Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases
draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases
Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Informational December 15, 2015
Expires: June 17, 2016
RPKI Local Trust Anchor Use Cases
draft-ietf-sidr-lta-use-cases-04
Abstract
There are a number of critical circumstances where a localized
routing domain needs to augment or modify its view of the Global
RPKI. This document attempts to outline a few of them.
Status of This Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 17, 2016.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. What is 'Local' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4. Example Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction
Today RPKI-based Origin Validation, [RFC6811], relies on widespread
deployment of the Global Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI),
[RFC6480]. In the future, RPKI-based Path Validation,
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview], will be even more reliant on the
Global RPKI.
But there are critical circumstances in which a local, clearly-
scoped, administrative and/or routing domain will want to augment
and/or modify their internal view of the Global RPKI.
This document attempts to lay out a few of those use cases. It is
not intended to be authoritative, complete, or to become a standard.
It merely tries to lay out a few critical examples to help frame the
issues.
2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, see [RFC6480],
the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], Route Origin
Authorizations (ROAs), see [RFC6482], and GhostBusters Records, see
[RFC6493].
3. What is 'Local'
The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs,
manifests, ROAs, and GhostBusters Records as described in [RFC6481].
Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and
maintenance are discussed elsewhere.
Like the DNS, the Global RPKI tries to present a single global view,
although only a loosely consistent view, depending on timing,
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updating, fetching, etc. There is no 'fix' for this, it is not
broken, it is the nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
There are critical uses of the RPKI where a local administrative and/
or routing domain, e.g. an end-user site, a particular ISP or content
provider, an organization, a geo-political region, ... may wish to
have a specialized view of the RPKI.
For the purposes of this exploration, we refer to this localized view
as a 'Local Trust Anchor', mostly for historical reasons, but also
because implementation would likely require the local distribution of
one or more specialized trust anchors, [RFC6481].
4. Example Uses
We explore this space using three examples.
Carol, a RIPE resource holder (LIR, PI holder, ...), operates outside
of the Netherlands. Someone convinces a Dutch court to force the
RIPE/NCC to remove or modify some or all of Carol's certificates,
ROAs, etc. or the resources they represent, and the operational
community wants to retain the ability to route to Carol's network(s).
There is need for some channel through which operators can exchange
local trust, command, and data collections necessary to propagate
patches local to all their RPKI views.
Bob has a multi-AS network under his administration and some of those
ASs use private ([RFC1918]) or 'borrowed' address space which is not
announced on the global Internet, and he wishes to certify them for
use in his internal routing.
Alice is responsible for the trusted routing for a large
organization, commercial or geo-political, in which management
requests routing engineering to redirect their competitors' prefixes
to socially acceptable data, and Alice is responsible for making the
CA hierarchy have validated certificates for those redirected
resources as well as the rest of the Internet.
5. Notes
In these examples, it is ultimately the ROAs, not the certificates,
which one wants to modify or replace. But one probably can not
simply create new ROAs as one does not have the private keys needed
to sign them. Hence it is likely that one has to also do something
about the [RFC6480] certificates.
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The goal is to modify, create, and/or replace ROAs and GhostBuster
Records which are needed to present the localized view of the RPKI
data.
One wants to reproduce only as much of the Global RPKI as needed.
Replicating more than is needed would amplify tracking and
maintenance.
One can not reissue down from the root trust anchor at the IANA or
from the RIRs' certificates because one does not have the private
keys required. So one has to create a new trust anchor which, for
ease of use, will contain the new/modified certificates and ROAs as
well as the unmodified remainder of the Global RPKI.
Because Alice, Bob, and Carol want to be able to archive, reproduce,
and send to other operators the data necessary to reproduce their
modified view of the global RPKI, there will need to be a formally
formally defined set of data which is input to a well-defined process
to take an existing Global RPKI tree and produce the desired modified
re-anchored tree.
It is possible that an operator may need to accept and process
modification data from more than one source. Hence modification
'recipes' should be mergable.
6. Security Considerations
These use cases are all about violating global security, albeit
within a constrained local context.
Authentication of modification 'recipes' will be needed.
7. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations.
8. Acknowledgments
The author thanks Chris Morrow, Karen Seo, Rob Austein, and Steve
Kent for comments and suggestions.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
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[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
February 2012.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012.
[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, February 2012.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, January
2013.
9.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-02 (work in progress), May
2012.
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, February 1996.
Author's Address
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US
Email: randy@psg.com
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