Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata
draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata
OAuth Working Group M.B. Jones
Internet-Draft Self-Issued Consulting
Intended status: Standards Track P. Hunt
Expires: 4 August 2024 Independent Identity, Inc.
A. Parecki
Okta
1 February 2024
OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata
draft-ietf-oauth-resource-metadata-03
Abstract
This specification defines a metadata format that an OAuth 2.0 client
or authorization server can use to obtain the information needed to
interact with an OAuth 2.0 protected resource.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 August 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Protected Resource Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Signed Protected Resource Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Obtaining Protected Resource Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Protected Resource Metadata Request . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. Protected Resource Metadata Response . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Protected Resource Metadata Validation . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Use of WWW-Authenticate for Protected Resource Metadata . . . 9
5.1. WWW-Authenticate Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Changes to Resource Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3. Client Identifier and Client Authentication . . . . . . . 11
5.4. Compatibility with other authentication methods . . . . . 11
6. String Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2. Scopes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.3. Impersonation Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.4. Audience-Restricted Access Tokens . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.5. Publishing Metadata in a Standard Format . . . . . . . . 14
7.6. Authorization Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.7. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) . . . . . . . . . . . 15
7.8. Phishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.1. OAuth Protected Resource Metadata Registry . . . . . . . 16
8.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registry . . . . . . 18
8.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.3. Well-Known URI Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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1. Introduction
This specification defines a metadata format enabling OAuth 2.0
clients and authorization servers to obtain information needed to
interact with an OAuth 2.0 protected resource. This specification is
intentionally as parallel as possible to "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client
Registration Protocol" [RFC7591], which enables a client to provide
metadata about itself to an OAuth 2.0 authorization server and to
OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414], which enables a
client to obtain metadata about an OAuth 2.0 authorization server.
The metadata for a protected resource is retrieved from a well-known
location as a JSON [RFC7159] document, which declares information
about its capabilities and optionally, its relationships to other
services. This process is described in Section 3.
This metadata can either be communicated in a self-asserted fashion
or as a set of signed metadata values represented as claims in a JSON
Web Token (JWT) [JWT]. In the JWT case, the issuer is vouching for
the validity of the data about the protected resource. This is
analogous to the role that the Software Statement plays in OAuth
Dynamic Client Registration [RFC7591].
Each protected resource publishing metadata about itself makes its
own metadata document available at a well-known location rooted at
the protect resource's URL, even when the resource server implements
multiple protected resources. This prevents attackers from
publishing metadata supposedly describing the protected resource, but
that is not actually authoritative for the protected resource, as
described in Section 7.3.
The means by which the client obtains the location of the protected
resource metadata document is out of scope. In some cases, the
location may be manually configured into the client. In other cases,
it may be dynamically discovered, for instance, through the use of
WebFinger [RFC7033], in a manner related to the description in
Section 2 of "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0" [OpenID.Discovery].
Section 2 defines metadata values that a protected resource can
publish, which includes things like which scopes are supported, how a
client can present an access token, and more. These values may be
used by other specifications, such as the jwks_uri used to publish
public keys the resource server uses to sign resource responses, as
described in Section 5.6.2 of [FAPI.MessageSigning].
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1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
All uses of JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] and JSON Web Encryption
(JWE) [JWE] data structures in this specification utilize the JWS
Compact Serialization or the JWE Compact Serialization; the JWS JSON
Serialization and the JWE JSON Serialization are not used.
1.2. Terminology
This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Authorization
Code", "Authorization Endpoint", "Authorization Grant",
"Authorization Server", "Client", "Client Authentication", "Client
Identifier", "Client Secret", "Grant Type", "Protected Resource",
"Redirection URI", "Refresh Token", "Resource Owner", "Resource
Server", "Response Type", and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749], the terms "Claim Name", "Claim Value", and "JSON Web Token
(JWT)" defined by JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT].
This specification defines the following term:
Resource Identifier:
The Protected resource's resource identifier, which is a URL that
uses the https scheme and has no query or fragment components.
Protected resource metadata is published at a .well-known location
[RFC5785] derived from this resource identifier, as described in
Section 3.
2. Protected Resource Metadata
Protected resources can have metadata describing their configuration.
The following protected resource metadata values are used by this
specification and are registered in the IANA "OAuth Protected
Resource Metadata" registry established in Section 8.1:
resource
REQUIRED. The protected resource's resource identifier, which is
a URL that uses the https scheme and has no query or fragment
components. Using these well-known resources is described in
Section 3.
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authorization_servers
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of OAuth authorization
server issuer identifiers, as defined in [RFC8414], for
authorization servers that can be used with this protected
resource. Protected resources MAY choose not to advertise some
supported authorization servers even when this parameter is used.
In some use cases, the set of authorization servers will not be
enumerable, in which case this metadata parameter would not be
used.
jwks_uri
OPTIONAL. URL of the protected resource's JWK Set [JWK] document.
This contains public keys belonging to the protected resource.
For instance, this JWK Set MAY contain encryption key(s) that are
used to encrypt access tokens to the protected resource. The JWK
Set MAY also contain signing key(s) that the resource server uses
to sign responses. When both signing and encryption keys are made
available, a use (public key use) parameter value is REQUIRED for
all keys in the referenced JWK Set to indicate each key's intended
usage.
scopes_supported
RECOMMENDED. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] scope values that are used in authorization requests to
request access to this protected resource. Protected resources
MAY choose not to advertise some scope values supported even when
this parameter is used.
bearer_methods_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0 Bearer
Token [RFC6750] presentation methods that this protected resource
supports. Defined values are ["header", "body", "query"],
corresponding to Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 of RFC 6750.
resource_signing_alg_values_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWS [JWS] signing
algorithms (alg values) [JWA] supported by the protected resource
for signed content. The value none MAY be included.
resource_encryption_alg_values_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWE [JWE]
encryption algorithms (alg values) [JWA] supported by the
protected resource for encrypted content.
resource_encryption_enc_values_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWE encryption
algorithms (enc values) [JWA] supported by the protected resource
for encrypted content.
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resource_documentation
OPTIONAL. URL of a page containing human-readable information
that developers might want or need to know when using the
protected resource
resource_policy_uri
OPTIONAL. URL that the protected resource provides to read about
the protected resource's requirements on how the client can use
the data provided by the protected resource
resource_tos_uri
OPTIONAL. URL that the protected resource provides to read about
the protected resource's terms of service
Additional protected resource metadata parameters MAY also be used.
2.1. Signed Protected Resource Metadata
In addition to JSON elements, metadata values MAY also be provided as
a signed_metadata value, which is a JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT] that
asserts metadata values about the protected resource as a bundle. A
set of claims that can be used in signed metadata are defined in
Section 2. The signed metadata MUST be digitally signed or MACed
using JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] and MUST contain an iss (issuer)
claim denoting the party attesting to the claims in the signed
metadata. Consumers of the metadata MAY ignore the signed metadata
if they do not support this feature. If the consumer of the metadata
supports signed metadata, metadata values conveyed in the signed
metadata MUST take precedence over the corresponding values conveyed
using plain JSON elements.
Signed metadata is included in the protected resource metadata JSON
object using this OPTIONAL member:
signed_metadata
A JWT containing metadata values about the protected resource as
claims. This is a string value consisting of the entire signed
JWT. A signed_metadata metadata value SHOULD NOT appear as a
claim in the JWT.
3. Obtaining Protected Resource Metadata
Protected resources supporting metadata MUST make a JSON document
containing metadata as specified in Section 2 available at a path
formed by inserting a well-known URI string into the protected
resource's resource identifier between the host component and the
path component, if any. By default, the well-known URI string used
is /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource. The syntax and semantics
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of .well-known are defined in [RFC5785]. The well-known URI path
suffix used MUST be registered in the IANA "Well-Known URIs" registry
[IANA.well-known].
Different applications utilizing OAuth protected resources in
application-specific ways may define and register different well-
known URI path suffixes used to publish protected resource metadata
as used by those applications. For instance, if the Example
application uses an OAuth protected resource in an Example-specific
way, and there are Example-specific metadata values that it needs to
publish, then it might register and use the example-protected-
resource URI path suffix and publish the metadata document at the
path formed by inserting /.well-known/example-protected-resource
between the host and path components of the protected resource's
resource identifier. Alternatively, many such applications will use
the default well-known URI string /.well-known/oauth-protected-
resource, which is the right choice for general-purpose OAuth
protected resources, and not register an application-specific one.
An OAuth 2.0 application using this specification MUST specify what
well-known URI string it will use for this purpose. The same
protected resource MAY choose to publish its metadata at multiple
well-known locations derived from its resource identifier, for
example, publishing metadata at both /.well-known/example-protected-
resource and /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource.
3.1. Protected Resource Metadata Request
A protected resource metadata document MUST be queried using an HTTP
GET request at the previously specified path.
The consumer of the metadata would make the following request when
the resource identifier is https://resource.example.com and the well-
known URI path suffix is oauth-protected-resource to obtain the
metadata, since the resource identifier contains no path component:
GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource HTTP/1.1
Host: resource.example.com
If the resource identifier value contains a path component, any
terminating / MUST be removed before inserting /.well-known/ and the
well-known URI path suffix between the host component and the path
component. The consumer of the metadata would make the following
request when the resource identifier is https://resource.example.com/
resource1 and the well-known URI path suffix is oauth-protected-
resource to obtain the metadata, since the resource identifier
contains a path component:
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GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/resource1 HTTP/1.1
Host: resource.example.com
Using path components enables supporting multiple resources per host.
This is required in some multi-tenant hosting configurations. This
use of .well-known is for supporting multiple resources per host;
unlike its use in [RFC5785], it does not provide general information
about the host.
3.2. Protected Resource Metadata Response
The response is a set of claims about the protected resource's
configuration. A successful response MUST use the 200 OK HTTP status
code and return a JSON object using the application/json content type
that contains a set of claims as its members that are a subset of the
metadata values defined in Section 2. Other claims MAY also be
returned.
Claims that return multiple values are represented as JSON arrays.
Claims with zero elements MUST be omitted from the response.
An error response uses the applicable HTTP status code value.
The following is a non-normative example response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{
"resource":
"https://resource.example.com",
"authorization_servers":
["https://as1.example.com",
"https://as2.example.net"],
"bearer_methods_supported":
["header", "body"],
"resource_documentation":
"http://resource.example.com/resource_documentation.html"
}
3.3. Protected Resource Metadata Validation
The resource value returned MUST be identical to the protected
resource's resource identifier value into which the well-known URI
path suffix was inserted to create the URL used to retrieve the
metadata. If these values are not identical, the data contained in
the response MUST NOT be used.
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If the protected resource metadata was retrieved from a URL returned
by the protected resource via the WWW-Authenticate resource_metadata
parameter, then the resource value returned MUST be identical to the
URL that the client used to make the request to the resource server.
If these values are not identical, the data contained in the response
MUST NOT be used.
4. Authorization Server Metadata
To support use cases in which the set of legitimate protected
resources to use with the authorization server is fixed and
enumerable, this specification defines the protected_resources
metadata value, which enables explicitly listing them. Note that if
the set of legitimate authorization servers to use with a protected
resource is also fixed and enumerable, lists in the authorization
server metadata and protected resource metadata should be cross-
checked against one another for consistency when these lists are used
by the application profile.
The following authorization server metadata value is defined by this
specification and is registered in the IANA "OAuth Authorization
Server Metadata" registry established in OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Server Metadata [RFC8414].
protected_resources
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of resource identifiers
for OAuth protected resources for protected resources that can be
used with this authorization server. Authorization servers MAY
choose not to advertise some supported protected resources even
when this parameter is used. In some use cases, the set of
protected resources will not be enumerable, in which case this
metadata parameter would not be used.
5. Use of WWW-Authenticate for Protected Resource Metadata
A protected resource MAY use a WWW-Authenticate response to return a
URL to its protected resource metadata to the client. The client can
then retrieve protected resource metadata as described in Section 3.
The client might then, for instance, determine what authorization
server to use for the resource based on protected resource metadata
retrieved.
A typical end-to-end flow doing so is as follows. Note that while
this example uses the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Code flow, a similar
sequence could also be implemented with any other OAuth flow.
1. The client makes a request to a protected resource without
presenting an access token.
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2. The resource server responds with a WWW-Authenticate header
including the URL of the protected resource metadata.
3. The client fetches the protected resource metadata from this
URL.
4. The protected resource responds with the protected resource
metadata according to Section 3.2.
5. The client validates the protected resource metadata.
6. The client builds the authorization server metadata URL from an
issuer identifier in the resource metadata according to
[RFC8414] and makes a request to fetch the authorization server
metadata.
7. The authorization server responds with the authorization server
metadata document according to [RFC8414].
8. The client directs the user agent to the authorization server to
begin the authorization flow.
9. The authorization exchange is completed and the authorization
server returns an access token to the client.
10. The client repeats the resource request from step 1, presenting
the newly obtained access token.
11. The resource server returns the requested protected resource.
5.1. WWW-Authenticate Response
This specification introduces a new parameter in the WWW-Authenticate
response to indicate the protected resource metadata URL:
resource_metadata:
The URL of the protected resource metadata.
The response below is an example of a WWW-Authenticate header that
includes the resource identifier.
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="invalid_request",
error_description="No access token was provided in this request",
resource_metadata=
"https://resource.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"
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The HTTP status code and error string in the response are defined by
[RFC6750].
The resource_metadata parameter MAY be combined with other parameters
defined in other extensions, such as the max_age parameter defined by
[RFC9470].
5.2. Changes to Resource Metadata
At any point, for any reason determined by the protected resource,
the protected resource MAY respond with a new WWW-Authenticate
challenge that includes a value for the protected resource metadata
URL to indicate that its metadata MAY have changed. If the client
receives such a WWW-Authenticate response, it is expected retrieve
the protected resource metadata again, and SHOULD use the new
metadata values obtained. Among other things, this enables a
resource server to change which authorization servers it uses without
any other coordination with clients.
5.3. Client Identifier and Client Authentication
The way in which the client identifier is established at the
authorization server is out of scope of this specification.
This specification is intended to be deployed in scenarios where the
client has no prior knowledge about the resource server, and the
resource server might or might not have prior knowledge about the
client.
There are some existing methods by which an unrecognized client can
make use of an authorization server, such as using Dynamic Client
Registration [RFC7591] to register the client prior to initiating the
authorization flow. Future extensions might define alternatives,
such as using URLs to identify clients.
5.4. Compatibility with other authentication methods
Resource servers MAY return other WWW-Authenticate headers indicating
various authentication schemes. This allows the resource server to
support clients that may or may not implement this specification, and
allows clients to choose their preferred authentication scheme.
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6. String Operations
Processing some OAuth 2.0 messages requires comparing values in the
messages to known values. For example, the member names in the
metadata response might be compared to specific member names such as
resource. Comparing Unicode [UNICODE] strings, however, has
significant security implications.
Therefore, comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings
MUST be performed as specified below:
1. Remove any JSON applied escaping to produce an array of Unicode
code points.
2. Unicode Normalization [USA15] MUST NOT be applied at any point to
either the JSON string or to the string it is to be compared
against.
3. Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a
Unicode code point to code point equality comparison.
Note that this is the same equality comparison procedure described in
Section 8.3 of [RFC8259].
7. Security Considerations
7.1. TLS Requirements
Implementations MUST support TLS. Which version(s) ought to be
implemented will vary over time, and depend on the widespread
deployment and known security vulnerabilities at the time of
implementation. Implementations SHOULD follow the guidance in BCP
195 [RFC8996] [RFC9325], which provides recommendations and
requirements for improving the security of deployed services that use
TLS.
To protect against information disclosure and tampering,
confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a
ciphersuite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection.
7.2. Scopes
The scopes_supported parameter is the list of scopes the resource
server is willing to disclose that it supports. It is not meant to
indicate that an OAuth client should request all scopes in the list.
The client SHOULD still follow OAuth best practices and request
tokens with as limited scope as possible for the given operation, as
described in Section 2.3 of OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice
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[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics].
7.3. Impersonation Attacks
TLS certificate checking MUST be performed by the client, as
described in Section 7.1, when making a protected resource metadata
request. Checking that the server certificate is valid for the
resource identifier URL prevents man-in-middle and DNS-based attacks.
These attacks could cause a client to be tricked into using an
attacker's resource server, which would enable impersonation of the
legitimate protected resource. If an attacker can accomplish this,
they can access the resources that the affected client has access to
using the protected resource that they are impersonating.
An attacker may also attempt to impersonate a protected resource by
publishing a metadata document that contains a resource claim using
the resource identifier URL of the protected resource being
impersonated, but containing information of the attacker's choosing.
This would enable it to impersonate that protected resource, if
accepted by the client. To prevent this, the client MUST ensure that
the resource identifier URL it is using as the prefix for the
metadata request exactly matches the value of the resource metadata
value in the protected resource metadata document received by the
client.
7.4. Audience-Restricted Access Tokens
If a client expects to interact with multiple resource servers, the
client SHOULD request audience-restricted access tokens using
[RFC8707], and the authorization server SHOULD support audience-
restricted access tokens.
Without audience-restricted access tokens, a malicious resource
server (RS1) may be able to use the WWW-Authenticate header to get a
client to request an access token with a scope used by a legitimate
resource server (RS2), and after the client sends a request to RS1,
then RS1 could re-use the access token at RS2.
While this attack is not explicitly enabled by this specification,
and is possible in a plain OAuth 2.0 deployment, it is made somewhat
more likely by the use of dynamically-configured clients. As such,
the use of audience-restricted access tokens and Resource Indicators
[RFC8707] is RECOMMENDED when using the features in this
specification.
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7.5. Publishing Metadata in a Standard Format
Publishing information about the protected resource in a standard
format makes it easier for both legitimate clients and attackers to
use the protected resource. Whether a protected resource publishes
its metadata in an ad-hoc manner or in the standard format defined by
this specification, the same defenses against attacks that might be
mounted that use this information should be applied.
7.6. Authorization Servers
Secure determination of appropriate authorization servers to use with
a protected resource for all use cases is out of scope of this
specification. This specification assumes that the client has a
means of determining appropriate authorization servers to use with a
protected resource and that the client is using the correct metadata
for each protected resource. Implementers need to be aware that if
an inappropriate authorization server is used by the client, that an
attacker may be able to act as a man-in-the-middle proxy to a valid
authorization server without it being detected by the authorization
server or the client.
The ways to determine the appropriate authorization servers to use
with a protected resource are in general, application-dependent. For
instance, some protected resources are used with a fixed
authorization server or set of authorization servers, the locations
of which may be well known, or which could be published as metadata
values by the protected resource. In other cases, the set of
authorization servers that can be used with a protected resource can
by dynamically changed by administrative actions or by changes to the
set of authorization servers adhering to a trust framework. Many
other means of determining appropriate associations between protected
resources and authorization servers are also possible.
To support use cases in which the set of legitimate authorization
servers to use with the protected resource is fixed and enumerable,
this specification defines the authorization_servers metadata value,
which enables explicitly listing them. Note that if the set of
legitimate protected resources to use with an authorization server is
also fixed and enumerable, lists in the protected resource metadata
and authorization server metadata should be cross-checked against one
another for consistency when these lists are used by the application
profile.
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7.7. Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
The OAuth client is expected to fetch the authorization server
metadata based on the value of the issuer in the resource server
metadata. Since this specification enables clients to interoperate
with RSs and ASs it has no prior knowledge of, this opens a risk for
SSRF attacks by malicious users or malicious resource servers.
Clients SHOULD take appropriate precautions against SSRF attacks,
such as blocking requests to internal IP address ranges. Further
recommendations can be found in the OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet
[OWASP.SSRF].
7.8. Phishing
This specification may be deployed in a scenario where the desired
HTTP resource is identified by a user-selected URL. If this resource
is malicious or compromised, it could mislead the user into revealing
their account credentials or authorizing unwanted access to OAuth-
controlled capabilities. This risk is reduced, but not eliminated,
by following best practices for OAuth user interfaces, such as
providing clear notice to the user, displaying the authorization
server's domain name, supporting origin-bound phishing-resistant
authenticators, supporting the use of password managers, and applying
heuristic checks such as domain reputation.
8. IANA Considerations
The following registration procedure is used for the registry
established by this specification.
Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis
after a two-week review period on the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org
mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts.
However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication,
the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are
satisfied that such a specification will be published.
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register OAuth Protected
Resource Metadata: example").
Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve
or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the
review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if
applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than
21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the
iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
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Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general
applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application,
and whether the registration makes sense.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list.
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other
Experts.
8.1. OAuth Protected Resource Metadata Registry
This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Protected Resource
Metadata" registry for OAuth 2.0 protected resource metadata names.
The registry records the protected resource metadata member and a
reference to the specification that defines it.
8.1.1. Registration Template
Metadata Name:
The name requested (e.g., "resource"). This name is case-
sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case-
insensitive manner unless the Designated Experts state that there
is a compelling reason to allow an exception.
Metadata Description:
Brief description of the metadata (e.g., "Resource identifier
URL").
Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IETF". For others, give the
name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
included but is not required.
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8.1.2. Initial Registry Contents
* Metadata Name: resource
* Metadata Description: Protected resource's resource identifier URL
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]
* Metadata Name: authorization_servers
* Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of OAuth
authorization server issuer identifiers
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]
* Metadata Name: jwks_uri
* Metadata Description: URL of the protected resource's JWK Set
document
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]
* Metadata Name: scopes_supported
* Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the OAuth
2.0 scope values that are used in authorization requests to
request access this protected resource
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]
* Metadata Name: bearer_methods_supported
* Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the OAuth
2.0 Bearer Token presentation methods that this protected resource
supports
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]
* Metadata Name: resource_signing_alg_values_supported
* Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWS
signing algorithms (alg values) supported by the protected
resource for signed content
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]
* Metadata Name: resource_encryption_alg_values_supported
* Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWE
encryption algorithms (alg values) supported by the protected
resource for encrypted content
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]
* Metadata Name: resource_encryption_enc_values_supported
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* Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of the JWE
encryption algorithms (enc values) supported by the protected
resource for encrypted content
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]
* Metadata Name: resource_documentation
* Metadata Description: URL of a page containing human-readable
information that developers might want or need to know when using
the protected resource
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]
* Metadata Name: resource_policy_uri
* Metadata Description: URL that the protected resource provides to
read about the protected resource's requirements on how the client
can use the data provided by the protected resource
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]
* Metadata Name: resource_tos_uri
* Metadata Description: URL that the protected resource provides to
read about the protected resource's terms of service
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [[ this specification ]]
* Metadata Name: signed_metadata
* Metadata Description: Signed JWT containing metadata values about
the protected resource as claims
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 2.1 of [[ this specification ]]
8.2. OAuth Authorization Server Metadata Registry
The following authorization server metadata value is registered in
the IANA "OAuth Authorization Server Metadata" registry established
in OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata [RFC8414].
8.2.1. Registry Contents
* Metadata Name: protected_resources
* Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of resource
identifiers for OAuth protected resources
* Change Controller: IETF
* Specification Document(s): Section 4 of [[ this specification ]]
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8.3. Well-Known URI Registry
This specification registers the well-known URI defined in Section 3
in the IANA "Well-Known URIs" registry [IANA.well-known] established
by [RFC5785].
8.3.1. Registry Contents
* URI suffix: oauth-protected-resource
* Change controller: IETF
* Specification document: Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
* Related information: (none)
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[JWA] Jones, M.B., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518>.
[JWE] Jones, M.B. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption
(JWE)", RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7516>.
[JWK] Jones, M.B., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517>.
[JWS] Jones, M.B., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515>.
[JWT] Jones, M.B., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
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[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7033] Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., Jones, M., and J. Smarr,
"WebFinger", RFC 7033, DOI 10.17487/RFC7033, September
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7033>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
[RFC8707] Campbell, B., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Resource
Indicators for OAuth 2.0", RFC 8707, DOI 10.17487/RFC8707,
February 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8707>.
[RFC8996] Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS
1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>.
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[RFC9325] Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325>.
[UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard",
<http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>.
[USA15] Davis, M. and K. Whistler, "Unicode Normalization Forms",
Unicode Standard Annex 15, 1 June 2015,
<http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr15/>.
9.2. Informative References
[FAPI.MessageSigning]
Tonge, D. and D. Fett, "FAPI 2.0 Message Signing", 24
March 2023,
<https://openid.net/specs/fapi-2_0-message-signing.html>.
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
"OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-security-
topics-23, 5 June 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
security-topics-23>.
[IANA.well-known]
IANA, "Well-Known URIs",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris>.
[OpenID.Discovery]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M.B., and E. Jay,
"OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0", 8 November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-
1_0.html>.
[OWASP.SSRF]
OWASP, "OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet",
<https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/
Server_Side_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html>.
[RFC9470] Bertocci, V. and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Step Up
Authentication Challenge Protocol", RFC 9470,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9470, September 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9470>.
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Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The authors of this specification would like to thank the attendees
of the IETF 115 OAuth and HTTP API Working Groups and the attendees
of the IETF 116 OAuth Working Group for their input on this
specification. We would would also like to thank George Fletcher,
Tony Nadalin, and Filip Skokan for their contributions to the
specification.
Appendix B. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-03
* Applied correction by Filip Skokan.
-02
* Switched from concatenating .well-known to the end of the resource
identifier to inserting it between the host and path components of
it.
* Have WWW-Authenticate return resource_metadata rather than
resource.
-01
* Renamed scopes_provided to scopes_supported.
* Added security consideration for scopes_supported.
* Use BCP 195 for TLS recommendations.
* Clarified that resource metadata can be used by clients and
authorization servers.
* Updated references.
* Added security consideration recommending audience-restricted
access tokens.
* Mention FAPI Message Signing as a use case for publishing signing
keys.
-00
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* Initial working group version based on draft-jones-oauth-resource-
metadata-04.
Authors' Addresses
Michael B. Jones
Self-Issued Consulting
Email: michael_b_jones@hotmail.com
URI: https://self-issued.info/
Phil Hunt
Independent Identity, Inc.
Email: phil.hunt@yahoo.com
Aaron Parecki
Okta
Email: aaron@parecki.com
URI: https://aaronparecki.com/
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