtensionContent)
SafeVerifyWithLabel(ExtensionType, VerificationKey, Label, Content, SignatureValue) =
VerifyWithLabel(VerificationKey, "LabeledExtensionContent", LabeledExtensionContent, SignatureValue)
Where the fields of LabeledExtensionContent are set to
label = Label
extension_type = ExtensionType
extension_data = Content
For signing operations, the ExtensionType MUST be set to the
ExtensionType of the implemented extension, and not to the type of
any other extension. In particular, this means that an extension
cannot produce signatures in place of other extensions. However,
extensions can verify signatures computed by other extensions. Note
that domain separation is ensured by explicitly including the
ExtensionType with every operation.
2.1.5. Exporting Secrets
An extension can use MLS as a group key agreement protocol by
exporting symmetric keys. Such keys can be exported (i.e. derived
from MLS key material) in two phases per epoch: Either at the start
of the epoch, or during the epoch. Derivation at the start of the
epoch has the added advantage that the source key material is deleted
after use, allowing the derived key material to be deleted later even
during the same MLS epoch to achieve forward secrecy. The following
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protocol secrets can be used to derive key from for use by
extensions:
* epoch_secret at the beginning of an epoch
* extension_secret during an epoch
The extension_secret is an additional secret derived from the
epoch_secret at the beginning of the epoch in the same way as the
other secrets listed in Table 4 of [RFC9420] using the label
"extension".
Any derivation performed by an extension either from the epoch_secret
or the extension_secret has to use the following function:
DeriveExtensionSecret(Secret, Label) =
ExpandWithLabel(Secret, "ExtensionExport " + ExtensionType + " " + Label)
Where ExpandWithLabel is defined in Section 8 of [RFC9420] and where
ExtensionType MUST be set to the ExtensionType of the implemented
extension.
2.1.6. Pre-Shared Keys (PSKs)
PSKs represent key material that is injected into the MLS key
schedule when creating or processing a commit as defined in
Section 8.4 of [RFC9420]. Its injection into the key schedule means
that all group members have to agree on the value of the PSK.
While PSKs are typically cryptographic keys which due to their
properties add to the overall security of the group, the PSK
mechanism can also be used to ensure that all members of a group
agree on arbitrary pieces of data represented as octet strings
(without the necessity of sending the data itself over the wire).
For example, an extension can use the PSK mechanism to enforce that
all group members have access to and agree on a password or a shared
file.
This is achieved by creating a new epoch via a PSK proposal.
Transitioning to the new epoch requires using the information agreed
upon.
To facilitate using PSKs in a safe way, this document defines a new
PSKType for extensions. This provides domain separation between pre-
shared keys used by the core MLS protocol and applications, and
between those used by different extensions.
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enum {
reserved(0),
external(1),
resumption(2),
extensions(3),
(255)
} PSKType;
struct {
PSKType psktype;
select (PreSharedKeyID.psktype) {
case external:
opaque psk_id<V>;
case resumption:
ResumptionPSKUsage usage;
opaque psk_group_id<V>;
uint64 psk_epoch;
case extensions:
ExtensionType extension_type;
opaque psk_id<V>;
};
opaque psk_nonce<V>;
} PreSharedKeyID;
2.1.7. Extension Designer Tools
The safe extension API allows extension designers to sign and encrypt
payloads without the need to register their own IANA labels.
Following the same pattern, this document also provides ways for
extension designers to define their own wire formats, proposals and
credentials.
2.1.7.1. Wire Formats
Extensions can define their own MLS messages by using the
mls_extension_message MLS Wire Format. The mls_extension_message
Wire Format is IANA registered specifically for this purpose and
extends the select statement in the MLSMessage struct as follows:
case mls_extension_message:
ExtensionContent extension_content;
The extension_type in extension_content MUST be set to the type of
the extension in question. Processing of self-defined wire formats
has to be defined by the extension.
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2.1.7.2. Proposals
Similar to wire formats, extensions can define their own proposals by
using one of three dedicated extension proposal types:
extension_proposal, extension_path_proposal and
extension_external_propsal. Each type contains the same
ExtensionContent struct, but is validated differently:
extension_proposal requires no UpdatePath and can not be sent by an
external sender extension_path_proposal requires an UpdatePath and
can not be sent by an external sender extensions_external_proposal
requires no UpdatePath and can be sent by an external sender.
Each of the three proposal types is IANA registered and extends the
select statement in the Proposal struct as follows:
case extension_proposal:
ExtensionContent extension_content;
case extension_path_proposal:
ExtensionContent extension_content;
case extension_external_proposal:
ExtensionContent extension_content;
The extension_type MUST be set to the type of the extension in
question.
Processing and validation of self-defined proposals has to be defined
by the extension. However, validation rules can lead to a previously
valid commit to become invalid, not the other way around. This is
with the exception of proposal validation for external commits, where
self-defined proposals can be declared valid for use in external
commits. More concretely, if an external commit is invalid, only
because the self-defined proposal is part of it (the last rule in
external commit proposal validation in Section 12.2 of [RFC9420]),
then the self-defined validation rules may rule that the commit is
instead valid.
2.1.7.3. Credentials
Extension designers can also define their own credential types via
the IANA registered extension_credential credential type. The
extension_credential extends the select statement in the Credential
struct as follows:
case extension_credential:
ExtensionContent extension_content;
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The extension_type in the extension_content must be set to that of
the extension in question with the extension_data containing all
other relevant data. Note that any credential defined in this way
has to meet the requirements detailed in Section 5.3 of the MLS
specification.
2.2. Extension Design Guidance
While extensions can modify the protocol flow of MLS and the
associated properties in arbitrary ways, the base MLS protocol
already enables a number of functionalities that extensions can use
without modifying MLS itself. Extension authors should consider
using these built-in mechanisms before employing more intrusive
changes to the protocol.
2.2.1. Storing State in Extensions
Every type of MLS extension can have data associated with it and,
depending on the type of extension (KeyPackage Extension,
GroupContext Extension, etc.) that data is included in the
corresponding MLS struct. This allows the authors of an extension to
make use of any authentication or confidentiality properties that the
struct is subject to as part of the protocol flow.
* GroupContext Extensions: Any data in a group context extension is
agreed-upon by all members of the group in the same way as the
rest of the group state. As part of the GroupContext, it is also
sent encrypted to new joiners via Welcome messages and (depending
on the architecture of the application) may be available to
external joiners. Note that in some scenarios, the GroupContext
may also be visible to components that implement the delivery
service.
* GroupInfo Extensions: GroupInfo extensions are included in the
GroupInfo struct and thus sent encrypted and authenticated by the
signer of the GroupInfo to new joiners as part of Welcome
messages. It can thus be used as a confidential and authenticated
channel from the inviting group member to new joiners. Just like
GroupContext extensions, they may also be visible to external
joiners or even parts of the delivery service. Unlike
GroupContext extensions, the GroupInfo struct is not part of the
group state that all group members agree on.
* KeyPackage Extensions: KeyPackages (and the extensions they
include) are pre-published by individual clients for asynchronous
group joining. They are included in Add proposals and become part
of the group state once the Add proposal is committed. They are,
however, removed from the group state when the owner of the
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KeyPackage does the first commit with a path. As such, KeyPackage
extensions can be used to communicate data to anyone who wants to
invite the owner to a group, as well as the other members of the
group the owner is added to. Note that KeyPackage extensions are
visible to the server that provides the KeyPackages for download,
as well as any part of the delivery service that can see the
public group state.
* LeafNode Extensions: LeafNodes are a part of every KeyPackage and
thus follow the same lifecycle. However, they are also part of
any commit that includes an UpdatePath and clients generally have
a leaf node in each group they are a member of. Leaf node
extensions can thus be used to include member-specific data in a
group state that can be updated by the owner at any time.
3. Extensions
3.1. AppAck
Type: Proposal
3.1.1. Description
An AppAck proposal is used to acknowledge receipt of application
messages. Though this information implies no change to the group, it
is structured as a Proposal message so that it is included in the
group's transcript by being included in Commit messages.
struct {
uint32 sender;
uint32 first_generation;
uint32 last_generation;
} MessageRange;
struct {
MessageRange received_ranges<V>;
} AppAck;
An AppAck proposal represents a set of messages received by the
sender in the current epoch. Messages are represented by the sender
and generation values in the MLSCiphertext for the message. Each
MessageRange represents receipt of a span of messages whose
generation values form a continuous range from first_generation to
last_generation, inclusive.
AppAck proposals are sent as a guard against the Delivery Service
dropping application messages. The sequential nature of the
generation field provides a degree of loss detection, since gaps in
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the generation sequence indicate dropped messages. AppAck completes
this story by addressing the scenario where the Delivery Service
drops all messages after a certain point, so that a later generation
is never observed. Obviously, there is a risk that AppAck messages
could be suppressed as well, but their inclusion in the transcript
means that if they are suppressed then the group cannot advance at
all.
The schedule on which sending AppAck proposals are sent is up to the
application, and determines which cases of loss/suppression are
detected. For example:
* The application might have the committer include an AppAck
proposal whenever a Commit is sent, so that other members could
know when one of their messages did not reach the committer.
* The application could have a client send an AppAck whenever an
application message is sent, covering all messages received since
its last AppAck. This would provide a complete view of any losses
experienced by active members.
* The application could simply have clients send AppAck proposals on
a timer, so that all participants' state would be known.
An application using AppAck proposals to guard against loss/
suppression of application messages also needs to ensure that AppAck
messages and the Commits that reference them are not dropped. One
way to do this is to always encrypt Proposal and Commit messages, to
make it more difficult for the Delivery Service to recognize which
messages contain AppAcks. The application can also have clients
enforce an AppAck schedule, reporting loss if an AppAck is not
received at the expected time.
3.2. Targeted messages
3.2.1. Description
MLS application messages make sending encrypted messages to all group
members easy and efficient. Sometimes application protocols mandate
that messages are only sent to specific group members, either for
privacy or for efficiency reasons.
Targeted messages are a way to achieve this without having to create
a new group with the sender and the specific recipients – which might
not be possible or desired. Instead, targeted messages define the
format and encryption of a message that is sent from a member of an
existing group to another member of that group.
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The goal is to provide a one-shot messaging mechanism that provides
confidentiality and authentication.
Targeted Messages makes use the Safe Extension API as defined in
Section 2.1. reuse mechanisms from [mls-protocol], in particular
[hpke].
3.2.2. Format
This extension uses the mls_extension_message WireFormat as defined
in Section Section 2.1.7.1, where the content is a TargetedMessage.
struct {
opaque group_id<V>;
uint64 epoch;
uint32 recipient_leaf_index;
opaque authenticated_data<V>;
opaque encrypted_sender_auth_data<V>;
opaque hpke_ciphertext<V>;
} TargetedMessage;
enum {
hpke_auth_psk(0),
signature_hpke_psk(1),
} TargetedMessageAuthScheme;
struct {
uint32 sender_leaf_index;
TargetedMessageAuthScheme authentication_scheme;
select (authentication_scheme) {
case HPKEAuthPsk:
case SignatureHPKEPsk:
opaque signature<V>;
}
opaque kem_output<V>;
} TargetedMessageSenderAuthData;
struct {
opaque group_id<V>;
uint64 epoch;
uint32 recipient_leaf_index;
opaque authenticated_data<V>;
TargetedMessageSenderAuthData sender_auth_data;
} TargetedMessageTBM;
struct {
opaque group_id<V>;
uint64 epoch;
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uint32 recipient_leaf_index;
opaque authenticated_data<V>;
uint32 sender_leaf_index;
TargetedMessageAuthScheme authentication_scheme;
opaque kem_output<V>;
opaque hpke_ciphertext<V>;
} TargetedMessageTBS;
struct {
opaque group_id<V>;
uint64 epoch;
opaque label<V> = "MLS 1.0 targeted message psk";
} PSKId;
Note that TargetedMessageTBS is only used with the
TargetedMessageAuthScheme.SignatureHPKEPsk authentication mode.
3.2.3. Encryption
Targeted messages uses HPKE to encrypt the message content between
two leaves.
3.2.3.1. Sender data encryption
In addition, TargetedMessageSenderAuthData is encrypted in a similar
way to MLSSenderData as described in section 6.3.2 in [mls-protocol].
The TargetedMessageSenderAuthData.sender_leaf_index field is the leaf
index of the sender. The
TargetedMessageSenderAuthData.authentication_scheme field is the
authentication scheme used to authenticate the sender. The
TargetedMessageSenderAuthData.signature field is the signature of the
TargetedMessageTBS structure. The
TargetedMessageSenderAuthData.kem_output field is the KEM output of
the HPKE encryption.
The key and nonce provided to the AEAD are computed as the KDF of the
first KDF.Nh bytes of the hpke_ciphertext generated in the following
section. If the length of the hpke_ciphertext is less than KDF.Nh,
the whole hpke_ciphertext is used. In pseudocode, the key and nonce
are derived as:
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sender_auth_data_secret
= DeriveExtensionSecret(extension_secret, "targeted message sender auth data")
ciphertext_sample = hpke_ciphertext[0..KDF.Nh-1]
sender_data_key = ExpandWithLabel(sender_auth_data_secret, "key",
ciphertext_sample, AEAD.Nk)
sender_data_nonce = ExpandWithLabel(sender_auth_data_secret, "nonce",
ciphertext_sample, AEAD.Nn)
The Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) for the SenderAuthData
ciphertext is the first three fields of TargetedMessage:
struct {
opaque group_id<V>;
uint64 epoch;
uint32 recipient_leaf_index;
} SenderAuthDataAAD;
3.2.3.2. Padding
The TargetedMessage structure does not include a padding field. It
is the responsibility of the sender to add padding to the message as
used in the next section.
3.2.4. Authentication
For ciphersuites that support it, HPKE mode_auth_psk is used for
authentication. For other ciphersuites, HPKE mode_psk is used along
with a signature. The authentication scheme is indicated by the
authentication_scheme field in TargetedMessageContent. See
Section 3.2.5 for more information.
For the PSK part of the authentication, clients export a dedicated
secret:
targeted_message_psk
= DeriveExtensionSecret(extension_secret, "targeted message psk")
The functions SealAuth and OpenAuth defined in [hpke] are used as
described in Section 2.1.3 with an empty context. Other functions
are defined in [mls-protocol].
3.2.4.1. Authentication with HPKE
The sender MUST set the authentication scheme to
TargetedMessageAuthScheme.HPKEAuthPsk.
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As described in Section 2.1.3 the hpke_context is a
LabeledExtensionContent struct with the following content, where
group_context is the serialized context of the group.
label = "MLS 1.0 ExtensionData"
extension_type = ExtensionType
extension_data = group_context
The sender then computes the following:
(kem_output, hpke_ciphertext) = SealAuthPSK(receiver_node_public_key,
hpke_context,
targeted_message_tbm,
message,
targeted_message_psk,
psk_id,
sender_node_private_key)
The recipient computes the following:
message = OpenAuthPSK(kem_output,
receiver_node_private_key,
hpke_context,
targeted_message_tbm,
hpke_ciphertext,
targeted_message_psk,
psk_id,
sender_node_public_key)
3.2.4.2. Authentication with signatures
The sender MUST set the authentication scheme to
TargetedMessageAuthScheme.SignatureHPKEPsk. The signature is done
using the signature_key of the sender's LeafNode and the
corresponding signature scheme used in the group.
The sender then computes the following with hpke_context defined as
in Section 3.2.4.1:
(kem_output, hpke_ciphertext) = SealPSK(receiver_node_public_key,
hpke_context,
targeted_message_tbm,
message,
targeted_message_psk,
epoch)
The signature is computed as follows, where the extension_type is the
type of this extension (see Section 4).
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signature = SafeSignWithLabel(extension_type, ., "TargetedMessageTBS", targeted_message_tbs)
The recipient computes the following:
message = OpenPSK(kem_output,
receiver_node_private_key,
hpke_context,
targeted_message_tbm,
hpke_ciphertext,
targeted_message_psk,
epoch)
The recipient MUST verify the message authentication:
SafeVerifyWithLabel.verify(extension_type,
sender_leaf_node.signature_key,
"TargetedMessageTBS",
targeted_message_tbs,
signature)
3.2.5. Guidance on authentication schemes
If the group’s ciphersuite does not support HPKE mode_auth_psk,
implementations MUST choose
TargetedMessageAuthScheme.SignatureHPKEPsk.
If the group’s ciphersuite does support HPKE mode_auth_psk,
implementations CAN choose TargetedMessageAuthScheme.HPKEAuthPsk if
better efficiency and/or repudiability is desired. Implementations
SHOULD consult [hpke-security-considerations] beforehand.
3.3. Content Advertisement
3.3.1. Description
This section describes two extensions to MLS. The first allows MLS
clients to advertise their support for specific formats inside MLS
application_data. These are expressed using the extensive IANA Media
Types registry (formerly called MIME Types). The
accepted_media_types LeafNode extension lists the formats a client
supports inside application_data. The second, the
required_media_types GroupContext extension specifies which media
types need to be supported by all members of a particular MLS group.
These allow clients to confirm that all members of a group can
communicate. Note that when the membership of a group changes, or
when the policy of the group changes, it is responsibility of the
committer to insure that the membership and policies are compatible.
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Finally, this document defines a minimal framing format so MLS
clients can signal which media type is being sent when multiple
formats are permitted in the same group. As clients are upgraded to
support new formats they can use these extensions to detect when all
members support a new or more efficient encoding, or select the
relevant format or formats to send.
Note that the usage of IANA media types in general does not imply the
usage of MIME Headers [RFC2045] for framing. Vendor-specific media
subtypes starting with vnd. can be registered with IANA without
standards action as described in [RFC6838]. Implementations which
wish to send multiple formats in a single application message, may be
interested in the multipart/alternative media type defined in
[RFC2046] or may use or define another type with similar semantics
(for example using TLS Presentation Language syntax [RFC8446]).
3.3.2. Syntax
MediaType is a TLS encoding of a single IANA media type (including
top-level type and subtype) and any of its parameters. Even if the
parameter_value would have required formatting as a quoted-string in
a text encoding, only the contents inside the quoted-string are
included in parameter_value. MediaTypeList is an ordered list of
MediaType objects.
struct {
opaque parameter_name<V>;
/* Note: parameter_value never includes the quotation marks of an
* RFC 2045 quoted-string */
opaque parameter_value<V>;
} Parameter;
struct {
/* media_type is an IANA top-level media type, a "/" character,
* and the IANA media subtype */
opaque media_type<V>;
/* a list of zero or more parameters defined for the subtype */
Parameter parameters<V>;
} MediaType;
struct {
MediaType media_types<V>;
} MediaTypeList;
MediaTypeList accepted_media_types;
MediaTypeList required_media_types;
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Example IANA media types with optional parameters:
image/png
text/plain ;charset="UTF-8"
application/json
application/vnd.example.msgbus+cbor
For the example media type for text/plain, the media_type field would
be text/plain, parameters would contain a single Parameter with a
parameter_name of charset and a parameter_value of UTF-8.
3.3.3. Expected Behavior
An MLS client which implements this section SHOULD include the
accepted_media_types extension in its LeafNodes, listing all the
media types it can receive. As usual, the client also includes
accepted_media_types in its capabilities field in its LeafNodes
(including LeafNodes inside its KeyPackages).
When creating a new MLS group for an application using this
specification, the group MAY include a required_media_type extension
in the GroupContext Extensions. As usual, the client also includes
required_media_types in its capabilities field in its LeafNodes
(including LeafNodes inside its KeyPackages). When used in a group,
the client MUST include the required_media_types and
accepted_media_types extensions in the list of extensions in
RequiredCapabilities.
MLS clients SHOULD NOT add an MLS client to an MLS group with
required_media_types unless the MLS client advertises it can support
all of the required MediaTypes. As an exception, a client could be
preconfigured to know that certain clients support the requried
types. Likewise, an MLS client is already forbidden from issuing or
committing a GroupContextExtensions Proposal which introduces
required extensions which are not supported by all members in the
resulting epoch.
3.3.4. Framing of application_data
When an MLS group contains the required_media_types GroupContext
extension, the application_data sent in that group is interpreted as
ApplicationFraming as defined below:
struct {
MediaType media_type;
opaque<V> application_content;
} ApplicationFraming;
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The media_type MAY be zero length, in which case, the media type of
the application_content is interpreted as the first MediaType
specified in required_media_types.
3.4. SelfRemove Proposal
The design of the MLS protocol prevents a member of an MLS group from
removing itself immediately from the group. (To cause an immediate
change in the group, a member must send a Commit message. However
the sender of a Commit message knows the keying material of the new
epoch and therefore needs to be part of the group.) Instead a member
wishing to remove itself can send a Remove Proposal and wait for
another member to Commit its Proposal.
Unfortunately, MLS clients that join via an External Commit ignore
pending, but otherwise valid, Remove Proposals. The member trying to
remove itself has to monitor the group and send a new Remove Proposal
in every new epoch until the member is removed. In a group with a
burst of external joiners, a member connected over a high-latency
link (or one that is merely unlucky) might have to wait several
epochs to remove itself. A real-world situation in which this
happens is a member trying to remove itself from a conference call as
several dozen new participants are trying to join (often on the
hour).
This section describes a new SelfRemove Proposal extension type. It
is designed to be included in External Commits.
3.4.1. Extension Description
This document specifies a new MLS Proposal type called SelfRemove.
Its syntax is described using the TLS Presentation Language
[@!RFC8446] below (its content is an empty struct). It is allowed in
External Commits and requires an UpdatePath. SelfRemove proposals
are only allowed in a Commit by reference. SelfRemove cannot be sent
as an external proposal.
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struct {} SelfRemove;
struct {
ProposalType msg_type;
select (Proposal.msg_type) {
case add: Add;
case update: Update;
case remove: Remove;
case psk: PreSharedKey;
case reinit: ReInit;
case external_init: ExternalInit;
case group_context_extensions: GroupContextExtensions;
case self_remove: SelfRemove;
};
} Proposal;
The description of behavior below only applies if all the members of
a group support this extension in their capabilities; such a group is
a "self-remove-capable group".
An MLS client which supports this extension can send a SelfRemove
Proposal whenever it would like to remove itself from a self-remove-
capable group. Because the point of a SelfRemove Proposal is to be
available to external joiners (which are not yet members), these
proposals MUST be sent in an MLS PublicMessage.
Whenever a member receives a SelfRemove Proposal, it includes it
along with any other pending Propsals when sending a Commit. It
already MUST send a Commit of pending Proposals before sending new
application messages.
When a member receives a Commit referencing one or more SelfRemove
Proposals, it treats the proposal like a Remove Proposal, except the
leaf node to remove is determined by looking in the Sender leaf_index
of the original Proposal. The member is able to verify that the
Sender was a member.
Whenever a new joiner is about to join a self-remove-capable group
with an External Commit, the new joiner MUST fetch any pending
SelfRemove Proposals along with the GroupInfo object, and include the
SelfRemove Proposals in its External Commit by reference. (An
ExternalCommit can contain zero or more SelfRemove proposals). The
new joiner MUST validate the SelfRemove Proposal before including it
by reference, except that it skips the validation of the
membership_tag because a non-member cannot verify membership.
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During validation, SelfRemove proposals are processed after Update
proposals and before Remove proposals. If there is a pending
SelfRemove proposal for a specific leaf node and a pending Remove
proposal for the same leaf node, the Remove proposal is invalid. A
client MUST NOT issue more than one SelfRemove proposal per epoch.
The MLS Delivery Service (DS) needs to validate SelfRemove Proposals
it receives (except that it cannot validate the membership_tag). If
the DS provides a GroupInfo object to an external joiner, the DS
SHOULD attach any SelfRemove proposals known to the DS to the
GroupInfo object.
As with Remove proposals, clients need to be able to receive a Commit
message which removes them from the group via a SelfRemove. If the
DS does not forward a Commit to a removed client, it needs to inform
the removed client out-of-band.
3.5. Last resort KeyPackages
Type: KeyPackage extension
3.5.1. Description
Section 10 of [RFC9420] details that clients are required to pre-
publish KeyPackages s.t. other clients can add them to groups
asynchronously. It also states that they should not be re-used:
KeyPackages are intended to be used only once and SHOULD NOT be
reused except in the case of a "last resort" KeyPackage (see
Section 16.8). Clients MAY generate and publish multiple
KeyPackages to support multiple cipher suites.
Section 16.8 of [RFC9420] then introduces the notion of last-resort
KeyPackages as follows:
An application MAY allow for reuse of a "last resort" KeyPackage
in order to prevent denial-of-service attacks.
However, [RFC9420] does not specify how to distinguish regular
KeyPackages from last-resort ones. The last_resort_key_package
KeyPackage extension defined in this section fills this gap and
allows clients to specifically mark KeyPackages as KeyPackages of
last resort that MAY be used more than once in scenarios where all
other KeyPackages have already been used.
The extension allows clients that pre-publish KeyPackages to signal
to the Delivery Service which KeyPackage(s) are meant to be used as
last resort KeyPackages.
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An additional benefit of using an extension rather than communicating
the information out-of-band is that the extension is still present in
Add proposals. Clients processing such Add proposals can
authenticate that a KeyPackage is a last-resort KeyPackage and MAY
make policy decisions based on that information.
3.5.2. Format
The purpose of the extension is simply to mark a given KeyPackage,
which means it carries no additional data.
As a result, a LastResort Extension contains the ExtensionType with
an empty extension_data field.
4. IANA Considerations
This document requests the addition of various new values under the
heading of "Messaging Layer Security". Each registration is
organized under the relevant registry Type.
RFC EDITOR: Please replace XXXX throughout with the RFC number
assigned to this document
4.1. MLS Wire Formats
4.1.1. MLS Extension Message
* Value: 0x0006
* Name: mls_extension_message
* Recommended: Y
* Reference: RFC XXXX
4.2. MLS Extension Types
4.2.1. targeted_messages_capability MLS Extension
The targeted_messages_capability MLS Extension Type is used in the
capabilities field of LeafNodes to indicate the support for the
Targeted Messages Extension. The extension does not carry any
payload.
* Value: 0x0006
* Name: targeted_messages_capability
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* Message(s): LN: This extension may appear in LeafNode objects
* Recommended: Y
* Reference: RFC XXXX
4.2.2. targeted_messages MLS Extension
The targeted_messages MLS Extension Type is used inside GroupContext
objects. It indicates that the group supports the Targeted Messages
Extension.
* Value: 0x0007
* Name: targeted_messages
* Message(s): GC: This extension may appear in GroupContext objects
* Recommended: Y
* Reference: RFC XXXX
4.2.3. accepted_media_types MLS Extension
The accepted_media_types MLS Extension Type is used inside LeafNode
objects. It contains a MediaTypeList representing all the media
types supported by the MLS client referred to by the LeafNode.
* Value: 0x0008
* Name: accepted_media_types
* Message(s): LN: This extension may appear in LeafNode objects
* Recommended: Y
* Reference: RFC XXXX
4.2.4. required_media_types MLS Extension
The required_media_types MLS Extension Type is used inside
GroupContext objects. It contains a MediaTypeList representing the
media types which are mandatory for all MLS members of the group to
support.
* Value: 0x0009
* Name: required_media_types
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* Message(s): GC: This extension may appear in GroupContext objects
* Recommended: Y
* Reference: RFC XXXX
4.2.5. last_resort_key_package MLS Extension
The last_resort_key_package MLS Extension Type is used inside
KeyPackage objects. It marks the KeyPackage for usage in last resort
scenarios and contains no additional data.
* Value: 0x0009
* Name: last_resort_key_package
* Message(s): KP: This extension may appear in KeyPackage objects
* Recommended: Y
* Reference: RFC XXXX
4.3. MLS Proposal Types
4.3.1. Extension Proposal
* Value: 0x0008
* Name: extension_proposal
* Recommended: Y
* Path Required: N
* External Sender: N
* Reference: RFC XXXX
4.3.2. Extension Path Proposal
* Value: 0x0009
* Name: extension_path_proposal
* Recommended: Y
* Path Required: Y
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* External Sender: N
* Reference: RFC XXXX
4.3.3. Extension External Proposal
* Value: 0x000a
* Name: extension_external_proposal
* Recommended: Y
* Path Required: N
* External Sender: Y
* Reference: RFC XXXX
4.3.4. AppAck Proposal
* Value: 0x000b
* Name: app_ack
* Recommended: Y
* Path Required: Y
* Reference: RFC XXXX
4.3.5. SelfRemove Proposal
The self_remove MLS Proposal Type is used for a member to remove
itself from a group more efficiently than using a remove proposal
type, as the self_remove type is permitted in External Commits.
* Value: 0x000c
* Name: self_remove
* Recommended: Y
* External: N
* Path Required: Y
4.4. MLS Credential Types
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4.4.1. Extension Credential
* Value: 0x0000
* Name: extension_credential
* Recommended: Y
* Reference: RFC XXXX
4.5. MLS Signature Labels
4.5.1. Labeled Extension Content
* Label: "LabeledExtensionContent"
* Recommended: Y
* Reference: RFC XXXX
5. Security considerations
5.1. AppAck
TBC
5.2. Targeted Messages
In addition to the sender authentication, Targeted Messages are
authenticated by using a preshared key (PSK) between the sender and
the recipient. The PSK is exported from the group key schedule using
the label "targeted message psk". This ensures that the PSK is only
valid for a specific group and epoch, and the Forward Secrecy and
Post-Compromise Security guarantees of the group key schedule apply
to the targeted messages as well. The PSK also ensures that an
attacker needs access to the private group state in addition to the
HPKE/signature's private keys. This improves confidentiality
guarantees against passive attackers and authentication guarantees
against active attackers.
5.3. Content Advertisement
Use of the accepted_media_types and rejected_media_types extensions
could leak some private information visible in KeyPackages and inside
an MLS group. They could be used to infer a specific implementation,
platform, or even version. Clients should consider carefully the
privacy implications in their environment of making a list of
acceptable media types available.
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5.4. SelfRemove
An external recipient of a SelfRemove Proposal cannot verify the
membership_tag. However, an external joiner also has no way to
completely validate a GroupInfo object that it receives. An insider
can prevent an External Join by providing either an invalid GroupInfo
object or an invalid SelfRemove Proposal. The security properties of
external joins does not change with the addition of this proposal
type.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[RFC9180] Barnes, R., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. Wood, "Hybrid
Public Key Encryption", RFC 9180, DOI 10.17487/RFC9180,
February 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9180>.
[RFC9420] Barnes, R., Beurdouche, B., Robert, R., Millican, J.,
Omara, E., and K. Cohn-Gordon, "The Messaging Layer
Security (MLS) Protocol", RFC 9420, DOI 10.17487/RFC9420,
July 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9420>.
6.2. Informative References
[hpke] "Hybrid Public Key Encryption", n.d., <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/rfc9180.html](https://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/rfc9180.html>.
[hpke-security-considerations]
"HPKE Security Considerations", n.d., <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/rfc/rfc9180.html#name-key-compromise-
impersonatio](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/
rfc9180.html#name-key-compromise-impersonatio>.
[mls-protocol]
"The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) Protocol", n.d.,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-mls-
protocol/](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-
mls-protocol/>.
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[RFC2045] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message
Bodies", RFC 2045, DOI 10.17487/RFC2045, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2045>.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2046>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.
Contributors
Joel Alwen
Amazon
Email: alwenjo@amazon.com
Konrad Kohbrok
Phoenix R&D
Email: konrad.kohbrok@datashrine.de
Rohan Mahy
Wire
Email: rohan@wire.com
Marta Mularczyk
Amazon
Email: mulmarta@amazon.com
Author's Address
Raphael Robert
Phoenix R&D
Email: ietf@raphaelrobert.com
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