Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-opsawg-tlstm-update
draft-ietf-opsawg-tlstm-update
Internet Engineering Task Force K. Vaughn, Ed.
Internet-Draft Trevilon LLC
Updates: 6353 (if approved) 8 May 2023
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: 9 November 2023
Updates to the TLS Transport Model for SNMP
draft-ietf-opsawg-tlstm-update-15
Abstract
This document updates RFC 6353 "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
to reflect changes necessary to support Transport Layer Security
Version 1.3 (TLS 1.3) and Datagram Transport Layer Security Version
1.3 (DTLS 1.3), which are jointly known as "(D)TLS 1.3". This
document is compatible with (D)TLS 1.2 and is intended to be
compatible with future versions of SNMP and (D)TLS.
This document updates the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB as defined in RFC 6353.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 9 November 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Changes from RFC 6353 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. TLSTM Fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Security Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. (D)TLS Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Additional Rules for TLS 1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Zero Round Trip Time Resumption (0-RTT) . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. TLS cipher suites, extensions and protocol invariants . . 6
4. MIB Module Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1. Introduction
This document updates and clarifies how the rules of [RFC6353] apply
when using Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Datagram Transport Layer
Security (DTLS) versions later than 1.2. This document jointly
refers to these two protocols as "(D)TLS". The update also
emphasizes the [RFC8996] requirement that prohibits the use of TLS
versions prior to TLS 1.2 when using SNMP. Although the text of this
document specifically references SNMPv3 and (D)TLS 1.3, this document
may be applicable to future versions of these protocols and is
backwards compatible with (D)TLS 1.2.
1.1. Conventions
Within this document the terms "TLS", "DTLS", and "(D)TLS" apply to
all versions of the indicated protocols. The term "SNMP" means
"SNMPv3" unless a specific version number is indicated. Specific
version numbers are used when the text needs to emphasize version
numbers.
For consistency with SNMP-related specifications, this document
favors terminology as defined in [STD62], rather than favoring
terminology that is consistent with non-SNMP specifications. This is
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
consistent with the IESG decision to not require the SNMP terminology
be modified to match the usage of other non-SNMP specifications when
SNMP was advanced to a Full Standard. "Authentication" in this
document typically refers to the English meaning of "serving to prove
the authenticity of" the message, not data source authentication or
peer identity authentication. The terms "manager" and "agent" are
not used in this document because, in the RFC3411 architecture, all
SNMP entities have the capability of acting as manager, agent, or
both depending on the SNMP application types supported in the
implementation. Where distinction is necessary, the application
names of command generator, command responder, notification
originator, notification receiver, and proxy forwarder are used. See
"SNMP Applications" (RFC3411) for further information.
Throughout this document, the terms "client" and "server" are used to
refer to the two ends of the TLS transport connection. The client
actively opens the TLS connection, and the server passively listens
for the incoming TLS connection. An SNMP entity MAY act as a TLS
client or server or both, depending on the SNMP applications
supported.
Throughout this document, the term "session" is used to refer to a
secure association between two instances of the TLS Transport Model
(TLSTM) that permits the transmission of one or more SNMP messages
within the lifetime of the session. The TLS protocol also has an
internal notion of a session and although these two concepts of a
session are related, when the term "session" is used this document is
referring to the TLSTM's specific session and not directly to the TLS
protocol's session.
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Changes from RFC 6353
This document updates [RFC6353]. The changes from [RFC6353] are
defined in the following clauses.
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
2.1. TLSTM Fingerprint
[RFC6353] defines a fingerprint algorithm that references the one-
octet TLS 1.2 hash algorithm identifier. TLS 1.3 replaced the one-
octet hash algorithm identifier with a two-octet TLS 1.3 cipher suite
identifier. The TLS community does not plan to ever add additional
values to the TLS 1.2 hash algorithm registry because some might
incorrectly infer that using a new hash algorithm with TLS 1.2 would
overcome the limitations of TLS 1.2. However, there is still a need
within TLSTM to support new values as they are developed.
This document updates the definition of SnmpTLSFingerprint to clarify
that the one-octet identifier in the fingerprint algorithm uses the
IANA SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithm Registry; this registry is consistent
with the IANA TLS HashAlgorithm Registry for its initial values but
can be extended as needed to support new hashing algorithms without
implying that the new values can be used by TLS version 1.2. This
change allows the reuse of the existing fingerprint TEXTUAL-
CONVENTION and minimizes the impact to [RFC6353].
A "Y" in the "Recommended" column indicates that the registered value
has been recommended through a formal Standards Action. Not all
parameters defined in Standards Track documents are necessarily
marked as "Recommended".
An "N" in the "Recommended" column does not necessarily mean that it
is flawed; rather, it indicates that the item either has not been
through the IETF consensus process, has limited applicability, or is
intended only for specific use cases.
The initial values for the SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithm Registry are
defined below:
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
+=========+=============+=============+===========+
| Value | Description | Recommended | Reference |
+=========+=============+=============+===========+
| 0 | none | N | [RFC5246] |
+---------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| 1 | md5 | N | [RFC5246] |
+---------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| 2 | sha1 | N | [RFC5246] |
+---------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| 3 | sha224 | Y | [RFC5246] |
+---------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| 4 | sha256 | Y | [RFC5246] |
+---------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| 5 | sha384 | Y | [RFC5246] |
+---------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| 6 | sha512 | Y | [RFC5246] |
+---------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| 7 | reserved | | [RFC8447] |
+---------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| 8 | intrinsic | N | [RFC8422] |
+---------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| 9-223 | reserved | | [RFC8447] |
+---------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
| 224-255 | private | | [RFC5246] |
+---------+-------------+-------------+-----------+
Table 1: SNMP-TLSTM Hash Algorithms
Values 0 through 2 MUST NOT be used by implementations of this
document but are listed for historical consistency.
2.2. Security Level
The RFC3411 architecture recognizes three levels of security:
* without authentication and without privacy (noAuthNoPriv)
* with authentication but without privacy (authNoPriv)
* with authentication and with privacy (authPriv)
Cipher suites for (D)TLS 1.3 defined in [RFC8446] provide both
authentication and privacy. Cipher suites defined in [RFC9150] for
(D)TLS 1.3 provide only authentication, without any privacy
protection. Implementations MAY choose to force (D)TLS 1.3 to only
allow cipher suites that provide both authentication and privacy.
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
2.3. (D)TLS Version
[RFC6353] states that TLSTM clients and servers MUST NOT request,
offer, or use SSL 2.0. [RFC8996] prohibits the use of (D)TLS
versions prior to version 1.2. TLSTM MUST only be used with (D)TLS
version 1.2 and later.
3. Additional Rules for TLS 1.3
This document specifies additional rules and clarifications for the
use of TLS 1.3. These rules may additionally apply to future
versions of TLS.
3.1. Zero Round Trip Time Resumption (0-RTT)
TLS 1.3 implementations for SNMP MUST NOT enable the 0-RTT mode of
session resumption (either sending or accepting) and MUST NOT
automatically resend 0-RTT data if it is rejected by the server. The
reason 0-RTT is disallowed is that there are no "safe" SNMP messages
that if replayed will be guaranteed to cause no harm at a server
side: all incoming notification or command responses are meant to be
acted upon only once. See Security considerations section for
further details.
TLS TM clients and servers MUST NOT request, offer, or use the 0-RTT
mode of TLS 1.3. [RFC8446] removed the renegotiation supported in
TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]; for session resumption, it introduced a zero-RTT
(0-RTT) mode, saving a round-trip at connection setup at the cost of
increased risk of replay attacks (it is possible for servers to guard
against this attack by keeping track of all the messages received).
[RFC8446] requires a profile be written for any application that
wants to use 0-RTT, specifying which messages are "safe to use" on
this mode. Within SNMP, there are no messages that are "safe to use"
with this mode.
Renegotiation of sessions is not supported as it is not supported by
TLS 1.3. If a future version of TLS supports renegotiation, this RFC
should be updated to indicate whether there are any additional
requirements related to its use.
3.2. TLS cipher suites, extensions and protocol invariants
[RFC8446] section 9 requires that, in the absence of application
profiles, certain cipher suites, TLS extensions, and TLS protocol
invariants are mandatory to implement. This document does not
specify an application profile, hence all the compliance requirements
in [RFC8446] apply.
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
4. MIB Module Definition
This module makes references to [RFC1123], RFC2578, RFC2579, RFC2580,
RFC3411, RFC3413, [RFC5246], [RFC5280], [RFC5890], [RFC5952],
[RFC5953], [RFC6353], and [STD58]
SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE,
OBJECT-IDENTITY, mib-2, snmpDomains,
Counter32, Unsigned32, Gauge32, NOTIFICATION-TYPE
FROM SNMPv2-SMI -- RFC 2578 or any update thereof
TEXTUAL-CONVENTION, TimeStamp, RowStatus, StorageType,
AutonomousType
FROM SNMPv2-TC -- RFC 2579 or any update thereof
MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP, NOTIFICATION-GROUP
FROM SNMPv2-CONF -- RFC 2580 or any update thereof
SnmpAdminString
FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB -- RFC 3411 or any update thereof
snmpTargetParamsName, snmpTargetAddrName
FROM SNMP-TARGET-MIB -- RFC 3413 or any update thereof
;
snmpTlstmMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "202303010000Z"
ORGANIZATION "OPSA Working Group"
CONTACT-INFO "WG-EMail: opsawg@ietf.org
Mailing list subscription info:
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/opsawg
Kenneth Vaughn
Trevilon LLC
1060 Hwy 107 South
Del Rio, TN 37727
United States
Phone: +1 571 331 5670
Email: kvaughn@trevilon.com"
DESCRIPTION "
The TLS Transport Model MIB
Copyright (c) 2010-2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
to the license terms contained in, the Revised BSD License
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT
RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to
be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174)
when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown
here."
REVISION "202303010000Z"
DESCRIPTION "This version of this MIB module is part of
RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal
notices. This version: [ Note to RFC Editor:
please replace the above XXXX with the RFC number
of this document ]
1. Updates the definition of SnmpTLSFingerprint
to clarify the registry used for the one-octet
hash algorithm identifier.
2. Capitalizes key words in conformance with
BCP 14
3. Replaces 'may not' with 'MUST NOT' to clarify
intent in several locations.
4. Replaces 'may not' with a clarification within
the definition of SnmpTLSAddress"
REVISION "201107190000Z"
DESCRIPTION "This version of this MIB module is part of
RFC 6353; see the RFC itself for full legal
notices. The only change was to introduce
new wording to reflect require changes for
IDNA addresses in the SnmpTLSAddress TC."
REVISION "201005070000Z"
DESCRIPTION "This version of this MIB module is part of
RFC 5953; see the RFC itself for full legal
notices."
::= { mib-2 198 }
-- ************************************************
-- subtrees of the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB
-- ************************************************
snmpTlstmNotifications OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 0 }
snmpTlstmIdentities OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 1 }
snmpTlstmObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 2 }
snmpTlstmConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 3 }
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
snmpTlstmHashAlgorithms OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A node used to register hashing algorithm identifiers recorded
in the IANA SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithm Registry."
::= { snmpTlstmMIB 4 }
-- ************************************************
-- snmpTlstmObjects - Objects
-- ************************************************
snmpTLSTCPDomain OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The SNMP over TLS via TCP transport domain. The
corresponding transport address is of type SnmpTLSAddress.
The securityName prefix to be associated with the
snmpTLSTCPDomain is 'tls'. This prefix MAY be used by
security models or other components to identify which secure
transport infrastructure authenticated a securityName."
REFERENCE
"RFC 2579: Textual Conventions for SMIv2"
::= { snmpDomains 8 }
snmpDTLSUDPDomain OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The SNMP over DTLS via UDP transport domain. The
corresponding transport address is of type SnmpTLSAddress.
The securityName prefix to be associated with the
snmpDTLSUDPDomain is 'dtls'. This prefix MAY be used by
security models or other components to identify which secure
transport infrastructure authenticated a securityName."
REFERENCE
"RFC 2579: Textual Conventions for SMIv2"
::= { snmpDomains 9 }
SnmpTLSAddress ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "1a"
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Represents an IPv4 address, an IPv6 address, or a
US-ASCII-encoded hostname and port number.
An IPv4 address MUST be in dotted decimal format followed by
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
a colon ':' (US-ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port
number in US-ASCII.
An IPv6 address MUST be a colon-separated format (as
described in RFC 5952), surrounded by square brackets ('[',
US-ASCII character 0x5B, and ']', US-ASCII character 0x5D),
followed by a colon ':' (US-ASCII character 0x3A) and a
decimal port number in US-ASCII.
A hostname MUST be in US-ASCII (as per RFC 1123);
internationalized hostnames MUST be encoded as A-labels as
specified in RFC 5890. The hostname is followed by a
colon ':' (US-ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port number
in US-ASCII. The name SHOULD be fully qualified whenever
possible.
Values of this textual convention are not guaranteed to be
directly usable as transport layer addressing information,
potentially requiring additional processing, such as run-time
resolution. As such, applications that write them MUST be
prepared for handling errors if such values are not
supported, or cannot be resolved (if resolution occurs at the
time of the management operation).
The DESCRIPTION clause of TransportAddress objects that may
have SnmpTLSAddress values MUST fully describe how (and
when) such names are to be resolved to IP addresses and vice
versa.
This textual convention SHOULD NOT be used directly in object
definitions since it restricts addresses to a specific
format. However, if it is used, it MAY be used either on its
own or in conjunction with TransportAddressType or
TransportDomain as a pair.
When this textual convention is used as a syntax of an index
object, there may be issues with the limit of 128
sub-identifiers specified in SMIv2 (STD 58). It is
RECOMMENDED that all MIB documents using this textual
convention make explicit any limitations on index component
lengths that management software MUST observe. This MAY be
done either by including SIZE constraints on the index
components or by specifying applicable constraints in the
conceptual row DESCRIPTION clause or in the surrounding
documentation."
REFERENCE
"RFC 1123: Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and
Support
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
RFC 5890: Internationalized Domain Names for Applications
(IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework
RFC 5952: A Recommendation for IPv6 Address Text
Representation"
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..255))
SnmpTLSFingerprint ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
DISPLAY-HINT "1x:1x"
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A fingerprint value that can be used to uniquely reference
other data of potentially arbitrary length.
An SnmpTLSFingerprint value is composed of a 1-octet hashing
algorithm identifier followed by the fingerprint value. The
1-octet identifier value encoded is taken from IANA SNMP-TLSTM
HashAlgorithm Registry. The remaining octets of the
SnmpTLSFingerprint value are filled using the results of the
hashing algorithm.
Historically, the 1-octet hashing algorithm identifier was
based on the IANA TLS HashAlgorithm Registry (RFC 5246);
however, this registry is no longer in use for TLS 1.3
and above and are not expected to have any new registrations
added to it. To
allow the fingerprint algorithm to support additional hashing
algorithms that might be used by later versions of (D)TLS, the
octet value encoded is now taken from IANA SNMP-TLSTM
HashAlgorithm Registry. The initial values within this
registry are identical to the values in the TLS HashAlgorithm
registry but can be extended to support new hashing algorithms
as needed.
This TEXTUAL-CONVENTION allows for a zero-length (blank)
SnmpTLSFingerprint value for use in tables where the
fingerprint value MAY be optional. MIB definitions or
implementations MAY refuse to accept a zero-length value as
appropriate."
REFERENCE "https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/
smi-numbers.xhtml"
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (0..255))
-- Identities for use in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities OBJECT IDENTIFIER
::= { snmpTlstmIdentities 1 }
snmpTlstmCertSpecified OBJECT-IDENTITY
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Directly specifies the tmSecurityName to be used for this
certificate. The value of the tmSecurityName to use is
specified in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNData column. The
snmpTlstmCertToTSNData column MUST contain a non-zero length
SnmpAdminString compliant value or the mapping described in
this row MUST be considered a failure."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 1 }
snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Maps a subjectAltName's rfc822Name to a tmSecurityName. The
local part of the rfc822Name is passed unaltered but the
host-part of the name MUST be passed in lowercase. This
mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between equivalent
subjectAltName rfc822Name values and tmSecurityName values
except that the host-part of the name MUST be passed in
lowercase.
Example rfc822Name Field: FooBar@Example.COM is mapped to
tmSecurityName: FooBar@example.com."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 2 }
snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Maps a subjectAltName's dNSName to a tmSecurityName after
first converting it to all lowercase (RFC 5280 does not
specify converting to lowercase, so this involves an extra
step). This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
subjectAltName dNSName values and the tmSecurityName values."
REFERENCE "RFC 5280 - Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 3 }
snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Maps a subjectAltName's iPAddress to a tmSecurityName by
transforming the binary encoded address as follows:
1) for IPv4, the value is converted into a decimal-dotted quad
address (e.g., '192.0.2.1').
2) for IPv6 addresses, the value is converted into a 32-
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
character all lowercase hexadecimal string without any colon
separators.
This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
subjectAltName iPAddress values and the tmSecurityName values.
The resulting length of an encoded IPv6 address is the maximum
length supported by the View-Based Access Control Model
(VACM). Using both the Transport Security Model's support for
transport prefixes (see the SNMP-TSM-MIB's
snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix object for details) will result
in securityName lengths that exceed what VACM can handle."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 4 }
snmpTlstmCertSANAny OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Maps any of the following fields using the corresponding
mapping algorithms:
|------------+----------------------------|
| Type | Algorithm |
|------------+----------------------------|
| rfc822Name | snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name |
| dNSName | snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName |
| iPAddress | snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress |
|------------+----------------------------|
The first matching subjectAltName value found in the
certificate of the above types MUST be used when deriving the
tmSecurityName. The mapping algorithm specified in the
'Algorithm' column MUST be used to derive the tmSecurityName.
This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
subjectAltName values and tmSecurityName values. The three
sub-mapping algorithms produced by this combined algorithm
cannot produce conflicting results between themselves."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 5 }
snmpTlstmCertCommonName OBJECT-IDENTITY
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Maps a certificate's CommonName to a tmSecurityName after
converting it to a UTF-8 encoding. The usage of CommonNames
is deprecated and users are encouraged to use subjectAltName
mapping methods instead. This mapping results in a 1:1
correspondence between certificate CommonName values and
tmSecurityName values."
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 6 }
-- The snmpTlstmSession Group
snmpTlstmSession OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmObjects 1 }
snmpTlstmSessionOpens OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times an openSession() request has been
executed as a (D)TLS client, regardless of whether it
succeeded or failed."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 1 }
snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times a closeSession() request has been
executed as a (D)TLS client, regardless of whether it
succeeded or failed."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 2 }
snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times an openSession() request failed to open
a session as a (D)TLS client, for any reason."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 3 }
snmpTlstmSessionAccepts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times a (D)TLS server has accepted a new
connection from a client and has received at least one SNMP
message through it."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 4 }
snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times a closeSession() request has been
executed as a (D)TLS server, regardless of whether it
succeeded or failed."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 5 }
snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times an outgoing message was dropped because
the session associated with the passed tmStateReference was
no longer (or was never) available."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 6 }
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times an incoming session was not established
on a (D)TLS server because the presented client certificate
was invalid. Reasons for invalidation include, but are not
limited to, cryptographic validation failures or lack of a
suitable mapping row in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 7 }
snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times an outgoing session was not established
on a (D)TLS client because the server certificate presented
by an SNMP over (D)TLS server was invalid because no
configured fingerprint or Certification Authority (CA) was
acceptable to validate it.
This may result because there was no entry in the
snmpTlstmAddrTable or because no path could be found to a
known CA."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 8 }
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
DESCRIPTION
"The number of times an outgoing session was not established
on a (D)TLS client because the server certificate presented
by an SNMP over (D)TLS server could not be validated even if
the fingerprint or expected validation path was known. That
is, a cryptographic validation error occurred during
certificate validation processing.
Reasons for invalidation include, but are not
limited to, cryptographic validation failures."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 9 }
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of outgoing messages dropped because the
tmStateReference referred to an invalid cache."
::= { snmpTlstmSession 10 }
-- Configuration Objects
snmpTlstmConfig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmObjects 2 }
-- Certificate mapping
snmpTlstmCertificateMapping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {snmpTlstmConfig 1}
snmpTlstmCertToTSNCount OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Gauge32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A count of the number of entries in the
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 1 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeStamp
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable
was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not been
modified since the command responder was started."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 2 }
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This table is used by a (D)TLS server to map the (D)TLS
client's presented X.509 certificate to a tmSecurityName.
On an incoming (D)TLS/SNMP connection, the client's presented
certificate MUST either be validated based on an established
trust anchor, or it MUST directly match a fingerprint in this
table. This table does not provide any mechanisms for
configuring the trust anchors; the transfer of any needed
trusted certificates for path validation is expected to occur
through an out-of-band transfer.
Once the certificate has been found acceptable (either by
path validation or directly matching a fingerprint in this
table), this table is consulted to determine the appropriate
tmSecurityName to identify with the remote connection. This
is done by considering each active row from this table in
prioritized order according to its snmpTlstmCertToTSNID
value. Each row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value
determines whether the row is a match for the incoming
connection:
1) If the row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value
identifies the presented certificate, then consider
the row as a successful match.
2) If the row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value
identifies a locally held copy of a trusted CA
certificate and that CA certificate was used to
validate the path to the presented certificate, then
consider the row as a successful match.
Once a matching row has been found, the
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType value can be used to determine how
the tmSecurityName to associate with the session should be
determined. See the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType column's
DESCRIPTION for details on determining the tmSecurityName
value. If it is impossible to determine a tmSecurityName
from the row's data combined with the data presented in the
certificate, then additional rows MUST be searched looking
for another potential match. If a resulting tmSecurityName
mapped from a given row is not compatible with the needed
requirements of a tmSecurityName (e.g., VACM imposes a
32-octet-maximum length and the certificate derived
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
securityName could be longer), then it MUST be considered an
invalid match and additional rows MUST be searched looking
for another potential match.
If no matching and valid row can be found, the connection
MUST be closed and SNMP messages MUST NOT be accepted over
it.
Missing values of snmpTlstmCertToTSNID are acceptable and
implementations SHOULD continue to the next highest numbered
row. It is RECOMMENDED that administrators skip index values
to leave room for the insertion of future rows (for example,
use values of 10 and 20 when creating initial rows).
Users are encouraged to make use of certificates with
subjectAltName fields that can be used as tmSecurityNames so
that a single root CA certificate can allow all child
certificate's subjectAltName to map directly to a
tmSecurityName via a 1:1 transformation. However, this table
is flexible to allow for situations where existing deployed
certificate infrastructures do not provide adequate
subjectAltName values for use as tmSecurityNames.
Certificates MAY also be mapped to tmSecurityNames using the
CommonName portion of the Subject field. However, the usage
of the CommonName field is deprecated and thus this usage is
NOT RECOMMENDED. Direct mapping from each individual
certificate fingerprint to a tmSecurityName is also possible
but requires one entry in the table per tmSecurityName and
requires more management operations to completely configure a
device."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 3 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A row in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable that specifies a
mapping for an incoming (D)TLS certificate to a
tmSecurityName to use for a connection."
INDEX { snmpTlstmCertToTSNID }
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable 1 }
SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
snmpTlstmCertToTSNID Unsigned32,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType AutonomousType,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNData OCTET STRING,
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType StorageType,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus RowStatus
}
snmpTlstmCertToTSNID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique, prioritized index for the given entry. Lower
numbers indicate a higher priority."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 1 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpTLSFingerprint (SIZE(1..255))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A cryptographic hash of an X.509 certificate. The results
of a successful matching fingerprint to either the trusted CA
in the certificate validation path or to the certificate
itself is dictated by the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType column."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 2 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX AutonomousType
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Specifies the mapping type for deriving a tmSecurityName
from a certificate. Details for mapping of a particular type
SHALL be specified in the DESCRIPTION clause of the OBJECT-
IDENTITY that describes the mapping. If a mapping succeeds
it will return a tmSecurityName for use by the TLSTM model
and processing stops.
If the resulting mapped value is not compatible with the
needed requirements of a tmSecurityName (e.g., VACM imposes a
32-octet-maximum length and the certificate derived
securityName could be longer), then future rows MUST be
searched for additional snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint matches
to look for a mapping that succeeds.
Suitable values for assigning to this object that are defined
within the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB can be found in the
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities portion of the MIB tree."
DEFVAL { snmpTlstmCertSpecified }
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 3 }
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
snmpTlstmCertToTSNData OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024))
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Auxiliary data used as optional configuration information
for a given mapping specified by the
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType column. Only some mapping
systems will make use of this column. The value in this
column MUST be ignored for any mapping type that does not
require data present in this column."
DEFVAL { "" }
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 4 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX StorageType
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows
having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access to
any columnar objects in the row."
DEFVAL { nonVolatile }
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 5 }
snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RowStatus
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The status of this conceptual row. This object MAY be used
to create or remove rows from this table.
To create a row in this table, an administrator MUST set this
object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).
Until instances of all corresponding columns are
appropriately configured, the value of the corresponding
instance of the snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus column is
notReady(3).
In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active
until the corresponding snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType, and snmpTlstmCertToTSNData columns
have been set.
The following objects MUST NOT be modified while the
value of this object is active(1):
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
- snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint
- snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType
- snmpTlstmCertToTSNData
An attempt to set these objects while the value of
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus is active(1) will result in
an inconsistentValue error."
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 6 }
-- Maps tmSecurityNames to certificates for use by the
-- SNMP-TARGET-MIB
snmpTlstmParamsCount OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Gauge32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A count of the number of entries in the
snmpTlstmParamsTable."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 4 }
snmpTlstmParamsTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeStamp
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmParamsTable
was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not been
modified since the command responder was started."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 5 }
snmpTlstmParamsTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmParamsEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This table is used by a (D)TLS client when a (D)TLS
connection is being set up using an entry in the
SNMP-TARGET-MIB. It extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's
snmpTargetParamsTable with a fingerprint of a certificate to
use when establishing such a (D)TLS connection."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 6 }
snmpTlstmParamsEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpTlstmParamsEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A conceptual row containing a fingerprint hash of a locally
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
held certificate for a given snmpTargetParamsEntry. The
values in this row SHOULD be ignored if the connection that
needs to be established, as indicated by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB
infrastructure, is not a certificate and (D)TLS based
connection. The connection SHOULD NOT be established if the
certificate fingerprint stored in this entry does not point
to a valid locally held certificate or if it points to an
unusable certificate (such as might happen when the
certificate's expiration date has been reached)."
INDEX { IMPLIED snmpTargetParamsName }
::= { snmpTlstmParamsTable 1 }
SnmpTlstmParamsEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint,
snmpTlstmParamsStorageType StorageType,
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus RowStatus
}
snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpTLSFingerprint
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This object stores the hash of the public portion of a
locally held X.509 certificate. The X.509 certificate, its
public key, and the corresponding private key will be used
when initiating a (D)TLS connection as a (D)TLS client."
::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 1 }
snmpTlstmParamsStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX StorageType
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows
having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access to
any columnar objects in the row."
DEFVAL { nonVolatile }
::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 2 }
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RowStatus
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The status of this conceptual row. This object MAY be used
to create or remove rows from this table.
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
To create a row in this table, an administrator MUST set this
object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).
Until instances of all corresponding columns are
appropriately configured, the value of the corresponding
instance of the snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus column is
notReady(3).
In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active
until the corresponding snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint
column has been set.
The snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint object MUST NOT be
modified while the value of this object is active(1).
An attempt to set these objects while the value of
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus is active(1) will result in
an inconsistentValue error."
::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 3 }
snmpTlstmAddrCount OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Gauge32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A count of the number of entries in the snmpTlstmAddrTable."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 7 }
snmpTlstmAddrTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeStamp
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmAddrTable
was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not been
modified since the command responder was started."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 8 }
snmpTlstmAddrTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmAddrEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This table is used by a (D)TLS client when a (D)TLS
connection is being set up using an entry in the
SNMP-TARGET-MIB. It extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's
snmpTargetAddrTable so that the client can verify that the
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
correct server has been reached. This verification can use
either a certificate fingerprint, or an identity
authenticated via certification path validation.
If there is an active row in this table corresponding to the
entry in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB that was used to establish the
connection, and the row's snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint
column has non-empty value, then the server's presented
certificate is compared with the
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint value (and the
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity column is ignored). If the
fingerprint matches, the verification has succeeded. If the
fingerprint does not match, then the connection MUST be
closed.
If the server's presented certificate has passed
certification path validation [RFC5280] to a configured
trust anchor, and an active row exists with a zero-length
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint value, then the
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity column contains the expected
host name. This expected host name is then compared against
the server's certificate as follows:
- Implementations MUST support matching the expected host
name against a dNSName in the subjectAltName extension
field and MAY support checking the name against the
CommonName portion of the subject distinguished name.
- The '*' (ASCII 0x2a) wildcard character is allowed in the
dNSName of the subjectAltName extension (and in common
name, if used to store the host name), but only as the
left-most (least significant) DNS label in that value.
This wildcard matches any left-most DNS label in the
server name. That is, the subject *.example.com matches
the server names a.example.com and b.example.com, but does
not match example.com or a.b.example.com. Implementations
MUST support wildcards in certificates as specified above,
but MAY provide a configuration option to disable them.
- If the locally configured name is an internationalized
domain name, conforming implementations MUST convert it to
the ASCII Compatible Encoding (ACE) format for performing
comparisons, as specified in Section 7 of [RFC5280].
If the expected host name fails these conditions then the
connection MUST be closed.
If there is no row in this table corresponding to the entry
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB and the server can be authorized by
another, implementation-dependent means, then the connection
MAY still proceed."
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 9 }
snmpTlstmAddrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpTlstmAddrEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A conceptual row containing a copy of a certificate's
fingerprint for a given snmpTargetAddrEntry. The values in
this row SHOULD be ignored if the connection that needs to be
established, as indicated by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB
infrastructure, is not a (D)TLS based connection. If an
snmpTlstmAddrEntry exists for a given snmpTargetAddrEntry,
then the presented server certificate MUST match or the
connection MUST NOT be established. If a row in this table
does not exist to match an snmpTargetAddrEntry row, then the
connection SHOULD still proceed if some other certificate
validation path algorithm (e.g., RFC 5280) can be used."
INDEX { IMPLIED snmpTargetAddrName }
::= { snmpTlstmAddrTable 1 }
SnmpTlstmAddrEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint,
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity SnmpAdminString,
snmpTlstmAddrStorageType StorageType,
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus RowStatus
}
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpTLSFingerprint
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A cryptographic hash of a public X.509 certificate. This
object should store the hash of the public X.509 certificate
that the remote server should present during the (D)TLS
connection setup. The fingerprint of the presented
certificate and this hash value MUST match exactly, or the
connection MUST NOT be established."
DEFVAL { "" }
::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 1 }
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
MAX-ACCESS read-create
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The reference identity to check against the identity
presented by the remote system."
DEFVAL { "" }
::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 2 }
snmpTlstmAddrStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX StorageType
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows
having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access to
any columnar objects in the row."
DEFVAL { nonVolatile }
::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 3 }
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX RowStatus
MAX-ACCESS read-create
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The status of this conceptual row. This object may be used
to create or remove rows from this table.
To create a row in this table, an administrator MUST set this
object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).
Until instances of all corresponding columns are
appropriately configured, the value of the
corresponding instance of the snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus
column is notReady(3).
In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active
until the corresponding snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint column
has been set.
Rows MUST NOT be active if the snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint
column is blank and the snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity is set to
'*' since this would insecurely accept any presented
certificate.
The snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint object MUST NOT be
modified while the value of this object is active(1).
An attempt to set these objects while the value of
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus is active(1) will result in
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
an inconsistentValue error."
::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 4 }
-- ************************************************
-- snmpTlstmNotifications - Notifications Information
-- ************************************************
snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown NOTIFICATION-TYPE
OBJECTS { snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate }
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Notification that the server certificate presented by an
SNMP over (D)TLS server was invalid because no configured
fingerprint or CA was acceptable to validate it. This may
be because there was no entry in the snmpTlstmAddrTable or
because no path could be found to known Certification
Authority.
To avoid notification loops, this notification MUST NOT be
sent to servers that themselves have triggered the
notification."
::= { snmpTlstmNotifications 1 }
snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate NOTIFICATION-TYPE
OBJECTS { snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint,
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Notification that the server certificate presented by an
SNMP over (D)TLS server could not be validated even if the
fingerprint or expected validation path was known. That is,
a cryptographic validation error occurred during certificate
validation processing.
To avoid notification loops, this notification MUST NOT be
sent to servers that themselves have triggered the
notification."
::= { snmpTlstmNotifications 2 }
-- ************************************************
-- snmpTlstmCompliances - Conformance Information
-- ************************************************
snmpTlstmCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConformance 1 }
snmpTlstmGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConformance 2 }
-- ************************************************
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
-- Compliance statements
-- ************************************************
snmpTlstmCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The compliance statement for SNMP engines that support the
SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB"
MODULE
MANDATORY-GROUPS { snmpTlstmStatsGroup,
snmpTlstmIncomingGroup,
snmpTlstmOutgoingGroup,
snmpTlstmNotificationGroup }
::= { snmpTlstmCompliances 1 }
-- ************************************************
-- Units of conformance
-- ************************************************
snmpTlstmStatsGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
snmpTlstmSessionOpens,
snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses,
snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors,
snmpTlstmSessionAccepts,
snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses,
snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions,
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates,
snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate,
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates,
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A collection of objects for maintaining
statistical information of an SNMP engine that
implements the SNMP TLS Transport Model."
::= { snmpTlstmGroups 1 }
snmpTlstmIncomingGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
snmpTlstmCertToTSNCount,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTableLastChanged,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNData,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType,
snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus
}
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A collection of objects for maintaining
incoming connection certificate mappings to
tmSecurityNames of an SNMP engine that implements the
SNMP TLS Transport Model."
::= { snmpTlstmGroups 2 }
snmpTlstmOutgoingGroup OBJECT-GROUP
OBJECTS {
snmpTlstmParamsCount,
snmpTlstmParamsTableLastChanged,
snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint,
snmpTlstmParamsStorageType,
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus,
snmpTlstmAddrCount,
snmpTlstmAddrTableLastChanged,
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint,
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity,
snmpTlstmAddrStorageType,
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A collection of objects for maintaining
outgoing connection certificates to use when opening
connections as a result of SNMP-TARGET-MIB settings."
::= { snmpTlstmGroups 3 }
snmpTlstmNotificationGroup NOTIFICATION-GROUP
NOTIFICATIONS {
snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown,
snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate
}
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Notifications"
::= { snmpTlstmGroups 4 }
END
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
5. Security Considerations
This document updates a transport model that permits SNMP to utilize
(D)TLS security services. The security threats and how the TLS
transport model mitigates these threats are covered throughout this
document and in [RFC6353]. Security considerations for TLS are
described in Section 10 and Appendix E of TLS 1.3 [RFC8446].
Security considerations for DTLS are described in Section 11 of DTLS
1.3 [RFC9147].
Implementations should consider the latest recommendations on the use
of (DTLS), such as that documented in [RFC9325].
SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
Even if the network itself is secure (for example, by using IPsec),
there is no control as to who on the secure network is allowed to
access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this
MIB module.
It is RECOMMENDED that only SNMPv3 messages using the Transport
Security Model (TSM) or another secure-transport aware security model
be sent over the TLSTM transport.
6. IANA Considerations
IANA is asked to create a new registry called the SNMP-TLSTM
HashAlgorithm Registry in the Structure of Management Information
(SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations) Group and to update the
proposed URL reference in the above MIB (listed as
"https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xhtml"
under SnmpTLSFingerprint), if needed, to accurately reflect its
location. The description of this registry should be:
iso.org.dod.internet.mgmt.mib-2.snmpTlstmMIB.snmpTlstmHashAlgorithms
(1.3.6.1.2.1.198.4). IANA is also asked to either 1) create the
snmp-tlstm-reg-review@ietf.org email address that appears later
within this section or 2) update the email address to an appropriate
address.
The registry should have the following fields: value, description,
recommended, and reference. The range of values is zero to 255, with
initial assignments shown in Section 2.1. The "recommended" column
indicates "Y" for hashing algorithms that are standards track and are
deemed to be acceptable for widely applicable current use and "N" for
hashing algorithms that reflect meanings that are not recommended
(e.g., they do not provide sufficient security for modern systems,
they are not standards track, they have limited applicability). A
blank field indicates that no recommendation is made (e.g., because
the value is reserved or left for private use).
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
This registry is expected to be updated infrequently and, as such,
its values are limited to one octet.
The policy for updates to the SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithm Registry is
Expert Review. Registry requests should be sent to the <snmp-tlstm-
reg-review@ietf.org> mailing list. Registration requests sent to the
mailing list for review SHOULD use an appropriate subject (e.g.,
"Request to register value in SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithm Registry").
In addition, designated experts should consult with the tls-reg-
review@ietf.org mailing list to make sure any new hash algorithms are
considered for inclusion in this registry.
Designated experts SHOULD ascertain the existence of suitable
documentation that defines a hash algorithm and SHOULD also verify
that the request does not conflict or duplicate other entries in the
registry. The experts should also provide a recommendation as to how
the recommended column of the registry should be updated. Only
publicly available specifications that represent current industry-
accepted practices should receive an assignment of "Y" in the
recommneded column; all other specific assignments in the registry
should receive an of "N". Assignments that are inspecific (e.g.,
reserved values) SHOULD not receive an assigned value for the
recommended column.
Within the three-week review period, the designated experts will
either approve or deny the registration request, communicating this
decision to the review list and IANA. Denials SHOULD include an
explanation and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the
request successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for
a period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention
(using the <iesg@ietf.org> mailing list) for resolution.
IANA MUST only accept registry updates from the designated experts
and SHOULD direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list. While future additions to the IANA TLS HashAlgorithm Registry
(i.e., the registry from which the SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithm Registry
was spawned) are not expected, any future addition to the IANA TLS
HashAlgorithm Registry MUST be consistent with the values assigned in
the IANA SNMP-TLSTM HashAlgorithm Registry.
It is suggested that multiple designated experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification, in order to enable broadly informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert, that Expert SHOULD defer to the judgment of the other
Experts.
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
7. Acknowledgements
This document is based on [RFC6353]. This document was reviewed by
the following people who helped provide useful comments: Michaela
Vanderveen, Joe Clarke, Jurgen Schonwalder, and Tom Petch.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC1123] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
RFC 5890, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890>.
[RFC5952] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
Address Text Representation", RFC 5952,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5952>.
[RFC6353] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
STD 78, RFC 6353, DOI 10.17487/RFC6353, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6353>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
[STD58] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of Management Information
Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, RFC 2578, April 1999.
McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions for SMIv2",
STD 58, RFC 2579, April 1999.
McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Conformance Statements for SMIv2",
STD 58, RFC 2580, April 1999.
[STD62] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An
Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, RFC 3411,
December 2002.
Case, J., Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen,
"Message Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3412, December
2002.
Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications", STD 62,
RFC 3413, December 2002.
Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model
(USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, RFC 3414, December 2002.
Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based
Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3415, December
2002.
Presuhn, R., Ed., "Version 2 of the Protocol Operations
for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
STD 62, RFC 3416, December 2002.
Presuhn, R., Ed., "Transport Mappings for the Simple
Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, RFC 3417,
December 2002.
Presuhn, R., Ed., "Management Information Base (MIB) for
the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62,
RFC 3418, December 2002.
8.2. Informative References
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5953] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
RFC 5953, DOI 10.17487/RFC5953, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5953>.
[RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.
[RFC8447] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
and DTLS", RFC 8447, DOI 10.17487/RFC8447, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8447>.
[RFC8996] Moriarty, K. and S. Farrell, "Deprecating TLS 1.0 and TLS
1.1", BCP 195, RFC 8996, DOI 10.17487/RFC8996, March 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8996>.
[RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.
[RFC9150] Cam-Winget, N. and J. Visoky, "TLS 1.3 Authentication and
Integrity-Only Cipher Suites", RFC 9150,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9150, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9150>.
[RFC9325] Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325>.
Author's Address
Kenneth Vaughn (editor)
Trevilon LLC
1060 Highway 107 South
Del Rio, TN 37727
United States of America
Phone: +1 571 331 5670
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft Updates to the TLSTM for SNMP May 2023
Email: kvaughn@trevilon.com
Vaughn Expires 9 November 2023 [Page 35]
