Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-oauth-rar
draft-ietf-oauth-rar
Web Authorization Protocol T. Lodderstedt
Internet-Draft yes.com
Intended status: Standards Track J. Richer
Expires: 3 August 2023 Bespoke Engineering
B. Campbell
Ping Identity
30 January 2023
OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests
draft-ietf-oauth-rar-23
Abstract
This document specifies a new parameter authorization_details that is
used to carry fine-grained authorization data in OAuth messages.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 August 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Request parameter "authorization_details" . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Authorization Details Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Common data fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Authorization Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1. Relationship to "scope" parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2. Relationship to "resource" parameter . . . . . . . . . . 14
4. Authorization Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Authorization Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Token Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. Comparing authorization details . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7. Token Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.1. Enriched authorization details in Token Response . . . . 19
8. Token Error Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
9. Resource Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.1. JWT-based Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
9.2. Token Introspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10. Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
11. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
11.1. Using authorization details in a certain deployment . . 27
11.2. Minimal implementation support . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
11.3. Use of Machine-readable Type Schemas . . . . . . . . . . 28
11.4. Large requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
12. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
13. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
14. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
15. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
15.1. OAuth Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
15.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 31
15.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration . . . . 32
15.4. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration . . . . 32
15.5. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata
Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
15.6. OAuth Extensions Error Registration . . . . . . . . . . 32
16. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
17. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix A. Additional Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.1. OpenID Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A.2. Remote Electronic Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
A.3. Access to Tax Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A.4. eHealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
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1. Introduction
The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework [RFC6749] defines the scope
parameter that allows OAuth clients to specify the requested scope,
i.e., the limited capability, of an access token. This mechanism is
sufficient to implement static scenarios and coarse-grained
authorization requests, such as "give me read access to the resource
owner's profile" but it is not sufficient to specify fine-grained
authorization requirements, such as "please let me transfer an amount
of 45 Euros to Merchant A" or "please give me read access to
directory A and write access to file X".
This specification introduces a new parameter authorization_details
that allows clients to specify their fine-grained authorization
requirements using the expressiveness of JSON [RFC8259] data
structures.
For example, an authorization request for a credit transfer
(designated as "payment initiation" in several open banking
initiatives) can be represented using a JSON object like this:
{
"type": "payment_initiation",
"locations": [
"https://example.com/payments"
],
"instructedAmount": {
"currency": "EUR",
"amount": "123.50"
},
"creditorName": "Merchant A",
"creditorAccount": {
"bic":"ABCIDEFFXXX",
"iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
},
"remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
}
Figure 1: Example authorization request for a credit transfer.
This object contains detailed information about the intended payment,
such as amount, currency, and creditor, that are required to inform
the user and obtain their consent. The authorization server (AS) and
the respective resource server (RS) (providing the payment initiation
API) will together enforce this consent.
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For a comprehensive discussion of the challenges arising from new use
cases in the open banking and electronic signing spaces see
[transaction-authorization].
In addition to facilitating custom authorization requests, this
specification also introduces a set of common data type fields for
use across different APIs.
1.1. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This specification uses the terms "access token", "refresh token",
"authorization server", "resource server", "authorization endpoint",
"authorization request", "authorization response", "token endpoint",
"grant type", "access token request", "access token response", and
"client" defined by The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework [RFC6749].
2. Request parameter "authorization_details"
The request parameter authorization_details contains, in JSON
notation, an array of objects. Each JSON object contains the data to
specify the authorization requirements for a certain type of
resource. The type of resource or access requirement is determined
by the type field, which is defined as follows:
type: An identifier for the authorization details type as a string.
The value of the type field determines the allowable contents of
the object which contains it and is unique for the described API
in the context of the AS. This field is REQUIRED.
An authorization_details array MAY contain multiple entries of the
same type.
This example shows an authorization_details of type
payment_initiation using the example data shown above:
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[
{
"type": "payment_initiation",
"actions": [
"initiate",
"status",
"cancel"
],
"locations": [
"https://example.com/payments"
],
"instructedAmount": {
"currency": "EUR",
"amount": "123.50"
},
"creditorName": "Merchant A",
"creditorAccount": {
"iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
},
"remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
}
]
Figure 2: Example authorization_details for a credit transfer.
This example shows a combined request asking for access to account
information and permission to initiate a payment:
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[
{
"type": "account_information",
"actions": [
"list_accounts",
"read_balances",
"read_transactions"
],
"locations": [
"https://example.com/accounts"
]
},
{
"type": "payment_initiation",
"actions": [
"initiate",
"status",
"cancel"
],
"locations": [
"https://example.com/payments"
],
"instructedAmount": {
"currency": "EUR",
"amount": "123.50"
},
"creditorName": "Merchant A",
"creditorAccount": {
"iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
},
"remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
}
]
Figure 3: Example authorization_details for a combined request.
The JSON objects with type fields of account_information and
payment_initiation represent the different authorization_details to
be used by the AS to ask for consent.
Note: The AS will make this data subsequently available to the
respective resource servers (see Section 9).
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2.1. Authorization Details Types
Interpretation of the value of the type parameter, and the object
fields that the type parameter allows, is under the control of the
AS. However, the value of the type parameter is also generally
documented and intended to be used by developers, it is RECOMMENDED
that API designers choose type values that are easily copied without
ambiguity. For example, some glyphs have multiple Unicode code
points for the same visual character, and a developer could
potentially type a different character than what the AS has defined.
Possible means of reducing potential confusion are limiting the value
to ASCII [RFC0020] characters, providing a machine-readable listing
of data type values, or instructing developers to copy and paste
directly from the documentation.
If an application or API is expected to be deployed across different
servers, such as the case in an open standard, the API designer is
RECOMMENDED to use a collision-resistant namespace under their
control, such as a URI that the API designer controls.
The following example shows how an implementation could utilize the
namespace https://scheme.example.org/ to ensure collision-resistant
type values.
{
"type": "https://scheme.example.org/files",
"locations": [
"https://example.com/files"
],
"permissions": [
{
"path": "/myfiles/A",
"access": [
"read"
]
},
{
"path": "/myfiles/A/X",
"access": [
"read",
"write"
]
}
]
}
Figure 4: Example for authorization_details with a URL as type
identifier.
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2.2. Common data fields
This specification defines a set of common data fields that are
designed to be usable across different types of APIs. This
specification does not require the use of these common fields by an
API definition, but instead provides them as reusable generic
components for API designers to make use of. The allowable values of
all fields are determined by the API being protected, as defined by a
particular "type" value.
locations: An array of strings representing the location of the
resource or resource server. These strings are typically URIs
identifying the location of the RS. This field can allow a client
to specify a particular RS, as discussed in Section 12.
actions: An array of strings representing the kinds of actions to be
taken at the resource.
datatypes: An array of strings representing the kinds of data being
requested from the resource.
identifier: A string identifier indicating a specific resource
available at the API.
privileges: An array of strings representing the types or levels of
privilege being requested at the resource.
When different common data fields are used in combination, the
permissions the client requests are the product of all the values.
The object represents a request for all action values listed within
the object to be used at all locations values listed within the
object for all datatype values listed within the object. In the
following example, the client is requesting read and write access to
both the contacts and photos belonging to customers in a
customer_information API. If this request is granted, the client
would assume it would be able to use any combination of rights
defined by the API, such as reading the photos and writing the
contacts.
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[
{
"type": "customer_information",
"locations": [
"https://example.com/customers"
],
"actions": [
"read",
"write"
],
"datatypes": [
"contacts",
"photos"
]
}
]
Figure 5: Example for authorization_details with common data fields.
If the client wishes to have finer control over its access, it can
send multiple objects. In this example, the client is asking for
read access to the contacts and write access to the photos in the
same API endpoint. If this request is granted, the client would not
be able to write to the contacts.
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[
{
"type": "customer_information",
"locations": [
"https://example.com/customers"
],
"actions": [
"read"
],
"datatypes": [
"contacts"
]
},
{
"type": "customer_information",
"locations": [
"https://example.com/customers"
],
"actions": [
"write"
],
"datatypes": [
"photos"
]
}
]
Figure 6: Example for authorization_details with common data
fields in multiple objects.
An API MAY define its own extensions, subject to the type of the
respective authorization object. It is anticipated that API
designers will use a combination of common data fields defined in
this specification as well as fields specific to the API itself. The
following non-normative example shows the use of both common and API-
specific fields as part of two different fictitious API type values.
The first access request includes the actions, locations, and
datatypes fields specified here as well as the API-specific
geolocation field, indicating access to photos taken at the given
coordinates. The second access request includes the actions and
identifier fields specified here as well as the API-specific currency
fields.
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[
{
"type":"photo-api",
"actions":[
"read",
"write"
],
"locations":[
"https://server.example.net/",
"https://resource.local/other"
],
"datatypes":[
"metadata",
"images"
],
"geolocation":[
{
"lat":-32.364,
"lng":153.207
},
{
"lat":-35.364,
"lng":158.207
}
]
},
{
"type":"financial-transaction",
"actions":[
"withdraw"
],
"identifier":"account-14-32-32-3",
"currency":"USD"
}
]
Figure 7: Example for authorization_details using common and
extension data fields.
If this request is approved, the resulting access token's access
rights will be the union of the requested types of access for each of
the two APIs, just as above.
3. Authorization Request
The authorization_details authorization request parameter can be used
to specify authorization requirements in all places where the scope
parameter is used for the same purpose, examples include:
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* Authorization requests as specified in [RFC6749],
* Device Authorization Request as specified in [RFC8628],
* Backchannel Authentication Requests as defined in [OpenID.CIBA].
In case of authorization requests as defined in [RFC6749],
implementors MAY consider using pushed authorization requests
[RFC9126] to improve the security, privacy, and reliability of the
flow. See Section 12, Section 13, and Section 11.4 for details.
Parameter encoding is determined by the respective context. In the
context of an authorization request according to [RFC6749], the
parameter is encoded using the application/x-www-form-urlencoded
format of the serialized JSON as shown in the following using the
example from Section 2 (line breaks for display purposes only):
GET /authorize?response_type=code
&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&state=af0ifjsldkj
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&code_challenge_method=S256
&code_challenge=K2-ltc83acc4h0c9w6ESC_rEMTJ3bwc-uCHaoeK1t8U
&authorization_details=%5B%7B%22type%22%3A%22account%5Finfo
rmation%22%2C%22actions%22%3A%5B%22list%5Faccounts%22%2C%22
read%5Fbalances%22%2C%22read%5Ftransactions%22%5D%2C%22loca
tions%22%3A%5B%22https%3A%2F%2Fexample%2Ecom%2Faccounts%22%
5D%7D%2C%7B%22type%22%3A%22payment%5Finitiation%22%2C%22act
ions%22%3A%5B%22initiate%22%2C%22status%22%2C%22cancel%22%5
D%2C%22locations%22%3A%5B%22https%3A%2F%2Fexample%2Ecom%2Fp
ayments%22%5D%2C%22instructedAmount%22%3A%7B%22currency%22%
3A%22EUR%22%2C%22amount%22%3A%22123%2E50%22%7D%2C%22credito
rName%22%3A%22Merchant%20A%22%2C%22creditorAccount%22%3A%7B
%22iban%22%3A%22DE02100100109307118603%22%7D%2C%22remittanc
eInformationUnstructured%22%3A%22Ref%20Number%20Merchant%22
%7D%5D HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Figure 8: Example authorization request with authorization_details.
Based on the data provided in the authorization_details parameter the
AS will ask the user for consent to the requested access permissions.
Note: the user may also grant a subset of the requested authorization
details.
In this example, the client wants to get access to account
information and initiate a payment:
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[
{
"type": "account_information",
"actions": [
"list_accounts",
"read_balances",
"read_transactions"
],
"locations": [
"https://example.com/accounts"
]
},
{
"type": "payment_initiation",
"actions": [
"initiate",
"status",
"cancel"
],
"locations": [
"https://example.com/payments"
],
"instructedAmount": {
"currency": "EUR",
"amount": "123.50"
},
"creditorName": "Merchant A",
"creditorAccount": {
"iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
},
"remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
}
]
Figure 9: URL decoded authorization_details.
3.1. Relationship to "scope" parameter
authorization_details and scope can be used in the same authorization
request for carrying independent authorization requirements.
Combined use of authorization_details and scope is supported by this
specification in part to allow existing OAuth-based applications to
incrementally migrate towards using authorization_details
exclusively. It is RECOMMENDED that a given API use only one form of
requirement specification.
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The AS MUST process both sets of requirements in combination with
each other for the given authorization request. The details of how
the AS combines these parameters are specific to the APIs being
protected and outside the scope of this specification.
When gathering user consent, the AS MUST present the merged set of
requirements represented by the authorization request.
If the resource owner grants the client the requested access, the AS
will issue tokens to the client that are associated with the
respective authorization_details (and scope values, if applicable).
3.2. Relationship to "resource" parameter
The resource authorization request parameter as defined in [RFC8707]
can be used to further determine the resources where the requested
scope can be applied. The resource parameter does not have any
impact on the way the AS processes the authorization_details
authorization request parameter.
4. Authorization Response
This specification does not define extensions to the authorization
response.
5. Authorization Error Response
The AS MUST refuse to process any unknown authorization details type
or authorization details not conforming to the respective type
definition. The AS MUST abort processing and respond with an error
invalid_authorization_details to the client if any of the following
are true of the objects in authorization_details structure:
* Contains an unknown authorization details type value,
* An object of known type but containing unknown fields,
* Contains fields of the wrong type for the authorization details
type,
* Contains fields with invalid values for the authorization details
type, or
* Missing required fields for the authorization details type.
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6. Token Request
The authorization_details token request parameter can be used to
specify the authorization details a client wants the AS to assign to
an access token. The AS checks whether the underlying grant (in case
of grant types authorization_code, refresh_token, ...) or the
client's policy (in case of grant type client_credential) allows the
issuance of an access token with the requested authorization details.
Otherwise, the AS refuses the request with the error code
invalid_authorization_details (similar to invalid_scope).
6.1. Comparing authorization details
Many actions in the OAuth protocol allow the AS and RS to make
security decisions based on whether the request is asking for "more"
or "less" than a previous, existing request. For example, upon
refreshing a token, the client can ask for a new access token with
"fewer permissions" than had been previously authorized by the
resource owner. The requested access token will convey the reduced
permissions but the resource owner's previous authorization is
unchanged by such requests. Since the semantics of the fields in the
authorization_details will be implementation specific to a given API
or set of APIs, there is no standardized mechanism to compare two
arbitrary authorization detail requests. Authorization servers
should not rely on simple object comparison in most cases, as the
intersection of some fields within a request could have side effects
on the access rights granted, depending on how the API has been
designed and deployed. This is a similar effect to the scope values
used with some APIs.
When comparing a new request to an existing request, authorization
servers can use the same processing techniques as used in granting
the request in the first place to determine if a resource owner needs
to authorize the request. The details of this comparison are
dependent on the definition of the type of authorization request and
outside the scope of this specification, but common patterns can be
applied.
This shall be illustrated using our running example. The example
authorization request in Section 3, if approved by the user, resulted
in the issuance of an authorization code associated with the
privileges to
* list accounts
* access the balance of one or more accounts,
* access the transactions of one or more accounts, and
* to initiate, check the status of, and cancel a payment.
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The client could now request the AS to issue an access token assigned
with the privilege to just access a list of accounts as follows:
[
{
"type": "account_information",
"actions": [
"list_accounts"
],
"locations": [
"https://example.com/accounts"
]
}
]
Figure 10: Example for authorization_details reduced privileges.
The example API is designed such that each field used by the
account_information type contains additive rights, with each value
within the actions and locations arrays specifying a different
element of access. To make a comparison in this instance, the AS
would perform the following steps:
* compare that the authorization code issued in the previous step
contains an authorization details object of type
account_information
* compare whether the approved list of actions contains
list_account, and
* whether the locations value includes only previously-approved
locations.
If all checks succeed, the AS would issue the requested access token
with the reduced set of access.
Note that this comparison is relevant to this specific API type
definition. A different API type definition could have different
processing rules. For example, the value of an action could subsume
the rights associated with another action value. For example, if a
client initially asks for a token with write access, which implies
both read and write access to this API:
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[
{
"type": "example_api",
"actions": [
"write"
]
}
]
Figure 11: Example for authorization_details requesting "write"
access to an API.
Later that same client makes a refresh request for read access:
[
{
"type": "example_api",
"actions": [
"read"
]
}
]
Figure 12: Example for authorization_details requesting "read"
access to an API.
The AS would compare the type value and the action value to determine
that the read access is already covered by the write access
previously granted to the client.
This same API could be designed with a possible value for privileges
of admin, used in this example to denote that the resulting token is
allowed to perform any functions on the resources. If that client is
then granted such admin privileges to the API:
[
{
"type": "example_api",
"privileges": [
"admin"
]
}
]
Figure 13: Example for authorization_details requesting "admin"
access to an API.
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The AS would compare the type value and find the privileges value
subsumes any aspects of read or write access that had been granted to
the client previously. Note that other API definitions can use
privileges such that values do not subsume one another.
The next example shows how the client can use the common data element
locations (see Section 2.2) to request the issuance of an access
token restricted to a certain resource server. In our running
example, the client may ask for all permissions of the approved grant
of type payment_iniation applicable to the resource server residing
at https://example.com/payments as follows:
[
{
"type": "payment_initiation",
"locations": [
"https://example.com/payments"
]
}
]
Figure 14: Example for authorization_details requesting an
audience restricted access token.
7. Token Response
In addition to the token response parameters as defined in [RFC6749],
the authorization server MUST also return the authorization_details
as granted by the resource owner and assigned to the respective
access token.
The authorization details assigned to the access token issued in a
token response are determined by the authorization_details parameter
of the corresponding token request. If the client does not specify
the authorization_details token request parameters, the AS determines
the resulting authorization_details at its discretion.
The AS MAY omit values in the authorization_details to the client.
For our running example, this would look like this:
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"access_token": "2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
"token_type": "example",
"expires_in": 3600,
"refresh_token": "tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
"authorization_details": [
{
"type": "payment_initiation",
"actions": [
"initiate",
"status",
"cancel"
],
"locations": [
"https://example.com/payments"
],
"instructedAmount": {
"currency": "EUR",
"amount": "123.50"
},
"creditorName": "Merchant A",
"creditorAccount": {
"iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
},
"remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
}
]
}
Figure 15: Example token response.
7.1. Enriched authorization details in Token Response
The authorization details attached to the access token MAY differ
from what the client requests. In addition to the user authorizing
less than what the client requested, there are some use cases where
the authorization server enriches the data in an authorization
details object. Whether enrichment is allowed and specifics of how
it works are necessarily part of the definition of the respective
authorization details type.
As one example, a client may ask for access to account information
but leave the decision about the specific accounts it will be able to
access to the user. The user would, during the course of the
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authorization process, select the subset of their accounts that they
want to allow the client to access. As one design option to convey
the selected accounts, the authorization server could add this
information to the respective authorization details object.
In that example, the requested authorization detail parameter might
look like the following. In this example the empty arrays serve as
placeholders for where data will be added during enrichment by the
AS. This example is illustrative only and is not intended to suggest
a preference for designing the specifics of any authorization details
type this way.
"authorization_details": [
{
"type": "account_information",
"access": {
"accounts": [],
"balances": [],
"transactions": []
},
"recurringIndicator":true
}
]
Figure 16: Example for requested authorization_details.
The authorization server then would expand the authorization details
object and add the respective account identifiers.
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
{
"access_token":"2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
"token_type":"example",
"expires_in":3600,
"refresh_token":"tGzv3JokF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
"authorization_details":[
{
"type":"account_information",
"access":{
"accounts":[
{
"iban":"DE2310010010123456789"
},
{
"maskedPan":"123456xxxxxx1234"
}
],
"balances":[
{
"iban":"DE2310010010123456789"
}
],
"transactions":[
{
"iban":"DE2310010010123456789"
},
{
"maskedPan":"123456xxxxxx1234"
}
]
},
"recurringIndicator":true
}
]
}
Figure 17: Example for enriched authorization_details.
For another example, the client is asking for access to a medical
record but does not know the record number at request time. In this
example, the client specifies the type of access it wants but doesn't
specify the location or identifier of that access.
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{
"authorization_details": [
{
"type": "medical_record",
"sens": [ "HIV", "ETH", "MART" ],
"actions": [ "read" ],
"datatypes": [ "Patient", "Observation", "Appointment" ]
}
]}
Figure 18: Example for requested authorization_details.
When the user interacts with the AS, they select which of the medical
records they are responsible for giving to the client. This
information gets returned with the access token.
{
"access_token":"2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
"token_type":"example",
"expires_in":3600,
"refresh_token":"tGzv3JokF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
"authorization_details":[
{
"type": "medical_record",
"sens": [ "HIV", "ETH", "MART" ],
"actions": [ "read" ],
"datatypes": [ "Patient", "Observation", "Appointment" ],
"identifier": "patient-541235",
"locations": [ "https://records.example.com/" ]
}
]
}
Figure 19: Example for enriched authorization_details.
Note: the client needs to be aware upfront of the possibility that a
certain authorization details object can be enriched. It is assumed
that this property is part of the definition of the respective
authorization details type.
8. Token Error Response
The Token Error Response MUST conform to the rules given in
Section 5.
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9. Resource Servers
In order to enable the RS to enforce the authorization details as
approved in the authorization process, the AS MUST make this data
available to the RS. The AS MAY add the authorization_details field
to access tokens in JWT format or to Token Introspection responses.
9.1. JWT-based Access Tokens
If the access token is a JWT [RFC7519], the AS is RECOMMENDED to add
the authorization_details object, filtered to the specific audience,
as a top-level claim.
The AS will typically also add further claims to the JWT the RS
requires for request processing, e.g., user id, roles, and
transaction-specific data. What claims the particular RS requires is
defined by the RS-specific policy with the AS.
The following shows the contents of an example JWT for the payment
initiation example above:
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{
"iss": "https://as.example.com",
"sub": "24400320",
"aud": "a7AfcPcsl2",
"exp": 1311281970,
"acr": "psd2_sca",
"txn": "8b4729cc-32e4-4370-8cf0-5796154d1296",
"authorization_details": [
{
"type": "https://scheme.example.com/payment_initiation",
"actions": [
"initiate",
"status",
"cancel"
],
"locations": [
"https://example.com/payments"
],
"instructedAmount": {
"currency": "EUR",
"amount": "123.50"
},
"creditorName": "Merchant A",
"creditorAccount": {
"iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
},
"remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
}
],
"debtorAccount": {
"iban": "DE40100100103307118608",
"user_role": "owner"
}
}
Figure 20: Example for authorization_details in JWT-based access
token.
In this case, the AS added the following example claims to the JWT-
based access token:
* sub: conveys the user on which behalf the client is asking for
payment initiation
* txn: transaction id used to trace the transaction across the
services of provider example.com
* debtorAccount: API-specific field containing the debtor account.
In the example, this account was not passed in the
authorization_details but selected by the user during the
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authorization process. The field user_role conveys the role the
user has with respect to this particular account. In this case,
they are the owner. This data is used for access control at the
payment API (the RS).
9.2. Token Introspection
Token introspection [RFC7662] provides a means for an RS to query the
AS to determine information about an access token. If the AS
includes authorization detail information for the token in its
response, the information MUST be conveyed with authorization_details
as a top-level member of the introspection response JSON object. The
authorization_details member MUST contain the same structure defined
in Section 2, potentially filtered and extended for the RS making the
introspection request.
Here is an example introspection response for the payment initiation
example:
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{
"active": true,
"sub": "24400320",
"aud": "s6BhdRkqt3",
"exp": 1311281970,
"acr": "psd2_sca",
"txn": "8b4729cc-32e4-4370-8cf0-5796154d1296",
"authorization_details": [
{
"type": "https://scheme.example.com/payment_initiation",
"actions": [
"initiate",
"status",
"cancel"
],
"locations": [
"https://example.com/payments"
],
"instructedAmount": {
"currency": "EUR",
"amount": "123.50"
},
"creditorName": "Merchant123",
"creditorAccount": {
"iban": "DE02100100109307118603"
},
"remittanceInformationUnstructured": "Ref Number Merchant"
}
],
"debtorAccount": {
"iban": "DE40100100103307118608",
"user_role": "owner"
}
}
Figure 21: Example for authorization_details in introspection
response.
10. Metadata
To advertise its support for this feature, the supported list of
authorization details types is included in the AS metadata response
[RFC8414] using the metadata parameter
authorization_details_types_supported, which is a JSON array.
This is illustrated by the following example:
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{
...
"authorization_details_types_supported":[
"payment_initiation",
"account_information"
]
}
Figure 22: Example for server metadata about the supported
authorization details.
Clients MAY indicate the authorization details types they will use
when requesting authorization with the client registration metadata
parameter authorization_details_types, which is a JSON array.
This is illustrated by the following example:
{
...
"authorization_details_types":[
"payment_initiation"
]
}
Figure 23: Example for server metadata about authorization details.
The registration of authorization details types with the AS is out of
scope of this specification.
11. Implementation Considerations
11.1. Using authorization details in a certain deployment
Using authorization details in a certain deployment will require the
following steps:
* Define authorization details types
* Publish authorization details types in the OAuth server metadata
* Determine how authorization details are shown to the user in the
user consent prompt
* (if needed) Enrich authorization details in the user consent
process (e.g. add selected accounts or set expirations)
* (if needed) Determine how authorization details are reflected in
access token content or introspection responses
* Determine how the resource server(s) process(s) the authorization
details or token data derived from authorization details
* (if needed) Entitle clients to use certain authorization details
types
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11.2. Minimal implementation support
General authorization server implementations supporting this
specification should provide the following basic functions:
* Support advertisement of supported authorization details types in
OAuth server metadata
* Accept authorization_details parameter in authorization requests
in conformance with this specification
* Support storage of consented authorization details as part of a
grant
* Implement default behavior for adding authorization details to
access tokens and token introspection responses in order to make
them available to resource servers (similar to scope values).
This should work with any grant type, especially
authorization_code and refresh_token.
Processing and presentation of authorization details will vary
significantly among different authorization details types.
Implementations should therefore support customization of the
respective behavior. In particular, implementations should:
* allow deployments to determine presentation of the authorization
details
* allow deployments to modify requested authorization details in the
user consent process, e.g. adding fields
* allow deployments to merge requested and pre-existing
authorization details
One approach to supporting such customization would be to have a
mechanism allowing the registration of extension modules, each of
them responsible for rendering the respective user consent and any
transformation needed to provide the data needed to the resource
server by way of structured access tokens or token introspection
responses.
11.3. Use of Machine-readable Type Schemas
Implementations might allow deployments to use machine-readable
schema languages for defining authorization details types to
facilitate creating and validating authorization details objects
against such schemas. For example, if an authorization details type
were defined using JSON Schemas [JSON.Schema], the JSON Schema
identifier could be used as type value in the respective
authorization details objects.
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Note however that type values are identifiers understood by the AS
and, to the extent necessary, the client and RS. This specification
makes no assumption that a type value point to a machine-readable
schema format, or that any party in the system (such as the client,
AS, or RS) dereference or process the contents of the type field in
any specific way.
11.4. Large requests
Authorization request URIs containing authorization_details in a
request parameter or a request object can become very long.
Implementers should therefore consider using the request_uri
parameter as defined in [RFC9101] in combination with the pushed
request object mechanism as defined in [RFC9126] to pass
authorization_details in a reliable and secure manner. Here is an
example of such a pushed authorization request that sends the
authorization request data directly to the AS via an HTTPS-protected
connection:
POST /as/par HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0Mzo3RmpmcDBaQnIxS3REUmJuZlZkbUl3
response_type=code&
client_id=s6BhdRkqt3
&state=af0ifjsldkj
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient.example.org%2Fcb
&code_challenge_method=S256
&code_challenge=K2-ltc83acc4h0c9w6ESC_rEMTJ3bwc-uCHaoeK1t8U
&authorization_details=%5B%7B%22type%22%3A%22account_information%22
%2C%22actions%22%3A%5B%22list_accounts%22%2C%22read_balances%22%2C%
22read_transactions%22%5D%2C%22locations%22%3A%5B%22https%3A%2F%2Fe
xample.com%2Faccounts%22%5D%7D%2C%7B%22type%22%3A%22payment_initiat
ion%22%2C%22actions%22%3A%5B%22initiate%22%2C%22status%22%2C%22canc
el%22%5D%2C%22locations%22%3A%5B%22https%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%2Fpaym
ents%22%5D%2C%22instructedAmount%22%3A%7B%22currency%22%3A%22EUR%22
%2C%22amount%22%3A%22123.50%22%7D%2C%22creditorName%22%3A%22Merchan
t123%22%2C%22creditorAccount%22%3A%7B%22iban%22%3A%22DE021001001093
07118603%22%7D%2C%22remittanceInformationUnstructured%22%3A%22Ref%2
0Number%20Merchant%22%7D%5D
Figure 24: Example for large request including authorization_details.
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12. Security Considerations
The authorization_details parameter is sent through the user agent in
case of an OAuth authorization request, which makes them vulnerable
to modifications by the user. If integrity of the
authorization_details is a concern, clients MUST protect
authorization_details against tampering and swapping. This can be
achieved by signing the request using signed request objects as
defined in [RFC9101] or using the request_uri authorization request
parameter as defined in [RFC9101] in conjunction with [RFC9126] to
pass the URI of the request object to the authorization server.
All string comparisons in an authorization_details parameter are to
be done as defined by [RFC8259]. No additional transformation or
normalization is to be done in evaluating equivalence of string
values.
The common data field locations allows a client to specify where it
intends to use a certain authorization, i.e., it is possible to
unambiguously assign permissions to resource servers. In situations
with multiple resource servers, this prevents unintended client
authorizations (e.g. a read scope value potentially applicable for an
email as well as a cloud service) through audience restriction.
The AS MUST properly sanitized and handle the data passed in the
authorization_details in order to prevent injection attacks.
The Security Considerations of [RFC6749], [RFC7662], and [RFC8414]
also apply.
13. Privacy Considerations
It is especially important for implementers to design and use
authorization details in a privacy-preserving manner.
Any sensitive personal data included in authorization_details must be
prevented from leaking, e.g., through referrer headers.
Implementation options include encrypted request objects as defined
in [RFC9101] or transmission of authorization_details via end-to-end
encrypted connections between client and authorization server by
utilizing [RFC9126] and the request_uri authorization request
parameter as defined in [RFC9101]. The latter does not require
application level encryption but it requires another message exchange
between client and AS.
Even if the request data is encrypted, an attacker could use the
authorization server to learn the user's data by injecting the
encrypted request data into an authorization request on a device
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under their control and use the authorization server's user consent
screens to show the (decrypted) user data in the clear.
Implementations need to consider this attack vector and implement
appropriate countermeasures, e.g. by only showing portions of the
data or, if possible, determining whether the assumed user context is
still the same (after user authentication).
The AS needs to take into consideration the privacy implications when
sharing authorization_details with the client or resource servers.
The AS should share this data with those parties on a "need to know"
basis as determined by local policy.
14. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Daniel Fett, Sebastian Ebling, Dave Tonge,
Mike Jones, Nat Sakimura, and Rob Otto for their valuable feedback
during the preparation of this specification.
We would also like to thank Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Takahiko Kawasaki,
Daniel Fett, Dave Tonge, Travis Spencer, Joergen Binningsboe, Aamund
Bremer, Steinar Noem, Francis Pouatcha, Jacob Ideskog, Hannes
Tschofenig, and Aaron Parecki for their valuable feedback to this
specification.
15. IANA Considerations
15.1. OAuth Parameters Registration
This specification requests registration of the following parameter
in the "OAuth Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
established by [RFC6749].
Name: authorization_details
Parameter Usage Location: authorization request, token request,
token response
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): [[ this document ]]
15.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registration
This specification requests registration of the following value in
the IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry established by [RFC7519].
Claim Name: authorization_details
Claim Description: The claim authorization_details contains a JSON
array of JSON objects representing the rights of the access token.
Each JSON object contains the data to specify the authorization
requirements for a certain type of resource.
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Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): Section 9.1 of [[ this document ]]
15.3. OAuth Token Introspection Response Registration
This specification requests registration of the following value in
the IANA "OAuth Token Introspection Response" registry established by
[RFC7662].
Name: authorization_details
Description: The member authorization_details contains a JSON array
of JSON objects representing the rights of the access token. Each
JSON object contains the data to specify the authorization
requirements for a certain type of resource.
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): Section 9.2 of [[ this document ]]
15.4. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registration
This specification requests registration of the following values in
the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry of
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC8414].
Metadata Name: authorization_details_types_supported
Metadata Description: JSON array containing the authorization
details types the AS supports
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): Section 10 of [[ this document ]]
15.5. OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata Registration
This specification requests registration of the following value in
the IANA "OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Metadata" registry of
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] established by [RFC7591].
Metadata Name: authorization_details_types
Metadata Description: Indicates what authorization details types the
client uses.
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): Section 10 of [[ this document ]]
15.6. OAuth Extensions Error Registration
This specification requests registration of the following value in
the IANA "OAuth Extensions Error" registry of [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
established by [RFC6749].
Error name: invalid_authorization_details
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Error usage location: token endpoint, authorization endpoint
Related protocol extension: OAuth 2.0 Rich Authorization Requests
Change Controller: IETF
Reference: Section 5 of [[ this document ]]
16. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
[RFC8628] Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
"OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8628>.
[RFC8707] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Resource
Indicators for OAuth 2.0", RFC 8707, DOI 10.17487/RFC8707,
February 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8707>.
17. Informative References
[CSC] Consortium, C. S., "Architectures and protocols for remote
signature applications", 1 June 2019,
<https://cloudsignatureconsortium.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/07/CSC_API_V1_1.0.4.0.pdf>.
[ETSI] ETSI, "ETSI TS 119 432, Electronic Signatures and
Infrastructures (ESI); Protocols for remote digital
signature creation", 20 March 2019,
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<https://www.etsi.org/deliver/
etsi_ts/119400_119499/119432/01.01.01_60/
ts_119432v010101p.pdf>.
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.
[JSON.Schema]
json-schema.org, "JSON Schema",
<https://json-schema.org/>.
[OIDC] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
errata set 1", 8 November 2014,
<https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[OpenID.CIBA]
Fernandez, G., Walter, F., Nennker, A., Tonge, D., and B.
Campbell, "OpenID Connect Client Initiated Backchannel
Authentication Flow - Core 1.0", 16 January 2019,
<https://openid.net/specs/openid-client-initiated-
backchannel-authentication-core-1_0.html>.
[RFC0020] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for network interchange", STD 80,
RFC 20, DOI 10.17487/RFC0020, October 1969,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc20>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC9101] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "The OAuth 2.0
Authorization Framework: JWT-Secured Authorization Request
(JAR)", RFC 9101, DOI 10.17487/RFC9101, August 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9101>.
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[RFC9126] Lodderstedt, T., Campbell, B., Sakimura, N., Tonge, D.,
and F. Skokan, "OAuth 2.0 Pushed Authorization Requests",
RFC 9126, DOI 10.17487/RFC9126, September 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9126>.
[transaction-authorization]
Lodderstedt, T., "Transaction Authorization or why we need
to re-think OAuth scopes", 20 April 2019,
<https://medium.com/oauth-2/transaction-authorization-or-
why-we-need-to-re-think-oauth-scopes-2326e2038948>.
Appendix A. Additional Examples
A.1. OpenID Connect
OpenID Connect [OIDC] specifies the JSON-based claims request
parameter that can be used to specify the claims a client (acting as
OpenID Connect Relying Party) wishes to receive in a fine-grained and
privacy-preserving way as well as assign those claims to certain
delivery mechanisms, i.e. ID Token or userinfo response.
The combination of the scope value openid and the additional
parameter claims can be used beside authorization_details in the same
way as every non-OIDC scope value.
Alternatively, there could be an authorization details type for
OpenID Connect. This section gives an example of what such an
authorization details type could look like, but defining this
authorization details type is outside the scope of this
specification.
These hypothetical examples try to encapsulate all details specific
to the OpenID Connect part of an authorization process into an
authorization JSON object.
The top-level field are based on the definitions given in [OIDC]:
* claim_sets: names of predefined claim sets, replacement for
respective scope values, such as profile
* max_age: Maximum Authentication Age
* acr_values: requested Authentication Context Class Reference (ACR)
values.
* claims: the claims JSON structure as defined in [OIDC]
This is a simple request for some claim sets.
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[
{
"type": "openid",
"locations": [
"https://op.example.com/userinfo"
],
"claim_sets": [
"email",
"profile"
]
}
]
Figure 25: Example for OpenID Connect request utilizing
authorization_details.
Note: locations specifies the location of the userinfo endpoint since
this is the only place where an access token is used by a client (RP)
in OpenID Connect to obtain claims.
A more sophisticated example is shown in the following
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[
{
"type": "openid",
"locations": [
"https://op.example.com/userinfo"
],
"max_age": 86400,
"acr_values": "urn:mace:incommon:iap:silver",
"claims": {
"userinfo": {
"given_name": {
"essential": true
},
"nickname": null,
"email": {
"essential": true
},
"email_verified": {
"essential": true
},
"picture": null,
"http://example.com/claims/groups": null
},
"id_token": {
"auth_time": {
"essential": true
}
}
}
}
]
Figure 26: Advanced example for OpenID Connect request utilizing
authorization_details.
A.2. Remote Electronic Signing
The following example is based on the concept laid out for remote
electronic signing in ETSI TS 119 432 [ETSI] and the CSC API for
remote signature creation [CSC].
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[
{
"type": "sign",
"locations": [
"https://signing.example.com/signdoc"
],
"credentialID": "60916d31-932e-4820-ba82-1fcead1c9ea3",
"documentDigests": [
{
"hash": "sTOgwOm+474gFj0q0x1iSNspKqbcse4IeiqlDg/HWuI=",
"label": "Credit Contract"
},
{
"hash": "HZQzZmMAIWekfGH0/ZKW1nsdt0xg3H6bZYztgsMTLw0=",
"label": "Contract Payment Protection Insurance"
}
],
"hashAlgorithmOID": "2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1"
}
]
Figure 27: Example for electronic signing.
The top-level fields have the following meaning:
* credentialID: identifier of the certificate to be used for signing
* documentDigests: array containing the hash of every document to be
signed (hash fields). Additionally, the corresponding label field
identifies the respective document to the user, e.g. to be used in
user consent.
* hashAlgorithm: algorithm that was used to calculate the hash
values.
The AS is supposed to ask the user for consent for the creation of
signatures for the documents listed in the structure. The client
uses the access token issued as a result of the process to call the
sign doc endpoint at the respective signing service to actually
create the signature. This access token is bound to the client, the
user id and the hashes (and signature algorithm) as consented by the
user.
A.3. Access to Tax Data
This example is inspired by an API allowing third parties to access
citizen's tax declarations and income statements, for example, to
determine their creditworthiness.
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[
{
"type": "tax_data",
"locations": [
"https://taxservice.govehub.no.example.com"
],
"actions":"read_tax_declaration",
"periods": ["2018"],
"duration_of_access": 30,
"tax_payer_id": "23674185438934"
}
]
Figure 28: Example for tax data access.
The top-level fields have the following meaning:
* periods: determines the periods the client wants to access
* duration_of_access: how long does the client intend to access the
data in days
* tax_payer_id: identifier of the taxpayer (if known to the client)
A.4. eHealth
These two examples are inspired by requirements for APIs used in the
Norwegian eHealth system.
In this use case, the physical therapist sits in front of their
computer using a local Electronic Health Records (EHR) system. They
want to look at the electronic patient records of a certain patient
and they also want to fetch the patients journal entries in another
system, perhaps at another institution or a national service. Access
to this data is provided by an API.
The information necessary to authorize the request at the API is only
known by the EHR system, and must be presented to the API.
In the first example, the authorization details object contains the
identifier of an organization. In this case, the API needs to know
if the given organization has the lawful basis for processing
personal health information to give access to sensitive data.
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"authorization_details": {
"type": "patient_record",
"requesting_entity": {
"type": "Practitioner",
"identifier": [
{
"system": "urn:oid:2.16.578.1.12.4.1.4.4",
"value": "1234567"
}],
"practitioner_role": {
"organization": {
"identifier": {
"system": "urn:oid:2.16.578.1.12.4.1.2.101",
"type": "ENH",
"value": "[organizational number]"
}
}
}
}
}
Figure 29: eHealth Example.
In the second example, the API requires more information to authorize
the request. In this case, the authorization details object contains
additional information about the health institution and the current
profession the user has at the time of the request. The additional
level of detail could be used for both authorization and data
minimization.
[
{
"type": "patient_record",
"location": "https://fhir.example.com/patient",
"actions": [
"read"
],
"patient_identifier": [
{
"system": "urn:oid:2.16.578.1.12.4.1.4.1",
"value": "12345678901"
}
],
"reason_for_request": "Clinical treatment",
"requesting_entity": {
"type": "Practitioner",
"identifier": [
{
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"system": "urn:oid:2.16.578.1.12.4.1.4.4",
"value": "1234567"
}
],
"practitioner_role": {
"organization": {
"identifier": [
{
"system": "urn:oid:2.16.578.1.12.4.1.2.101",
"type": "ENH",
"value": "<organizational number>"
}
],
"type": {
"coding": [
{
"system":
"http://hl7.example.org/fhir/org-type",
"code": "dept",
"display": "Hospital Department"
}
]
},
"name": "Akuttmottak"
},
"profession": {
"coding": [
{
"system": "http://snomed.example.org/sct",
"code": "36682004",
"display": "Physical therapist"
}
]
}
}
}
}
]
Figure 30: Advanced eHealth example.
Description of the fields:
* patient_identifier: the identifier of the patient composed of a
system identifier in OID format (namespace) and the actual value
within this namespace.
* reason_for_request: the reason why the user wants to access a
certain API
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* requesting_entity: specification of the requester by means of
identity, role and organizational context. This data is provided
to facilitate authorization and for auditing purposes.
In this use case, the AS authenticates the requester, who is not the
patient, and approves access based on policies.
Appendix B. Document History
[[ To be removed from the final specification ]]
-23
* fix minor inconsistency in example
-22
* Add clarifying language around the geolocation example and
Section 6.1 per Paul Wouters' ballot comment
-21
* incorporated feedback from Robert Wilton and É (U+00C9)ric Vyncke
-20
* incorporated feedback from Murray Kucherawy
-19
* incorporated feedback from Lars Eggert
-18
* IANA Considerations cleanup
-17
* incorporated feedback from Genart review
-16
* incorporated feedback from Sec Dir review
-15
* Editorial updates from Roman Danyliw's AD review
* Other editorial updates
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-14
* Added clarification regarding authorization details types matching
* Removed duplicate text on use of "scope" and "resource" parameters
alongside "authorization_details"
* Replaced duplicate error response description in Section 8 with
reference to Section 5
-13
* Editorial updates from Roman Danyliw's AD review
* Removed normative language from field definitions.
-12
* Clarify introspection response.
* Editorial updates
-11
* Updated IANA registrations adding authorization_details parameter
-10
* Updated IANA registrations
-09
* Incorporated feedback by Hannes as document shepherd
-08
* formatting in authorization details type section
* added example for privileges common data element
-07
* incorporated review feedback from WGLC
* fixed wording in token introspection section
* added privacy considerations re authorization details in token
response
-06
* removed use of resource indicators to filter authorization details
in token response
-05
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* added authorization_details token request parameter and discussion
on authorization details comparison
* added privileges field to authorization details (to align with
GNAP)
* added IANA text and changed metadata parameter names
* added text about use of machine-readable type schemas, e.g. JSON
Schema
* added text on how authorization details are determined for access
token issued with token response
* added token error response and further error conditions to
authorization error response
-04
* restructured draft for better readability
* simplified normative text about use of the resource parameter with
authorization_details
* added implementation considerations for deployments and products
* added type union language from GNAP
* added recommendation to use PAR to cope with large requests and
for request protection
-03
* Updated references to current revisions or RFC numbers
* Added section about enrichment of authorization details objects by
the AS
* Clarified processing of unknown authorization details parameters
* clarified dependencies between resource and authorization_details
parameters
-02
* Clarify "type" parameter processing
-01
* Minor fix-up in a few examples
-00 (WG draft)
* initial WG revision
-03
* Reworked examples to illustrate privacy preserving use of
authorization_details
* Added text on audience restriction
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* Added description of relationship between scope and
authorization_details
* Added text on token request & response and authorization_details
* Added text on how authorization details are conveyed to RSs by
JWTs or token introspection endpoint response
* Added description of relationship between claims and
authorization_details
* Added more example from different sectors
* Clarified string comparison to be byte-exact without collation
-02
* Added Security Considerations
* Added Privacy Considerations
* Added notes on URI size and authorization details
* Added requirement to return the effective authorization details
granted by the resource owner in the token response
* changed authorization_details structure from object to array
* added Justin Richer & Brian Campbell as Co-Authors
-00 / -01
* first draft
Authors' Addresses
Torsten Lodderstedt
yes.com
Email: torsten@lodderstedt.net
Justin Richer
Bespoke Engineering
Email: ietf@justin.richer.org
Brian Campbell
Ping Identity
Email: bcampbell@pingidentity.com
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