Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-sidrops-lta-use-cases
draft-ietf-sidrops-lta-use-cases
Network Working Group R. Bush
Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan
Intended status: Informational April 30, 2019
Expires: November 1, 2019
Use Cases for Localized Versions of the RPKI
draft-ietf-sidrops-lta-use-cases-06
Abstract
There are a number of critical circumstances where a localized
routing domain needs to augment or modify its view of the Global
RPKI. This document attempts to outline a few of them.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. What is 'Local' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4. Example Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Some Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
Today RPKI-based Origin Validation, [RFC6811], relies on widespread
deployment of the Global Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI),
[RFC6480]. In the future, RPKI-based Path Validation, [RFC8205],
will be even more reliant on the Global RPKI.
But there are critical circumstances in which a local, clearly-
scoped, administrative and/or routing domain will want to augment
and/or modify their internal view of the Global RPKI.
This document attempts to lay out a few of those use cases. It is
not intended to be authoritative, complete, or to become a standard.
It is informative laying out a few critical examples to help frame
the issues.
2. Suggested Reading
It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, see [RFC6480],
the RPKI Repository Structure, see [RFC6481], Route Origin
Authorizations (ROAs), see [RFC6482], and GhostBusters Records, see
[RFC6493].
3. What is 'Local'
The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs,
manifests, ROAs, and GhostBusters Records as described in [RFC6481].
Policies and considerations for RPKI object generation and
maintenance are discussed elsewhere.
Like the DNS, the Global RPKI tries to present a single global view,
although only a loosely consistent view, depending on timing,
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updating, fetching, etc. There is no 'fix' for this, it is not
broken, it is the nature of distributed data with distributed caches.
There are critical uses of the RPKI where a local administrative and/
or routing domain, e.g. an end-user site, a particular ISP or content
provider, an organization, a geo-political region, ... may wish to
have a specialized view of the RPKI.
For the purposes of this exploration, we refer to this localized view
as a 'Local Trust Anchor', mostly for historical reasons, but also
because implementation would likely require the local distribution of
one or more specialized trust anchors, [RFC6481].
4. Example Uses
We explore this space using three examples.
Carol, a resource holder (Local Internet Registry (LIR), Provider
Independent address space (PI) holder, ...), operates outside of the
country in which her Regional Internet Registry (RIR) is based.
Someone convinces the RIR's local court to force the RIR to remove or
modify some or all of Carol's certificates, ROAs, etc. or the
resources they represent, and the operational community wants to
retain the ability to route to Carol's network(s). There is need for
some channel through which operators can permit Carol to be believed
and exchange local trust, command, and data collections necessary to
propagate patches local to all their RPKI views.
Bob has a multi-AS network under his administration and some of those
ASs use private ([RFC1918]) or 'borrowed' address space which is not
announced on the global Internet (not to condone borrowing), and he
wishes to certify them for use in his internal routing.
Alice is responsible for the trusted routing for a large
organization, commercial or geo-political, in which management
requests routing engineering to redirect their competitors' prefixes
to socially acceptable data. Alice is responsible for making the
Certificate Authority (CA) hierarchy have validated certificates for
those redirected resources as well as the rest of the Internet.
5. Some Approaches
In these examples, it is ultimately the ROAs, not the certificates,
which one wants to modify or replace. But one probably can not
simply create new ROAs as one does not have the private keys needed
to sign them. Hence it is likely that one has to also do something
about the [RFC6480] certificates.
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The goal is to modify, create, and/or replace ROAs and GhostBuster
Records which are needed to present the localized view of the RPKI
data.
One wants to reproduce only as much of the Global RPKI as needed.
Replicating more than is needed would amplify tracking and
maintenance.
One can not reissue down from the root trust anchor at the IANA or
from the RIRs' certificates because one does not have the private
keys required. So one has to create a new trust anchor which, for
ease of use, will contain the new/modified certificates and ROAs as
well as the unmodified remainder of the Global RPKI.
Because Alice, Bob, and Carol want to be able to archive, reproduce,
and send to other operators the data necessary to reproduce their
modified view of the global RPKI, there will need to be a formally
defined set of data which is input to a well-defined process to take
an existing Global RPKI tree and produce the desired modified re-
anchored tree.
It is possible that an operator may need to accept and process
modification data from more than one source. Hence there is a need
to merge modification 'recipes'.
Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI
(SLURM), [RFC8416], addresses many, but not all, of these issues and
approaches. This document was originally a gating requirements
document for SLURM and other approaches.
6. Security Considerations
Though the above use cases are all constrained to local contexts,
they violate the model of a single Global RPKI, albeit to meet real
operational needs. Hence the result must be able to be validated as
if the changed data were part of the validatable Global RPKI while
including the local context, perhaps with the addition of trust
anchors or authenticatable patching of trust.
Modification 'recipes' may lack authentication. E.g., if
modifications to the tree are passed around a la SLURM files, see
[RFC8416], what was object security becomes, at best, transport
security, or authentication by other trust domains such as PGP.
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7. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations.
8. Acknowledgments
The author thanks Chris Morrow, Karen Seo, Rob Austein, and Steve
Kent for comments and suggestions.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, DOI 10.17487/RFC6493,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6493>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC8416] Ma, D., Mandelberg, D., and T. Bruijnzeels, "Simplified
Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI
(SLURM)", RFC 8416, DOI 10.17487/RFC8416, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8416>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
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[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
Author's Address
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US
Email: randy@psg.com
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