Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi
draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi
SCITT H. Birkholz
Internet-Draft Fraunhofer SIT
Intended status: Standards Track O. Steele
Expires: 5 September 2024 Transmute
J. Geater
DataTrails Inc.
4 March 2024
SCITT Reference APIs
draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi-01
Abstract
This document describes a REST API that supports the normative
requirements of the SCITT Architecture
[I-D.draft-ietf-scitt-architecture]. Optional key discovery and
query interfaces are provided to support interoperability issues with
Decentralized Identifiers, X509 Certificates and Artifact
Reposistories.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the SCITT Working Group
mailing list (mailto:scitt@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/scitt/. Subscribe at
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/scitt/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/ietf-wg-scitt/draft-ietf-scitt-scrapi.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 5 September 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Mandatory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1. Transparency Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2. Signed Statement Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Optional Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.1. Issue Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2.2. Resolve Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.3. Resolve Signed Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2.4. Resolve Receipt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.5. Resolve Issuer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.6. Request Nonce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.7. Resolve Issuer DID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.1. URN Sub-namespace for SCITT (urn:ietf:params:scitt) . . . 17
5.2. Well-Known URI for Issuers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.3. Well-Known URI for Transparency Configuration . . . . . . 18
5.4. Media Type Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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1. Introduction
The SCITT Architecture [I-D.draft-ietf-scitt-architecture] defines
the core operations necessary to support supply chain transparency
using COSE (CBOR Object Signing and Encryption).
* Issuance of Signed Statements
* Verification of Signed Statements
* Registration of Signed Statements
* Issuance of Receipts
* Verification of Receipts
* Production of Transparent Statements
* Verification of Transparent Statements
In addition to defining concrete HTTP endpoints for these operations,
this specification defines support for the following endpoints which
support these operations:
* Resolving Verification Keys for Issuers
* Retrieving Receipts Asynchronously
* Retrieving Signed Statements from an Artifact Repository
* Retrieving Statements from an Artifact Repository
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
This specification uses the terms "Signed Statement", "Receipt",
"Transparent Statement", "Artifact Repositories", "Transparency
Service", "Append-Only Log" and "Registration Policy" as defined in
[I-D.draft-ietf-scitt-architecture].
This specification uses "payload" as defined in [RFC9052].
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2. Endpoints
Authentication is out of scope for this document. If Authentication
is not implemented, rate limiting or other denial of service
mititations MUST be applied to enable anonymous access.
NOTE: '' line wrapping per RFC 8792 in HTTP examples.
All messages are sent as HTTP GET or POST requests.
If the Transparency Service cannot process a client's request, it
MUST return an HTTP 4xx or 5xx status code, and the body SHOULD be a
JSON problem details object ([RFC7807]) containing:
* type: A URI reference identifying the problem. To facilitate
automated response to errors, this document defines a set of
standard tokens for use in the type field within the URN namespace
of: "urn:ietf:params:scitt:error:".
* detail: A human-readable string describing the error that
prevented the Transparency Service from processing the request,
ideally with sufficient detail to enable the error to be
rectified.
Error responses SHOULD be sent with the Content-Type: application/
problem+json HTTP header.
As an example, submitting a Signed Statement with an unsupported
signature algorithm would return a 400 Bad Request status code and
the following body:
{
"type": "urn:ietf:params:scitt:error:badSignatureAlgorithm",
"detail": "Signing algorithm not support"
}
Most error types are specific to the type of request and are defined
in the respective subsections below. The one exception is the
"malformed" error type, which indicates that the Transparency Service
could not parse the client's request because it did not comply with
this document:
* Error code: malformed (The request could not be parsed).
Clients SHOULD treat 500 and 503 HTTP status code responses as
transient failures and MAY retry the same request without
modification at a later date. Note that in the case of a 503
response, the Transparency Service MAY include a Retry-After header
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field per [RFC7231] in order to request a minimum time for the client
to wait before retrying the request. In the absence of this header
field, this document does not specify a minimum.
2.1. Mandatory
The following HTTP endpoints are mandatory to implement to enable
conformance to this specification.
2.1.1. Transparency Configuration
Authentication SHOULD NOT be implemented for this endpoint. This
endpoint is used to discovery the capabilites of a transparency
service implementing this specification.
Request:
GET /.well-known/transparency-configuration HTTP/1.1
Host: transparency.example
Accept: application/json
Response:
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HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
Content-Type: application/json
{
"issuer": "https://transparency.example",
"registration_endpoint": "https://transparency.example/entries",
"nonce_endpoint": "https://transparency.example/nonce",
"registration_policy": \
"https://transparency.example\
/statements/urn:ietf:params:scitt:statement\
:sha-256:base64url:5i6UeRzg1...qnGmr1o",
"supported_signature_algorithms": ["ES256"],
"jwks": {
"keys": [
{
"kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:\
jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:DgyowWs04gfVRim5i1WlQ-HFFFKI6Ltqulj1rXPagRo",
"alg": "ES256",
"use": "sig",
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "p-kZ4uOASt9IjQRTrWikGnlbGb-z3LU1ltwRjZaOS9w",
"y": "ymXE1yltJPXgjQSRe9NweN3TLlSUALYZTzy83NVfdg0"
},
{
"kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:\
jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:4Fzx5HO1W0ob9CZNc3RJx28Ixpgy9JAFM8jyXKW0ClE",
"alg": "HPKE-Base-P256-SHA256-AES128GCM",
"use": "enc",
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "Vreuil95vzR6ixutgBBf2ota-rj97MvKfuJWB4qqp5w",
"y": "NkUTeaoNlLRRsVRxHGDA-RsA0ex2tSpcd3G-4SmKXbs"
}
]
}
}
Additional fields may be present. Fields that are not understood
MUST be ignored.
2.1.2. Signed Statement Registration
Authentication MUST be implemented for this endpoint.
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The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request to
register a Signed Statement:
Request:
POST /entries HTTP/1.1
Host: transparency.example
Accept: application/json
Content-Type: application/cose
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation)
18([ / COSE Sign1 /
h'a1013822', / Protected Header /
{}, / Unprotected Header /
null, / Detached Payload /
h'269cd68f4211dffc...0dcb29c' / Signature /
])
The Registration Policy for the Transparency Service MUST be applied
to the payload bytes, before any additional processing is performed.
If the payload is detached, the Transparency Service depends on the
authentication context of the client in the Registration Policy. If
the payload is attached, the Transparency Service depends on both the
authentication context of the client, and the verification of the
Signed Statement in the Registration Policy. The details of
Registration Policy are out of scope for this document.
If registration succeeds the following identifier MAY be used to
refer to the Signed Statement that was accepted:
urn:ietf:params:scitt:signed-statement:sha-
256:base64url:5i6UeRzg1...qnGmr1o
If the payload was attached, or otherwise communicated to the
Transparency Service, the following identifier MAY be used to refer
to the payload of the Signed Statement:
urn:ietf:params:scitt:statement:sha-256:base64url:5i6UeRzg1...qnGmr1o
Response:
One of the following:
2.1.2.1. Status 201 - Registration is successful
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HTTP/1.1 201 Ok
Location: https://transparency.example/receipts\
/urn:ietf:params:scitt:signed-statement\
:sha-256:base64url:5i6UeRzg1...qnGmr1o
Content-Type: application/cose
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation)
18([ / COSE Sign1 /
h'a1013822', / Protected Header /
{}, / Unprotected Header /
null, / Detached Payload /
h'269cd68f4211dffc...0dcb29c' / Signature /
])
The response contains the Receipt for the Signed Statement. Fresh
receipts may be requested through the resource identified in the
Location header.
2.1.2.2. Status 202 - Registration is running
HTTP/1.1 202 Ok
Location: https://transparency.example/receipts\
/urn:ietf:params:scitt:signed-statement\
:sha-256:base64url:5i6UeRzg1...qnGmr1o
Content-Type: application/json
Retry-After: <seconds>
{
"receipt": "urn:ietf:params:scitt:receipt\
:sha-256:base64url:5i6UeRzg1...qnGmr1o",
}
The response contains a reference to the receipt which will
eventually be available for the Signed Statement.
If 202 is returned, then clients should wait until Registration
succeeded or failed by polling the receipt endpoint using the receipt
identifier returned in the response.
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2.1.2.3. Status 400 - Invalid Client Request
One of the following errors:
{
"type": "urn:ietf:params:scitt:error\
:signed-statement:algorithm-not-supported",
"detail": \
"Signed Statement contained an algorithm that is not supported."
}
{
"type": "urn:ietf:params:scitt:error\
:signed-statement:payload-missing",
"detail": \
"Signed Statement payload must be attached (must be present)"
}
{
"type": "urn:ietf:params:scitt:error\
:signed-statement:payload-forbidden",
"detail": \
"Signed Statement payload must be detached (must not be present)"
}
{
"type": "urn:ietf:params:scitt:error\
:signed-statement:rejected-by-registration-policy",
"detail": \
"Signed Statement was not accepted by the current Registration Policy"
}
{
"type": "urn:ietf:params:scitt:error\
:signed-statement:confirmation-missing",
"detail": \
"Signed Statement did not contain proof of possession"
}
TODO: other error codes
2.2. Optional Endpoints
The following HTTP endpoints are optional to implement.
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2.2.1. Issue Statement
Authentication MUST be implemented for this endpoint.
This endpoint enables a Transparency Service to be an issuer of
Signed Statements on behalf of authenticated clients. This supports
cases where a client lacks the ability to perform complex
cryptographic operations, but can be authenticated and report
statements and measurements.
Request:
POST /signed-statements/issue HTTP/1.1
Host: transparency.example
Accept: application/json
Content-Type: application/vc+ld+json
Payload
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/v2",
"https://www.w3.org/ns/credentials/examples/v2"
],
"id": "https://transparency.example/credentials/1872",
"type": ["VerifiableCredential", "SensorCredential"],
"issuer": "https://transparency.example/device/1234",
"validFrom": "2010-01-01T19:23:24Z",
"credentialSubject": {
"type": "Feature",
"geometry": {
"type": "Point",
"coordinates": [125.6, 10.1]
},
"properties": {
"name": "Dinagat Islands"
}
}
}
Response:
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HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
Content-Type: application/cose
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation)
18([ / COSE Sign1 /
h'a1013822', / Protected Header /
{}, / Unprotected Header /
null, / Detached Payload /
h'269cd68f4211dffc...0dcb29c' / Signature /
])
2.2.2. Resolve Statement
Authentication SHOULD be implemented for this endpoint.
This endpoint enables Transparency Service APIs to act like Artifact
Repositories, and serve payload values directly, instead of
indirectly through Receipts.
Request:
GET /statements/urn...qnGmr1o HTTP/1.1
Host: transparency.example
Accept: application/pdf
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
Content-Type: application/pdf
Payload (pdf bytes)
2.2.3. Resolve Signed Statement
Authentication SHOULD be implemented for this endpoint.
This endpoint enables Transparency Service APIs to act like Artifact
Repositories, and serve Signed Statements directly, instead of
indirectly through Receipts.
Request:
GET /signed-statements/urn...qnGmr1o HTTP/1.1
Host: transparency.example
Accept: application/cose
Response:
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HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
Content-Type: application/cose
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation)
18([ / COSE Sign1 /
h'a1013822', / Protected Header /
{}, / Unprotected Header /
null, / Detached Payload /
h'269cd68f4211dffc...0dcb29c' / Signature /
])
2.2.4. Resolve Receipt
Authentication SHOULD be implemented for this endpoint.
Request:
GET /receipts/urn...qnGmr1o HTTP/1.1
Host: transparency.example
Accept: application/cose
Response:
If the Signed Statement requested is already included in the Append-
Only Log:
HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
Location: https://transparency.example/receipts/urn...qnGmr1o
Content-Type: application/cose
Payload (in CBOR diagnostic notation)
18([ / COSE Sign1 /
h'a1013822', / Protected Header /
{}, / Unprotected Header /
null, / Detached Payload /
h'269cd68f4211dffc...0dcb29c' / Signature /
])
If the Signed Statement requested is not yet included in the Append-
Only Log:
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HTTP/1.1 202 Ok
Location: https://transparency.example/receipts/urn...qnGmr1o
Content-Type: application/json
Retry-After: <seconds>
{
"receipt": "urn:ietf:params:scitt:receipt\
:sha-256:base64url:5i6UeRzg1...qnGmr1o",
}
Additional eventually consistent operation details MAY be present.
Support for eventually consistent Receipts is implementation
specific, and out of scope for this specification.
2.2.5. Resolve Issuer
This endpoint is inspired by [I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc].
Authentication SHOULD NOT be implemented for this endpoint. This
endpoint is used to discover verification keys, which is the reason
that authentication is not required.
The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request for the
Issuer Metadata configuration when iss is set to
https://transparency.example/tenant/1234:
Request:
GET /.well-known/issuer/tenant/1234 HTTP/1.1
Host: transparency.example
Accept: application/json
Response:
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HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
Content-Type: application/json
{
"issuer": "https://transparency.example/tenant/1234",
"jwks": {
"keys": [
{
"kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth\
:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:DgyowWs04gfVRim5i1WlQ-HFFFKI6Ltqulj1rXPagRo",
"alg": "ES256",
"use": "sig",
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "p-kZ4uOASt9IjQRTrWikGnlbGb-z3LU1ltwRjZaOS9w",
"y": "ymXE1yltJPXgjQSRe9NweN3TLlSUALYZTzy83NVfdg0"
},
{
"kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth\
:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:4Fzx5HO1W0ob9CZNc3RJx28Ixpgy9JAFM8jyXKW0ClE",
"alg": "HPKE-Base-P256-SHA256-AES128GCM",
"use": "enc",
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "Vreuil95vzR6ixutgBBf2ota-rj97MvKfuJWB4qqp5w",
"y": "NkUTeaoNlLRRsVRxHGDA-RsA0ex2tSpcd3G-4SmKXbs"
}
]
}
}
2.2.6. Request Nonce
This endpoint in inspired by
[I-D.draft-demarco-oauth-nonce-endpoint].
Authentication SHOULD NOT be implemented for this endpoint. This
endpoint is used to demonstrate proof of posession, which is the
reason that authentication is not required. Client holding signed
statements that require demonstrating proof of possession MUST use
this endpoint to obtain a nonce.
Request:
GET /nonce HTTP/1.1
Host: transparency.example
Accept: application/json
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Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{
"nonce": "d2JhY2NhbG91cmVqdWFuZGFt"
}
2.2.7. Resolve Issuer DID
This endpoint enables the use of the DID Web Decentralized Identifier
Method, as an alternative expression of the Issuer Metadata endpoint.
This endpoint is DEPRECATED.
The following is a non-normative example of a HTTP request for the
Issuer Metadata configuration when iss is set to
did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234:
Request:
GET /tenant/1234/did.json HTTP/1.1
Host: transparency.example
Accept: application/did+ld+json
Response:
HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
Content-Type: application/did+ld+json
{
"@context": [
"https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
{
"@vocab": "https://vocab.transparency.example#"
}
],
"id": "did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234",
"verificationMethod": [
{
"id": "did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234\
#urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint\
:sha-256:5b30k1hBWBMcggA9GIJImUqj4pXqrJ9EOWV6MDdcstA",
"type": "JsonWebKey",
"controller": "did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234",
"publicKeyJwk": {
"kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint\
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:sha-256:5b30k1hBWBMcggA9GIJImUqj4pXqrJ9EOWV6MDdcstA",
"alg": "ES256",
"use": "sig",
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "9ptuW0PBHSTN7bVexWd7xM5kmSPGRaCu-K3SLtJyvNc",
"y": "l7NvF6QbovicSciZqu_W_xy4JTZwtnUbn2SNdMKoaAk"
}
},
{
"id": "did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234\
#urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint\
:sha-256:DgyowWs04gfVRim5i1WlQ-HFFFKI6Ltqulj1rXPagRo",
"type": "JsonWebKey",
"controller": "did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234",
"publicKeyJwk": {
"kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint\
:sha-256:DgyowWs04gfVRim5i1WlQ-HFFFKI6Ltqulj1rXPagRo",
"alg": "ES256",
"use": "sig",
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "p-kZ4uOASt9IjQRTrWikGnlbGb-z3LU1ltwRjZaOS9w",
"y": "ymXE1yltJPXgjQSRe9NweN3TLlSUALYZTzy83NVfdg0"
}
},
{
"id": "did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234\
#urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint\
:sha-256:4Fzx5HO1W0ob9CZNc3RJx28Ixpgy9JAFM8jyXKW0ClE",
"type": "JsonWebKey",
"controller": "did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234",
"publicKeyJwk": {
"kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint\
:sha-256:4Fzx5HO1W0ob9CZNc3RJx28Ixpgy9JAFM8jyXKW0ClE",
"alg": "HPKE-Base-P256-SHA256-AES128GCM",
"use": "enc",
"kty": "EC",
"crv": "P-256",
"x": "Vreuil95vzR6ixutgBBf2ota-rj97MvKfuJWB4qqp5w",
"y": "NkUTeaoNlLRRsVRxHGDA-RsA0ex2tSpcd3G-4SmKXbs"
}
}
],
"assertionMethod": [
"did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234\
#urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint\
:sha-256:5b30k1hBWBMcggA9GIJImUqj4pXqrJ9EOWV6MDdcstA",
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"did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234\
#urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint\
:sha-256:DgyowWs04gfVRim5i1WlQ-HFFFKI6Ltqulj1rXPagRo"
],
"authentication": [
"did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234\
#urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint\
:sha-256:5b30k1hBWBMcggA9GIJImUqj4pXqrJ9EOWV6MDdcstA",
"did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234\
#urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint\
:sha-256:DgyowWs04gfVRim5i1WlQ-HFFFKI6Ltqulj1rXPagRo"
],
"keyAgreement": [
"did:web:transparency.example:tenant:1234\
#urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint\
:sha-256:4Fzx5HO1W0ob9CZNc3RJx28Ixpgy9JAFM8jyXKW0ClE"
]
}
3. Privacy Considerations
TODO
4. Security Considerations
TODO
TODO: Consider negotiation for receipt as "JSON" or "YAML". TODO:
Consider impact of media type on "Data URIs" and QR Codes.
5. IANA Considerations
5.1. URN Sub-namespace for SCITT (urn:ietf:params:scitt)
IANA is requested to register the URN sub-namespace
urn:ietf:params:scitt in the "IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered
Protocol Parameter Identifiers" Registry [IANA.params], following the
template in [RFC3553]:
Registry name: scitt
Specification: [RFCthis]
Repository: http://www.iana.org/assignments/scitt
Index value: No transformation needed.
5.2. Well-Known URI for Issuers
The following value is requested to be registered in the "Well-Known
URIs" registry (using the template from [RFC5785]):
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URI suffix: issuer Change controller: IETF Specification document(s):
RFCthis. Related information: N/A
5.3. Well-Known URI for Transparency Configuration
The following value is requested to be registered in the "Well-Known
URIs" registry (using the template from [RFC5785]):
URI suffix: transparency-configuration Change controller: IETF
Specification document(s): RFCthis. Related information: N/A
TODO: Register them from here.
5.4. Media Type Registration
This section requests registration of the "application/
scitt.receipt+cose" media type [RFC2046] in the "Media Types"
registry in the manner described in [RFC6838].
To indicate that the content is a SCITT Receipt:
* Type name: application
* Subtype name: scitt.receipt+cose
* Required parameters: n/a
* Optional parameters: n/a
* Encoding considerations: TODO
* Security considerations: TODO
* Interoperability considerations: n/a
* Published specification: this specification
* Applications that use this media type: TBD
* Fragment identifier considerations: n/a
* Additional information:
- Magic number(s): n/a
- File extension(s): n/a
- Macintosh file type code(s): n/a
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* Person & email address to contact for further information: TODO
* Intended usage: COMMON
* Restrictions on usage: none
* Author: TODO
* Change Controller: IESG
* Provisional registration? No
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[I-D.draft-ietf-scitt-architecture]
Birkholz, H., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Deshpande,
Y., and S. Lasker, "An Architecture for Trustworthy and
Transparent Digital Supply Chains", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-05, 9
February 2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-scitt-architecture-05>.
[IANA.params]
IANA, "Uniform Resource Name (URN) Namespace for IETF
Use", <http://www.iana.org/assignments/params>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC3553] Mealling, M., Masinter, L., Hardie, T., and G. Klyne, "An
IETF URN Sub-namespace for Registered Protocol
Parameters", BCP 73, RFC 3553, DOI 10.17487/RFC3553, June
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3553>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5785>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7231>.
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[RFC7807] Nottingham, M. and E. Wilde, "Problem Details for HTTP
APIs", RFC 7807, DOI 10.17487/RFC7807, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7807>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC9052] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE):
Structures and Process", STD 96, RFC 9052,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9052, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9052>.
6.2. Informative References
[I-D.draft-demarco-oauth-nonce-endpoint]
De Marco, G. and O. Steele, "OAuth 2.0 Nonce Endpoint",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-demarco-oauth-
nonce-endpoint-00, 6 February 2024,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-demarco-
oauth-nonce-endpoint-00>.
[I-D.draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc]
Terbu, O., Fett, D., and B. Campbell, "SD-JWT-based
Verifiable Credentials (SD-JWT VC)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-02, 27 February
2024, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-
oauth-sd-jwt-vc-02>.
[RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2046>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13,
RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6838>.
Authors' Addresses
Henk Birkholz
Fraunhofer SIT
Rheinstrasse 75
64295 Darmstadt
Germany
Email: henk.birkholz@sit.fraunhofer.de
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Orie Steele
Transmute
Email: orie@transmute.industries
Jon Geater
DataTrails Inc.
United States
Email: jon.geater@datatrails.ai
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