Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling
SIDR P. Mohapatra
Internet-Draft Sproute Networks
Intended status: Standards Track K. Patel
Expires: July 14, 2017 Cisco
J. Scudder
Juniper Networks
D. Ward
Cisco
R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
January 10, 2017
BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community
draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-11
Abstract
This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry
the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system.
IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local
policies allowing it to influence their decision process.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on July 14, 2017.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Origin Validation State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Deployment Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction
This document defines a new BGP opaque extended community to carry
the origination AS validation state inside an autonomous system.
IBGP speakers that receive this validation state can configure local
policies allowing it to influence their decision process.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. Origin Validation State Extended Community
The origin validation state extended community is an opaque extended
community [RFC4360] with the following encoding:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| 0x43 | 0x00 | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |validationstate|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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The value of the high-order octet of the extended Type Field is 0x43,
which indicates it is non-transitive. The value of the low-order
octet of the extended type field as assigned by IANA is 0x00. The
Reserved field MUST be set to 0 and ignored upon the receipt of this
community. The last octet of the extended community is an unsigned
integer that gives the route's validation state [RFC6811]. It can
assume the following values:
+-------+-----------------------------+
| Value | Meaning |
+-------+-----------------------------+
| 0 | Lookup result = "valid" |
| 1 | Lookup result = "not found" |
| 2 | Lookup result = "invalid" |
+-------+-----------------------------+
If the router is configured to support the extensions defined in this
draft, it SHOULD attach the origin validation state extended
community to BGP UPDATE messages sent to IBGP peers by mapping the
computed validation state in the last octet of the extended
community. Similarly on the receiving IBGP speakers, the validation
state of an IBGP route SHOULD be derived directly from the last octet
of the extended community, if present.
An implementation SHOULD NOT send more than one instance of the
origin validation state extended community. However, if more than
one instance is received, an implementation MUST disregard all
instances other than the one with the numerically-greatest validation
state value. If the value received is greater than the largest
specified value (2), the implementation MUST apply a strategy similar
to attribute discard [RFC7606] by discarding the erroneous community
and logging the error for further analysis.
By default, implementations MUST drop the origin validation state
extended community if received from an EBGP peer, without further
processing it. Similarly, by default an implementation SHOULD NOT
send the community to EBGP peers. However it SHOULD be possible to
configure an implementation to send or accept the community when
warranted. An example of a case where the community would reasonably
be received from, or sent to, an EBGP peer is when two adjacent ASes
are under control of the same administration. A second example is
documented in [I-D.ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light].
3. Deployment Considerations
In deployment scenarios where not all the speakers in an autonomous
system are upgraded to support the extensions defined in this
document, it is necessary to define policies that match on the origin
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validation extended community and set another BGP attribute [RFC6811]
that influences the best path selection the same way as what would
have been enabled by an implementation of this extension.
4. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the valuable review and
suggestions from Wesley George, Roque Gagliano and Bruno Decraene on
this document.
5. IANA Considerations
IANA has assigned the value 0x00 from the "Non-Transitive Opaque
Extended Community Sub-Types" registry. The value is called "BGP
Origin Validation State Extended Community".
6. Security Considerations
Security considerations such as those described in [RFC4272] continue
to apply. Since this document introduces an extended community that
will generally be used to affect route selection, the analysis in
Section 4.5 ("Falsification") of [RFC4593] is relevant. These issues
are neither new, nor unique to the origin validation extended
community.
The security considerations provided in [RFC6811] apply equally to
this application of origin validation. In addition, this document
describes a scheme where router A outsources validation to some
router B. If this scheme is used, the participating routers should
have the appropriate trust relationship -- B should trust A either
because they are under the same administrative control or for some
other reason (for example, consider
[I-D.ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light]). The security properties of
the propagation path between the two routers should also be
considered. See [RFC7454] Section 5.1 for advice regarding
protection of the propagation path.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360,
February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4360>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light]
King, T., Kopp, D., Lambrianidis, A., and A. Fenioux,
"Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-
Server to Peers", draft-ietf-sidr-route-server-rpki-
light-01 (work in progress), December 2016.
[RFC4272] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis",
RFC 4272, DOI 10.17487/RFC4272, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4272>.
[RFC4593] Barbir, A., Murphy, S., and Y. Yang, "Generic Threats to
Routing Protocols", RFC 4593, DOI 10.17487/RFC4593,
October 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4593>.
[RFC7454] Durand, J., Pepelnjak, I., and G. Doering, "BGP Operations
and Security", BCP 194, RFC 7454, DOI 10.17487/RFC7454,
February 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7454>.
[RFC7606] Chen, E., Ed., Scudder, J., Ed., Mohapatra, P., and K.
Patel, "Revised Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages",
RFC 7606, DOI 10.17487/RFC7606, August 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7606>.
Authors' Addresses
Pradosh Mohapatra
Sproute Networks
Email: mpradosh@yahoo.com
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Keyur Patel
Cisco
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95124
Email: keyupate@cisco.com
John Scudder
Juniper Networks
1194 N. Mathilda Ave
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
Email: jgs@juniper.net
Dave Ward
Cisco
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95124
Email: dward@cisco.com
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
Email: randy@psg.com
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