Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid
draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid
REGEXT Working Group S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft Verisign Labs
Intended status: Standards Track 5 November 2023
Expires: 8 May 2024
Federated Authentication for the Registration Data Access Protocol
(RDAP) using OpenID Connect
draft-ietf-regext-rdap-openid-27
Abstract
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access
control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes
support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Identification methods that require
clients to obtain and manage credentials from every RDAP server
operator present management challenges for both clients and servers,
whereas a federated authentication system would make it easier to
operate and use RDAP without the need to maintain server-specific
client credentials. This document describes a federated
authentication system for RDAP based on OpenID Connect.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 May 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Federated Authentication for RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Client Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.3. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.4. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps . . . . . 12
3.1.4.1. Provider Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1.4.2. Authentication Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1.4.3. End-User Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.1.4.4. Authorization Response and Validation . . . . . . 13
3.1.4.5. Token Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.4.6. Delivery of User Information . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.5. Specialized Claims and Authorization Scope for
RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.5.1. Stated Purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1.5.2. Do Not Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Common Protocol Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1. OpenID Connect Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.2. RDAP Query Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2.1. RDAP Query Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.2. RDAP Do Not Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2.3. Parameter Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
5. Protocol Features for Session-Oriented Clients . . . . . . . 20
5.1. Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1.1. Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.1.2. Device Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2. Client Login . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2.1. End-User Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2.2. OP Issuer Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2.3. Login Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2.4. Clients with Limited User Interfaces . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.4.1. UI-constrained Client Login . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.4.2. UI-constrained Client Login Polling . . . . . . . 28
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5.3. Session Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.4. Session Refresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.5. Client Logout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.6. Request Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6. Protocol Features for Token-Oriented Clients . . . . . . . . 35
6.1. Client Login . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.2. Client Queries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.3. Access Token Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
6.4. Token Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7. RDAP Query Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
8. RDAP Conformance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
9.1. RDAP Extensions Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
9.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
9.3. RDAP Query Purpose Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
10. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
10.1. Editor Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
10.2. Verisign Labs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
10.3. Viagenie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
11.1. Authentication and Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . 44
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1. Introduction
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
regional internet registries. RDAP allows a server to make access
control decisions based on client identity, and as such it includes
support for client identification features provided by the Hypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [RFC9110].
RDAP is specified in multiple documents, including "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7480], "Security
Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [RFC7481],
"Registration Data Access Protocol Query Format" [RFC9082], and "JSON
Responses for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)"
[RFC9083]. RFC 7481 describes client identification and
authentication services that can be used with RDAP, but it does not
specify how any of these services can (or should) be used with RDAP.
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1.1. Problem Statement
The conventional "user name and password" authentication method does
not scale well in the RDAP ecosystem. Assuming that all domain name
and address registries will eventually provide RDAP service, it is
impractical and inefficient for users to secure login credentials
from the hundreds of different server operators. Authentication
methods based on user names and passwords do not provide information
that describes the user in sufficient detail (while protecting the
personal privacy of the user) for server operators to make fine-
grained access control decisions based on the user's identity. The
authentication system used for RDAP needs to address all of these
needs.
1.2. Approach
A basic level of RDAP service can be provided to users who possess an
identifier issued by a recognized provider who can authenticate and
validate the user. The identifiers issued by social media services,
for example, can be used. Users who require higher levels of service
(and who are willing to share more information about themselves to
gain access to that service) can secure identifiers from specialized
providers who are or will be able to provide more detailed
information about the user. Server operators can then make access
control decisions based on the identification information provided by
the user.
A federated authentication system in which an RDAP server outsources
identification and authentication services to a trusted identity
provider would make it easier to operate and use RDAP by reusing
existing identifiers to provide a basic level of access. It can also
provide the ability to collect additional user identification
information, and that information can be shared with the RDAP server
operator with the consent of the user in order to help the server
operator make access control decisions. This type of system allows
an RDAP server to make access control decisions based on the nature
of a query and the identity, authentication, and authorization
information that is received from the identity provider. This
document describes a federated authentication system for RDAP based
on OpenID Connect [OIDC] that meets these needs.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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All of the HTTP requests described in this document that are sent
from an RDAP client to an RDAP server use the HTTP GET method as
specified in [RFC9110].
Long lines in examples are wrapped using the "The Single Backslash
Strategy" described in RFC 8792 [RFC8792].
3. Federated Authentication for RDAP
RDAP itself does not include built-in security services. Instead,
RDAP relies on features that are available in other protocol layers
to provide needed security services including access control,
authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
data integrity, and identification. A description of each of these
security services can be found in "Internet Security Glossary,
Version 2" [RFC4949]. This document focuses on a federated
authentication system for RDAP that provides services for
authentication, authorization, and identification, allowing a server
operator to make access control decisions. Section 3 of RFC 7481
[RFC7481] describes general considerations for RDAP access control,
authentication, and authorization.
The conventional client-server authentication model requires clients
to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This
situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers
increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use
one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client
credential management complexity.
3.1. RDAP and OpenID Connect
OpenID Connect 1.0 [OIDCC] is a decentralized, single sign-on (SSO)
federated authentication system that allows users to access multiple
web resources with one identifier instead of having to create
multiple server-specific identifiers. Users acquire identifiers from
OpenID Providers, or OPs. Relying Parties, or RPs, are applications
(such as RDAP) that outsource their user authentication function to
an OP. OpenID Connect is built on top of the authorization framework
provided by the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] protocol.
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The OAuth authorization framework describes a method for users to
access protected web resources without having to hand out their
credentials. Instead, clients are issued Access Tokens by OpenID
Providers with the permission of the resource owners. Using OpenID
Connect and OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a federation and
clients can access any server in the federation by providing one
credential registered with any OP in that federation. The OAuth
authorization framework is designed for use with HTTP and thus can be
used with RDAP.
3.1.1. Terminology
This document uses the terms "client" and "server" as defined by RDAP
[RFC7480].
This document uses the terms "Access Token", "Authorization Code",
"Authorization Endpoint", "Authorization Grant", "Client
Authentication", "Client Identifier", "Protected Resource", "Refresh
Token", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server", and "Token Endpoint"
defined by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]; the terms "Claim Name", "Claim
Value", and "JSON Web Token (JWT)" defined by JSON Web Token (JWT)
[RFC7519]; the terms "ID Token" and "UserInfo Endpoint" defined by
OpenID Connect Core 1.0 [OIDCC]; and the term "JWT Access Token"
defined by RFC 9068 [RFC9068]. Additional terms from Section 1.2 of
the OpenID Connect Core specification are incorporated by reference.
This document uses the terms "remote" and "default" to describe the
relationship between an RDAP server and the OpenID Providers that it
interacts with. A "remote" OpenID Provider is one that is identified
by the RDAP Client by providing either an Issuer Identifier or an
End-User Identifier in a login request. Whether an Issuer Identifier
or End-User Identifier can be provided in the login request for the
purposes of selecting an OpenID Provider can be determined by
retrieving the RDAP Server's OIDC configuration details (see
Section 4.1). A "default" OpenID Provider is one that the RDAP
Server will use when the RDAP Client does not provide an Issuer
Identifier or an End-User Identifier in the login request.
This document uses the term "session" to describe a set of
interactions between an RDAP client and an RDAP server during a given
period of time. For session-oriented clients (see Section 3.1.2),
the RDAP session is a typical HTTP session starting with a
farv1_session/login request and ending with either a farv1_session/
logout request (see Section 5 for a description of both path
segments) or a timeout. For token-oriented clients (see
Section 3.1.2 and Section 6), the RDAP session corresponds to the
lifespan of an authorization obtained from an OP and the
corresponding Access Token, including any refreshed Access Token.
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3.1.2. Client Considerations
Clients that delegate OIDC Authentication to an RDAP server as part
of session-oriented interactions, and can accept and process HTTP
cookies [RFC6265] to maintain the session, are known as "session-
oriented" clients. This type of RDAP client performs the role of
user agent [RFC9110]. An RDAP server performs the role of an OpenID
Connect Core Relying Party (RP). A web browser used to send queries
directly to an RDAP server is an example of a session-oriented
client. Specifications for this type of client can be found in
Section 5.
Clients that perform OIDC Authentication directly, taking the role of
an RP in interactions with an OP and sending Access Tokens [RFC6749]
to an RDAP server to authorize RDAP queries, are known as "token-
oriented" clients. An RDAP server performs resource server [RFC6749]
functions to verify the tokens received from the client, and RP
functions to retrieve information from the OP as necessary to make
access control decisions. A web browser running JavaScript received
from a web service that sends queries to an RDAP server directly or
through its back-end web service is an example of a token-oriented
client. Specifications for this type of client can be found in
Section 6.
Clients MAY operate as either session-oriented or token-oriented
clients, but they MUST do so consistently by not mixing token-
oriented and session-oriented requests while interacting with an OP.
Servers SHOULD support both types of client to maximize
interoperability, but MAY choose to support only one type of client
as required by local policy or operating conditions. A server that
does not support a particular client type will not support the
protocol features (the data structures, path segments, parameters,
and interactions) specified for that client type. Server signaling
of supported client types is described in Section 4.1.
3.1.3. Overview
At a high level, RDAP authentication of a session-oriented client
using OpenID Connect requires completion of the following steps:
1. An RDAP client sends an RDAP "help" query to an RDAP server to
determine the type and capabilities of the OpenID Providers that
are used by the RDAP server. This information is returned in
the rdapConformance section of the response. A value of "farv1"
indicates support for the extension described in this
specification. If one or more remote OpenID Providers are
supported, the RDAP client SHOULD evaluate the additional
information described in Section 4.1 in order to discover the
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capabilities of the RDAP server and optionally obtain the set of
supported OPs unless that information is available from a
trusted out-of-band source and has already been processed.
2. An RDAP client sends an RDAP "login" request to an RDAP server
as described in Section 5.2.
3. The RDAP server prepares an Authentication Request containing
the desired request parameters.
4. The RDAP server sends an Authentication Request to an OpenID
Provider (OP) Authorization Endpoint and redirects the RDAP
client to the OpenID Provider using an HTTP redirect.
5. The OpenID Provider authenticates the End-User.
6. The OpenID Provider obtains End-User consent/authorization.
7. The OpenID Provider sends the RDAP Client back to the RDAP
server with an Authorization Code using an HTTP redirect.
8. The RDAP server requests tokens using the Authorization Code at
the OpenID Provider's Token Endpoint.
9. The RDAP server receives a response that contains an ID Token
and Access Token in the response body.
10. The RDAP server validates the tokens as described in [OIDCC] and
retrieves the claims associated with the End-User's identity
from the OpenID Provider's UserInfo Endpoint.
The steps above can be described in a sequence diagram:
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End OpenID RDAP RDAP
User Provider Client Server
| | | |
| | |-----Help Query---->|
| | | |
| | |<---Help Response---|
| | | |
|-------Login Request------>| |
| | | |
| | |---Login Request--->|
| | | |
| |<-----Authentication Request------|
| | | |
| Credential--| | |
|<--Request | | |
| | | |
|--Credential | | |
| Response->| | |
| | | |
| |-----Authentication Response----->|
| | | |
| |<----------Token Request----------|
| | | |
| |-----------Token Response-------->|
| | | |
| |<----------Claim Request----------|
| | | |
| |-----------Claim Response-------->|
| | | |
| | |<--Login Response---|
| | | |
|<------Login Response------| |
| | | |
|----------RDAP Query------>| |
| | | |
| | |-----RDAP Query---->|
| | | |
| | |<---RDAP Response---|
| | | |
|<------RDAP Response-------| |
Figure 1
The RDAP server can then make identification, authorization, and
access control decisions based on End-User identity information and
local policies. Note that OpenID Connect describes different process
flows for other types of clients, such as script-based or command
line clients.
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RDAP authentication of a token-oriented client using OpenID Connect
requires completion of the following steps:
1. An RDAP client sends an RDAP "help" query to an RDAP server to
determine the type and capabilities of the OpenID Providers
(OPs) that are used by the RDAP server. This information is
returned in the rdapConformance section of the response. A
value of "farv1" indicates support for the extension described
in this specification. If one or more remote OpenID Providers
are supported, the RDAP client SHOULD evaluate the additional
information described in Section 4.1 in order to discover the
capabilities of the RDAP server and optionally obtain the set of
supported OPs. Support for token-oriented clients requires a
default OP.
2. The RDAP client determines the End-User's OP and confirms that
it's supported by the RDAP server.
3. The RDAP client sends an Authentication Request to the OP's
Authorization Endpoint.
4. The OP authenticates the End-User.
5. The OP obtains End-User consent/authorization.
6. The OP returns an Authorization Code to the RDAP client.
7. The RDAP client requests tokens using the Authorization Code at
the OP's Token Endpoint.
8. The RDAP client receives a response that contains an ID Token
and an Access Token in the response body.
9. The RDAP client monitors the token validity period and either
refreshes the token or requests new tokens as necessary.
10. The RDAP client sends queries that require user identification,
authentication, and authorization to an RDAP server that include
an Access Token in an HTTP "Authorization" header using the
"Bearer" authentication scheme described in RFC 6750 [RFC6750].
11. The RDAP server validates the Access Token and retrieves the
claims associated with the End-User's identity from the OP's
UserInfo Endpoint.
12. The RDAP server determines the End-User's authorization level
and processes the query in accordance with server policies.
The steps above can be described in a sequence diagram:
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End OpenID RDAP RDAP
User Provider Client Server
| | | |
| | |-----Help Query---->|
| | | |
| | |<----Help Response--|
| | | |
|-------Login Request------>| |
| | | |
| |<-Authentication |
| | Request---| |
| | | |
|<-Credential | | |
| Request---| | |
| | | |
|--Credential | | |
| Response->| | |
| | | |
| |--Authentication |
| | Response--->| |
| | | |
| |<-Token | |
| | Request----| |
| | | |
| |--Token | |
| | Response-->| |
| | | |
|<------Login Response------| |
| | | |
|-----RDAP Query----------->| |
| | | |
| | |----RDAP Query----->|
| | | |
| |<------------Claim |
| | Request---------------|
| | | |
| |-------------Claim |
| | Response------------->|
| | | |
| | |<---RDAP Response---|
| | | |
|<----RDAP Response---------| |
Figure 2
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3.1.4. RDAP Authentication and Authorization Steps
End-Users MAY present an identifier (an OpenID) issued by an OP to
use OpenID Connect with RDAP. If the RDAP server supports a default
OpenID Provider or provider discovery is not supported, the End-User
identifier MAY be omitted. An OP SHOULD include support for the
claims described in Section 3.1.5 to provide additional information
needed for RDAP End-User authorization; in the absence of these
claims clients and servers MAY make authorization and access control
decisions as appropriate given any other information returned from
the OP. OpenID Connect requires RPs to register with OPs to use
OpenID Connect services for an End-User. The registration process is
often completed using out-of-band methods, but it is also possible to
use the automated method described by the "OpenID Connect Dynamic
Client Registration" protocol [OIDCR]. The parties involved can use
any method that is mutually acceptable.
3.1.4.1. Provider Discovery
An RDAP server/RP needs to be able to map an End-User's identifier to
an OP. This can be accomplished using the OPTIONAL "OpenID Connect
Discovery" protocol [OIDCD], but that protocol is not widely
implemented. Out-of-band methods are also possible and can be more
dependable. For example, an RP can support a limited number of OPs
and maintain internal associations of those identifiers with the OPs
that issued them.
Alternatively, if mapping of an End-User's identifier is not
possible, or not supported by the RDAP server, the RDAP server SHOULD
support explicit specification of a remote OP by the RDAP client in
the form of a query parameter as described in Section 5.2.2 unless
the remote OP has been identified using an out-of-band mechanism. An
RDAP server MUST provide information about its capabilities and
supported OPs in the "help" query response in the
"farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure described in Section 4.1.
An RDAP server/RP MUST support at least one of these methods of OP
discovery.
3.1.4.2. Authentication Request
Once the OP is known, an RP MUST form an Authentication Request and
send it to the OP as described in Section 3 of the OpenID Connect
Core protocol [OIDCC]. The authentication path followed
(authorization, implicit, or hybrid) will depend on the
Authentication Request response_type set by the RP. The remainder of
the processing steps described here assume that the Authorization
Code Flow is being used by setting "response_type=code" in the
Authentication Request.
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The benefits of using the Authorization Code Flow for authenticating
a human user are described in Section 3.1 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol. The Implicit Flow is more commonly used by clients
implemented in a web browser using a scripting language; it is
described in Section 3.2 of the OpenID Connect Core protocol. At the
time of this writing, the Implicit Flow is considered insecure and
efforts are being made to deprecate the flow. The Hybrid Flow
(described in Section 3.3 of the OpenID Connect Core protocol)
combines elements of the Authorization Code and Implicit Flows by
returning some tokens from the Authorization Endpoint and others from
the Token Endpoint.
An Authentication Request can contain several parameters. REQUIRED
parameters are specified in Section 3.1.2.1 of the OpenID Connect
Core protocol [OIDCC]. Apart from these parameters, it is
RECOMMENDED that the RP include the optional "login_hint" parameter
in the request, with the value being that of the "farv1_id" query
parameter of the End-User's RDAP "login" request, if provided.
Passing the "login_hint" parameter allows a client to pre-fill login
form information, so logging in can be more convenient for users.
Other parameters MAY be included.
The OP receives the Authentication Request and attempts to validate
it as described in Section 3.1.2.2 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol [OIDCC]. If the request is valid, the OP attempts to
authenticate the End-User as described in Section 3.1.2.3 of the
OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC]. The OP returns an error
response if the request is not valid or if any error is encountered.
3.1.4.3. End-User Authorization
After the End-User is authenticated, the OP MUST obtain consent from
the End-User to release authorization information to the RDAP Server/
RP. This process is described in Section 3.1.2.4 of the OpenID
Connect Core protocol [OIDCC].
3.1.4.4. Authorization Response and Validation
After obtaining an authorization result, the OP will send a response
to the RP that provides the result of the authorization process using
an Authorization Code. The RP MUST validate the response. This
process is described in Sections 3.1.2.5 - 3.1.2.7 of the OpenID
Connect Core protocol [OIDCC].
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3.1.4.5. Token Processing
The RP sends a Token Request using the Authorization Grant to a Token
Endpoint to obtain a Token Response containing an Access Token, ID
Token, and an OPTIONAL Refresh Token. The RP MUST validate the Token
Response. This process is described in Section 3.1.3.5 of the OpenID
Connect Core protocol [OIDCC].
3.1.4.6. Delivery of User Information
The set of claims can be retrieved by sending a request to a UserInfo
Endpoint using the Access Token. The claims are returned in the ID
Token. The process of retrieving claims from a UserInfo Endpoint is
described in Section 5.3 of the OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC].
OpenID Connect specifies a set of standard claims in Section 5.1 of
the OpenID Connect Core protocol [OIDCC]. Additional claims for RDAP
are described in Section 3.1.5.
3.1.5. Specialized Claims and Authorization Scope for RDAP
OpenID Connect claims are pieces of information used to make
assertions about an entity. Section 5 of the OpenID Connect Core
protocol [OIDCC] describes a set of standard claims. Section 5.1.2
notes that additional claims MAY be used, and it describes a method
to create them. The set of claims that are specific to RDAP are
associated with an OAuth scope request parameter value (see
Section 3.3 of RFC 6749 ([RFC6749])) of "rdap".
3.1.5.1. Stated Purposes
Communities of RDAP users and operators may wish to make and validate
claims about a user's "need to know" when it comes to requesting
access to a protected resource. For example, a law enforcement agent
or a trademark attorney may wish to be able to assert that they have
a legal right to access a protected resource, and a server operator
may need to be able to receive and validate that claim. These needs
can be met by defining and using an additional
"rdap_allowed_purposes" claim.
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The "rdap_allowed_purposes" claim identifies the purposes for which
access to a protected resource can be requested by an End-User. Use
of the "rdap_allowed_purposes" claim is OPTIONAL; processing of this
claim is subject to server acceptance of the purposes, the trust
level assigned to this claim by the server, and successful
authentication of the End-User. Unrecognized purpose values MUST be
ignored and the associated query MUST be processed as if the
unrecognized purpose value was not present at all. See Section 9.3
for a description of the IANA considerations associated with this
claim.
The "rdap_allowed_purposes" claim is represented as an array of case-
sensitive StringOrURI values as specified in Section 2 of the JSON
Web Token (JWT) specification ([RFC7519]). An example:
"rdap_allowed_purposes": ["domainNameControl","dnsTransparency"]
Purpose values are assigned to an End User's credential by an
Identity Provider. Identity Providers MUST ensure that appropriate
purpose values are only assigned to End User identities that are
authorized to use them.
3.1.5.2. Do Not Track
Communities of RDAP users and operators may wish to make and validate
claims about a user's wish to not have their queries logged, tracked,
or recorded. For example, a law enforcement agent may wish to assert
that their queries are part of a criminal investigation and should
not be tracked due to a risk of query exposure compromising the
investigation, and a server operator may need to be able to receive
and validate that claim. These needs can be met by defining and
using an additional "do not track" claim.
The "do not track" ("rdap_dnt_allowed") claim can be used to identify
an End-User that is authorized to perform queries without the End-
User's association with those queries being logged, tracked, or
recorded by the server. Client use of the "rdap_dnt_allowed" claim
is OPTIONAL. Server operators MUST NOT log, track, or record any
association of the query and the End-User's identity if the End-User
is successfully identified and authorized, the "rdap_dnt_allowed"
claim is present, the value of the claim is "true", and accepting the
claim complies with local regulations regarding logging and tracking.
The "rdap_dnt_allowed" value is represented as a JSON boolean
literal. An example:
rdap_dnt_allowed: true
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No special query tracking processing is required if this claim is not
present or if the value of the claim is "false". Use of this claim
MUST be limited to End-Users who are granted "do not track"
privileges in accordance with service policies and regulations.
Specification of these policies and regulations is beyond the scope
of this document.
4. Common Protocol Features
As described in Section 3.1.4.1, an RDAP server MUST provide
information about its capabilities and supported OPs in a "help"
query response. This specification describes a new
"farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure that describes the OpenID
Connect configuration and related extension features supported by the
RDAP server. This data structure is returned to all client types.
4.1. OpenID Connect Configuration
The "farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure is an object with the
following members:
1. "sessionClientSupported": (REQUIRED) a boolean value that
describes RDAP server support for session-oriented clients (see
Section 3.1.2).
2. "tokenClientSupported": (REQUIRED) a boolean value that describes
RDAP server support for token-oriented clients (see
Section 3.1.2).
3. "dntSupported": (REQUIRED) a boolean value that describes RDAP
server support for the "farv1_dnt" query parameter (see
Section 4.2.2).
4. "providerDiscoverySupported": (OPTIONAL) a boolean value that
describes RDAP server support for discovery of providers of End-
User identifiers. The default value is "true".
5. "issuerIdentifierSupported": (OPTIONAL) a boolean value that
describes RDAP server support for explicit client specification
of an Issuer Identifier. The default value is "true".
6. "implicitTokenRefreshSupported": (OPTIONAL) a boolean value that
describes RDAP server support for implicit token refresh. The
default value is "false".
7. "openidcProviders": (OPTIONAL) a list of objects with the
following members that describes the set of OPs that are
supported by the RDAP server. This data is RECOMMENDED if the
value of issuerIdentifierSupported is "true":
a. "iss": (REQUIRED) a URI value that represents the Issuer
Identifier of the OP as per the OpenID Connect Core
specification [OIDCC]
b. "name": (REQUIRED) a string value representing the human-
friendly name of the OP.
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c. "default": (OPTIONAL) a boolean value that describes RDAP
server support for an OPTIONAL default OP that will be used
when a client omits the "farv1_id" and "farv1_iss" query
parameters from a "farv1_session/login" request. Only one
member of this set can be identified as the default OP by
setting a value of "true". The default value is "false".
d. "additionalAuthorizationQueryParams": (OPTIONAL) an object
where each member represents an OAuth authorization request
parameter name-value pair supported by the OP. The name
represents an OAuth query parameter and the value is the
query parameter value. A token-oriented RDAP client SHOULD
add these query parameters and their corresponding values to
the Authentication Request URL when requesting authorization
by a specified OP through a proxy OP.
An RDAP server MUST set either the "sessionClientSupported" or
"tokenClientSupported" value to "true". Both values MAY be set to
"true" if an RDAP server supports both types of client.
The "providerDiscoverySupported" value has a direct impact on the use
of the "farv1_id" query parameter described in Section 3.1.4.2 and
Section 5.2.1. The value of "providerDiscoverySupported" MUST be
"true" for an RDAP server to properly accept and process "farv1_id"
query parameters. Similarly, The "issuerIdentifierSupported" value
has a direct impact on the use of the "farv1_iss" query parameter
described in Section 5.2.2. The value of "issuerIdentifierSupported"
MUST be "true" for an RDAP server to properly accept and process
"farv1_iss" query parameters.
An example of a "farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure:
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"farv1_openidcConfiguration": {
"sessionClientSupported": true,
"tokenClientSupported": true,
"dntSupported": false,
"providerDiscoverySupported": true,
"issuerIdentifierSupported": true,
"openidcProviders":
[
{
"iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"name": "Example IDP"
},
{
"iss": "https://accounts.example.net",
"name": "Login with EXAMPLE",
"additionalAuthorizationQueryParams": {
"kc_idp_hint": "examplePublicIDP"
}
},
{
"iss": "https://auth.nic.example/auth/realms/rdap",
"name": "Default OP for the Example RDAP server",
"default": true
}
]
}
Figure 3
4.2. RDAP Query Parameters
This specification describes two OPTIONAL query parameters for use
with RDAP queries that request access to information associated with
protected resources:
1. "farv1_qp": A query parameter to identify the purpose of the
query.
2. "farv1_dnt": A query parameter to request that the server not log
or otherwise record information about the identity associated
with a query.
One or both parameters MAY be added to an RDAP request URI using the
syntax described in the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" section
of the WHATWG URL Standard [HTMLURL].
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4.2.1. RDAP Query Purpose
This query is represented as a "key=value" pair using a key value of
"farv1_qp" and a value component that contains a single query purpose
string from the set of allowed purposes associated with the End-
User's identity (see Section 3.1.5.1). If present, the server SHOULD
compare the value of the parameter to the "rdap_allowed_purposes"
claim values associated with the End-User's identity and ensure that
the requested purpose is present in the set of allowed purposes. The
RDAP server MAY choose to ignore both requested purpose and the
"rdap_allowed_purposes" claim values if they are inconsistent with
local server policy. The server MUST return an HTTP 403 (Forbidden)
response if the requested purpose is not an allowed purpose. If the
"farv1_qp" parameter is not present, the server MUST process the
query and make an access control decision based on any other
information known to the server about the End-User and the
information they are requesting. For example, a server MAY treat the
request as one performed by an unidentified or unauthenticated user
and return either an error or an appropriate subset of the available
data. An example domain query using the "farv1_qp" query parameter:
https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com?farv1_qp=legalActions
4.2.2. RDAP Do Not Track
This query is represented as a "key=value" pair using a key value of
"farv1_dnt" and a value component that contains a single boolean
value. A value of "true" indicates that the End-User is requesting
that their query is not tracked or logged in accordance with server
policy. A value of "false" indicates that the End-User is accepting
that their query can be tracked or logged in accordance with server
policy. The server MUST return an HTTP 403 (Forbidden) response if
the server is unable to perform the action requested by this query
parameter. An example domain query using the "farv1_dnt" query
parameter:
https://example.com/rdap/domain/example.com?farv1_dnt=true
4.2.3. Parameter Processing
Unrecognized query parameters MUST be ignored. An RDAP server that
processes an authenticated query MUST determine if the End-User
identification information is associated with an OP that is
recognized and supported by the server. RDAP servers MUST reject
queries that include identification information that is not
associated with a supported OP by returning an HTTP 400 (Bad Request)
response. An RDAP server that receives a query containing
identification information associated with a recognized OP MUST
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perform the steps required to authenticate the user with the OP,
process the query, and return an RDAP response that is appropriate
for the End-User's level of authorization and access.
5. Protocol Features for Session-Oriented Clients
This specification adds the following features to RDAP that are
commonly used by session-oriented clients:
1. Data structures to return information that describes an
established session and the information needed to establish a
session for a UI-constrained device.
2. A query parameter to request authentication for a specific End-
User identity.
3. A query parameter to support authentication for a specific End-
User identity on a device with a constrained user interface.
4. A query parameter to identify the purpose of the query.
5. A query parameter to request that the server not log or otherwise
record information about the identity associated with a query.
6. Path segments to start, stop, refresh, and determine the status
of an authenticated session for a specific End-User identity.
5.1. Data Structures
This specification describes two new data structures that are used to
return information to a session-oriented client: a "farv1_session"
data structure that contains information that describes an
established session, and a "farv1_deviceInfo" data structure that
contains information that describes an active attempt to establish a
session on a UI-constrained device.
5.1.1. Session
The "farv1_session" data structure is an object that contains the
following members:
1. "userID": an OPTIONAL string value that represents the End-User
identifier associated with the session.
2. "iss": an OPTIONAL URI value that represents the issuer of the
End-User identifier associated with the session.
3. "userClaims": an OPTIONAL object that contains the set of claims
associated with the End-User's identity based on the user
information provided by the OP as described in Section 3.1.4.6
and processed by the RDAP server in the authentication and
authorization process. The set of possible values is determined
by OP policy and RDAP server policy.
4. "sessionInfo": an OPTIONAL object that contains two members:
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a. "tokenExpiration": an integer value that represents the
number of seconds that remain in the lifetime of the Access
Token, and
b. "tokenRefresh": a boolean value that indicates if the OP
supports refresh tokens. As described in RFC 6749 [RFC6749],
support for refresh tokens is OPTIONAL.
Note that all of the members of the "farv1_session" data structure
are OPTIONAL. See Section 5.2.3 for instructions describing when to
return the minimum set of members.
An example of a "farv1_session" data structure:
"farv1_session": {
"userID": "user.idp.example",
"iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"userClaims": {
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"name": "User Person",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"email": "user@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"locale": "en",
"rdap_allowed_purposes": [
"domainNameControl",
"personalDataProtection"
],
"rdap_dnt_allowed": false
},
"sessionInfo": {
"tokenExpiration": 3599,
"tokenRefresh": true
}
}
Figure 4
5.1.2. Device Info
The flow described in Section 3.1.4 requires an End-User to interact
with a server using a user interface that can process HTTP. This
will not work well in situations where the client is automated or an
End-User is using a command line user interface such as curl
(https://curl.se/) or wget (https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/).
This limitation can be addressed using a web browser on a second
device. The information that needs to be entered using the web
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browser is contained in the "farv1_deviceInfo" data structure, an
object that contains members as described in Section 3.2 ("Device
Authorization Response") of RFC 8628 [RFC8628].
An example of a "farv1_deviceInfo" data structure:
"farv1_deviceInfo": {
"device_code": "AH-1ng2ezu",
"user_code": "NJJQ-GJFC",
"verification_uri": "https://www.example.com/device",
"verification_uri_complete":
"https://www.example.com/device?user_code=NJJQ-GJFC",
"expires_in": 1800,
"interval": 5
}
Figure 5
5.2. Client Login
Client authentication is requested by sending a "farv1_session/login"
request to an RDAP server. If the RDAP server supports only remote
OpenID Providers, the "farv1_session/login" request MUST include at
least one of an End-User Identifier or an OP Issuer Identifier.
The server sets an HTTP cookie as described in RFC 6265 [RFC6265]
when the "farv1_session/login" request is received and processed
successfully. The client MUST include the session cookie received
from the server in any RDAP request within the scope of that session,
including "farv1_session/refresh", "farv1_session/status" and
"farv1_session/logout". A "farv1_session/login" followed by another
"farv1_session/login" that does not include an HTTP cookie MUST start
a new session on the server that includes a new cookie. A server
that receives a "farv1_session/login" followed by another
"farv1_session/login" that includes an HTTP cookie MUST return an
HTTP 409 (Conflict) response.
To help reduce the risk of resource starvation, a server MAY reject a
"farv1_session/login" request and refuse to start a new session by
returning an HTTP 409 (Conflict) response if a server-side maximum
number of concurrent sessions per user exists and the client exceeds
that limit. Additionally, an active session MAY be removed by the
server due to timeout expiration or because a maximum session
lifetime has been exceeded. Clients SHOULD proactively monitor the
"tokenExpiration" value associated with an active session and refresh
the session as appropriate to provide a positive user experience.
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5.2.1. End-User Identifier
The End-User identifier is delivered using one of two methods: by
adding a query component to an RDAP request URI using the syntax
described in the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" section of
WHATWG URL Standard [HTMLURL], or by including an HTTP
"Authorization" request header for the Basic authentication scheme as
described in RFC 7617 [RFC7617]. Clients can use either of these
methods to deliver the End-User identifier to a server that supports
remote OpenID Providers and provider discovery. Servers that support
remote OpenID Providers and provider discovery MUST accept both
methods. If the RDAP server supports a default OpenID Provider or
provider discovery is not supported, the End-User identifier MAY be
omitted.
The query parameter used to deliver the End-User identifier is
represented as an OPTIONAL "key=value" pair using a key value of
"farv1_id" and a value component that contains the client identifier
issued by an OP. An example for client identifier
"user.idp.example":
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/\
login?farv1_id=user.idp.example
The authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme contains
a Base64-encoded representation of the client identifier issued by an
OP. No password is provided. An example for client identifier
"user.idp.example":
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/login
Authorization: Basic dXNlci5pZHAuZXhhbXBsZQ==
An example for use with a default OpenID Provider:
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/login
5.2.2. OP Issuer Identifier
The OP's Issuer Identifier is delivered by adding a query component
to an RDAP request URI using the syntax described in the
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded" section of WHATWG URL Standard
[HTMLURL]. If the RDAP server supports a default OpenID Provider,
the Issuer Identifier MAY be omitted.
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The query parameter used to deliver the OP's Issuer Identifier is
represented as an OPTIONAL "key=value" pair using a key value of
"farv1_iss" and a value component that contains the Issuer Identifier
associated with an OP. An RDAP server MAY accept Issuer Identifiers
not specified in the "farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure and
MAY also decide to accept specific Issuer Identifiers only from
specific clients. An example for Issuer Identifier
"https://idp.example.com":
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/\
login?farv1_iss=https://idp.example.com
5.2.3. Login Response
The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response, per RFC
9083 [RFC9083]. It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a
specific RDAP object type (e.g., "events", "status"). In addition,
the response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
success or failure in the "notices" data structure. If successful,
the response MUST include a "farv1_session" data structure that
includes a "sessionInfo" object and an OPTIONAL "userClaims" object.
If unsuccessful, the response MUST include a "farv1_session" data
structure that omits the "userClaims" and "sessionInfo" objects.
An example of a successful "farv1_session/login" response:
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{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Login Result",
"description": [
"Login succeeded"
]
}
],
"farv1_session": {
"userID": "user.idp.example",
"iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"userClaims": {
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"name": "User Person",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"email": "user@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"locale": "en",
"rdap_allowed_purposes": [
"domainNameControl",
"personalDataProtection"
],
"rdap_dnt_allowed": false
},
"sessionInfo": {
"tokenExpiration": 3599,
"tokenRefresh": true
}
}
}
Figure 6
An example of a failed "farv1_session/login" response:
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{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Login Result",
"description": [
"Login failed"
]
}
],
"farv1_session": {
"userID": "user.idp.example",
"iss": "https://idp.example.com"
}
}
Figure 7
5.2.4. Clients with Limited User Interfaces
The "OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant" [RFC8628] provides an
OPTIONAL method to request user authorization from devices that have
an Internet connection, but lack a suitable browser for a more
conventional OAuth flow. This method requires an End-User to use a
second device (such as a smart telephone) that has access to a web
browser for entry of a code sequence that is presented on the UI-
constrained device.
5.2.4.1. UI-constrained Client Login
Client authentication is requested by sending a "farv1_session/
device" request to an RDAP server. If the RDAP server supports only
remote OpenID Providers, the "farv1_session/device" request MUST
include either an End-User identifier as described in Section 5.2.1
or an OP Issuer Identifier as described in Section 5.2.2.
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
An example using wget for client identifier "user.idp.example":
wget -qO- "https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/device\
?farv1_id=user.idp.example"
Figure 8
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The authorization header for the Basic authentication scheme contains
a Base64-encoded representation of the client identifier issued by an
OP. No password is provided.
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
An example using curl and an authorization header:
curl -H "Authorization: Basic dXNlci5pZHAuZXhhbXBsZQ=="\
"https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/device"
Figure 9
The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response, per RFC
9083 [RFC9083]. It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a
specific RDAP object type (e.g., "events", "status"). In addition,
the response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
success or failure in the "notices" data structure, and, if
successful, a "farv1_deviceInfo" data structure.
An example of a "farv1_session/device" response:
{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Device Login Result",
"description": [
"Login succeeded"
]
}
],
"farv1_deviceInfo": {
"device_code": "AH-1ng2ezu",
"user_code": "NJJQ-GJFC",
"verification_uri": "https://www.example.com/device",
"verification_uri_complete":
"https://www.example.com/device?user_code=NJJQ-GJFC",
"expires_in": 1800,
"interval": 5
}
}
Figure 10
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5.2.4.2. UI-constrained Client Login Polling
After successful processing of the "farv1_session/device" request,
the client MUST send a "farv1_session/devicepoll" request to the RDAP
server to continue the login process. This request initiates the
polling function described in RFC 8628 [RFC8628] on the RDAP server.
The RDAP server polls the OP as described in Section 3.4 of RFC 8628,
allowing the RDAP server to wait for the End-User to enter the
information returned from the "farv1_session/device" request using
the interface on their second device. After the End-User has
completed that process, or if the process fails or times out, the OP
will respond to the polling requests with an indication of success or
failure. If the RDAP server supports only remote OpenID Providers,
the "farv1_session/devicepoll" request MUST include either an End-
User identifier as described in Section 5.2.1 or an OP Issuer
Identifier as described in Section 5.2.2.
The "farv1_session/devicepoll" request MUST also include a "farv1_dc"
query parameter. The query parameter is represented as an OPTIONAL
"key=value" pair using a key value of "farv1_dc" and a value
component that contains the value of the device_code that was
returned in the response to the "farv1_session/device" request.
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ===========
An example using wget:
wget -qO- --keep-session-cookies --save-cookies cookie.txt\
"https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/devicepoll\
?farv1_id=user.idp.example&farv1_dc=AH-1ng2ezu"
Figure 11
An example using curl:
curl -c cookie.txt "https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/\
devicepoll?farv1_id=user.idp.example&farv1_dc=AH-1ng2ezu"
Figure 12
The response to this request MUST use the response structures
described in Section 5.2. RDAP query processing can continue
normally on the UI-constrained device once the device polling process
has been completed successfully.
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5.3. Session Status
Clients MAY send a query to an RDAP server to determine the status of
an existing login session using a "farv1_session/status" path
segment. An example "farv1_session/status" request:
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/status
The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response, per RFC
9083 [RFC9083]. It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a
specific RDAP object type (e.g., "events", "status"). In addition,
the response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
success or failure in the "notices" data structure. If the operation
is successful, and an active session exists, the response MUST
include a "farv1_session" data structure that includes a
"sessionInfo" object and an OPTIONAL "userClaims" object. If the
operation is unsuccessful, or if no active session exists, the
response MUST NOT include a "farv1_session" object.
An example of a "farv1_session/status" response for an active
session:
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{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Session Status Result",
"description": [
"Session status succeeded"
]
}
],
"farv1_session": {
"userID": "user.idp.example",
"iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"userClaims": {
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"name": "User Person",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"email": "user@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"locale": "en",
"rdap_allowed_purposes": [
"domainNameControl",
"personalDataProtection"
],
"rdap_dnt_allowed": false
},
"sessionInfo": {
"tokenExpiration": 3490,
"tokenRefresh": true
}
}
}
Figure 13
If the operation is successful, and an active session does not exist,
the response MAY note the lack of an active session in the "notices"
data structure. The "farv1_session" data structure MUST be omitted.
An example of a "farv1_session/status" response with no active
session:
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{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Session Status Result",
"description": [
"Session status succeeded",
"No active session"
]
}
]
}
Figure 14
5.4. Session Refresh
Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to refresh, or extend,
an existing login session using a "farv1_session/refresh" path
segment. The RDAP server MAY attempt to refresh the Access Token
associated with the current session as part of extending the session
for a period of time determined by the RDAP server. As described in
RFC 6749 [RFC6749], OP support for refresh tokens is OPTIONAL. An
RDAP server MUST determine if the OP supports token refresh and
process the refresh request by either requesting refresh of the
Access Token or by returning a response that indicates that token
refresh is not supported by the OP in the "notices" data structure.
An example "farv1_session/refresh" request:
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/refresh
The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response, per RFC
9083 [RFC9083]. It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a
specific RDAP object type (e.g., "events", "status"). In addition,
the response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
success or failure in the "notices" data structure. The response
MUST include a "farv1_session" data structure that includes a
"sessionInfo" object and an OPTIONAL "userClaims" object. If
unsuccessful, but an active session exists, the response MUST include
a "farv1_session" data structure that includes a "sessionInfo" object
and an OPTIONAL "userClaims" object. If unsuccessful, and no active
session exists, the response MUST omit the "farv1_session" data
structure.
An example of a successful "farv1_session/refresh" response:
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{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Session Refresh Result",
"description": [
"Session refresh succeeded",
"Token refresh succeeded."
]
}
],
"farv1_session": {
"userID": "user.idp.example",
"iss": "https://idp.example.com",
"userClaims": {
"sub": "103892603076825016132",
"name": "User Person",
"given_name": "User",
"family_name": "Person",
"picture": "https://lh3.example.com/a-/AOh14=s96-c",
"email": "user@example.com",
"email_verified": true,
"locale": "en",
"rdap_allowed_purposes": [
"domainNameControl",
"personalDataProtection"
],
"rdap_dnt_allowed": false
},
"sessionInfo": {
"tokenExpiration": 3599,
"tokenRefresh": true
}
}
}
Figure 15
Alternatively, an RDAP server MAY attempt to refresh an Access Token
upon receipt of a query if the Access Token associated with an
existing session has expired and the corresponding OP supports token
refresh. The default RDAP server behavior is described in the
"implicitTokenRefreshSupported" value that's included in the
"farv1_openidcConfiguration" data structure (see Section 4.1).
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If the value of "implicitTokenRefreshSupported" is "true", the client
MAY either explicitly attempt to refresh the session using the
"farv1_session/refresh" query, or it MAY depend on the RDAP server to
attempt to refresh the session as necessary when an RDAP query is
received by the server. In this case, a server MUST attempt to
refresh the Access Token upon receipt of a query if the Access Token
associated with an existing session has expired and the corresponding
OP supports token refresh. Servers MUST return an HTTP 401
(Unauthorized) response to a query if an attempt to implicitly
refresh an existing session fails.
If the value of "implicitTokenRefreshSupported" is "false", the
client MUST explicitly attempt to refresh the session using the
"farv1_session/refresh" query to extend an existing session. If a
session cannot be extended for any reason, the client MUST establish
a new session to continue authenticated query processing by
submitting a "farv1_session/login" query. If the OP does not support
token refresh, the client MUST submit a new "farv1_session/login"
request to establish a new session once an Access Token has expired.
Clients SHOULD NOT send a "farv1_session/refresh" request in the
absence of an active login session because the request conflicts with
the current state of the server. Servers MUST return an HTTP 409
(Conflict) response if a "farv1_session/refresh" request is received
in the absence of a session cookie.
5.5. Client Logout
Clients MAY send a request to an RDAP server to terminate an existing
login session. Termination of a session is requested using a
"farv1_session/logout" path segment. Access and refresh tokens can
be revoked during the "farv1_session/logout" process as described in
RFC 7009 [RFC7009] if supported by the OP (token revocation endpoint
support is OPTIONAL per RFC 8414 [RFC8414]). If supported, this
feature SHOULD be used to ensure that the tokens are not mistakenly
associated with a future RDAP session. Alternatively, an RDAP server
MAY attempt to log out from the OP using the "OpenID Connect RP-
Initiated Logout" protocol ([OIDCL]) if that protocol is supported by
the OP. In any case, to prevent abuse before the cookie times out an
RDAP server SHOULD invalidate the HTTP cookie associated with the
session as part of terminating the session.
An example "farv1_session/logout" request:
https://example.com/rdap/farv1_session/logout
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The response to this request MUST be a valid RDAP response, per RFC
9083 [RFC9083]. It MUST NOT include any members that relate to a
specific RDAP object type (e.g., "events", "status"). In addition,
the response MAY include an indication of the requested operation's
success or failure in the "notices" data structure. The "notices"
data structure MAY include an indication of the success or failure of
any attempt to logout from the OP or to revoke the tokens issued by
the OP.
An example of a "farv1_session/logout" response:
{
"rdapConformance": [
"farv1"
],
"lang": "en-US",
"notices": [
{
"title": "Logout Result",
"description": [
"Logout succeeded"
"Provider logout failed: Not supported by provider.",
"Token revocation successful."
]
}
]
}
Figure 16
In the absence of a "logout" request, an RDAP session MUST be
terminated by the RDAP server after a server-defined period of time.
The server SHOULD also take appropriate steps to ensure that the
tokens associated with the terminated session cannot be reused. This
SHOULD include revoking the tokens or logging out from the OP if
either operation is supported by the OP.
5.6. Request Sequencing
The requests described in this document are typically performed in a
specific sequence: "farv1_session/login" (or the related
"farv1_session/device" and "farv1_session/devicepoll" requests) to
start a session, "farv1_session/status" and/or "farv1_session/
refresh" to manage a session, and "farv1_session/logout" to end a
session. If a client sends a "farv1_session/status", "farv1_session/
refresh", or "farv1_session/logout" request in the absence of a
session cookie, the server MUST return an HTTP 409 (Conflict) error.
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A client can end a session explicitly by sending a "farv1_session/
logout" request to the RDAP server. A session can also be ended
implicitly by the server after a server-defined period of time. The
status of a session can be determined at any time by sending a
"farv1_session/status" query to the RDAP server.
An RDAP server MUST maintain session state information for the
duration of an active session. This is commonly done using HTTP
cookies as described in RFC 6265 [RFC6265]. Doing so allows End-User
to submit queries without having to explicitly identify and
authenticate themselves for every query.
An RDAP server can receive queries that include a session cookie
where the associated session has expired or is otherwise unavailable
(e.g., due to the user requesting explicit logout for the associated
session). The server MUST return an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) error in
response to such queries.
6. Protocol Features for Token-Oriented Clients
This specification adds additional processing steps for token-
oriented clients as described in this section and Section 3.1.3. It
does not define additional data structures or RDAP-specific protocol
parameters specifically for token-oriented clients.
6.1. Client Login
Clients identify and authenticate End-Users by exchanging information
with an OP that is recognized by the RDAP server as described in
Section 3.1.4.2, Section 3.1.4.3, and Section 3.1.4.4. A client
SHOULD append the "additionalAuthorizationQueryParams" values
retrieved from the "openidcProviders" array described in Section 4.1
to the Authorization Endpoint URL when requesting authorization from
the OP. Once these processes are completed successfully, the client
can request tokens from the OP as described in Section 3.1.4.5. The
OP SHOULD include the RDAP server's client_id in the "aud" claim
value of an issued ID token. The RDAP server MAY choose to ignore
the value of the "aud" claim or exchange the token as described in
Section 6.4. With these steps completed, the Access Token received
from the OP can be passed to an RDAP server in an HTTP
"Authorization" request header [RFC6750] for RDAP queries that
require End-User identification, authentication, and authorization.
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6.2. Client Queries
An RDAP server that receives a bearer token in an HTTP
"Authorization" request header as part of an RDAP object query MUST
validate the token in accordance with local policy and confirm that
the token is a legitimate Access Token. Once validated, the Access
Token MAY be used to retrieve the claims associated with the End-
User's identity, including claims associated with the "rdap" scope
that are not already included in the Access Token, as described in
Section 3.1.4.6. The RDAP server can then evaluate the End-User's
identity information to determine the End-User's authorization level
and process the query in accordance with server policies. A client
MUST include the "farv1_iss" query parameter and issuer identifier
value with an RDAP query if the token was issued by a remote OP.
6.3. Access Token Validation
An RDAP server MUST validate a received Access Token prior to using
that token for access control purposes. Validation MAY include token
introspection [RFC7662] using the issuing OP, or analysis of the
values included in a JWT Access Token. Once an Access Token is
validated, an RDAP server MAY use that token to request user claims
from the issuing OP.
There are performance considerations associated with the process of
validating a token and requesting user claims as part of processing
every received RDAP query. An RDAP server MAY cache validated
information and use that cached information to reduce the amount of
time needed to process subsequent RDAP queries associated with the
same Access Token as long as the token has not expired. The client
SHOULD monitor the token expiration time and refresh the token as
needed.
6.4. Token Exchange
Tokens can include an "aud" (audience) claim that contains the OAuth
2.0 client_id of the RP as an audience value. In some operational
scenarios (such as a client that is providing a proxy service), an RP
can receive tokens with an "aud" claim value that does not include
the RP's client_id. These tokens might not be trusted by the RP, and
the RP might refuse to accept the tokens. This situation can be
remedied by having the RP exchange the Access Token with the OP for a
set of trusted tokens that reset the "aud" claim. The token exchange
protocol is described in RFC 8693 [RFC8693].
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7. RDAP Query Processing
Once an RDAP session is active, an RDAP server MUST determine if the
End-User is authorized to perform any queries that are received
during the duration of the session. This MAY include rejecting
queries outright, and it MAY include omitting or otherwise redacting
information that the End-User is not authorized to receive. Specific
processing requirements are beyond the scope of this document.
8. RDAP Conformance
RDAP responses that contain values described in this document MUST
indicate conformance with this specification by including an
rdapConformance ([RFC9083]) value of "farv1" (Federated
Authentication for RDAP version 1). The information needed to
register this value in the RDAP Extensions Registry is described in
Section 9.1.
Example rdapConformance structure with extension specified:
"rdapConformance" :
[
"rdap_level_0",
"farv1"
]
Figure 17
9. IANA Considerations
9.1. RDAP Extensions Registry
IANA is requested to register the following value in the RDAP
Extensions Registry:
Extension identifier: farv1
Registry operator: Any
Published specification: This document.
Contact: IETF <iesg@ietf.org>
Intended usage: This extension describes version 1 of a federated
authentication method for RDAP using OAuth 2.0 and OpenID Connect.
9.2. JSON Web Token Claims Registry
IANA is requested to register the following values in the JSON Web
Token Claims Registry:
Claim Name: "rdap_allowed_purposes"
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Claim Description: This claim describes the set of RDAP query
purposes that are available to an identity that is presented for
access to a protected RDAP resource.
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.5.1 of this document.
Claim Name: "rdap_dnt_allowed"
Claim Description: This claim contains a JSON boolean literal that
describes a "do not track" request for server-side tracking,
logging, or recording of an identity that is presented for access
to a protected RDAP resource.
Change Controller: IETF
Specification Document(s): Section 3.1.5.2 of this document.
9.3. RDAP Query Purpose Registry
IANA is requested to create a new protocol registry to manage RDAP
query purpose values.
Section at https://www.iana.org/protocols: Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP)
Name of registry: Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query
Purpose Values
Registration policy: This registry is operated under the
"Specification Required" policy defined in RFC 8126 ([RFC8126]). The
Designated Expert must ensure that requests to add values to this
registry meet the syntax, value, and description requirements
described in this section.
Required information: Registration requests are described in a
specification that's consistent with the "Specification Required"
policy defined in RFC 8126 ([RFC8126]). The specification must
include one or more purpose values as described below.
Size, format, and syntax of registry entries:
Individual purpose values are registered with IANA. Each entry in
the registry contains the following fields:
Value: the purpose string value being registered. Value strings can
contain upper case ASCII characters from "A" to "Z", lower case ASCII
characters from "a" to "z", and the underscore ("_") character.
Value strings contain at least one character and no more than 64
characters.
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Description: a one- or two-sentence, English language description of
the meaning of the purpose value, how it might be used, and/or how it
should be interpreted by clients and servers.
Initial assignments and reservations:
The set of initial values used to populate the registry as described
here are taken from the final report
(https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-report-
06jun14-en.pdf) produced by the Expert Working Group on gTLD
Directory Services chartered by the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN).
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: domainNameControl
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
creating and managing and monitoring a registrant's own domain
name, including creating the domain name, updating information
about the domain name, transferring the domain name, renewing the
domain name, deleting the domain name, maintaining a domain name
portfolio, and detecting fraudulent use of the Registrant's own
contact information.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: personalDataProtection
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
identifying the accredited privacy/proxy provider associated with
a domain name and reporting abuse, requesting reveal, or otherwise
contacting the provider.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: technicalIssueResolution
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include (but
are not limited to) working to resolve technical issues, including
email delivery issues, DNS resolution failures, and website
functional issues.
-----END FORM-----
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-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: domainNameCertification
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include a
Certification Authority (CA) issuing an X.509 certificate to a
subject identified by a domain name.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: individualInternetUse
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
identifying the organization using a domain name to instill
consumer trust, or contacting that organization to raise a
customer complaint to them or file a complaint about them.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: businessDomainNamePurchaseOrSale
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include making
purchase queries about a domain name, acquiring a domain name from
a registrant, and enabling due diligence research.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: academicPublicInterestDNSResearch
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
academic public interest research studies about domain names
published in the registration data service, including public
information about the registrant and designated contacts, the
domain name's history and status, and domain names registered by a
given registrant (reverse query).
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: legalActions
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Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
investigating possible fraudulent use of a registrant's name or
address by other domain names, investigating possible trademark
infringement, contacting a registrant/licensee's legal
representative prior to taking legal action and then taking a
legal action if the concern is not satisfactorily addressed.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: regulatoryAndContractEnforcement
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include tax
authority investigation of businesses with online presence,
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) investigation,
contractual compliance investigation, and registration data escrow
audits.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: criminalInvestigationAndDNSAbuseMitigation
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose include
reporting abuse to someone who can investigate and address that
abuse, or contacting entities associated with a domain name during
an offline criminal investigation.
-----END FORM-----
-----BEGIN FORM-----
Value: dnsTransparency
Description: Tasks within the scope of this purpose involve
querying the registration data made public by registrants to
satisfy a wide variety of use cases around informing the public.
-----END FORM-----
10. Implementation Status
NOTE: Please remove this section and the reference to RFC 7942 prior
to publication as an RFC.
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This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942
[RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is
intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing
drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual
implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.
Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information
presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not
intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available
implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that
other implementations may exist.
According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".
Version -09 of this specification introduced changes that are
incompatible with earlier implementations. Implementations that are
consistent with this specification will be added as they are
identified.
10.1. Editor Implementation
Location: https://procuratus.net/rdap/
Description: This implementation is a functionally limited RDAP
server that supports only the path segments described in this
specification. It uses the "jumbojett/OpenID-Connect-PHP" library
found on GitHub, which appears to be minimally maintained. The
library was modified to add support for the device authorization
grant. Session variable management is still a little buggy.
Supported OPs include Google (Gmail) and Yahoo.
Level of Maturity: This is a "proof of concept" research
implementation.
Coverage: This implementation includes all the features described
in this specification.
Version compatibility: Version -11+ of this specification.
Contact Information: Scott Hollenbeck, shollenbeck@verisign.com
10.2. Verisign Labs
Responsible Organization: Verisign Labs
Location: https://rdap.verisignlabs.com/
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Description: This implementation includes support for domain
registry RDAP queries using live data from the .cc and .tv country
code top-level domains and the .career generic top-level domain.
Three access levels are provided based on the authenticated
identity of the client:
1. Unauthenticated: Limited information is returned in response
to queries from unauthenticated clients.
2. Basic: Clients who authenticate using a publicly available
identity provider like Google Gmail or Microsoft Hotmail will
receive all the information available to an unauthenticated
client plus additional registration metadata, but no
personally identifiable information associated with entities.
3. Advanced: Clients who authenticate using a more restrictive
identity provider will receive all the information available
to a Basic client plus whatever information the server
operator deems appropriate for a fully authorized client.
Supported identity providers include those developed by
Verisign Labs (https://testprovider.rdap.verisignlabs.com/)
and CZ.NIC (https://www.mojeid.cz/).
Level of Maturity: This is a "proof of concept" research
implementation.
Coverage: This implementation includes all the features described
in this specification.
Version compatibility: Version -07 of this specification.
Contact Information: Scott Hollenbeck, shollenbeck@verisign.com
10.3. Viagenie
Responsible Organization: Viagenie
Location: https://auth.viagenie.ca
Description: This implementation is an OpenID identity provider
enabling users and registries to connect to the federation. It
also includes a barebone RDAP client and RDAP server in order to
test the authentication framework. Various levels of purpose are
available for testing.
Level of Maturity: This is a "proof of concept" research
implementation.
Coverage: This implementation includes most features described in
this specification as an identity provider.
Version compatibility: Version -07 of this specification.
Contact Information: Marc Blanchet, marc.blanchet@viagenie.ca
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11. Security Considerations
Security considerations for RDAP can be found in RFC 7481 [RFC7481].
Security considerations for OpenID Connect Core [OIDCC] and OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] can be found in their reference specifications; best
current security practice for OAuth 2.0 can be found in RFC TBD
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]. Additionally, the practices
described in RFC 9325 [RFC9325] MUST be followed when the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol is used.
As described in Section 3.1.4.2, the OAuth 2.0 Implicit Flow
[RFC6749] is considered insecure and efforts are being made to
deprecate the flow. It MUST NOT be used.
Some of the responses described in this specification return
information to a client from an RDAP server that is intended to help
the client match responses to queries and manage sessions. Some of
that information, such as the "userClaims" described in
Section 5.1.1, can be personally identifiable and considered
sensitive if disclosed to unauthorized parties. An RDAP server
operator must develop policies for information disclosure to ensure
that personally identifiable information is disclosed only to clients
that are authorized to process that information.
The "do not track" claim relies on the good will of the RDAP server
and associated proxies. As such, use and processing of this claim
depends on out-of-band trust relationships that need to be
established before the claim is used in practice. If used and
accepted by the RDAP server, there is a risk of information loss that
could seriously impair audit capabilities.
11.1. Authentication and Access Control
Having completed the client identification, authorization, and
validation process, an RDAP server can make access control decisions
based on a comparison of client-provided information (such as the set
of "userClaims" described in Section 5.1.1) and local policy. For
example, a client who provides an email address (and nothing more)
might be entitled to receive a subset of the information that would
be available to a client who provides an email address, a full name,
and a stated purpose. Development of these access control policies
is beyond the scope of this document.
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12. Acknowledgments
The author would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
their contributions to the development of this document: Julien
Bernard, Marc Blanchet, Tom Harrison, Russ Housley, Jasdip Singh,
Rhys Smith, Jaromir Talir, Rick Wilhelm, and Alessandro Vesely. In
addition, the Verisign Registry Services Lab development team of
Joseph Harvey, Andrew Kaizer, Sai Mogali, Anurag Saxena, Swapneel
Sheth, Nitin Singh, and Zhao Zhao provided critical "proof of
concept" implementation experience that helped demonstrate the
validity of the concepts described in this document.
Pawel Kowalik and Mario Loffredo provided significant text
contributions that led to welcome improvements in several sections of
this document. Their contributions are greatly appreciated.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[HTMLURL] Web Hypertext Application Technology Working Group
(WHATWG), "URL (Living Standard)", September 2023,
<https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#application/x-www-form-
urlencoded>.
[OIDCC] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Core incorporating
errata set 1", November 2014,
<https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[OIDCD] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0
incorporating errata set 1", November 2014,
<https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-
1_0.html>.
[OIDCL] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout
1.0", September 2022, <https://openid.net/specs/openid-
connect-rpinitiated-1_0.html>.
[OIDCR] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client
Registration 1.0 incorporating errata set 1", November
2014, <https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-
registration-1_0.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6750, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750>.
[RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
August 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>.
[RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 7480, DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7480>.
[RFC7481] Hollenbeck, S. and N. Kong, "Security Services for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 7481, DOI 10.17487/RFC7481, March 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7481>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7617] Reschke, J., "The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme",
RFC 7617, DOI 10.17487/RFC7617, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617>.
[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
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[RFC8628] Denniss, W., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and H. Tschofenig,
"OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant", RFC 8628,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8628, August 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8628>.
[RFC8693] Jones, M., Nadalin, A., Campbell, B., Ed., Bradley, J.,
and C. Mortimore, "OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange", RFC 8693,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8693, January 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693>.
[RFC9068] Bertocci, V., "JSON Web Token (JWT) Profile for OAuth 2.0
Access Tokens", RFC 9068, DOI 10.17487/RFC9068, October
2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9068>.
[RFC9082] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "Registration Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) Query Format", STD 95, RFC 9082,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9082, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9082>.
[RFC9083] Hollenbeck, S. and A. Newton, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95,
RFC 9083, DOI 10.17487/RFC9083, June 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9083>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke,
Ed., "HTTP Semantics", STD 97, RFC 9110,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9110, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.
[RFC9325] Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325>.
13.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics]
Lodderstedt, T., Bradley, J., Labunets, A., and D. Fett,
"OAuth 2.0 Security Best Current Practice", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-security-
topics-24, 23 October 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-
security-topics-24>.
[OIDC] OpenID Foundation, "What is OpenID Connect",
<https://openid.net/developers/how-connect-works/>.
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[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.
[RFC8414] Jones, M., Sakimura, N., and J. Bradley, "OAuth 2.0
Authorization Server Metadata", RFC 8414,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8414, June 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414>.
[RFC8792] Watsen, K., Auerswald, E., Farrel, A., and Q. Wu,
"Handling Long Lines in Content of Internet-Drafts and
RFCs", RFC 8792, DOI 10.17487/RFC8792, June 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8792>.
Appendix A. Change Log
00: Initial working group version ported from draft-hollenbeck-
regext-rdap-openid-10.
01: Modified ID Token delivery approach to note proper use of an
HTTP bearer authorization header.
02: Modified token delivery approach (Access Token is the bearer
token) to note proper use of an HTTP bearer authorization header,
fixing the change made in -01.
03: Updated OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant description and
reference due to publication of RFC 8628.
04: Updated OAuth 2.0 token exchange description and reference due
to publication of RFC 8693. Corrected the RDAP conformance
identifier to be registered with IANA.
05: Keepalive refresh.
06: Keepalive refresh.
07: Added "login_hint" description to Section 3.1.4.2. Added some
text to Section 3.1.5.2 to note that "do not track" requires
compliance with local regulations.
08: Rework of token management processing in Sections 4 and 5.
09: Updated RDAP specification references. Added text to describe
both default and remote OpenID Provider processing. Removed text
that described passing of ID Tokens as query parameters.
10: Updated Section 3.1.4.1. Replaced token processing queries with
"login", "session", and "logout" queries.
11: Replaced queries with "session/*" queries. Added description of
"rdap" OAuth scope. Added implementation status information.
12: Updated data structure descriptions. Updated Section 9. Minor
formatting changes due to a move to xml2rfc-v3 markup.
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13: Added support for OP discovery via OP's Issuer Identifier.
Modified the RDAP conformance text to use "roidc1", and added that
value to extension path segments, data structures, and query
parameters. Changed the "purpose" and "dnt" claims to
"rdap_allowed_purposes" (making it an array) and
"rdap_dnt_allowed". Added the "roidc1_qp" and "roidc1_dnt" query
parameters. Changed the descriptions of "local" OPs to "default"
OPs.
14: Fixed a few instances of "id" that were changed to "roidc1_id"
and "session" that were changed to "roidc1_session". Added
"implicitTokenRefreshSupported".
15: Fixed an instance of openidcConfiguration that was missing the
"roidc1" prefix. Changed SHOULD to MUST to describe the need to
return the roidc1_openidcConfiguration data structure in a "help"
response.
16: Changed the "roidc1" prefix to "farv1". Added additional
terminology text. Added RFC 8996 as a normative reference.
Multiple clarifications in Sections 3, 4, and 5. Added
login/refresh/logout sequence and conflict response text. Added
"clientID" and "iss" to the "farv1_session" data structure. Made
the "userClaims" and "sessionInfo" objects OPTIONAL in the
"farv1_session" data structure. Fixed the curl example in
Section 5.2.4.1. Modified the "/device" and "/devicepoll"
requests to include query parameters. Added "device_code" to the
"farv1_deviceInfo" data structure. Added the "farv1_dc" query
parameter.
17: Changed string "true" to boolean true in Figure 3. Fixed the
reference to RFC 8996. Updated references for RFCs 5226 (to 8126)
and 7230 (to 9110).
18 Addressed WG last call feedback for which we had agreed-upon
updates.
19 Updated Security Considerations. Updated response processing
text. Added and changed text to describe support for session-
oriented and token-oriented clients. Added reference to RFC 9068.
20 Updated text to describe support for session-oriented and token-
oriented clients.
21 Changed "Servers MUST support both types of client" to "SHOULD".
Added "sessionClientSupported" and "tokenClientSupported" as a
consequence. Noted that the OIDCC Implicit Flow is being
deprecated due to security concerns. Added additional text to
describe the relationship between "providerDiscoverySupported" and
"farv1_id", and "issuerIdentifierSupported" and "farv1_iss".
Restructured Section 5.6 and Section 7. Replaced the reference to
RFC 2616 (obsolete) with RFC 9110. Replaced the reference to RFC
7231 (obsolete) with RFC 9110.
22 Changed MANDATORY to REQUIRED for BCP 14 alignment. Updated
Section 3.1.2, Section 11, and Section 12.
23 Changed "IESG" to "IETF" in Section 9 at IANA's request.
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24 AD evaluation edits.
25 IETF last call edits.
26 IESG evaluation edits.
27 IESG evaluation edit. Changed "An RDAP server operator SHOULD
develop policies" to "An RDAP server operator must develop
policies" in Section 11.
Author's Address
Scott Hollenbeck
Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190
United States of America
Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
URI: https://www.verisignlabs.com/
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