Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp
draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp
Web Authorization Protocol K. Meyer zu Selhausen
Internet-Draft Hackmanit
Intended status: Standards Track D. Fett
Expires: 15 July 2022 yes.com
11 January 2022
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Issuer Identification
draft-ietf-oauth-iss-auth-resp-05
Abstract
This document specifies a new parameter "iss" that is used to
explicitly include the issuer identifier of the authorization server
in the authorization response of an OAuth authorization flow. The
"iss" parameter serves as an effective countermeasure to "mix-up
attacks".
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Response Parameter "iss" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Example Authorization Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Example Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Providing the Issuer Identifier "iss" . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.4. Validation of the Issuer Identifier "iss" . . . . . . . . 5
3. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. OAuth Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749] allows clients to
interact with multiple independent authorization servers under the
control of separate entities. Some OAuth grant types utilize the
resource owner's user-agent to deliver the authorization server's
response to the OAuth client. One example of this pattern is the
authorization response of the authorization code grant.
The authorization response as specified in Section 4.1.2 of [RFC6749]
does not contain any information about the identity of the
authorization server which issued the response. Therefore, clients
receiving a response from the resource owner's user-agent cannot be
sure who initially issued the response and the secrets contained
therein. The lack of certainty about the origin of the response
enables a class of attacks called "mix-up attacks".
Mix-up attacks are a potential threat to all OAuth clients that
interact with multiple authorization servers. When at least one of
these authorization servers is under an attacker's control, the
attacker can launch a mix-up attack to acquire authorization codes or
access tokens issued by any one of the other authorization servers.
There are multiple ways in which an attacker can gain control over an
authorization server supported by the client: For instance, an
authorization server could become compromised, or the attacker could
register their own authorization server, for example, using dynamic
client registration ([RFC7591]).
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OAuth clients that interact with only one authorization server are
not vulnerable to mix-up attacks. However, when such clients decide
to add support for a second authorization server in the future they
become vulnerable and need to apply countermeasures to mix-up
attacks.
Mix-up attacks aim to steal an authorization code or access token by
tricking the client into sending the authorization code or access
token to the attacker instead of the honest authorization or resource
server. This marks a severe threat to the confidentiality and
integrity of resources whose access is managed with OAuth. A
detailed description and different variants of the mix-up attack
class can be found in Section 4.4 of the OAuth Security Best Current
Practice [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as in the original
research first highlighting this attack class, "On the security of
modern Single Sign-On Protocols: Second-Order Vulnerabilities in
OpenID Connect" [arXiv.1508.04324] and "A Comprehensive Formal
Security Analysis of OAuth 2.0" [arXiv.1601.01229].
This document defines a new parameter in the authorization response
called "iss". The "iss" parameter allows the authorization server to
include its identity in the authorization response explicitly. The
client can compare the value of the "iss" parameter to the issuer
identifier of the authorization server (e.g., retrieved from its
metadata) it believes it is interacting with. The "iss" parameter
gives the client certainty about the authorization server's identity
and enables it to send credentials such as authorization codes and
access tokens only to the intended recipients.
The effectiveness of the "iss" parameter against mix-up attacks was
analyzed and formally proven in "A Comprehensive Formal Security
Analysis of OAuth 2.0" [arXiv.1601.01229].
1.1. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This specification uses the terms "access token", "authorization
code", "authorization code grant", "authorization server", "resource
server", "authorization response", "grant type", and "client" defined
by the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749] and the term
"issuer identifier" defined by OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server
Metadata [RFC8414].
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2. Response Parameter "iss"
In authorization responses to the client, including error responses,
an authorization server supporting this specification MUST indicate
its identity by including the "iss" parameter in the response.
The "iss" parameter value is the issuer identifier of the
authorization server which created the authorization response, as
defined in [RFC8414]. Its value MUST be a URL that uses the "https"
scheme without any query or fragment components.
2.1. Example Authorization Response
The following example shows an authorization response from the
authorization server whose issuer identifier is
"https://honest.as.example" (extra line breaks and indentation are
for display purposes only):
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example/cb?
code=x1848ZT64p4IirMPT0R-X3141MFPTuBX-VFL_cvaplMH58
&state=ZWVlNDBlYzA1NjdkMDNhYjg3ZjUxZjAyNGQzMTM2NzI
&iss=https%3A%2F%2Fhonest.as.example
2.2. Example Error Response
The following example shows an error response from the same
authorization server (extra line breaks and indentation are for
display purposes only):
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example/cb?
error=access_denied
&state=N2JjNGJhY2JiZjRhYzA3MGJkMzNmMDE5OWJhZmJhZjA
&iss=https%3A%2F%2Fhonest.as.example
2.3. Providing the Issuer Identifier "iss"
Authorization servers supporting this specification MUST provide
their issuer identifier to enable clients to validate the "iss"
parameter effectively.
For authorization servers publishing metadata according to [RFC8414],
the following rules apply:
* The issuer identifier included in the server's metadata value
"issuer" MUST be identical to the "iss" parameter's value.
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* The server MUST indicate its support for the "iss" parameter by
setting the metadata parameter
"authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported", defined in
Section 3, to "true".
Authorization servers MAY additionally provide the issuer identifier
to clients by any other mechanism which is outside of the scope of
this specification.
2.4. Validation of the Issuer Identifier "iss"
Clients that support this specification MUST extract the value of the
"iss" parameter from authorization responses they receive if the
parameter is present. Clients MUST then decode the value from its
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded" form according to [RFC6749],
Appendix B, and compare the result to the issuer identifier of the
authorization server where the authorization request was sent to.
This comparison MUST use simple string comparison as defined in
Section 6.2.1 of [RFC3986]. If the value does not match the expected
issuer identifier, clients MUST reject the authorization response and
MUST NOT proceed with the authorization grant. For error responses,
clients MUST NOT assume that the error originates from the intended
authorization server.
More precisely, clients that interact with authorization servers
supporting OAuth metadata [RFC8414] MUST compare the "iss" parameter
value to the "issuer" value in the server's metadata document. If
OAuth metadata is not used, clients MUST use deployment-specific
ways, for example a static configuration, to decide if the returned
"iss" value is the expected value in the current flow (see also
Section 4).
If clients interact with both authorization servers supporting this
specification and authorization servers not supporting this
specification, clients MUST retain state about whether each
authorization server supports the "iss" parameter. Clients MUST
reject authorization responses without the "iss" parameter from
authorization servers which do support the parameter according to the
client's configuration. Clients SHOULD discard authorization
responses with the "iss" parameter from authorization servers which
do not indicate their support for the parameter. However, there
might be legitimate authorization servers that provide the "iss"
parameter without indicating their support in their metadata. Local
policy or configuration can determine whether to accept such
responses and specific guidance is out of scope for this
specification.
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In general, clients that support this specification MAY accept
authorization responses that do not contain the "iss" parameter or
reject them and exclusively support authorization servers which
provide the "iss" parameter in the authorization response. Local
policy or configuration can determine when to accept such responses
and specific guidance is out of scope for this specification.
In OpenID Connect [OIDC.Core] flows where an ID Token is returned
from the authorization endpoint, the value in the "iss" parameter
MUST always be identical to the "iss" claim in the ID Token.
Section 4.1.2 of [RFC6749] already mandates that clients that do not
support this specification MUST ignore the unrecognized "iss"
parameter.
Note: The "JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0
(JARM)" [JARM] defines a mechanism that conveys all authorization
response parameters in a JWT. This JWT contains an "iss" claim that
provides the same protection if it is validated as described in
Section 2.4. Therefore, an additional "iss" parameter outside the
JWT is not necessary when JARM is used.
3. Authorization Server Metadata
The following parameter for the authorization server metadata
[RFC8414] is introduced to signal the authorization server's support
for this specification:
"authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported" Boolean parameter
indicating whether the authorization server provides the "iss"
parameter in the authorization response as defined in Section 2.
If omitted, the default value is false.
4. Security Considerations
Clients MUST validate the "iss" parameter precisely as described in
Section 2.4 and MUST NOT allow multiple authorization servers to use
the same issuer identifier. In particular, when authorization server
details can be manually configured in the client, the client MUST
ensure that the accepted "iss" values are unique for each
authorization server.
The "iss" parameter enables a client to decide if an authorization
server "expects" to be used in an OAuth flow together with a certain
token endpoint and potentially other endpoints, like the userinfo
endpoint ([OIDC.Core]). When OAuth metadata is used, the "iss"
parameter identifies the issuer and therefore the respective OAuth
metadata document which points to the other endpoints. When OAuth
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metadata is not used, the client can use, for example, a statically
configured expected "iss" value for each configured authorization
server.
The issuer identifier contained in the authorization response is not
cryptographically protected against tampering. In general,
mechanisms such as JWTs (as specified in JARM [JARM]) could be used
to protect the integrity of the authorization response. However, in
mix-up attacks, the client generally receives the authorization
response from an uncompromised authorization server. If an attacker
can tamper this authorization response before it is received by the
client, the attacker would also have direct access to the
authorization code. The attacker does not need to execute a mix-up
attack to steal the authorization code. Therefore, integrity
protection for the authorization response is not necessary to defend
against mix-up attacks.
There are also alternative countermeasures to mix-up attacks. When
an authorization response already includes an authorization server's
issuer identifier by other means, and this identifier is checked as
laid out in Section 2.4, the use and verification of the "iss"
parameter is not necessary and MAY be omitted. This is the case when
OpenID Connect response types that return an ID token from the
authorization endpoint (e.g., "response_type=code id_token") or JARM
response mode are used, for example. However, if a client receives
an authorization response that contains multiple issuer identifiers,
the client MUST reject the response if these issuer identifiers do
not match. The details of alternative countermeasures are outside of
the scope of this specification.
Mix-up attacks are only relevant to clients that interact with
multiple authorization servers. However, clients interacting with
only one authorization server might add support for a second
authorization server in the future. By supporting multiple
authorization servers they become vulnerable to mix-up attacks and
need to apply countermeasures.
5. IANA Considerations
5.1. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata
This specification adds the following values to the IANA "OAuth
Authorization Server Metadata" registry of [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
established by [RFC8414].
Metadata Name: "authorization_response_iss_parameter_supported"
Metadata Description: Boolean value indicating whether the
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authorization server provides the "iss" parameter in the
authorization response.
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this document ]]
5.2. OAuth Parameters Registration
This specification updates the "iss" entry in the IANA "OAuth
Parameters" registry of [IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by
[RFC6749].
Parameter name: "iss"
Parameter usage location: authorization request, authorization
response
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this document ]],
[RFC9101], and Section 4.1.1 of [RFC7519].
6. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
7. Informative References
[RFC9101] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "The OAuth 2.0
Authorization Framework: JWT-Secured Authorization Request
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(JAR)", RFC 9101, DOI 10.17487/RFC9101, August 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9101>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
"OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-security-
topics-19, 16 December 2021, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics-19>.
[arXiv.1601.01229]
Fett, D., Kuesters, R., and G. Schmitz, "A Comprehensive
Formal Security Analysis of OAuth 2.0", 6 January 2016,
<https://arxiv.org/abs/1601.01229>.
[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.
[OIDC.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
errata set 1", 8 November 2014,
<https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[JARM] Lodderstedt, T. and B. Campbell, "Financial-grade API: JWT
Secured Authorization Response Mode for OAuth 2.0 (JARM)",
17 October 2018,
<https://openid.net/specs/openid-financial-api-jarm.html>.
[arXiv.1508.04324]
Mainka, C., Mladenov, V., and J. Schwenk, "On the security
of modern Single Sign-On Protocols: Second-Order
Vulnerabilities in OpenID Connect", 18 August 2015,
<https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.04324>.
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Appendix A. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Brian Campbell, Roman Danyliw, Vladimir
Dzhuvinov, Joseph Heenan, Takahiko Kawasaki, Torsten Lodderstedt,
Christian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov, Warren Parad, Aaron Parecki,
and Rifaat Shekh-Yusef for their valuable feedback on this document.
Appendix B. Document History
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]
-05 [[ Working Group Draft ]]
* Changed reference to OAuth Security Best Current Practices from normative to informative
-04 [[ Working Group Draft ]]
* Incorporated feedback from Lars Eggert
* Incorporated feedback from Francesca Palombini (IANA registrations)
* Incorporated feedback from Benjamin Kaduk
-03 [[ Working Group Draft ]]
* Incorporated feedback from AD review
* Incorporated feedback from artart and secdir reviews
-02 [[ Working Group Draft ]]
* Incorporated feedback from shepherd review
* Changed SHOULD to MUST (clients MUST store which AS support `iss` parameter)
* Added note for clients receiving unexpected `iss` parameter
* Editorial changes
-01 [[ Working Group Draft ]]
* Incorporated WG feedback
* Changed title of the draft to make it shorter
* Clarified mix-up attacks in introduction
* Improved note on JARM in validation section
-00 [[ Working Group Draft ]]
* Working group draft
-02
* Incorporated WG feedback
* Clarifications for unique issuer identifier
* Clarifications when multiple issuer identifier could be present
* Added note that iss parameter MUST NOT be used with JARM
* Added note on error responses and example for error response
* Editorial changes
-01
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* Incorporated first WG feedback
* Clarifications for use with OIDC
* Added note that clients supporting just one AS are not vulnerable
* Renamed metadata parameter
* Various editorial changes
-00
* initial draft
Authors' Addresses
Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen
Hackmanit
Email: karsten.meyerzuselhausen@hackmanit.de
Daniel Fett
yes.com
Email: mail@danielfett.de
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