Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-rats-ar4si
draft-ietf-rats-ar4si
RATS Working Group E. Voit
Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track H. Birkholz
Expires: 2 September 2024 Fraunhofer SIT
T. Hardjono
MIT
T. Fossati
Linaro
V. Scarlata
Intel
1 March 2024
Attestation Results for Secure Interactions
draft-ietf-rats-ar4si-06
Abstract
This document defines reusable Attestation Result information
elements. When these elements are offered to Relying Parties as
Evidence, different aspects of Attester trustworthiness can be
evaluated. Additionally, where the Relying Party is interfacing with
a heterogeneous mix of Attesting Environment and Verifier types,
consistent policies can be applied to subsequent information exchange
between each Attester and the Relying Party.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/ietf-rats-wg/draft-ietf-rats-ar4si.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 2 September 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Attestation Results for Secure Interactions . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1. Information driving a Relying Party Action . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Non-repudiable Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2.1. Attester and Attesting Environment . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.2. Verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.3. Communicating Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3. Trustworthiness Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.1. Design Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.2. Enumeration Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.3. Assigning a Trustworthiness Claim value . . . . . . . 14
2.3.4. Specific Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.5. Trustworthiness Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.6. Trustworthiness Vector for a type of Attesting
Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4. Freshness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3. Secure Interactions Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1. Background-Check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.1. Verifier Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.1.2. Co-resident Verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2. Below Zero Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3. Mutual Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4. Transport Protocol Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix A. Implementation Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
A.1. Supplementing Trustworthiness Claims . . . . . . . . . . 29
Appendix B. Supportable Trustworthiness Claims . . . . . . . . . 29
B.1. Supportable Trustworthiness Claims for HSM-based CC . . . 29
B.2. Supportable Trustworthiness Claims for process-based
CC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
B.3. Supportable Trustworthiness Claims for VM-based CC . . . 33
Appendix C. Some issues being worked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Appendix D. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1. Introduction
The first paragraph of the May 2021 US Presidential Executive Order
on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity [US-Executive-Order] ends
with the statement "the trust we place in our digital infrastructure
should be proportional to how trustworthy and transparent that
infrastructure is." Later this order explores aspects of
trustworthiness such as an auditable trust relationship, which it
defines as an "agreed-upon relationship between two or more system
elements that is governed by criteria for secure interaction,
behavior, and outcomes."
The Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture [RFC9334]
provides a useful context for programmatically establishing and
maintaining such auditable trust relationships. Specifically, the
architecture defines conceptual messages conveyed between
architectural subsystems to support trustworthiness appraisal. The
RATS conceptual message used to convey evidence of trustworthiness is
the Attestation Results. The Attestation Results includes Verifier
generated appraisals of an Attester including such information as the
identity of the Attester, the security mechanisms employed on this
Attester, and the Attester's current state of trustworthiness.
Generated Attestation Results are ultimately conveyed to one or more
Relying Parties. Reception of an Attestation Result enables a
Relying Party to determine what action to take with regards to an
Attester. Frequently, this action will be to choose whether to allow
the Attester to securely interact with the Relying Party over some
connection between the two.
When determining whether to allow secure interactions with an
Attester, a Relying Party is challenged with a number of difficult
problems which it must be able to handle successfully. These
problems include:
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* What Attestation Results (AR) might a Relying Party be willing to
trust from a specific Verifier?
* What information does a Relying Party need before allowing
interactions or choosing policies to apply to a connection?
* What are the operating/environmental realities of the Attesting
Environment where a Relying Party should only be able to associate
a certain confidence regarding Attestation Results out of the
Verifier? (In other words, different types of Trusted Execution
Environments (TEE) need not be treated as equivalent.)
* How to make direct comparisons where there is a heterogeneous mix
of Attesting Environments and Verifier types.
To address these problems, it is important that specific Attestation
Result information elements are framed independently of Attesting
Environment specific constraints. If they are not, a Relying Party
would be forced to adapt to the syntax and semantics of many vendor
specific environments. This is not a reasonable ask as there can be
many types of Attesters interacting with or connecting to a Relying
Party.
The business need therefore is for common Attestation Result
information element definitions. With these definitions, consistent
interaction or connectivity decisions can be made by a Relying Party
where there is a heterogenous mix of Attesting Environment types and
Verifier types.
This document defines information elements for Attestation Results in
a way which normalizes the trustworthiness assertions that can be
made from a diverse set of Attesters.
1.1. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Terminology
The following terms are imported from [RFC9334]: Appraisal Policy for
Attestation Results, Attester, Attesting Environment, Claims,
Evidence, Relying Party, Target Environment and Verifier.
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[RFC9334] also describes topological patterns that illustrate the
need for interoperable conceptual messages. The two patterns called
"background-check model" and "passport model" are imported from the
RATS architecture and used in this document as a reference to the
architectural concepts: Background-Check Model and Passport Model.
Newly defined terms for this document:
AR-augmented Evidence: a bundle of Evidence which includes at least
the following:
1. Verifier signed Attestation Results. These Attestation
Results must include Identity Evidence for the Attester, a
Trustworthiness Vector describing a Verifier's most recent
appraisal of an Attester, and some Verifier Proof-of-Freshness
(PoF).
2. A Relying Party PoF which is bound to the Attestation Results
of (1) by the Attester's Attesting Environment signature.
3. Sufficient information to determine the elapsed interval
between the Verifier PoF and Relying Party PoF.
Identity Evidence: Evidence which unambiguously identifies an
identity. Identity Evidence could take different forms, such as a
certificate, or a signature which can be appraised to have only
been generated by a specific private/public key pair.
Trustworthiness Claim: a specific quanta of trustworthiness which
can be assigned by a Verifier based on its appraisal policy.
Trustworthiness Tier: a categorization of the levels of
trustworthiness which may be assigned by a Verifier to a specific
Trustworthiness Claim. These enumerated categories are:
Affirming, Warning, Contraindicated, and None.
Trustworthiness Vector: a set of zero to many Trustworthiness Claims
assigned during a single appraisal procedure by a Verifier using
Evidence generated by an Attester. The vector is included within
Attestation Results.
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2. Attestation Results for Secure Interactions
A Verifier generates the Attestation Results used by a Relying Party.
When a Relying Party needs to determine whether to permit
communications with an Attester, these Attestation Results must
contain a specific set of information elements. This section defines
those information elements, and in some cases encodings for
information elements.
2.1. Information driving a Relying Party Action
When the action is a communication establishment attempt with an
Attester, there is only a limited set of actions which a Relying
Party might take. These actions include:
* Allow or deny information exchange with the Attester. When there
is a deny, reasons should be returned to the Attester.
* Establish a transport connection between an Attester and a
specific context within a Relying Party (e.g., a TEE, or Virtual
Routing Function (VRF).)
* Apply policies on this connection (e.g., rate limits).
There are three categories of information which must be conveyed to
the Relying Party (which also is integrated with a Verifier) before
it determines which of these actions to take.
1. Non-repudiable Identity Evidence – Evidence which undoubtably
identifies one or more entities involved with a communication.
2. Trustworthiness Claims – Specifics a Verifier asserts with
regards to its trustworthiness findings about an Attester.
3. Claim Freshness – Establishes the time of last update (or
refresh) of Trustworthiness Claims.
The following sections detail requirements for these three
categories.
2.2. Non-repudiable Identity
Identity Evidence must be conveyed during the establishment of any
trust-based relationship. Specific use cases will define the minimum
types of identities required by a particular Relying Party as it
evaluates Attestation Results, and perhaps additional associated
Evidence. At a bare minimum, a Relying Party MUST start with the
ability to verify the identity of a Verifier it chooses to trust.
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Attester identities may then be acquired through signed or encrypted
communications with the Verifier identity and/or the pre-provisioning
Attester public keys in the Attester.
During the Remote Attestation process, the Verifier's identity must
be established with a Relying Party, often via a Verifier signature
across recent Attestation Results. This Verifier identity could only
have come from a key pair maintained by a trusted developer or
operator of the Verifier.
Additionally, each set of Attestation Results must be provably and
non-reputably bound to the identity of the original Attesting
Environment which was evaluated by the Verifier. This is
accomplished via satisfying two requirements. First the Verifier
signed Attestation Results MUST include sufficient Identity Evidence
to ensure that this Attesting Environment signature refers to the
same Attesting Environment appraised by the Verifier. Second, where
the passport model is used as a subsystem, an Attesting Environment
signature which spans the Verifier signature MUST also be included.
As the Verifier signature already spans the Attester Identity as well
as the Attestation Results, this restricts the viability of spoofing
attacks.
In a subset of use cases, these two pieces of Identity Evidence may
be sufficient for a Relying Party to successfully meet the criteria
for its Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results. If the use case is
a connection request, a Relying Party may simply then establish a
transport session with an Attester after a successful appraisal.
However an Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results will often be
more nuanced, and the Relying Party may need additional information.
Some Identity Evidence related policy questions which the Relying
Party may consider include:
* Does the Relying Party only trust this Verifier to make
Trustworthiness Claims on behalf a specific type of Attesting
Environment? Might a mix of Verifiers be necessary to cover all
mandatory Trustworthiness Claims?
* Does the Relying Party only accept connections from a verified-
authentic software build from a specific software developer?
* Does the Relying Party only accept connections from specific
preconfigured list of Attesters?
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For any of these more nuanced appraisals, additional Identity
Evidence or other policy related information must be conveyed or pre-
provisioned during the formation of a trust context between the
Relying Party, the Attester, the Attester's Attesting Environment,
and the Verifier.
2.2.1. Attester and Attesting Environment
Per [RFC9334] Figure 2, an Attester and a corresponding Attesting
Environment might not share common code or even hardware boundaries.
Consequently, an Attester implementation needs to ensure that any
Evidence which originates from outside the Attesting Environment MUST
have been collected and delivered securely before any Attesting
Environment signing may occur. After the Verifier performs its
appraisal, it will include sufficient information in the Attestation
Results to enable a Relying Party to have confidence that the
Attester's trustworthiness is represented via Trustworthiness Claims
signed by the appropriate Attesting Environment.
This document recognizes three general categories of Attesters.
1. HSM-based: A Hardware Security Module (HSM) based cryptoprocessor
which hashes one or more streams of security measurements from an
Attester within the Attesting Environment. Maintenance of this
hash enables detection of an Attester which is not reporting the
exact set of security measurements (such as log entries) taken
within the Attesting Environment. An example of a HSM is a
TPM2.0 [TPM2.0].
2. Process-based: An individual process which has its runtime memory
encrypted by an Attesting Environment in a way that no other
processes can read and decrypt that memory (e.g., [SGX] or
[I-D.tschofenig-rats-psa-token].)
3. VM-based: An entire Guest VM (or a set of containers within a
host) have been encrypted as a walled-garden unit by an Attesting
Environment. The result is that the host operating system cannot
read and decrypt what is executing within that VM (e.g.,
[SEV-SNP] or [TDX].)
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Each of these categories of Attesters above will be capable of
generating Evidence which is protected using private keys /
certificates which are not accessible outside of the corresponding
Attesting Environment. The owner of these secrets is the owner of
the identity which is bound within the Attesting Environment.
Effectively this means that for any Attester identity, there will
exist a chain of trust ultimately bound to a hardware-based root of
trust in the Attesting Environment. It is upon this root of trust
that unique, non-repudiable Attester identities may be founded.
There are several types of Attester identities defined in this
document. This list is extensible:
* chip-vendor: the vendor of the hardware chip used for the
Attesting Environment (e.g., a primary Endorsement Key from a TPM)
* chip-hardware: specific hardware with specific firmware from an
'chip-vendor'
* target-environment: a unique instance of a software build running
in an Attester (e.g., MRENCLAVE [SGX], an Instance ID
[I-D.tschofenig-rats-psa-token], an Identity Block [SEV-SNP], or a
hash which represents a set of software loaded since boot (e.g.,
TPM based integrity verification.))
* target-developer: the organizational unit responsible for a
particular 'target-environment' (e.g., MRSIGNER [SGX])
* instance: a unique instantiated instance of an Attesting
Environment running on 'chip-hardware' (e.g., an LDevID
[IEEE802.1AR])
Based on the category of the Attesting Environment, different types
of identities might be exposed by an Attester.
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+========================+===============+===========+===========+
| Attester Identity type | Process-based | VM-based | HSM-based |
+========================+===============+===========+===========+
| chip-vendor | Mandatory | Mandatory | Mandatory |
+------------------------+---------------+-----------+-----------+
| chip-hardware | Mandatory | Mandatory | Mandatory |
+------------------------+---------------+-----------+-----------+
| target-environment | Mandatory | Mandatory | Optional |
+------------------------+---------------+-----------+-----------+
| target-developer | Mandatory | Optional | Optional |
+------------------------+---------------+-----------+-----------+
| instance | Optional | Optional | Optional |
+------------------------+---------------+-----------+-----------+
Table 1
It is expected that drafts subsequent to this specification will
provide the definitions and value domains for specific identities,
each of which falling within the Attester identity types listed
above. In some cases the actual unique identities might encoded as
complex structures. An example complex structure might be a 'target-
environment' encoded as a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM).
With the identity definitions and value domains, a Relying Party will
have sufficient information to ensure that the Attester identities
and Trustworthiness Claims asserted are actually capable of being
supported by the underlying type of Attesting Environment.
Consequently, the Relying Party SHOULD require Identity Evidence
which indicates of the type of Attesting Environment when it
considers its Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results.
2.2.2. Verifier
For the Verifier identity, it is critical for a Relying Party to
review the certificate and chain of trust for that Verifier.
Additionally, the Relying Party must have confidence that the
Trustworthiness Claims being relied upon from the Verifier considered
the chain of trust for the Attesting Environment.
There are two categorizations of Verifier identities defined in this
document:
* verifier build: a unique instance of a software build running as a
Verifier.
* verifier developer: the organizational unit responsible for a
particular 'verifier build'.
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Within each category, communicating the identity can be accomplished
via a variety of objects and encodings.
2.2.3. Communicating Identity
Any of the above identities used by the Appraisal Policy for
Attestation Results needed to be pre-established by the Relying Party
before, or provided during, the exchange of Attestation Results.
When provided during this exchange, the identity may be communicated
either implicitly or explicitly.
An example of explicit communication would be to include the
following Identity Evidence directly within the Attestation Results:
a unique identifier for an Attesting Environment, the name of a key
which can be provably associated with that unique identifier, and the
set of Attestation Results which are signed using that key. As these
Attestation Results are signed by the Verifier, it is the Verifier
which is explicitly asserting the credentials it believes are
trustworthy.
An example of implicit communication would be to include Identity
Evidence in the form of a signature which has been placed over the
Attestation Results asserted by a Verifier. It would be then up to
the Relying Party's Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results to
extract this signature and confirm that it only could have been
generated by an Attesting Environment having access to a specific
private key. This implicit identity communication is only viable if
the Attesting Environment's public key is already known by the
Relying Party.
One final step in communicating identity is proving the freshness of
the Attestation Results to the degree needed by the Relying Party. A
typical way to accomplish this is to include an element of freshness
be embedded within a signed portion of the Attestation Results. This
element of freshness reduces the identity spoofing risks from a
replay attack. For more on this, see Section 2.4.
2.3. Trustworthiness Claims
2.3.1. Design Principles
Trust is not absolute. Trust is a belief in some aspect about an
entity (in this case an Attester), and that this aspect is something
which can be depended upon (in this case by a Relying Party.) Within
the context of Remote Attestation, believability of this aspect is
facilitated by a Verifier. This facilitation depends on the
Verifier's ability to parse detailed Evidence from an Attester and
then to assert conclusions about this aspect in a way interpretable
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by a Relying Party.
Specific aspects for which a Verifier will assert trustworthiness are
defined in this section. These are known as Trustworthiness Claims.
These claims have been designed to enable a common understanding
between a broad array of Attesters, Verifiers, and Relying Parties.
The following set of design principles have been applied in the
Trustworthiness Claim definitions:
1. Expose a small number of Trustworthiness Claims.
Reason: a plethora of similar Trustworthiness Claims will result
in divergent choices made on which to support between different
Verifiers. This would place a lot of complexity in the Relying
Party as it would be up to the Relying Party (and its policy
language) to enable normalization across rich but incompatible
Verifier object definitions.
2. Each Trustworthiness Claim enumerates only the specific states
that could viably result in a different outcome after the Policy
for Attestation Results has been applied.
Reason: by explicitly disallowing the standardization of
enumerated states which cannot easily be connected to a use case,
we avoid forcing implementers from making incompatible guesses on
what these states might mean.
3. Verifier and RP developers need explicit definitions of each
state in order to accomplish the goals of (1) and (2).
Reason: without such guidance, the Verifier will append plenty of
raw supporting info. This relieves the Verifier of making the
hard decisions. Of course, this raw info will be mostly non-
interpretable and therefore non-actionable by the Relying Party.
4. Support standards and non-standard extensibility for (1) and (2).
Reason: standard types of Verifier generated Trustworthiness
Claims should be vetted by the full RATS working group, rather
than being maintained in a repository which doesn't follow the
RFC process. This will keep a tight lid on extensions which must
be considered by the Relying Party's policy language. Because
this process takes time, non-standard extensions will be needed
for implementation speed and flexibility.
These design principles are important to keep the number of Verifier
generated claims low, and to retain the complexity in the Verifier
rather than the Relying Party.
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2.3.2. Enumeration Encoding
Per design principle (2), each Trustworthiness Claim will only expose
specific encoded values. To simplify the processing of these
enumerations by the Relying Party, the enumeration will be encoded as
a single signed 8 bit integer. These value assignments for this
integer will be in four Trustworthiness Tiers which follow these
guidelines:
None: The Verifier makes no assertions regarding this aspect of
trustworthiness.
* Value 0: The Evidence received is insufficient to make a
conclusion. Note: this should always be always treated
equivalently by the Relying Party as no claim being made. I.e.,
the RP's Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results SHOULD NOT make
any distinction between a Trustworthiness Claim with enumeration
'0', and no Trustworthiness Claim being provided.
* Value 1: The Evidence received contains unknown elements which the
Verifier is unable to evaluate. An example might be that the
wrong type of Evidence has been delivered. Another case is that
of Evidence coming from a composite Attester: a Verifier may
understand only part of it and leave as "unknown" the
Trustworthiness claims related to features it can't appraise.
* Value -1: A verifier malfunction occurred during the Verifier's
appraisal processing.
Affirming: The Verifier affirms the Attester support for this aspect
of trustworthiness.
* Values 2 to 31: A standards enumerated reason for affirming.
* Values -2 to -32: A non-standard reason for affirming.
Warning: The Verifier warns about this aspect of trustworthiness.
* Values 32 to 95: A standards enumerated reason for the warning.
* Values -33 to -96: A non-standard reason for the warning.
Contraindicated: The Verifier asserts the Attester is explicitly
untrustworthy in regard to this aspect.
* Values 96 to 127: A standards enumerated reason for the
contraindication.
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* Values -97 to -128: A non-standard reason for the
contraindication.
This enumerated encoding listed above will simplify the Appraisal
Policy for Attestation Results. Such a policies may be as simple as
saying that a specific Verifier has recently asserted Trustworthiness
Claims, all of which are Affirming.
2.3.3. Assigning a Trustworthiness Claim value
In order to simplify design, only a single encoded value is asserted
by a Verifier for any Trustworthiness Claim within a using the
following process.
1. If applicable, a Verifier MUST assign a standardized value from
the Contraindicated tier.
2. Else if applicable, a Verifier MUST assign a non-standardized
value from the Contraindicated tier.
3. Else if applicable, a Verifier MUST assign a standardized value
from the Warning tier.
4. Else if applicable, a Verifier MUST assign a non-standardized
value from the Warning tier.
5. Else if applicable, a Verifier MUST assign a standardized value
from the Affirming tier.
6. Else if applicable, a Verifier MUST assign a non-standardized
value from the Affirming tier.
7. Else a Verifier MAY assign a 0 or -1.
2.3.4. Specific Claims
Following are the Trustworthiness Claims and their supported
enumerations which may be asserted by a Verifier:
configuration: A Verifier has appraised an Attester's configuration,
and is able to make conclusions regarding the exposure of known
vulnerabilities
0: No assertion
1: Evidence contains unknown elements which inhibit Verifer
evaluation.
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-1: Verifier malfunction
2: The configuration is a known and approved config.
3: The configuration includes or exposes no known
vulnerabilities.
32: The configuration includes or exposes known vulnerabilities.
36: Elements of the configuration relevant to security are
unavailable to the Verifier.
96: The configuration is unsupportable as it exposes unacceptable
security vulnerabilities.
99: Cryptographic validation of the Evidence has failed.
executables: A Verifier has appraised and evaluated relevant runtime
files, scripts, and/or other objects which have been loaded into
the Target environment's memory.
0: No assertion
1: Evidence contains unknown elements which inhibit Verifer
evaluation.
-1: Verifier malfunction
2: Only a recognized genuine set of approved executables,
scripts, files, and/or objects have been loaded during and
after the boot process.
3: Only a recognized genuine set of approved executables have
been loaded during the boot process.
32: Only a recognized genuine set of executables, scripts, files,
and/or objects have been loaded. However the Verifier cannot
vouch for a subset of these due to known bugs or other known
vulnerabilities.
33: Runtime memory includes executables, scripts, files, and/or
objects which are not recognized.
96: Runtime memory includes executables, scripts, files, and/or
object which are contraindicated.
99: Cryptographic validation of the Evidence has failed.
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file-system: A Verifier has evaluated a specific set of directories
within the Attester's file system. (Note: the Verifier may or may
not indicate what these directory and expected files are via an
unspecified management interface.)
0: No assertion
1: Evidence contains unknown elements which inhibit Verifer
evaluation.
-1: Verifier malfunction
2: Only a recognized set of approved files are found.
32: The file system includes unrecognized executables, scripts,
or files.
96: The file system includes contraindicated executables,
scripts, or files.
99: Cryptographic validation of the Evidence has failed.
hardware: A Verifier has appraised any Attester hardware and
firmware which are able to expose fingerprints of their identity
and running code.
0: No assertion
1: Evidence contains unknown elements which inhibit Verifer
evaluation.
-1: Verifier malfunction
2: An Attester has passed its hardware and/or firmware
verifications needed to demonstrate that these are genuine/
supported.
32: An Attester contains only genuine/supported hardware and/or
firmware, but there are known security vulnerabilities.
96: Attester hardware and/or firmware is recognized, but its
trustworthiness is contraindicated.
97: A Verifier does not recognize an Attester's hardware or
firmware, but it should be recognized.
99: Cryptographic validation of the Evidence has failed.
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instance-identity: A Verifier has appraised an Attesting
Environment's unique identity based upon private key signed
Evidence which can be correlated to a unique instantiated instance
of the Attester. (Note: this Trustworthiness Claim should only be
generated if the Verifier actually expects to recognize the unique
identity of the Attester.)
0: No assertion
1: Evidence contains unknown elements which inhibit Verifer
evaluation.
-1: Verifier malfunction
2: The Attesting Environment is recognized, and the associated
instance of the Attester is not known to be compromised.
96: The Attesting Environment is recognized, and but its unique
private key indicates a device which is not trustworthy.
97: The Attesting Environment is not recognized; however the
Verifier believes it should be.
99: Cryptographic validation of the Evidence has failed.
runtime-opaque: A Verifier has appraised the visibility of Attester
objects in memory from perspectives outside the Attester.
0: No assertion
1: Evidence contains unknown elements which inhibit Verifer
evaluation.
-1: Verifier malfunction
2: the Attester's executing Target Environment and Attesting
Environments are encrypted and within Trusted Execution
Environment(s) opaque to the operating system, virtual machine
manager, and peer applications. (Note: This value corresponds
to the protections asserted by O.RUNTIME_CONFIDENTIALITY from
[GP-TEE-PP])
32: the Attester's executing Target Environment and Attesting
Environments inaccessible from any other parallel application
or Guest VM running on the Attester's physical device. (Note
that unlike "1" these environments are not encrypted in a way
which restricts the Attester's root operator visibility. See
O.TA_ISOLATION from [GP-TEE-PP].)
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96: The Verifier has concluded that in memory objects are
unacceptably visible within the physical host that supports the
Attester.
99: Cryptographic validation of the Evidence has failed.
sourced-data: A Verifier has evaluated of the integrity of data
objects from external systems used by the Attester.
0: No assertion
1: Evidence contains unknown elements which inhibit Verifer
evaluation.
-1: Verifier malfunction
2: All essential Attester source data objects have been provided
by other Attester(s) whose most recent appraisal(s) had both no
Trustworthiness Claims of "0" where the current Trustworthiness
Claim is "Affirming", as well as no "Warning" or
"Contraindicated" Trustworthiness Claims.
32: Attester source data objects come from unattested sources, or
attested sources with "Warning" type Trustworthiness Claims.
96: Attester source data objects come from contraindicated
sources.
99: Cryptographic validation of the Evidence has failed.
storage-opaque: A Verifier has appraised that an Attester is capable
of encrypting persistent storage. (Note: Protections must meet
the capabilities of [OMTP-ATE] Section 5, but need not be hardware
tamper resistant.)
0: No assertion
1: Evidence contains unknown elements which inhibit Verifer
evaluation.
-1: Verifier malfunction
2: the Attester encrypts all secrets in persistent storage via
using keys which are never visible outside an HSM or the
Trusted Execution Environment hardware.
32: the Attester encrypts all persistently stored secrets, but
without using hardware backed keys
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96: There are persistent secrets which are stored unencrypted in
an Attester.
99: Cryptographic validation of the Evidence has failed.
It is possible for additonal Trustworthiness Claims and enumerated
values to be defined in subsequent documents. At the same time, the
standardized Trustworthiness Claim values listed above have been
designed so there is no overlap within a Trustworthiness Tier. As a
result, it is possible to imagine a future where overlapping
Trustworthiness Claims within a single Trustworthiness Tier may be
defined. Wherever possible, the Verifier SHOULD assign the best
fitting standardized value.
Where a Relying Party doesn't know how to handle a particular
Trustworthiness Claim, it MAY choose an appropriate action based on
the Trustworthiness Tier under which the enumerated value fits.
It is up to the Verifier to publish the types of evaluations it
performs when determining how Trustworthiness Claims are derived for
a type of any particular type of Attester. It is out of the scope of
this document for the Verifier to provide proof or specific logic on
how a particular Trustworthiness Claim which it is asserting was
derived.
2.3.5. Trustworthiness Vector
Multiple Trustworthiness Claims may be asserted about an Attesting
Environment at single point in time. The set of Trustworthiness
Claims inserted into an instance of Attestation Results by a Verifier
is known as a Trustworthiness Vector. The order of Claims in the
vector is NOT meaningful. A Trustworthiness Vector with no
Trustworthiness Claims (i.e., a null Trustworthiness Vector) is a
valid construct. In this case, the Verifier is making no
Trustworthiness Claims but is confirming that an appraisal has been
made.
2.3.6. Trustworthiness Vector for a type of Attesting Environment
Some Trustworthiness Claims are implicit based on the underlying type
of Attesting Environment. For example, a validated MRSIGNER identity
can be present where the underlying [SGX] hardware is 'hw-authentic'.
Where such implicit Trustworthiness Claims exist, they do not have to
be explicitly included in the Trustworthiness Vector. However, these
implicit Trustworthiness Claims SHOULD be considered as being present
by the Relying Party. Another way of saying this is if a
Trustworthiness Claim is automatically supported as a result of
coming from a specific type of TEE, that claim need not be
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redundantly articulated. Such implicit Trustworthiness Claims can be
seen in the tables within Appendix B.2 and Appendix B.3.
Additionally, there are some Trustworthiness Claims which cannot be
adequately supported by an Attesting Environment. For example, it
would be difficult for an Attester that includes only a TPM (and no
other TEE) from ever having a Verifier appraise support for 'runtime-
opaque'. As such, a Relying Party would be acting properly if it
rejects any non-supportable Trustworthiness Claims asserted from a
Verifier.
As a result, the need for the ability to carry a specific
Trustworthiness Claim will vary by the type of Attesting Environment.
Example mappings can be seen in Appendix B.
2.4. Freshness
A Relying Party will care about the recentness of the Attestation
Results, and the specific Trustworthiness Claims which are embedded.
All freshness mechanisms of [RFC9334], Section 10 are supportable by
this specification.
Additionally, a Relying Party may track when a Verifier expires its
confidence for the Trustworthiness Claims or the Trustworthiness
Vector as a whole. Mechanisms for such expiry are not defined within
this document.
There is a subset of secure interactions where the freshness of
Trustworthiness Claims may need to be revisited asynchronously. This
subset is when trustworthiness depends on the continuous availability
of a transport session between the Attester and Relying Party. With
such connectivity dependent Attestation Results, if there is a reboot
which resets transport connectivity, all established Trustworthiness
Claims should be cleared. Subsequent connection re-establishment
will allow fresh new Trustworthiness Claims to be delivered.
3. Secure Interactions Models
There are multiple ways of providing a Trustworthiness Vector to a
Relying Party. This section describes two alternatives.
3.1. Background-Check
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3.1.1. Verifier Retrieval
It is possible to for a Relying Party to follow the Background-Check
Model defined in Section 5.2 of [RFC9334]. In this case, a Relying
Party will receive Attestation Results containing the Trustworthiness
Vector directly from a Verifier. These Attestation Results can then
be used by the Relying Party in determining the appropriate treatment
for interactions with the Attester.
While applicable in some cases, the utilization of the Background-
Check Model without modification has potential drawbacks in other
cases. These include:
* Verifier scale: if the Attester has many Relying Parties, a
Verifier appraising that Attester could be frequently be queried
based on the same Evidence.
* Information leak: Evidence which the Attester might consider
private can be visible to the Relying Party. Hiding that Evidence
could devalue any resulting appraisal.
* Latency: a Relying Party will need to wait for the Verifier to
return Attestation Results before proceeding with secure
interactions with the Attester.
An implementer should examine these potential drawbacks before
selecting this alternative.
3.1.2. Co-resident Verifier
A simplified Background-Check Model may exist in a very specific
case. This is where the Relying Party and Verifier functions are co-
resident. This model is appropriate when:
* Some hardware-based private key is used by an Attester while
proving its identity as part of a mutually authenticated secure
channel establishment with the Relying Party, and
* this Attester identity is accepted as sufficient proof of Attester
integrity.
Effectively this means that detailed forensic capabilities of a
robust Verifier are unnecessary because it is accepted that the code
and operational behavior of the Attester cannot be manipulated after
TEE initialization.
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An example of such a scenario may be when an SGX's MRENCLAVE and
MRSIGNER values have been associated with a known QUOTE value. And
the code running within the TEE is not modifiable after launch.
3.2. Below Zero Trust
Zero Trust Architectures are referenced in [US-Executive-Order]
eleven times. However despite this high profile, there is an
architectural gap with Zero Trust. The credentials used for
authentication and admission control can be manipulated on the
endpoint. Attestation can fill this gap through the generation of a
compound credential called AR-augmented Evidence. This compound
credential is rooted in the hardware based Attesting Environment of
an endpoint, plus the trustworthiness of a Verifier. The overall
solution is known as "Below Zero Trust" as the compound credential
cannot be manipulated or spoofed by an administrator of an endpoint
with root access. This solution is not adversely impacted by the
potential drawbacks with pure background-check described above.
To kick-off the "Below Zero Trust" compound credential creation
sequence, a Verifier evaluates an Attester and returns signed
Attestation Results back to this original Attester no less frequently
than a well-known interval. This interval may also be asynchronous,
based on the changing of certain Evidence as described in
[I-D.ietf-rats-network-device-subscription].
When a Relying Party is to receive information about the Attester's
trustworthiness, the Attesting Environment assembles the minimal set
of Evidence which can be used to confirm or refute whether the
Attester remains in the state of trustworthiness represented by the
AR. To this Evidence, the Attesting Environment appends the
signature from the most recent AR as well as a Relying Party Proof-
of-Freshness. The Attesting Environment then signs the combination.
The Attester then assembles AR Augmented Evidence by taking the
signed combination and appending the full AR. The assembly now
consists of two independent but semantically bound sets of signed
Evidence.
The AR Augmented Evidence is then sent to the Relying Party. The
Relying Party then can appraise these semantically bound sets of
signed Evidence by applying an Appraisal Policy for Attestation
Results as described below. This policy will consider both the AR as
well as additional information about the Attester within the AR
Augmented Evidence the when determining what action to take.
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This alternative combines the [RFC9334] Sections 5.1 Passport Model
and Section 5.2 Background-Check Model. Figure 1 describes this flow
of information. The flows within this combined model are mapped to
[RFC9334] in the following way. "Verifier A" below corresponds to
the "Verifier" Figure 5 within [RFC9334]. And "Relying Party/
Verifier B" below corresponds to the union of the "Relying Party" and
"Verifier" boxes within Figure 6 of [RFC9334]. This union is
possible because Verifier B can be implemented as a simple, self-
contained process. The resulting combined process can appraise the
AR-augmented Evidence to determine whether an Attester qualifies for
secure interactions with the Relying Party. The specific steps of
this process are defined later in this section.
.----------------.
| Attester |
| .-------------.|
| | Attesting || .----------. .---------------.
| | Environment || | Verifier | | Relying Party |
| '-------------'| | A | | / Verifier B |
'----------------' '----------' '---------------'
time(VG) | |
|<------Verifier PoF-------time(NS) |
| | |
time(EG)(1)------Evidence------------>| |
| time(RG) |
|<------Attestation Results-(2) |
~ ~ ~
time(VG')? | |
~ ~ ~
|<------Relying Party PoF-----------------(3)time(NS')
| | |
time(EG')(4)------AR-augmented Evidence----------------->|
| | time(RG',RA')(5)
(6)
~
time(RX')
Figure 1: Below Zero Trust
The interaction model depicted above includes specific time related
events from Appendix A of [RFC9334]. With the identification of
these time related events, time duration/interval tracking becomes
possible. Such duration/interval tracking can become important if
the Relying Party cares if too much time has elapsed between the
Verifier PoF and Relying Party PoF. If too much time has elapsed,
perhaps the Attestation Results themselves are no longer trustworthy.
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Note that while time intervals will often be relevant, there is a
simplified case that does not require a Relying Party's PoF in step
(3). In this simplified case, the Relying Party trusts that the
Attester cannot be meaningfully changed from the outside during any
reportable interval. Based on that assumption, and when this is the
case then the step of the Relying Party PoF can be safely omitted.
In all cases, appraisal policies define the conditions and
prerequisites for when an Attester does qualify for secure
interactions. To qualify, an Attester has to be able to provide all
of the mandatory affirming Trustworthiness Claims and identities
needed by a Relying Party's Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results,
and none of the disqualifying detracting Trustworthiness Claims.
More details on each interaction step of Below Zero Trust are as
follows. The numbers used in this sequence match to the numbered
steps in Figure 1:
1. An Attester sends Evidence which is provably fresh to Verifier A
at time(EG). Freshness from the perspective of Verifier A MAY be
established with Verifier PoF such as a nonce.
2. Verifier A appraises (1), then sends the following items back to
that Attester within Attestation Results:
1. the verified identity of the Attesting Environment,
2. the Verifier A appraised Trustworthiness Vector of an
Attester,
3. a freshness proof associated with the Attestation Results,
4. a Verifier signature across (2.1) though (2.3).
3. At time(EG') a Relying Party PoF (such as a nonce) known to the
Relying Party is sent to the Attester.
4. The Attester generates and sends AR-augmented Evidence to the
Relying Party/Verifier B. This AR-augmented Evidence includes:
1. The Attestation Results from (2)
2. Any (optionally) new incremental Evidence from the Attesting
Environment
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3. Attestation Environment signature which spans a hash of the
Attestation Results (such as the signature of (2.4)), the
proof-of-freshness from (3), and (4.2). Note: this construct
allows the delta of time between (2.3) and (3) to be
definitively calculated by the Relying Party.
5. On receipt of (4), the Relying Party applies its Appraisal Policy
for Attestation Results. At minimum, this appraisal policy
process must include the following:
1. Verify that (4.3) includes the nonce from (3).
2. Use a local certificate to validate the signature (4.1).
3. Verify that the hash from (4.3) matches (4.1)
4. Use the identity of (2.1) to validate the signature of (4.3).
5. Failure of any steps (5.1) through (5.4) means the link does
not meet minimum validation criteria, therefore appraise the
link as having a null Verifier B Trustworthiness Vector.
Jump to step (6.1).
6. When there is large or uncertain time gap between time(EG)
and time(EG'), the link should be assigned a null Verifier B
Trustworthiness Vector. Jump to step (6.1).
7. Assemble the Verifier B Trustworthiness Vector
1. Copy Verifier A Trustworthiness Vector to Verifier B
Trustworthiness Vector
2. Add implicit Trustworthiness Claims inherent to the type
of TEE.
3. Prune any Trustworthiness Claims unsupportable by the
Attesting Environment.
4. Prune any Trustworthiness Claims the Relying Party
doesn't accept from this Verifier.
6. The Relying Party takes action based on Verifier B's appraised
Trustworthiness Vector, and applies the Appraisal Policy for
Attestation Results. Following is a reasonable process for such
evaluation:
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1. Prune any Trustworthiness Claims from the Trustworthiness
Vector not used in the Appraisal Policy for Attestation
Results.
2. Allow the information exchange from the Attester into a
Relying Party context in the Appraisal Policy for Attestation
Results where the Verifier B appraised Trustworthiness Vector
includes all the mandatory Trustworthiness Claims are in the
"Affirming" value range, and none of the disqualifying
Trustworthiness Claims are in the "Contraindicated" value
range.
3. Disallow any information exchange into a Relying Party
context for which that Verifier B appraised Trustworthiness
Vector is not qualified.
As link layer protocols re-authenticate, steps (1) to (2) and steps
(3) to (6) will independently refresh. This allows the
Trustworthiness of Attester to be continuously re-appraised. There
are only specific event triggers which will drive the refresh of
Evidence generation (1), Attestation Result generation (2), or AR-
augmented Evidence generation (4):
* life-cycle events, e.g. a change to an Authentication Secret of
the Attester or an update of a software component.
* uptime-cycle events, e.g. a hard reset or a re-initialization of
an Attester.
* authentication-cycle events, e.g. a link-layer interface reset
could result in a new (4).
3.3. Mutual Attestation
In the interaction models described above, each device on either side
of a secure interaction may require remote attestation of its peer.
This process is known as mutual-attestation. To support mutual-
attestation, the interaction models listed above may be run
independently on either side of the connection.
3.4. Transport Protocol Integration
Either unidirectional attestation or mutual attestation may be
supported within the protocol interactions needed for the
establishment of a single transport session. While this document
does not mandate specific transport protocols, messages containing
the Attestation Results and AR Augmented Evidence can be passed
within an authentication framework such the EAP protocol [RFC5247]
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over TLS [RFC8446].
4. Privacy Considerations
Privacy Considerations Text
5. Security Considerations
Security Considerations Text
6. IANA Considerations
See Body.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[GP-TEE-PP]
"Global Platform TEE Protection Profile v1.3", September
2020, <https://globalplatform.org/specs-library/tee-
protection-profile-v1-3/>.
[OMTP-ATE] "Open Mobile Terminal Platform - Advanced Trusted
Environment", May 2009, <https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/
omtpadvancedtrustedenvironmentomtptr1v11.pdf>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS)
Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January
2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334>.
7.2. Informative References
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[I-D.ietf-rats-network-device-subscription]
Birkholz, H., Voit, E., and W. Pan, "Attestation Event
Stream Subscription", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-rats-network-device-subscription-04, 10
September 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-rats-network-device-subscription-04>.
[I-D.tschofenig-rats-psa-token]
Tschofenig, H., Frost, S., Brossard, M., Shaw, A. L., and
T. Fossati, "Arm's Platform Security Architecture (PSA)
Attestation Token", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-22, 21 February 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tschofenig-
rats-psa-token-22>.
[IEEE802.1AR]
"802.1AR: Secure Device Identity", 2 August 2018,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8423794>.
[RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
RFC 5247, DOI 10.17487/RFC5247, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5247>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[SEV-SNP] "AMD SEV-SNP: Stregthening VM Isolation with Integrity
Protection and More", 2020,
<https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-
strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-
more.pdf>.
[SGX] "Supporting Third Party Attestation for Intel SGX with
Intel Data Center Attestation Primitives", 2017, <https://
software.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/
documents/intel-sgx-support-for-third-party-attestation-
801017.pdf>.
[TDX] "Intel Trust Domain Extensions", 2020, <https://software.i
ntel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-
whitepaper-final9-17.pdf>.
[TPM-ID] "TPM Keys for Platform Identity for TPM 1.2", August 2015,
<https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/
TPM_Keys_for_Platform_Identity_v1_0_r3_Final.pdf>.
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[TPM2.0] "Trusted Platform Module Library - Part 1: Architecture",
n.d., <https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-
content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-1-Architecture-
01.07-2014-03-13.pdf>.
[US-Executive-Order]
"Executive Order on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity",
12 May 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
presidential-actions/2021/05/12/executive-order-on-
improving-the-nations-cybersecurity/>.
Appendix A. Implementation Guidance
A.1. Supplementing Trustworthiness Claims
What has been encoded into each Trustworthiness Claim is the domain
of integer values which is likely to drive a different programmatic
decision in the Relying Party's Appraisal Policy for Attestation
Results. This will not be the only thing a Relying Party's
Operations team might care to track for measurement or debugging
purposes.
There is also the opportunity for the Verifier to include
supplementary Evidence beyond a set of asserted Trustworthiness
Claims. It is recommended that if supplementary Evidence is provided
by the Verifier within the Attestation Results, that this
supplementary Evidence includes a reference to a specific
Trustworthiness Claim. This will allow a deeper understanding of
some of the reasoning behind the integer value assigned.
Appendix B. Supportable Trustworthiness Claims
The following is a table which shows what Claims are supportable by
different Attesting Environment types. Note that claims MAY BE
implicit to an Attesting Environment type, and therefore do not have
to be included in the Trustworthiness Vector to be considered as set
by the Relying Party.
B.1. Supportable Trustworthiness Claims for HSM-based CC
Following are Trustworthiness Claims which MAY be set for a HSM-based
Confidential Computing Attester. (Such as a TPM [TPM-ID].)
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+===================+===========+==================================+
| Trustworthiness | Required? | Appraisal Method |
| Claim | | |
+===================+===========+==================================+
| configuration | Optional | Verifier evaluation of Attester |
| | | reveals no configuration lines |
| | | which expose the Attester to |
| | | known security vulnerabilities. |
| | | This may be done with or without |
| | | the involvement of a TPM PCR. |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| executables | Yes | Checks the TPM PCRs for the |
| | | static operating system, and for |
| | | any tracked files subsequently |
| | | loaded |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| file-system | No | Can be supported, but TPM |
| | | tracking is unlikely |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| hardware | Yes | If TPM PCR check ok from BIOS |
| | | checks, through Master Boot |
| | | Record configuration |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| instance-identity | Optional | Check IDevID |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| runtime-opaque | n/a | TPMs are not recommended to |
| | | provide a sufficient technology |
| | | base for this Trustworthiness |
| | | Claim. |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| sourced-data | n/a | TPMs are not recommended to |
| | | provide a sufficient technology |
| | | base for this Trustworthiness |
| | | Claim. |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| storage-opaque | Minimal | With a TPM, secure storage space |
| | | exists and is writeable by |
| | | external applications. But the |
| | | space is so limited that it |
| | | often is used just be used to |
| | | store keys. |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
Table 2
Setting the Trustworthiness Claims may follow the following logic at
the Verifier A within (2) of Figure 1:
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Start: Evidence received starts the generation of a new
Trustworthiness Vector. (e.g., TPM Quote Received, log received,
or appraisal timer expired)
Step 0: set Trustworthiness Vector = Null
Step 1: Is there sufficient fresh signed evidence to appraise?
(yes) - No Action
(no) - Goto Step 6
Step 2: Appraise Hardware Integrity PCRs
if (hardware NOT "0") - push onto vector
if (hardware NOT affirming or warning), go to Step 6
Step 3: Appraise Attesting Environment identity
if (instance-identity <> "0") - push onto vector
Step 4: Appraise executable loaded and filesystem integrity
if (executables NOT "0") - push onto vector
if (executables NOT affirming or warning), go to Step 6
Step 5: Appraise all remaining Trustworthiness Claims
Independently and set as appropriate.
Step 6: Assemble Attestation Results, and push to Attester
End
B.2. Supportable Trustworthiness Claims for process-based CC
Following are Trustworthiness Claims which MAY be set for a process-
based Confidential Computing based Attester. (Such as a SGX Enclaves
and TrustZone.)
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+===================+===========+==================================+
| Trustworthiness | Required? | Appraisal Method |
| Claim | | |
+===================+===========+==================================+
| instance-identity | Optional | Internally available in TEE. |
| | | But keys might not be known/ |
| | | exposed to the Relying Party by |
| | | the Attesting Environment. |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| configuration | Optional | If done, this is at the |
| | | Application Layer. Plus each |
| | | process needs it own protection |
| | | mechanism as the protection is |
| | | limited to the process itself. |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| executables | Optional | Internally available in TEE. |
| | | But keys might not be known/ |
| | | exposed to the Relying Party by |
| | | the Attesting Environment. |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| file-system | Optional | Can be supported by application, |
| | | but process-based CC is not a |
| | | sufficient technology base for |
| | | this Trustworthiness Claim. |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| hardware | Implicit | At least the TEE is protected |
| | in | here. Other elements of the |
| | signature | system outside of the TEE might |
| | | need additional protections is |
| | | used by the application process. |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| runtime-opaque | Implicit | From the TEE |
| | in | |
| | signature | |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| storage-opaque | Implicit | Although the application must |
| | in | assert that this function is |
| | signature | used by the code itself. |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
| sourced-data | Optional | Will need to be supported by |
| | | application code |
+-------------------+-----------+----------------------------------+
Table 3
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B.3. Supportable Trustworthiness Claims for VM-based CC
Following are Trustworthiness Claims which MAY be set for a VM-based
Confidential Computing based Attester. (Such as SEV, TDX, ACCA, SEV-
SNP.)
+===================+===========+===================================+
| Trustworthiness | Required? | Appraisal Method |
| Claim | | |
+===================+===========+===================================+
| instance-identity | Optional | Internally available in TEE. |
| | | But keys might not be known/ |
| | | exposed to the Relying Party by |
| | | the Attesting Environment. |
+-------------------+-----------+-----------------------------------+
| configuration | Optional | Requires application |
| | | integration. Easier than with |
| | | process-based solution, as the |
| | | whole protected machine can be |
| | | evaluated. |
+-------------------+-----------+-----------------------------------+
| executables | Optional | Internally available in TEE. |
| | | But keys might not be known/ |
| | | exposed to the Relying Party by |
| | | the Attesting Environment. |
+-------------------+-----------+-----------------------------------+
| file-system | Optional | Can be supported by application |
+-------------------+-----------+-----------------------------------+
| hardware | Chip | At least the TEE is protected |
| | dependent | here. Other elements of the |
| | | system outside of the TEE might |
| | | need additional protections is |
| | | used by the application process. |
+-------------------+-----------+-----------------------------------+
| runtime-opaque | Implicit | From the TEE |
| | in | |
| | signature | |
+-------------------+-----------+-----------------------------------+
| storage-opaque | Chip | Although the application must |
| | dependent | assert that this function is |
| | | used by the code itself. |
+-------------------+-----------+-----------------------------------+
| sourced-data | Optional | Will need to be supported by |
| | | application code |
+-------------------+-----------+-----------------------------------+
Table 4
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Appendix C. Some issues being worked
It is possible for a cluster/hierarchy of Verifiers to have aggregate
AR which are perhaps signed/endorsed by a lead Verifier. What should
be the Proof-of-Freshness or Verifier associated with any of the
aggregate set of Trustworthiness Claims?
There will need to be a subsequent document which documents how these
objects which will be translated into a protocol on a wire (e.g. EAP
on TLS). Some breakpoint between what is in this draft, and what is
in specific drafts for wire encoding will need to be determined.
Questions like architecting the cluster/hierarchy of Verifiers fall
into this breakdown.
For some Trustworthiness Claims, there could be value in identifying
a specific Appraisal Policy for Attestation Results applied within
the Attester. One way this could be done would be a URI which
identifies the policy used at Verifier A, and this URI would
reference a specific Trustworthiness Claim. As the URI also could
encode the version of the software, it might also act as a mechanism
to signal the Relying Party to refresh/re-evaluate its view of
Verifier A. Do we need this type of structure to be included here?
Should it be in subsequent documents?
Expand the variant of Figure 1 which requires no Relying Party PoF
into its own picture.
In what document (if any) do we attempt normalization of the identity
claims between different types of TEE. E.g., does MRSIGNER plus
extra loaded software = the sum of TrustZone Signer IDs for loaded
components?
Appendix D. Contributors
Guy Fedorkow
Email: gfedorkow@juniper.net
Dave Thaler
Email: dthaler@microsoft.com
Ned Smith
Email: ned.smith@intel.com
Lawrence Lundblade
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Email: lgl@island-resort.com
Authors' Addresses
Eric Voit
Cisco Systems
Email: evoit@cisco.com
Henk Birkholz
Fraunhofer SIT
Rheinstrasse 75
64295 Darmstadt
Germany
Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de
Thomas Hardjono
MIT
Email: hardjono@mit.edu
Thomas Fossati
Linaro
Email: Thomas.Fossati@linaro.org
Vincent Scarlata
Intel
Email: vincent.r.scarlata@intel.com
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