Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile
Network Working Group A. Azimov
Internet-Draft Yandex
Intended status: Standards Track E. Uskov
Expires: 10 May 2024 JetLend
R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
J. Snijders
Fastly
R. Housley
Vigil Security
B. Maddison
Workonline
7 November 2023
A Profile for Autonomous System Provider Authorization
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-17
Abstract
This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protected
content type for Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA)
objects for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).
An ASPA is a digitally signed object through which the issuer (the
holder of an Autonomous System identifier), can authorize one or more
other Autonomous Systems (ASes) as its upstream providers. When
validated, an ASPA's eContent can be used for detection and
mitigation of route leaks.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 May 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. ASPA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. ASPA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. customerASID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. ASPA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier registry . . . 6
5.2. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type registry . . . . 7
5.3. RPKI Signed Object registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.4. RPKI Repository Name Scheme registry . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.5. Media Type registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Implementation status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Example ASPA eContent Payload . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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1. Introduction
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
is to improve routing security [RFC6480]. As part of this
infrastructure, a mechanism is needed to facilitate holders of
Autonomous System (AS) identifiers in their capacity as Customer to
authorize other ASes as their Provider(s). A Provider AS (PAS) is a
network that:
a. offers its customers outbound (customer to Internet) data traffic
connectivity and/or
b. further propagates in all directions (towards providers, lateral
peers, and customers) any BGP Updates that the customer may send.
The digitally signed Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA)
object described in this document provides the above-mentioned
authorization mechanism.
An ASPA object is a cryptographically verifiable attestation signed
by the holder of an Autonomous System identifier (hereafter called
the "Customer AS", or CAS). An ASPA contains a list of one or more
ASes, each listing meaning the listed AS is authorized to act as
Provider network. When the CAS has multiple Providers, all Provider
ASes are listed in the ASPA, including any non-transparent Internet
Exchange Point (IXP) Route Server (RS) ASes. The common case for RS
ASes at IXPs is to operate transparently (see Section 2.2.2.1
[RFC7947]), and in those instances the ASNs of IXP Route Servers are
not listed as PAS in ASPAs.
The BGP Roles that an Autonomous System (AS) may have in its peering
relationships with eBGP neighbors are discussed in
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification]. The details of ASPA
registration requirements for ASes in different scenarios are also
specified in that document. In addition, the procedures for
verifying AS_PATHs in BGP UPDATE messages using Validated ASPA
Payloads (VAPs) are described in that document.
This CMS [RFC5652] protected content type definition conforms to the
[RFC6488] template for RPKI signed objects. In accordance with
Section 4 of [RFC6488], this document defines:
1. The object identifier (OID) that identifies the ASPA signed
object. This OID appears in the eContentType field of the
encapContentInfo object as well as the content-type signed
attribute within the signerInfo structure.
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2. The ASN.1 syntax for the ASPA content, which is the payload
signed by the CAS. The ASPA content is encoded using the ASN.1
[X.680] Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [X.690].
3. The steps required to validate an ASPA beyond the validation
steps specified in [RFC6488].
2. ASPA Content Type
The content-type for an ASPA is defined as id-ct-ASPA, which has the
numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49. This OID MUST appear
both within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo structure as
well as the content-type signed attribute within the signerInfo
structure (see [RFC6488]).
3. ASPA eContent
The content of an ASPA identifies the Customer AS (CAS) as well as
the Set of Provider ASes (SPAS) that are authorized by the CAS to be
its Providers.
A user registering ASPA(s) must be cognizant of Sections 2, 3, and 4
of [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification] and the user (or their
software tool) must comply with the ASPA registration recommendations
in Section 4 of that document.
It is highly recommended that for a given Customer AS, a single ASPA
object be maintained which contains all providers, including any non-
transparent RS ASes. Such a practice helps prevent race conditions
during ASPA updates. Otherwise, said race conditions might affect
route propagation. The software that provides hosting for ASPA
records SHOULD support enforcement of this recommendation. In the
case of the transition process between different CA registries, the
ASPA records SHOULD be kept identical in all registries in terms of
their authorization contents.
The eContent of an ASPA is an instance of ASProviderAttestation,
formally defined by the following ASN.1 [X.680] module:
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RPKI-ASPA-2023
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-rpki-aspa-2023(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- RFC 6268
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;
id-ct-ASPA OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) aspa(49) }
ct-ASPA CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE ASProviderAttestation IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-ASPA }
ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
customerASID ASID,
providers ProviderASSet }
ProviderASSet ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASID
ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
END
Note that this content appears as the eContent within the
encapContentInfo as specified in [RFC6488].
3.1. version
The version number of the ASProviderAttestation that complies with
this specification MUST be 1 and MUST be explicitly encoded.
3.2. customerASID
The customerASID field contains the AS number of the Customer
Autonomous System that is the authorizing entity.
3.3. providers
The providers field contains the listing of ASes that are authorized
as providers.
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Each element contained in the providers field is an instance of ASID.
Each ASID element contains the AS number of an AS that has been
authorized by the customer AS as its provider or RS.
In addition to the constraints described by the formal ASN.1
definition, the contents of the providers field MUST satisfy the
following constraints:
* The CustomerASID value MUST NOT appear in any ASID in the
providers field.
* The elements of providers MUST be ordered in ascending numerical
order.
* Each value of ASID MUST be unique (with respect to the other
elements of providers).
4. ASPA Validation
Before a relying party can use an ASPA to validate a routing
announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ASPA object
itself. To validate an ASPA, the relying party MUST perform all the
validation checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following
additional ASPA-specific validation steps.
* The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension [RFC3779]
MUST be present in the end-entity (EE) certificate (contained
within the ASPA), and the Customer ASID in the ASPA eContent MUST
be contained within the set of AS numbers specified by the EE
certificate's Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension.
* The EE certificate's Autonomous System Identifier Delegation
Extension MUST NOT contain any "inherit" elements.
* The IP Address Delegation Extension [RFC3779] MUST be absent.
5. IANA Considerations
5.1. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier registry
Please add the id-mod-rpki-aspa-2023 to the SMI Security for S/MIME
Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/smi-
numbers.xml#security-smime-0) as follows:
Decimal | Description | Specification
-----------------------------------------------------------
TBD2 | id-mod-rpki-aspa-2023 | [RFC-to-be]
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5.2. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type registry
Please add the ASPA to the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/
smi-numbers/smi-numbers.xml#security-smime-1) as follows:
Decimal | Description | Specification
-----------------------------------------------------------
49 | id-ct-ASPA | [RFC-to-be]
5.3. RPKI Signed Object registry
Please add Autonomous System Provider Authorization to the RPKI
Signed Object registry (https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpki/
rpki.xhtml#signed-objects) as follows:
Name | OID | Specification
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Autonomous System Provider Authorization | 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.49 | [RFC-to-be]
5.4. RPKI Repository Name Scheme registry
Please add an item for the Autonomous System Provider Authorization
file extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Scheme" registry created
by [RFC6481] as follows:
Filename
Extension RPKI Object Reference
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
.asa Autonomous System Provider Authorization [RFC-to-be]
5.5. Media Type registry
The IANA is requested to register the media type application/rpki-
aspa in the "Media Type" registry as follows:
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Type name: application
Subtype name: rpki-aspa
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ASPA [RFC-to-be].
This media type contains no active content. See
Section 4 of [RFC-to-be] for further information.
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: [RFC-to-be]
Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
Additional information:
Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
AS identifers as defined in [RFC-to-be].
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .asa
Macintosh file type code(s):
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Change controller: IETF
6. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [RFC6481], [RFC6485], and [RFC6488]
also apply to ASPAs.
7. Implementation status
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942.
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist.
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According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".
* A validator implementation [rpki-client] (version 8.5 and higher),
written in C was provided by Job Snijders from Fastly.
* A validator implementation [routinator], written in Rust was
provided by Martin Hoffman from NLnet Labs.
* A validator implementation [rpki-prover], written in Haskell was
provided by Mikhail Puzanov.
* A Signer implementation [rpki-aspa-demo] in Perl was reported on
Tom Harrison from APNIC.
* A signer implementation [rpki-commons] in Java was reported on by
Ties de Kock from RIPE NCC.
* A signer implementation [krill] in Rust was reported on by Tim
Bruijnzeels from NLnet Labs.
8. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Keyur Patel for helping kick-start
the ASPA profile project, Ties de Kock & Tim Bruijnzeels for
suggesting that the ProviderASSet be in a canonical form, and Claudio
Jeker & Martin Hoffman for review and several suggestions for
improvements.
Contributors
The following people made significant contributions to this document:
Kotikalapudi Sriram
USA National Institute of Standards and Technology
Email: ksriram@nist.gov
References
Normative References
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[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification]
Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., Snijders,
J., and K. Sriram, "BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on
Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-
verification-16, 29 August 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
aspa-verification-16>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for
Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)",
RFC 6485, DOI 10.17487/RFC6485, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6485>.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[X.680] ITU-T, "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation
One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation",
ITU-T Recommendation X.680, 2021.
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[X.690] ITU-T, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2021.
Informative References
[krill] Bruijnzeels, T., "krill", 2023,
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/
RrHCYTmevxDHgebdLC_adRlKH-o/>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC7947] Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker,
"Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", RFC 7947,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7947, September 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7947>.
[routinator]
Hoffman, M., "routinator", 2023,
<https://github.com/NLnetLabs/rpki-rs/pull/264>.
[rpki-aspa-demo]
Harrison, T., "rpki-aspa-demo", 2023,
<https://github.com/APNIC-net/rpki-aspa-demo>.
[rpki-client]
Snijders, J., "rpki-client", 2023,
<https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=168614057916956&w=2>.
[rpki-commons]
de Kock, T., "rpki-commons", 2023,
<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/sidrops/
nNAmZMrr7t9NMzm12jRXU03ABN4/>.
[rpki-prover]
Puzanov, M., "rpki-prover", 2023,
<https://github.com/lolepezy/rpki-prover/compare/
master...aspa-profile-16>.
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Appendix A. Example ASPA eContent Payload
Below an example of a DER encoded ASPA eContent is provided with
annotation following the '#' character.
$ echo 301da00302010102023cca301202020b620202205b020300c790020303259e \
| xxd -r -ps | openssl asn1parse -inform DER -dump -i
0:d=0 hl=2 l= 29 cons: SEQUENCE
2:d=1 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
4:d=2 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :01
7:d=1 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :3CCA # Customer ASID 15562
11:d=1 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SEQUENCE
13:d=2 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :0B62 # ProviderAS 2914
17:d=2 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :205B # ProviderAS 8283
21:d=2 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :C790 # ProviderAS 51088
26:d=2 hl=2 l= 3 prim: INTEGER :03259E # ProviderAS 206238
Below is a complete Base64 [RFC4648] encoded RPKI ASPA Signed Object.
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MIIGoQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGkjCCBo4CAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwMAYLKoZIhvcNAQkQ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v76sXvhswso7CpMzTJyEx2VcIXwADMKZF/nWciTrkNzLfahVsL6UzflvMqNo3nVYJIsnF6U3
O3Niq7vO05r1PyS/pZqe+uwbV2gGQMcXwrvt
The above should decode as following:
Azimov, et al. Expires 10 May 2024 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile November 2023
Object SHA256 hash: s25yLaks3OXBzJcW3ZgvlLDiPUpyZbQk2jDHaPDgn1w=
EE Subject key identifier: E6:6F:34:7F:06:30:B3:FD:C5:88:50:FB:26:24:23:02:A6:75:45:84
EE Certificate issuer: /CN=caa805dbac364749b9b115590ab6ef0f970cdbd8
EE Certificate serial: A1C7752FF8B1D2E01F
EE Authority key identifier: CA:A8:05:DB:AC:36:47:49:B9:B1:15:59:0A:B6:EF:0F:97:0C:DB:D8
EE Authority info access: rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/DEFAULT/yqgF26w2R0m5sRVZCrbvD5cM29g.cer
EE Subject info access: rsync://chloe.sobornost.net/rpki/RIPE-nljobsnijders/5m80fwYws_3FiFD7JiQjAqZ1RYQ.asa
CMS Signing time: Wed 07 Jun 2023 09:08:41 +0000
EE notBefore: Wed 07 Jun 2023 09:08:14 +0000
EE notAfter: Thu 06 Jun 2024 09:08:14 +0000
ASPA eContent:
Customer AS: 15562
Provider Set: 1: AS: 2914
2: AS: 8283
3: AS: 51088
4: AS: 206238
Authors' Addresses
Alexander Azimov
Yandex
Email: a.e.azimov@gmail.com
Eugene Uskov
JetLend
Email: eu@jetlend.ru
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
Email: randy@psg.com
Job Snijders
Fastly
Amsterdam
Netherlands
Email: job@fastly.com
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
918 Spring Knoll Drive
Herndon, VA 20170
United States of America
Azimov, et al. Expires 10 May 2024 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft RPKI ASPA Profile November 2023
Email: housley@vigilsec.com
Ben Maddison
Workonline
Cape Town
South Africa
Email: benm@workonline.africa
Azimov, et al. Expires 10 May 2024 [Page 15]
