Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-radext-ieee802ext
draft-ietf-radext-ieee802ext
RADEXT Working Group Bernard Aboba
INTERNET-DRAFT Microsoft Corporation
Category: Proposed Standard Jouni Malinen
Expires: October 1, 2014 Devicescape Software
Updates: 3580, 4072 Paul Congdon
Tallac Networks
Joseph Salowey
Cisco Systems
Mark Jones
Azuca Systems
28 March 2014
RADIUS Attributes for IEEE 802 Networks
draft-ietf-radext-ieee802ext-12.txt
Abstract
RFC 3580 provides guidelines for the use of the Remote Authentication
Dialin User Service (RADIUS) within IEEE 802 local area networks
(LANs). This document defines additional attributes for use within
IEEE 802 networks, as well as clarifying the usage of the EAP-Key-
Name attribute and the Called-Station-Id attribute. This document
updates RFC 3580 as well as RFC 4072.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.
The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.
This Internet-Draft will expire on October 1, 2014.
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Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction .......................................... 4
1.1 Terminology ..................................... 4
1.2 Requirements Language ........................... 5
2. RADIUS attributes ..................................... 5
2.1 Allowed-Called-Station-Id ....................... 5
2.2 EAP-Key-Name .................................... 6
2.3 EAP-Peer-Id ..................................... 7
2.4 EAP-Server-Id ................................... 8
2.5 Mobility-Domain-Id .............................. 9
2.6 Preauth-Timeout ................................. 10
2.7 Network-Id-Name ................................. 11
2.8 EAPoL-Announcement .............................. 12
2.9 WLAN-HESSID ..................................... 14
2.10 WLAN-Venue-Info ................................. 14
2.11 WLAN-Venue-Language ............................. 15
2.12 WLAN-Venue-Name ................................. 16
2.13 WLAN-Reason-Code ................................ 17
2.14 WLAN-Pairwise-Cipher ............................ 18
2.15 WLAN-Group-Cipher ............................... 19
2.16 WLAN-AKM-Suite .................................. 20
2.17 WLAN-Group-Mgmt-Cipher .......................... 21
2.18 WLAN-RF-Band .................................... 22
3. Table of attributes ................................... 23
4. IANA Considerations ................................... 24
5. Security Considerations ............................... 24
6. References ............................................ 25
6.1 Normative References .................................. 25
6.2 Informative References ................................ 26
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................. 26
AUTHORS' ADDRESSES ........................................... 27
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1. Introduction
In situations where it is desirable to centrally manage
authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) for IEEE 802
[IEEE-802] networks, deployment of a backend authentication and
accounting server is desirable. In such situations, it is expected
that IEEE 802 authenticators will function as AAA clients.
"IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)
Usage Guidelines" [RFC3580] provides guidelines for the use of the
Remote Authentication Dialin User Service (RADIUS) within networks
utilizing IEEE 802 local area networks. This document defines
additional attributes suitable for usage by IEEE 802 authenticators
acting as AAA clients.
1.1. Terminology
This document uses the following terms:
Access Point (AP)
A Station that provides access to the distribution
services via the wireless medium for associated Stations.
Association The service used to establish Access Point/Station
mapping and enable Station invocation of the distribution
system services.
authenticator An authenticator is an entity that require authentication
from the supplicant. The authenticator may be connected
to the supplicant at the other end of a point-to-point
LAN segment or wireless link.
authentication server
An authentication server is an entity that provides an
authentication service to an authenticator. This service
verifies from the credentials provided by the supplicant,
the claim of identity made by the supplicant.
Station (STA) Any device that contains an IEEE 802.11 conformant medium
access control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) interface
to the wireless medium (WM).
Supplicant A supplicant is an entity that is being authenticated by
an authenticator. The supplicant may be connected to the
authenticator at one end of a point-to-point LAN segment
or 802.11 wireless link.
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1.2. Requirements Language
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
of the specification. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
2. RADIUS attributes
2.1. Allowed-Called-Station-Id
Description
The Allowed-Called-Station-Id Attribute allows the RADIUS server
to specify the authenticator MAC addresses and/or networks to
which the user is allowed to connect. One or more Allowed-Called-
Station-Id attributes MAY be included in an Access-Accept, CoA-
Request or Accounting-Request packet.
The Allowed-Called-Station-Id Attribute can be useful in
situations where pre-authentication is supported (e.g. IEEE
802.11 pre-authentication). In these scenarios, a Called-Station-
Id Attribute typically will not be included within the Access-
Request so that the RADIUS server will not know the network that
the user is attempting to access. The Allowed-Called-Station-Id
enables the RADIUS server to restrict the networks and attachment
points to which the user can subsequently connect.
A summary of the Allowed-Called-Station-Id Attribute format is
shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD1
Length
>=3
String
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The String field is one or more octets, specifying a Called-
Station-Id that the user MAY connect to; if the Called-Station-Id
that the user connects to does not match one of the Allowed-
Called-Station-Id Attributes, the Network Authentication Server
(NAS) MUST NOT permit the user to access the network.
In the case of IEEE 802, the Allowed-Called-Station-Id Attribute
is used to store the Medium Access Control (MAC) address in ASCII
format (upper case only), with octet values separated by a "-".
Example: "00-10-A4-23-19-C0". Where restrictions on both the
network and authenticator MAC address usage are intended, the
network name MUST be appended to the authenticator MAC address,
separated from the MAC address with a ":". Example:
"00-10-A4-23-19-C0:AP1". Where no MAC address restriction is
intended, the MAC address field MUST be omitted, but ":" and the
network name field MUST be included. Example: ":AP1".
Within IEEE 802.11 [IEEE-802.11], the SSID constitutes the network
name; within IEEE 802.1X [IEEE-802.1X] wired networks, the
Network-Id Name (NID-Name) constitutes the network name. Since a
NID-Name can be up to 253 octets in length, when used with
[IEEE-802.1X] wired networks, there may not be sufficient room
within the Allowed-Called-Station-Id Attribute to include both a
MAC address and a Network Name. However, as the Allowed-Called-
Station-Id Attribute is expected to be used largely in wireless
access scenarios, this restriction is not considered serious.
2.2. EAP-Key-Name
Description
The EAP-Key-Name Attribute, defined in "Diameter Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application" [RFC4072], contains the
EAP Session-Id, as described in "Extensible Authentication
Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework" [RFC5247]. Exactly how
this Attribute is used depends on the link layer in question.
It should be noted that not all link layers use this name. An
EAP-Key-Name Attribute MAY be included within Access-Request,
Access-Accept and CoA-Request packets. A summary of the EAP-Key-
Name Attribute format is shown below. The fields are transmitted
from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Aboba, et al. Proposed Standard [Page 6]
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Code
102 [RFC4072]
Length
>=3
String
The String field is one or more octets, containing the EAP
Session-Id, as defined in "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Key Management Framework" [RFC5247]. Since the NAS operates
as a pass-through in EAP, it cannot know the EAP Session-Id before
receiving it from the RADIUS server. As a result, an EAP-Key-Name
Attribute sent in an Access-Request MUST only contain a single NUL
character. A RADIUS server receiving an Access-Request with an
EAP-Key-Name Attribute containing anything other than a single NUL
character MUST silently discard the Attribute. In addition, the
RADIUS server SHOULD include this Attribute in an Access-Accept or
CoA-Request only if an EAP-Key-Name Attribute was present in the
Access-Request. Since a NAS will typically only include a EAP-
Key-Name Attribute in an Access-Request in situations where the
Attribute is required to provision service, if an EAP-Key-Name
Attribute is included in an Access-Request but is not present in
the Access-Accept, the NAS SHOULD treat the Access-Accept as
though it were an Access-Reject. If an EAP-Key-Name Attribute was
not present in the Access-Request but is included in the Access-
Accept, then the NAS SHOULD silently discard the EAP-Key-Name
Attribute. As noted in [IEEE-802.1X] Section 6.2.2, the
Connectivity Association Key Name (CKN) is derived from the EAP
Session-Id, and as described in Section 9.3.3, the CKN is
subsequently used in the derivation of the Key Encrypting Key
(KEK) and the Integrity Check Value Key (ICK), utilized to protect
the secret keys (SAKs) utilized by Media Access Control Security
(MACsec). As a result, for the NAS to acquire information needed
in the MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) exchange, it needs to include
the EAP-Key-Name attribute in the Access-Request and receive it
from the RADIUS server in the Access-Accept.
2.3. EAP-Peer-Id
Description
The EAP-Peer-Id Attribute contains a Peer-Id generated by the EAP
method. Exactly how this name is used depends on the link layer
in question. See [RFC5247] for more discussion. The EAP-Peer-Id
Attribute MAY be included in Access-Request, Access-Accept and
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Accounting-Request packets. More than one EAP-Peer-Id Attribute
MUST NOT be included in an Access-Request; one or more EAP-Peer-Id
attributes MAY be included in an Access-Accept.
It should be noted that not all link layers use this name, and
existing EAP method implementations do not generate it. Since the
NAS operates as a pass-through in EAP [RFC3748], it cannot know
the EAP-Peer-Id before receiving it from the RADIUS server. As a
result, an EAP-Peer-Id Attribute sent in an Access-Request MUST
only contain a single NUL character. A home RADIUS server
receiving an Access-Request an EAP-Peer-Id Attribute containing
anything other than a single NUL character MUST silently discard
the Attribute. In addition, the home RADIUS server SHOULD include
one or more EAP-Peer-Id attributes in an Access-Accept only if an
EAP-Peer-Id Attribute was present in the Access-Request. If a NAS
receives EAP-Peer-Id Attribute(s) in an Access-Accept without
having included one in an Access-Request, the NAS SHOULD silently
discard the Attribute(s). A summary of the EAP-Peer-Id Attribute
format is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to
right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD2
Length
>=3
String
The String field is one or more octets containing a EAP Peer-Id
exported by the EAP method. For details, see [RFC5247] Appendix
A. A robust implementation SHOULD support the field as
undistinguished octets. Only a single EAP Peer-Id may be included
per Attribute.
2.4. EAP-Server-Id
Description
The EAP-Server-Id Attribute contains a Server-Id generated by the
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EAP method. Exactly how this name is used depends on the link
layer in question. See [RFC5247] for more discussion. The EAP-
Server-Id Attribute is only allowed in Access-Request, Access-
Accept, and Accounting-Request packets. More than one EAP-Server-
Id Attribute MUST NOT be included in an Access-Request; one or
more EAP-Server-Id attributes MAY be included in an Access-Accept.
It should be noted that not all link layers use this name, and
existing EAP method implementations do not generate it. Since the
NAS operates as a pass-through in EAP [RFC3748], it cannot know
the EAP-Server-Id before receiving it from the RADIUS server. As
a result, an EAP-Server-Id Attribute sent in an Access-Request
MUST contain only a single NUL character. A home RADIUS server
receiving in an Access-Request an EAP-Server-Id Attribute
containing anything other than a single NUL character MUST
silently discard the Attribute. In addition, the home RADIUS
server SHOULD include this Attribute an Access-Accept only if an
EAP-Server-Id Attribute was present in the Access-Request. A
summary of the EAP-Server-Id Attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD3
Length
>=3
String
The String field is one or more octets, containing a EAP Server-Id
exported by the EAP method. For details, see [RFC5247] Appendix
A. A robust implementation SHOULD support the field as
undistinguished octets.
2.5. Mobility-Domain-Id
Description
A single Mobility-Domain-Id Attribute MAY be included in an
Access-Request or Accounting-Request, in order to enable the NAS
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to provide the RADIUS server with the Mobility Domain Identifier
(MDID), defined in Section 8.4.2.49 of [IEEE-802.11]. A summary
of the Mobility-Domain-Id Attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD4
Length
6
Value
The Value field is four octets, containing a 32-bit unsigned
integer. The two most significant octets MUST be set to zero by
the sender, and are ignored by the receiver; the two least
significant octets contain the Mobility Domain Identifier (MDID)
defined in Section 8.4.2.49 of [IEEE-802.11].
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Mobility Domain Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
2.6. Preauth-Timeout
Description
This Attribute sets the maximum number of seconds which pre-
authentication state is required to be kept by the NAS, without
being utilized within a user session. For example, when
[IEEE-802.11] pre-authentication is used, if a user has not
attempted to utilize the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) derived as a
result of pre-authentication within the time specified by the
Preauth-Timeout Attribute, the PMK MAY be discarded by the Access
Point. However, once the session is underway, the Preauth-Timeout
Attribute has no bearing on the maximum session time for the user,
Aboba, et al. Proposed Standard [Page 10]
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or the maximum time during which key state may be kept prior to
re-authentication. This is determined by the Session-Timeout
Attribute, if present.
A single Preauth-Timeout Attribute MAY be included within an
Access-Accept or CoA-Request packet. A summary of the Preauth-
Timeout Attribute format is shown below. The fields are
transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD5
Length
6
Value
The field is 4 octets, containing a 32-bit unsigned integer
encoding the maximum time in seconds that pre-authentication state
should be retained by the NAS.
2.7. Network-Id-Name
Description
The Network-Id-Name Attribute is utilized by implementations of
IEEE-802.1X [IEEE-802.1X] to specify the name of a Network-Id
(NID-Name).
Unlike the IEEE 802.11 SSID (which is a maximum of 32 octets in
length), the NID-Name may be up to 253 octets in length.
Consequently, if the MAC address is included within the Called-
Station-Id Attribute, it is possible that there will not be enough
remaining space to encode the NID-Name as well. Therefore when
used with IEEE 802.1X [IEEE-802.1X], the Called-Station-Id
Attribute SHOULD contain only the MAC address, with the Network-
Id-Name Attribute used to transmit the NID-Name. The Network-Id-
Name Attribute MUST NOT be used to encode the IEEE 802.11 SSID; as
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noted in [RFC3580], the Called-Station-Id Attribute is used for
this purpose.
Zero or one Network-Id-Name Attribute is permitted within an
Access-Request, Access-Challenge, Access-Accept or Accounting-
Request packet. When included within an Access-Request packet,
the Network-Id-Name Attribute represents a hint of the NID-Name to
which the Supplicant should be granted access. When included
within an Access-Accept packet, the Network-Id-Name Attribute
represents the NID-Name to which the Supplicant is to be granted
access. When included within an Accounting-Request packet, the
Network-Id-Name Attribute represents the NID-Name to which the
Supplicant has been granted access.
A summary of the Network-Id-Name Attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD6
Length
>=3
String
The String field is one or more octets, containing a NID-Name.
For details, see [IEEE-802.1X]. A robust implementation SHOULD
support the field as undistinguished octets.
2.8. EAPoL-Announcement
Description
The Extensible Authentication Protocol over Local Area Network
(EAPoL)-Announcement Attribute contains EAPoL-Announcement Type
Length Value Tuples (TLVs) defined within Table 11-8 of
IEEE-802.1X [IEEE-802.1X].
Zero or more EAPoL-Announcement attributes are permitted within an
Access-Request, Access-Accept, Access-Challenge, Access-Reject,
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Accounting-Request, CoA-Request or Disconnect-Request packet.
When included within an Access-Request packet, EAPoL-Announcement
attributes contain EAPoL-Announcement TLVs that the user sent in
an EAPoL-Announcement. When included within an Access-Accept,
Access-Challenge, Access-Reject, CoA-Request or Disconnect-Request
packet, EAPoL-Announcement attributes contain EAPoL-Announcement
TLVs that the NAS is to send to the user in a unicast EAPoL-
Announcement. When sent within an Accounting-Request packet,
EAPoL-Announcment attributes contain EAPoL-Announcement TLVs that
the NAS has most recently sent to the user in a unicast EAPoL-
Announcement.
A summary of the EAPoL-Announcement Attribute format is shown
below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD7
Length
>=3
String
The String field is one or more octets, containing EAPoL-
Announcement TLVs in the format defined in Figure 11-8 of Section
11.12 of [IEEE-802.1X]. Any EAPoL-Announcement TLV Type MAY be
included within an EAPoL-Announcement Attribute, including
Organizationally Specific TLVs. If multiple EAPoL-Announcement
attributes are present in a packet, their String fields MUST be
concatenated before being parsed for EAPoL-Announcement TLVs; this
allows EAPoL-Announcement TLVs longer than 253 octets to be
transported by RADIUS. Similarly, EAPoL-Announcement TLVs larger
than 253 octets MUST be fragmented between multiple EAPoL-
Announcement attributes.
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2.9. WLAN-HESSID
Description
The WLAN-HESSID attribute contains a MAC address that identifies
the Homogenous Extended Service Set. The HESSID is a globally
unique identifier that in conjunction with the SSID, encoded
within the Called-Station-Id Attribute as described in [RFC3580],
may be used to provide network identification for a subscription
service provider network (SSPN), as described in Section 8.4.2.94
of [IEEE-802.11]. Zero or one WLAN-HESSID Attribute is permitted
within an Access-Request or Accounting-Request packet.
A summary of the WLAN-HESSID Attribute format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD8
Length
19
String
The String field is encoded in upper-case ASCII characters with
the octet values separated by dash characters, as described in RFC
3580 [RFC3580]. Example: "00-10-A4-23-19-C0".
2.10. WLAN-Venue-Info
Description
The WLAN-Venue-Info attribute identifies the category of venue
hosting the WLAN, as defined in Section 8.4.1.34 of [IEEE-802.11].
Zero or more WLAN-Venue-Info attributes may be included in an
Access-Request or Accounting-Request.
A summary of the WLAN-Venue-Info Attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
Aboba, et al. Proposed Standard [Page 14]
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD9
Length
6
Value
The Value field is four octets, containing a 32-bit unsigned
integer. The two most significant octets MUST be set to zero by
the sender, and are ignored by the receiver; the two least
significant octets contain the Venue Group and Venue Type fields.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Venue Group | Venue Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Venue Group
The Venue Group field is a single octet and describes the broad
category of the venue, e.g. "Assembly". See Section 8.4.1.34
[IEEE-802.11] for Venue Group codes and descriptions.
Venue Type
The Venue Type field is a single octet and describes the venue in
a finer granularity within the Venue Group, e.g. "Library". See
Section 8.4.1.34 of [IEEE-802.11] for Venue Type codes and
descriptions.
2.11. WLAN-Venue-Language
Description
The WLAN-Venue-Language attribute is an ISO-14962-1997
[ISO-14962-1997] encoded string that defines the language used in
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the WLAN-Venue-Name attribute. Zero or more WLAN-Venue-Language
attributes may be included in an Access-Request or Accounting-
Request and each one indicates the language of the WLAN-Venue-Name
attribute that follows it.
A summary of the WLAN-Venue-Language Attribute format is shown
below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
String (cont) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD10
Length
4-5
String
The String field is a two or three character language code
selected from ISO-639 [ISO-639]. A two character language code
has a zero ("null" in ISO-14962-1997) appended to make it 3 octets
in length.
2.12. WLAN-Venue-Name
Description
The WLAN-Venue-Name attribute provides additional metadata on the
BSS. For example, this information may be used to assist a user
in selecting the appropriate BSS with which to associate. Zero or
more WLAN-Venue-Name attributes may be included in an Access-
Request or Accounting-Request in the same or different languages.
A summary of the WLAN-Venue-Name Attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD11
Length
>=3
String
The String field is a UTF-8 formatted field containing the venue's
name. The maximum length of this field is 252 octets.
2.13. WLAN-Reason-Code
Description
The WLAN-Reason-Code Attribute contains information on the reason
why a station has been refused network access and has been
disassociated or de-authenticated. This can occur due to policy
or for reasons related to the user's subscription.
A WLAN-Reason-Code Attribute MAY be included within an Access-
Reject or Disconnect-Request packet, as well as within an
Accounting-Request packet. Upon receipt of an Access-Reject or
Disconnect-Request packet containing a WLAN-Reason-Code Attribute,
the WLAN-Reason-Code value is copied by the Access Point into the
Reason Code field of a Disassociation or Deauthentication frame
(see clause 8.3.3.4 and 8.3.3.12 respectively in [IEEE- 802.11]),
which is subsequently transmitted to the station.
A summary of the WLAN-Reason-Code Attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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Code
TBD12
Length
6
Value
The Value field is four octets, containing a 32-bit unsigned
integer. The two most significant octets MUST be set to zero by
the sender, and are ignored by the receiver; the two least
significant octets contain the Reason Code values defined in Table
8-36 of Section 8.4.1.7 of [IEEE-802.11].
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Reason Code |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
2.14. WLAN-Pairwise-Cipher
Description
The WLAN-Pairwise-Cipher Attribute contains information on the
pairwise cipher suite used to establish the robust security
network association (RSNA) between the AP and mobile device. A
WLAN-Pairwise-Cipher Attribute MAY be included within Access-
Request and Accounting-Request packets.
A summary of the WLAN-Pairwise-Cipher Attribute format is shown
below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD13
Length
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6
Value
The Value field is four octets, containing a 32-bit unsigned
integer, in Suite selector format as specified in Figure 8-187
within Section 8.4.2.27.2 of [IEEE-802.11], with values of OUI and
Suite type drawn from Table 8-99.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OUI | Suite Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
2.15. WLAN-Group-Cipher
Description
The WLAN-Group-Cipher Attribute contains information on the group
cipher suite used to establish the robust security network
association (RSNA) between the AP and mobile device. A WLAN-
Group-Cipher Attribute MAY be included within Access-Request and
Accounting-Request packets.
A summary of the WLAN-Group-Cipher Attribute format is shown
below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD14
Length
6
Value
The Value field is four octets, containing a 32-bit unsigned
integer, in Suite selector format as specified in Figure 8-187
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within Section 8.4.2.27.2 of [IEEE-802.11], with values of OUI and
Suite type drawn from Table 8-99.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OUI | Suite Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
2.16. WLAN-AKM-Suite
Description
The WLAN-AKM-Suite Attribute contains information on the
authentication and key management suite used to establish the
robust security network association (RSNA) between the AP and
mobile device. A WLAN-AKM-Suite Attribute MAY be included within
Access-Request and Accounting-Request packets.
A summary of the WLAN-AKM-Suite Attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD15
Length
6
Value
The Value field is four octets, containing a 32-bit unsigned
integer, in Suite selector format as specified in Figure 8-187
within Section 8.4.2.27.2 of [IEEE-802.11], with values of OUI and
Suite type drawn from Table 8-101:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OUI | Suite Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
2.17. WLAN-Group-Mgmt-Cipher
Description
The WLAN-Group-Mgmt-Cipher Attribute contains information on group
management cipher used to establish the robust security network
association (RSNA) between the AP and mobile device.
Zero or one WLAN-Group-Mgmt-Cipher Attribute MAY be included
within Access-Request and Accounting-Request packets. Presence of
the attribute indicates that the station negotiated to use
management frame protection during association.
A summary of the WLAN-Group-Mgmt-Cipher Attribute format is shown
below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD16
Length
6
Value
The Value field is four octets, containing a 32-bit unsigned
integer, in Suite selector format as specified in Figure 8-187
within Section 8.4.2.27.2 of [IEEE-802.11], with values of OUI and
Suite type drawn from Table 8-99:
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| OUI | Suite Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
2.18. WLAN-RF-Band
Description
The WLAN-RF-Band Attribute contains information on the RF band
used by the Access Point for transmission and reception of
information to and from the mobile device. Zero or one WLAN-RF-
Band Attribute MAY be included within an Access-Request or
Accounting-Request packet.
A summary of the WLAN-RF-Band Attribute format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | Value
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Value |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
TBD17
Length
6
Value
The Value field is four octets, containing a 32-bit unsigned
integer. The three most significant octets MUST be set to zero by
the sender, and are ignored by the receiver; the least significant
octet contains the RF Band field, whose values are defined in
Table 8-53a of [IEEE-802.11ad].
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | RF Band |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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3. Table of attributes
The following table provides a guide to which attributes may be found
in which kinds of packets, and in what quantity.
Access- Access- Access- Access-
Request Accept Reject Challenge # Attribute
0 0+ 0 0 TBD1 Allowed-Called-Station-Id
0-1 0-1 0 0 102 EAP-Key-Name
0-1 0+ 0 0 TBD2 EAP-Peer-Id
0-1 0+ 0 0 TBD3 EAP-Server-Id
0-1 0 0 0 TBD4 Mobility-Domain-Id
0-1 0-1 0 0 TBD5 Preauth-Timeout
0-1 0 0 0 TBD6 Network-Id-Name
0+ 0+ 0+ 0+ TBD7 EAPoL-Announcement
0-1 0 0 0 TBD8 WLAN-HESSID
0-1 0 0 0 TBD9 WLAN-Venue-Info
0+ 0 0 0 TBD10 WLAN-Venue-Language
0+ 0 0 0 TBD11 WLAN-Venue-Name
0 0 0-1 0 TBD12 WLAN-Reason-Code
0-1 0 0 0 TBD13 WLAN-Pairwise-Cipher
0-1 0 0 0 TBD14 WLAN-Group-Cipher
0-1 0 0 0 TBD15 WLAN-AKM-Suite
0-1 0 0 0 TBD16 WLAN-Group-Mgmt-Cipher
0-1 0 0 0 TBD17 WLAN-RF-Band
CoA- Dis- Acct-
Req Req Req # Attribute
0+ 0 0+ TBD1 Allowed-Called-Station-Id
0-1 0 0 102 EAP-Key-Name
0 0 0+ TBD2 EAP-Peer-Id
0 0 0+ TBD3 EAP-Server-Id
0 0 0-1 TBD4 Mobility-Domain-Id
0-1 0 0 TBD5 Preauth-Timeout
0 0 0-1 TBD6 Network-Id-Name
0+ 0+ 0+ TBD7 EAPoL-Announcement
0 0 0-1 TBD8 WLAN-HESSID
0 0 0-1 TBD9 WLAN-Venue-Info
0 0 0+ TBD10 WLAN-Venue-Language
0 0 0+ TBD11 WLAN-Venue-Name
0 0-1 0-1 TBD12 WLAN-Reason-Code
0 0 0-1 TBD13 WLAN-Pairwise-Cipher
0 0 0-1 TBD14 WLAN-Group-Cipher
0 0 0-1 TBD15 WLAN-AKM-Suite
0 0 0-1 TBD16 WLAN-Group-Mgmt-Cipher
0 0 0-1 TBD17 WLAN-RF-Band
The following table defines the meaning of the above table entries.
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0 This Attribute MUST NOT be present in packet.
0+ Zero or more instances of this Attribute MAY be
present in the packet.
0-1 Zero or one instance of this Attribute MAY be
present in the packet.
4. IANA Considerations
This document uses the RADIUS [RFC2865] namespace, see
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/radius-types>. This specification
requires assignment of a RADIUS attribute types for the following
attributes:
Attribute Type
========= ====
Allowed-Called-Station-Id TBD1
EAP-Peer-Id TBD2
EAP-Server-Id TBD3
Mobility-Domain-Id TBD4
Preauth-Timeout TBD5
Network-Id-Name TBD6
EAPoL-Announcement TBD7
WLAN-HESSID TBD8
WLAN-Venue-Info TBD9
WLAN-Venue-Language TBD10
WLAN-Venue-Name TBD11
WLAN-Reason-Code TBD12
WLAN-Pairwise-Cipher TBD13
WLAN-Group-Cipher TBD14
WLAN-AKM-Suite TBD15
WLAN-Group-Mgmt-Cipher TBD16
WLAN-RF-Band TBD17
Since this specification relies entirely on values assigned by IEEE
802, no registries are established for maintenance by the IANA.
5. Security Considerations
Since this document describes the use of RADIUS for purposes of
authentication, authorization, and accounting in IEEE 802 networks,
it is vulnerable to all of the threats that are present in other
RADIUS applications. For a discussion of these threats, see
[RFC2607], [RFC2865], [RFC3162], [RFC3579], [RFC3580] and [RFC5176].
In particular, when RADIUS traffic is sent in the clear, the
attributes defined in this document can be obtained by an attacker
snooping the exchange between the RADIUS client and server. As a
result, RADIUS confidentiality is desirable; for a review of RADIUS
security and crypto-agility requirements, see [RFC6421].
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While it is possible for a RADIUS server to make decisions on whether
to Accept or Reject an Access-Request based on the values of the
WLAN-Pairwise-Cipher, WLAN-Group-Cipher, WLAN-AKM-Suite, WLAN-Group-
Mgmt-Cipher and WLAN-RF-Band Attributes the value of doing this is
limited. In general, an Access-Reject should not be necessary,
except where Access Points and Stations are misconfigured so as to
enable connections to be made with unacceptable values. Rather than
rejecting access on an ongoing basis, users would be better served by
fixing the misconfiguration.
Where access does need to be rejected, the user should be provided
with an indication of why the problem has occurred, or else they are
likely to become frustrated. For example, if the values of the WLAN-
Pairwise-Cipher, WLAN-Group-Cipher, WLAN-AKM-Suite or WLAN-Group-
Mgmt-Cipher Attributes included in the Access-Request are not
acceptable to the RADIUS server, then a WLAN-Reason-Code Attribute
with a value of 29 (Requested service rejected because of service
provider cipher suite or AKM requirement) SHOULD be returned in the
Access-Reject. Similarly, if the value of the WLAN-RF-Band Attribute
included in the Access-Request is not acceptable to the RADIUS
server, then a WLAN-Reason-Code Attribute with a value of 11
(Disassociated because the information in the Supported Channels
element is unacceptable) SHOULD be returned in the Access-Reject.
6. References
6.1. Normative references
[IEEE-802] IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:
Overview and Architecture, ANSI/IEEE Std 802, 1990.
[IEEE-802.11]
Information technology - Telecommunications and Information
Exchange Between Systems - Local and Metropolitan Area
Networks - Specific Requirements Part 11: Wireless LAN
Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY)
Specifications, IEEE Std. 802.11-2012, 2012.
[IEEE-802.11ad]
Information technology - Telecommunications and Information
Exchange Between Systems - Local and Metropolitan Area
Networks - Specific Requirements Part 11: Wireless LAN
Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY)
Specifications, Amendment 3: Enhancements for Very High
Throughput in the 60 GHz Band, IEEE Std. 802.11ad-2012, 2012.
[IEEE-802.1X]
IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks -
Aboba, et al. Proposed Standard [Page 25]
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Port-Based Network Access Control, IEEE 802.1X-2010, February
2010.
[ISO-639] ISO, "Codes for the Representation of Names of Languages".
[ISO-14962-1997]
ISO, "Space data and information transfer systems - ASCII
encoded English", 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, March, 1997.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Rubens, A., Simpson, W. and S. Willens, "Remote
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June
2000.
[RFC4072] Eronen, P., Hiller, T. and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072, August
2005.
[RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D. and P. Eronen, "EAP Key Management
Framework", RFC 5247, August 2008.
6.2. Informative references
[RFC2607] Aboba, B. and J. Vollbrecht, "Proxy Chaining and Policy
Implementation in Roaming", RFC 2607, June 1999.
[RFC3162] Aboba, B., Zorn, G. and D. Mitton, "RADIUS and IPv6", RFC
3162, August 2001.
[RFC3579] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS Support for Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.
[RFC3580] Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G. and J. Roese,
"IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
(RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580, September 2003.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J. and H.
Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC
3748, June 2004.
[RFC5176] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D. and B. Aboba,
"Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication
Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 5176, January 2008.
[RFC6421] Nelson, D., "Crypto-Agility Requirements for Remote
Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 6421,
Aboba, et al. Proposed Standard [Page 26]
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November 2011.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to acknowledge Maximilian Riegel, Dorothy
Stanley, Yoshihiro Ohba, and the contributors to the IEEE 802.1 and
IEEE 802.11 reviews of this document, for useful discussions.
Authors' Addresses
Bernard Aboba
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond, WA 98052
EMail: bernard_aboba@hotmail.com
Jouni Malinen
EMail: j@w1.fi
Paul Congdon
Tallac Networks
6528 Lonetree Blvd.
Rocklin, CA 95765
Phone: +19167576350
EMail: paul.congdon@tallac.com
Joseph Salowey
Cisco Systems
EMail: jsalowey@cisco.com
Mark Jones
Azuca Systems
EMail: mark@azu.ca
Aboba, et al. Proposed Standard [Page 27]
