Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-quic-retry-offload
draft-ietf-quic-retry-offload
QUIC M. Duke
Internet-Draft Google
Intended status: Standards Track N. Banks
Expires: 26 November 2022 Microsoft
25 May 2022
QUIC Retry Offload
draft-ietf-quic-retry-offload-00
Abstract
QUIC uses Retry packets to reduce load on stressed servers, by
forcing the client to prove ownership of its address before the
server commits state. QUIC also has an anti-tampering mechanism to
prevent the unauthorized injection of Retry packets into a
connection. However, a server operator may want to offload
production of Retry packets to an anti-Denial-of-Service agent or
hardware accelerator. "Retry Offload" is a mechanism for
coordination between a server and an external generator of Retry
packets that can succeed despite the anti-tampering mechanism.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 November 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Common Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Consistent Treatment of Initials . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Considerations for Non-Initial Packets . . . . . . . . . 7
3. No-Shared-State Retry Offload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Offload Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Server Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Shared-State Retry Offload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Token Protection with AEAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Configuration Agent Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Offload Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4. Server Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Shared-State Retry Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Retry Offload YANG Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix B. Transition Mode Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B.1. Handshakes in Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B.2. New Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix C. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix D. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
D.1. since draft-duke-quic-retry-offload-00 . . . . . . . . . 22
D.2. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-12 . . . . . . . . . 22
D.3. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-11 . . . . . . . . . 22
D.4. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-10 . . . . . . . . . 22
D.5. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-09 . . . . . . . . . 23
D.6. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-08 . . . . . . . . . 23
D.7. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-07 . . . . . . . . . 23
D.8. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-06 . . . . . . . . . 23
D.9. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-05 . . . . . . . . . 23
D.10. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-04 . . . . . . . . . 24
D.11. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-03 . . . . . . . . . 24
D.12. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-02 . . . . . . . . . 24
D.13. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-01 . . . . . . . . . 24
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D.14. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-00 . . . . . . . . . 25
D.15. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-06 . . . . . . . . . 25
D.16. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-05 . . . . . . . . . 25
D.17. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-04 . . . . . . . . . 25
D.18. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-03 . . . . . . . . . 25
D.19. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-02 . . . . . . . . . 25
D.20. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-01 . . . . . . . . . 26
D.21. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-00 . . . . . . . . . 26
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1. Introduction
QUIC [RFC9000] servers send Retry packets to avoid prematurely
allocating resources when under stress, such as during a Denial of
Service (DoS) attack. Because both Initial packets and Retry packets
have weak authentication properties, the Retry packet contains an
encrypted token that helps the client and server to validate, via
transport parameters, that an attacker did not inject or modify a
packet of either type for this connection attempt.
However, a server under stress is less inclined to process incoming
Initial packets and compute the Retry token in the first place. An
analogous mechanism for TCP is syncookies [RFC4987]. As TCP has
weaker authentication properties to QUIC, syncookie generation can
often be offloaded to a hardware device, or to a anti-Denial-of-
Service provider that is topologically far from the protected server.
As such an offload would behave exactly like an attacker, QUIC's
authentication methods make such a capability impossible.
This document seeks to enable offloading of Retry generation to QUIC
via explicit coordination between servers and the hardware or
provider offload, which this document refers to as a "Retry Offload."
It has two different modes, to conform to two different use cases.
The no-shared-state mode has minimal coordination and does not
require key sharing. While operationally easier to configure and
manage, it places severe constraints on the operational profile of
the offload. In particular, the offload must control all ingress to
the server and fail closed.
The shared-state mode removes the operational constraints, but also
requires more sophisticated key management.
Both modes specify a common format for encoding information in the
Retry token, so that the server can correctly populate the relevant
transport parameter fields.
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1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation
only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be
interpreted as carrying significance described in RFC 2119.
For brevity, "Connection ID" will often be abbreviated as "CID".
A "Retry Offload" is a hardware or software device that is
conceptually separate from a QUIC server that terminates QUIC
connections. This document assumes that the Retry Offload and the
server have an administrative relationship that allows them to accept
common configuation.
A "configuration agent" is some entity that determines the common
configuration to be distributed to the servers and the Retry Offload.
This document uses "QUIC" to refer to the protocol in QUIC version 1
[RFC9000]. Retry offloads can be applied to other versions of QUIC
that use Retry packets and have identical information requirements
for Retry validation. However, note that source and destination
connection IDs are the only relevant data fields that are invariant
across QUIC versions [RFC8999].
1.2. Notation
All wire formats will be depicted using the notation defined in
Section 1.3 of [RFC9000].
The example below illustrates the basic framework:
Example Structure {
One-bit Field (1),
7-bit Field with Fixed Value (7) = 61,
Field with Variable-Length Integer (i),
Arbitrary-Length Field (..),
Variable-Length Field (8..24),
Field With Minimum Length (16..),
Field With Maximum Length (..128),
[Optional Field (64)],
Repeated Field (8) ...,
}
Figure 1: Example Format
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2. Common Requirements
Regardless of mechanism, a Retry Offload has an active mode, where it
is generating Retry packets, and an inactive mode, where it is not,
based on its assessment of server load and the likelihood an attack
is underway. The choice of mode MAY be made on a per-packet or per-
connection basis, through a stochastic process or based on client
address.
A configuration agent MUST distribute a list of QUIC versions the
Retry Offload supports. It MAY also distribute either an "Allow-
List" or a "Deny-List" of other QUIC versions. It MUST NOT
distribute both an Allow-List and a Deny-List.
The Allow-List or Deny-List MUST NOT include any versions included
for Retry Offload support.
The Configuration Agent MUST provide a means for the entity that
controls the Retry Offload to report its supported version(s) to the
configuration Agent. If the entity has not reported this
information, it MUST NOT activate the Retry Offload and the
configuration agent MUST NOT distribute configuration that activates
it.
The configuration agent MAY delete versions from the final supported
version list if policy does not require the Retry Offload to operate
on those versions.
The configuration Agent MUST provide a means for the entities that
control servers behind the Retry Offload to report either an Allow-
List or a Deny-List.
If all entities supply Allow-Lists, the consolidated list MUST be the
union of these sets. If all entities supply Deny-Lists, the
consolidated list MUST be the intersection of these sets.
If entities provide a mixture of Allow-Lists and Deny-Lists, the
consolidated list MUST be a Deny-List that is the intersection of all
provided Deny-Lists and the inverses of all Allow-Lists.
If no entities that control servers have reported Allow-Lists or
Deny-Lists, the default is a Deny-List with the null set (i.e., all
unsupported versions will be admitted). This preserves the future
extensibilty of QUIC.
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A Retry Offload MUST forward all packets for a QUIC version it does
not support that are not on a Deny-List or absent from an Allow-List.
Note that if servers support versions the Retry Offload does not,
this may increase load on the servers.
Note that future versions of QUIC might not have Retry packets,
require different information in Retry, or use different packet type
indicators.
2.1. Consistent Treatment of Initials
Retry Offloads SHOULD treat Initial packets from the same connection
with a uniform policy. Initial packets of the first and second
client flight can be difficult to distinguish without expensive
decryption of the contents, which is unsuitable under the conditions
of a DDoS attack. If the first packet of a connection is admitted
without Retry, but the second triggers a Retry, that Retry packet
will be ignored and the loss of an Initial coalesced with other
packets can impair performance. In some situations, the client does
not yet have handshake keys, and dropping further client Initial
packets creates a deadlock where the connection cannot progress.
The simplest means to ensure this is to require, when active, a Retry
Token for all incoming Initial packets, and send a Retry packet
otherwise. If the Retry Offload is to be more selective, one
technique keeps state on which address/port 4-tuples have been
admitted. Another would be to apply a secure hash to the source IP
address, port, and connection ID to deterministically compute whether
the Initial requires a Retry Token or not. These source values
remain consistent over the handshake.
However, even with these techniques there is a potential problem when
a Retry Offload switches from inactive to active mode. The Retry
Offload could admit the first packet while in inactive mode, and then
drop subsequent Initials in active mode.
If the Retry Offload is always on-path, it MAY keep state on incoming
connections while in inactive mode to avoid this problem. If it
cannot or will not keep such state, it SHOULD implement "transition
mode" for an interval chosen to include the likely Initial packet
exchange of most clients (200ms is a sensible default).
In transition mode, Retry Offloads process Initial packets with Retry
tokens as in active mode. When the Retry Offload receives an Initial
packet with no token, it issues a Retry AND forwards the packet to
the server. If the client has already received a packet from the
server, it will ignore the Retry and the connection will progress
normally. If not, the client will reconnect based on the Retry, the
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server's response to the first initial will be discarded, and the
connection will progress normally based on the client's second
Initial. Appendix B explores the various possible packet sequences
in transition mode.
Note that transition mode provides no actual DDoS relief to the
server, so its duration should be as short as possible. The Retry
Offload can choose not to implement transition mode and cause some
client connections to fail.
Servers operating behind a Retry Offload SHOULD implement a mechanism
that operates whenever a client Initial arrives with a valid Retry
token. If there is another connection with identical client
Connection ID, IP, and Port, but with an unvalidated address, that
connection is immediately and silently terminated. This mechanism
eliminates incorrect connection state that is an artifact of
transition mode, as explained in Appendix B.
2.2. Considerations for Non-Initial Packets
Initial Packets are especially effective at consuming server
resources because they cause the server to create connection state.
Even when mitigating this load with Retry Packets, the act of
validating an Initial Token and sending a Retry Packet is more
expensive than the response to a non-Initial packet with an unknown
Connection ID: simply dropping it and/or sending a Stateless Reset.
Nevertheless, a Retry Offload in Active Mode might desire to shield
servers from non-Initial packets that do not correspond to a
previously admitted Initial Packet. This has a number of
considerations.
* If a Retry Offload maintains no per-flow state, it cannot
distinguish between valid and invalid non-Initial packets and MUST
forward all non-Initial Packets to the server.
* For QUIC versions the Retry Offload does not support and are
present on the Allow-List (or absent from the Deny-List), the
Retry Offload cannot distinguish Initial Packets from other long
headers and therefore MUST admit all long headers.
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* If a Retry Offload keeps per-flow state, it can identify 4-tuples
that have been previously approved, admit non-Initial packets from
those flows, and drop all others. However, dropping short headers
will effectively break Address Migration and NAT Rebinding when in
Active Mode, as post-migration packets will arrive with a
previously unknown 4-tuple. This policy will also break
connection attempts using any new QUIC versions that begin
connections with a short header.
* If a Retry Offload is integrated with a QUIC-LB routable load
balancer [I-D.ietf-quic-load-balancers], it can verify that the
Destination Connection ID is routable, and only admit non-Initial
packets with routable DCIDs. As the Connection ID encoding is
invariant across QUIC versions, the Retry Offload can do this for
all short headers.
Nothing in this section prevents Retry Offloads from making basic
syntax correctness checks on packets with QUIC versions that it
understands (e.g., enforcing the Initial Packet datagram size minimum
in version 1).
3. No-Shared-State Retry Offload
The no-shared-state Retry Offload requires no coordination, except
that the server must be configured to accept this offload and know
which QUIC versions the Retry Offload supports. The scheme uses the
first bit of the token to distinguish between tokens from Retry
packets (codepoint '0') and tokens from NEW_TOKEN frames (codepoint
'1').
3.1. Configuration Agent Actions
See Section 2.
3.2. Offload Requirements
A no-shared-state Retry Offload MUST be present on all paths from
potential clients to the server. These paths MUST fail to pass QUIC
traffic should the offload fail for any reason. That is, if the
offload is not operational, the server MUST NOT be exposed to client
traffic. Otherwise, servers that have already disabled their Retry
capability would be vulnerable to attack.
The path between offload and server MUST be free of any potential
attackers. Note that this and other requirements above severely
restrict the operational conditions in which a no-shared-state Retry
Offload can safely operate.
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Retry tokens generated by the offload MUST have the format below.
No-Shared-State Retry Offload Token {
Token Type (1) = 0,
ODCIL (7) = 8..20,
Original Destination Connection ID (64..160),
Opaque Data (..),
}
Figure 2: Format of non-shared-state Retry Offload tokens
The first bit of retry tokens generated by the offload MUST be zero.
The token has the following additional fields:
ODCIL: The length of the original destination connection ID from the
triggering Initial packet. This is in cleartext to be readable for
the server, but authenticated later in the token. The Retry Offload
SHOULD reject any token in which the value is less than 8.
Original Destination Connection ID: This also in cleartext and
authenticated later.
Opaque Data: This data contains the information necessary to
authenticate the Retry token in accordance with the QUIC
specification. A straightforward implementation would encode the
Retry Source Connection ID, client IP address, and a timestamp in the
Opaque Data. A more space-efficient implementation would use the
Retry Source Connection ID and Client IP as associated data in an
encryption operation, and encode only the timestamp and the
authentication tag in the Opaque Data. If the Initial packet alters
the Connection ID or source IP address, authentication of the token
will fail.
Upon receipt of an Initial packet with a token that begins with '0',
the Retry Offload MUST validate the token in accordance with the QUIC
specification.
In active mode, the offload MUST issue Retry packets for all client
Initial packets that contain no token, or a token that has the first
bit set to '1'. It MUST NOT forward the packet to the server. The
offload MUST validate all tokens with the first bit set to '0'. If
successful, the offload MUST forward the packet with the token
intact. If unsuccessful, it MUST drop the packet. The Retry Offload
MAY send an Initial Packet containing a CONNECTION_CLOSE frame with
the INVALID_TOKEN error code when dropping the packet.
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Note that this scheme has a performance drawback. When the Retry
Offload is in active mode, clients with a token from a NEW_TOKEN
frame will suffer a 1-RTT penalty even though its token provides
proof of address.
In inactive mode, the offload MUST forward all packets that have no
token or a token with the first bit set to '1'. It MUST validate all
tokens with the first bit set to '0'. If successful, the offload
MUST forward the packet with the token intact. If unsuccessful, it
MUST drop the packet.
3.3. Server Requirements
A server behind a non-shared-state Retry Offload MUST NOT send Retry
packets for a QUIC version the Retry Offload understands. It MAY
send Retry for QUIC versions the Retry Offload does not understand.
Tokens sent in NEW_TOKEN frames MUST have the first bit set to '1'.
If a server receives an Initial Packet with the first bit in the
token set to '1', it could be from a server-generated NEW_TOKEN frame
and should be processed in accordance with the QUIC specification.
If a server receives an Initial Packet with the first bit to '0', it
is a Retry token and the server MUST NOT attempt to validate it.
Instead, it MUST assume the address is validated, MUST include the
packet's Destination Connection ID in a Retry Source Connection ID
transport parameter, and MUST extract the Original Destination
Connection ID from the token cleartext for use in the transport
parameter of the same name.
4. Shared-State Retry Offload
A shared-state Retry Offload uses a shared key, so that the server
can decode the offload's retry tokens. It does not require that all
traffic pass through the Retry Offload, so servers MAY send Retry
packets in response to Initial packets without a valid token.
Both server and offload MUST have time synchronized within two
seconds of each other to prevent tokens being incorrectly marked as
expired.
The tokens are protected using AES128-GCM AEAD, as explained in
Section 4.1. All tokens, generated by either the server or Retry
Offload, MUST use the following format, which includes:
* A 1 bit token type identifier.
* A 7 bit token key identifier.
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* A 96 bit unique token number transmitted in clear text, but
protected as part of the AEAD associated data.
* A token body, encoding the Original Destination Connection ID and
the Timestamp, optionally followed by server specific Opaque Data.
The token protection uses an 128 bit representation of the source IP
address from the triggering Initial packet. The client IP address is
16 octets. If an IPv4 address, the last 12 octets are zeroes. It
also uses the Source Connection ID of the Retry packet, which will
cause an authentication failure if it differs from the Destination
Connection ID of the packet bearing the token.
If there is a Network Address Translator (NAT) in the server
infrastructure that changes the client IP, the Retry Offload MUST
either be positioned behind the NAT, or the NAT must have the token
key to rewrite the Retry token accordingly. Note also that a host
that obtains a token through a NAT and then attempts to connect over
a path that does not have an identically configured NAT will fail
address validation.
The 96 bit unique token number is set to a random value using a
cryptography-grade random number generator.
The token key identifier and the corresponding AEAD key and AEAD IV
are provisioned by the configuration agent.
The token body is encoded as follows:
Shared-State Retry Offload Token Body {
Timestamp (64),
[ODCIL (8) = 8..20],
[Original Destination Connection ID (64..160)],
[Port (16)],
Opaque Data (..),
}
Figure 3: Body of shared-state Retry Offload tokens
The token body has the following fields:
Timestamp: The Timestamp is a 64-bit integer, in network order, that
expresses the expiration time of the token as a number of seconds in
POSIX time (see Sec. 4.16 of [TIME_T]).
ODCIL: The original destination connection ID length. Tokens in
NEW_TOKEN frames do not have this field.
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Original Destination Connection ID: The server or Retry Offload
copies this from the field in the client Initial packet. Tokens in
NEW_TOKEN frames do not have this field.
Port: The Source Port of the UDP datagram that triggered the Retry
packet. This field MUST be present if and only if the ODCIL is
greater than zero. This field is therefore always absent in tokens
in NEW_TOKEN frames.
Opaque Data: The server may use this field to encode additional
information, such as congestion window, RTT, or MTU. The Retry
Offload MUST have zero-length opaque data.
Some implementations of QUIC encode in the token the Initial Packet
Number used by the client, in order to verify that the client sends
the retried Initial with a PN larger that the triggering Initial.
Such implementations will encode the Initial Packet Number as part of
the opaque data. As tokens may be generated by the Service, servers
MUST NOT reject tokens because they lack opaque data and therefore
the packet number.
Shared-state Retry Offloads use the AES-128-ECB cipher. Future
standards could add new algorithms that use other ciphers to provide
cryptographic agility in accordance with [RFC7696]. Retry Offload
and server implementations SHOULD be extensible to support new
algorithms.
4.1. Token Protection with AEAD
On the wire, the token is presented as:
Shared-State Retry Offload Token {
Token Type (1),
Key Sequence (7),
Unique Token Number (96),
Encrypted Shared-State Retry Offload Token Body (64..),
AEAD Integrity Check Value (128),
}
Figure 4: Wire image of shared-state Retry Offload tokens
The tokens are protected using AES128-GCM as follows:
* The Key Sequence is the 7 bit identifier to retrieve the token key
and IV.
* The AEAD IV, is 96 bits generated by the configuration agent.
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* The AEAD nonce, N, is formed by XORing the AEAD IV with the 96 bit
unique token number.
* The associated data is a formatted as a pseudo header by combining
the cleartext part of the token with the IP address of the client.
The format of the pseudoheader depends on whether the Token Type
bit is '1' (a NEW_TOKEN token) or '0' (a Retry token).
Shared-State Retry Offload Token Pseudoheader {
IP Address (128),
Token Type (1),
Key Sequence (7),
Unique Token Number (96),
[RSCIL (8)],
[Retry Source Connection ID (0..20)],
}
Figure 5: Psuedoheader for shared-state Retry Offload tokens
RSCIL: The Retry Source Connection ID Length in octets. This field
is only present when the Token Type is '0'.
Retry Source Connection ID: To create a Retry Token, populate this
field with the Source Connection ID the Retry packet will use. To
validate a Retry token, populate it with the Destination Connection
ID of the Initial packet that carries the token. This field is only
present when the Token Type is '0'.
* The input plaintext for the AEAD is the token body. The output
ciphertext of the AEAD is transmitted in place of the token body.
* The AEAD Integrity Check Value(ICV), defined in Section 6 of
[RFC4106], is computed as part of the AEAD encryption process, and
is verified during decryption.
4.2. Configuration Agent Actions
The configuration agent generates and distributes a "token key", a
"token IV", a key sequence, and the information described in
Section 2.
4.3. Offload Requirements
In inactive mode, the Retry Offload forwards all packets without
further inspection or processing. The rest of this section only
applies to a offload in active mode.
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Retry Offloads MUST NOT issue Retry packets except where explicitly
allowed below, to avoid sending a Retry packet in response to a Retry
token.
The offload MUST generate Retry tokens with the format described
above when it receives a client Initial packet with no token.
If there is a token of either type, the offload MUST attempt to
decrypt it.
To decrypt a packet, the offload checks the Token Type and constructs
a pseudoheader with the appropriate format for that type, using the
bearing packet's Destination Connection ID to populate the Retry
Source Connection ID field, if any.
A token is invalid if:
* it uses an unknown key sequence,
* the AEAD ICV does not match the expected value (By construction,
it will only match if the client IP Address, and any Retry Source
Connection ID, also matches),
* the ODCIL, if present, is invalid for a client-generated CID (less
than 8 or more than 20 in QUIC version 1),
* the Timestamp of a token points to time in the past (however, in
order to allow for clock skew, it SHOULD NOT consider tokens to be
expired if the Timestamp encodes less than two seconds in the
past), or
* the port number, if present, does not match the source port in the
encapsulating UDP header.
Packets with valid tokens MUST be forwarded to the server.
The offload MUST drop packets with invalid tokens. If the token is
of type '1' (NEW_TOKEN), it MUST respond with a Retry packet. If of
type '0', it MUST NOT respond with a Retry packet.
4.4. Server Requirements
The server MAY issue Retry or NEW_TOKEN tokens in accordance with
[RFC9000]. When doing so, it MUST follow the format above.
The server MUST validate all tokens that arrive in Initial packets,
as they may have bypassed the Retry Offload. It determines validity
using the procedure in Section 4.3.
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If a valid Retry token, the server populates the
original_destination_connection_id transport parameter using the
corresponding token field. It populates the
retry_source_connection_id transport parameter with the Destination
Connection ID of the packet bearing the token.
In all other respects, the server processes both valid and invalid
tokens in accordance with [RFC9000].
For QUIC versions the offload does not support, the server MAY use
any token format.
5. Security Considerations
5.1. Shared-State Retry Keys
The Shared-State Retry Offload defined in Section 4 describes the
format of retry tokens or new tokens protected and encrypted using
AES128-GCM. Each token includes a 96 bit randomly generated unique
token number, and an 8 bit identifier used to get the AES-GCM
encryption context. The AES-GCM encryption context contains a 128
bit key and an AEAD IV. There are three important security
considerations for these tokens:
* An attacker that obtains a copy of the encryption key will be able
to decrypt and forge tokens.
* Attackers may be able to retrieve the key if they capture a
sufficently large number of retry tokens encrypted with a given
key.
* Confidentiality of the token data will fail if separate tokens
reuse the same 96 bit unique token number and the same key.
To protect against disclosure of keys to attackers, offload and
servers MUST ensure that the keys are stored securely. To limit the
consequences of potential exposures, the lifetime of any given key
should be limited.
Section 6.6 of [RFC9001] states that "Endpoints MUST count the number
of encrypted packets for each set of keys. If the total number of
encrypted packets with the same key exceeds the confidentiality limit
for the selected AEAD, the endpoint MUST stop using those keys." It
goes on with the specific limit: "For AEAD_AES_128_GCM and
AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the confidentiality limit is 2^23 encrypted
packets; see Appendix B.1." It is prudent to adopt the same limit
here, and configure the offload in such a way that no more than 2^23
tokens are generated with the same key.
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In order to protect against collisions, the 96 bit unique token
numbers should be generated using a cryptographically secure
pseudorandom number generator (CSPRNG), as specified in Appendix C.1
of the TLS 1.3 specification [RFC8446]. With proper random numbers,
if fewer than 2^40 tokens are generated with a single key, the risk
of collisions is lower than 0.001%.
6. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA requirements.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
[TIME_T] "Open Group Standard: Vol. 1: Base Definitions, Issue 7",
IEEE Std 1003.1 , 2018,
<http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/
V1_chap04.html#tag_04_16>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-quic-load-balancers]
Duke, M., Banks, N., and C. Huitema, "QUIC-LB: Generating
Routable QUIC Connection IDs", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-13, 28 March 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-quic-load-
balancers-13.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4106] Viega, J. and D. McGrew, "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode
(GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4106, DOI 10.17487/RFC4106, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4106>.
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[RFC4987] Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common
Mitigations", RFC 4987, DOI 10.17487/RFC4987, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4987>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for
the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC7696] Housley, R., "Guidelines for Cryptographic Algorithm
Agility and Selecting Mandatory-to-Implement Algorithms",
BCP 201, RFC 7696, DOI 10.17487/RFC7696, November 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7696>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[RFC8999] Thomson, M., "Version-Independent Properties of QUIC",
RFC 8999, DOI 10.17487/RFC8999, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8999>.
[RFC9001] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure
QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9001>.
Appendix A. Retry Offload YANG Model
These YANG models conform to [RFC6020] and express a complete Retry
Offload configuration.
module ietf-retry-offload {
yang-version "1.1";
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-quic-lb";
prefix "quic-lb";
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types.";
}
import ietf-inet-types {
prefix inet;
reference
"RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types.";
}
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organization
"IETF QUIC Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/quic>
WG List: <quic@ietf.org>
Authors: Martin Duke (martin.h.duke at gmail dot com)
Nick Banks (nibanks at microsoft dot com)
Christian Huitema (huitema at huitema.net)";
description
"This module enables the explicit cooperation of QUIC servers
with offloads that generate Retry packets on their behalf.
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to
the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set
forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC itself
for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL
NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED',
'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as
described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when,
they appear in all capitals, as shown here.";
revision "2022-02-11" {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX, QUIC Retry Offloads";
}
container retry-offload-config {
description
"Configuration of Retry Offload. If supported-versions is empty,
there is no Retry Offload. If token-keys is empty, it uses the
non-shared-state offload. If present, it uses shared-state
tokens.";
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leaf-list supported-versions {
type uint32;
description
"QUIC versions that the Retry Offload supports. If empty,
there is no Retry Offload.";
}
leaf unsupported-version-default {
type enumeration {
enum allow {
description "Unsupported versions admitted by default";
}
enum deny {
description "Unsupported versions denied by default";
}
}
default allow;
description
"Are unsupported versions not in version-exceptions allowed
or denied?";
}
leaf-list version-exceptions {
type uint32;
description
"Exceptions to the default-deny or default-allow rule.";
}
list token-keys {
key "key-sequence-number";
description
"list of active keys, for key rotation purposes. Existence
implies shared-state format";
leaf key-sequence-number {
type uint8 {
range "0..127";
}
mandatory true;
description
"Identifies the key used to encrypt the token";
}
leaf token-key {
type retry-offload-key;
mandatory true;
description
"16-byte key to encrypt the token";
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}
leaf token-iv {
type yang:hex-string {
length 23;
}
mandatory true;
description
"8-byte IV to encrypt the token, encoded in 23 bytes";
}
}
}
}
A.1. Tree Diagram
This summary of the YANG models uses the notation in [RFC8340].
module: retry-offload-config
+--rw retry-offload-config
+--rw supported-versions* uint32
+--rw unsupported-version-default? enumeration
+--rw version-exceptions* uint32
+--rw token-keys* [key-sequence-number]
+--rw key-sequence-number uint8
+--rw token-key quic-lb-key
+--rw token-iv yang:hex-string
## Shared State Retry Token Test Vectors
In this case, the shared-state retry token is issued by Retry Offload, so the
opaque data of shared-state retry token body would be null
({{shared-state-retry}}).
Configuration: key_seq 0x00 encrypt_key
0x30313233343536373839303132333435 AEAD_IV 0x313233343536373839303132
Shared-State Retry Offload Token Body: ODCIL 0x12 RSCIL 0x10 port
0x1a0a original_destination_connection_id
0x0c3817b544ca1c94313bba41757547eec937 retry_source_connection_id
0x0301e770d24b3b13070dd5c2a9264307 timestamp 0x0000000060c7bf4d
Shared-State Retry Offload Token: unique_token_number
0x59ef316b70575e793e1a8782 key_sequence 0x00
encrypted_shared_state_retry_offload_token_body 0x7d38b274aa4427c7a15
57c3fa666945931defc65da387a83855196a7cb73caac1e28e5346fd76868de94f8b6
2294 AEAD_ICV 0xf91174fdd711543a32d5e959867f9c22
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AEAD related parameters: client_ip_addr 127.0.0.1 client_port 6666
AEAD_nonce 0x68dd025f45616941072ab6b0 AEAD_associated_data
0x7f00000100000000000000000000000059ef316b70575e793e1a878200 ~~~
Appendix B. Transition Mode Scenarios
The logic motivating transition mode behavior involves detailed
reasoning about endpoint behavior during the handshake. This non-
normative appendix walks through the scenarios.
Dropping Initial packets in the client's second flight can cause
performance problems or deadlocks. In the case where the client and
server first flight end with both sides having handshake keys, there
will generally be no impact on performance. However, if an Initial
ACK is critical to progress, as it can be in the case of multiple-
packet TLS messages, Hello Retry Requests, and similar cases,
dropping subsequent Initial ACKs results in deadlock.
In transition mode, the Retry Offload forwards Initials with no token
while also generating a Retry. This allows handshakes to progress
without further incident.
B.1. Handshakes in Progress
If the client hello was admitted in inactive mode, then the client
has already received a packet from the server. Although subsequent
client Initial packets will trigger a Retry, the client will ignore
these packets. Those Initials will also be processed by the server
to continue the handshake.
B.2. New Connections
After sending a Client Hello in Initial Packet A, a client will
rapidly receive a Retry Packet from the Offload and attempt to
reconnect accordingly with Initial Packet B.
The client will discard any server response to Initial A. If a
Retry, it is a second Retry on the connection. If an Initial, its is
encrypted with keys derived from Initial A, which have already been
discarded, and will be a decryption failure.
Initial B's destination connection ID will be new, so the server will
process it as a new connection and proceed normally.
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Unfortunately, the server connection state initiated by Initial A
will remain. For this reason, this document suggests that servers
silently terminate the older connection. Requiring the address to be
validated avoids cases where an attacker simply replays a client
Initial with a new Destination Connection ID to terminate a valid
connection.
Note that there are corner cases involving further packet loss that
result in connection timeout. For instance, if the Retry Offload's
response to Initial A is lost, then the connection will proceed based
on Initial A. If the Retry Offload then switches from transition
mode to active mode before the client's second flight arrives, the
Retry Offload will drop the Initial packet in that flight, and the
connection might deadlock.
Appendix C. Acknowledgments
Christian Huitema, Ling Tao Nju, and William Zeng Ke all provided
useful input to this document.
Appendix D. Change Log
*RFC Editor's Note:* Please remove this section prior to
publication of a final version of this document.
D.1. since draft-duke-quic-retry-offload-00
* Converted to adopted IETF draft
* Cleaner transition from inactive to active mode
D.2. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-12
* Separated from the QUIC-LB draft
* Renamed "Retry Service" to "Retry Offload"
D.3. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-11
* Fixed mistakes in test vectors
D.4. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-10
* Refactored algorithm descriptions; made the 4-pass algorithm
easier to implement
* Revised test vectors
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* Split YANG model into a server and middlebox version
D.5. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-09
* Renamed "Stream Cipher" and "Block Cipher" to "Encrypted Short"
and "Encrypted Long"
* Added section on per-connection state
* Changed "Encrypted Short" to a 4-pass algorithm.
* Recommended a random initial nonce when incrementing.
* Clarified what SNI LBs should do with unknown QUIC versions.
D.6. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-08
* Eliminate Dynamic SID allocation
* Eliminated server use bytes
D.7. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-07
* Shortened SSCID nonce minimum length to 4 bytes
* Removed RSCID from Retry token body
* Simplified CID formats
* Shrunk size of SID table
D.8. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-06
* Added interoperability with DTLS
* Changed "non-compliant" to "unroutable"
* Changed "arbitrary" algorithm to "fallback"
* Revised security considerations for mistrustful tenants
* Added Retry Offload considerations for non-Initial packets
D.9. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-05
* Added low-config CID for further discussion
* Complete revision of shared-state Retry Token
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* Added YANG model
* Updated configuration limits to ensure CID entropy
* Switched to notation from quic-transport
D.10. since draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-04
* Rearranged the shared-state retry token to simplify token
processing
* More compact timestamp in shared-state retry token
* Revised server requirements for shared-state retries
* Eliminated zero padding from the test vectors
* Added server use bytes to the test vectors
* Additional compliant DCID criteria
D.11. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-03
* Improved Config Rotation text
* Added stream cipher test vectors
* Deleted the Obfuscated CID algorithm
D.12. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-02
* Replaced stream cipher algorithm with three-pass version
* Updated Retry format to encode info for required TPs
* Added discussion of version invariance
* Cleaned up text about config rotation
* Added Reset Oracle and limited configuration considerations
* Allow dropped long-header packets for known QUIC versions
D.13. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-01
* Test vectors for load balancer decoding
* Deleted remnants of in-band protocol
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* Light edit of Retry Offloads section
* Discussed load balancer chains
D.14. since-draft-ietf-quic-load-balancers-00
* Removed in-band protocol from the document
D.15. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-06
* Switch to IETF WG draft.
D.16. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-05
* Editorial changes
* Made load balancer behavior independent of QUIC version
* Got rid of token in stream cipher encoding, because server might
not have it
* Defined "non-compliant DCID" and specified rules for handling
them.
* Added psuedocode for config schema
D.17. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-04
* Added standard for Retry Offloads
D.18. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-03
* Renamed Plaintext CID algorithm as Obfuscated CID
* Added new Plaintext CID algorithm
* Updated to allow 20B CIDs
* Added self-encoding of CID length
D.19. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-02
* Added Config Rotation
* Added failover mode
* Tweaks to existing CID algorithms
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* Added Block Cipher CID algorithm
* Reformatted QUIC-LB packets
D.20. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-01
* Complete rewrite
* Supports multiple security levels
* Lightweight messages
D.21. Since draft-duke-quic-load-balancers-00
* Converted to markdown
* Added variable length connection IDs
Authors' Addresses
Martin Duke
Google
Email: martin.h.duke@gmail.com
Nick Banks
Microsoft
Email: nibanks@microsoft.com
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