Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-sidrops-rfc6482bis
draft-ietf-sidrops-rfc6482bis
Network Working Group J. Snijders
Internet-Draft Fastly
Obsoletes: 6482 (if approved) B. Maddison
Intended status: Standards Track Workonline
Expires: 16 June 2024 M. Lepinski
Carleton College
D. Kong
Raytheon
S. Kent
Independent
14 December 2023
A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
draft-ietf-sidrops-rfc6482bis-09
Abstract
This document defines a standard profile for Route Origin
Authorizations (ROAs). A ROA is a digitally signed object that
provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has
authorized an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes to one or
more prefixes within the address block. This document obsoletes RFC
6482.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 June 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Changes from RFC6482 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. The ROA ContentType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. The ROA eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Element version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Element asID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. Element ipAddrBlocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3.1. Type ROAIPAddressFamily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3.2. Type ROAIPAddress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3.3. Canonical form for ipAddrBlocks . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. ROA Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. RPKI Signed Objects sub-registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.3. File Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.5. Media Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix B. Example ROA eContent Payload . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Introduction
The primary purpose of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
is to improve routing security. (See [RFC6480] for more
information.) As part of this system, a mechanism is needed to allow
entities to verify that an AS has been given permission by an IP
address block holder to advertise routes to one or more prefixes
within that block. A ROA provides this function.
The ROA makes use of the template for RPKI digitally signed objects
[RFC6488], which defines a Crytopgraphic Message Syntax (CMS)
[RFC5652] wrapper for the ROA content as well as a generic validation
procedure for RPKI signed objects. Therefore, to complete the
specification of the ROA (see Section 4 of [RFC6488]), this document
defines:
* The OID that identifies the signed object as being a ROA. (This
OID appears within the eContentType in the encapContentInfo object
as well as the content-type signed attribute in the signerInfo
object).
* The ASN.1 syntax for the ROA eContent. (This is the payload that
specifies the AS being authorized to originate routes as well as
the prefixes to which the AS may originate routes.) The ROA
eContent is ASN.1 encoded using the Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER) [X.690].
* Additional steps required to validate ROAs (in addition to the
validation steps specified in [RFC6488]).
1.1. Changes from RFC6482
This section summarizes the significant changes between [RFC6482] and
the profile described in this document.
* Clarified the requirements for the IP Addresses and AS Identifiers
X.509 certificate extensions.
* Strengthened the ASN.1 formal notation and definitions.
* Incorporated RFC 6482 Errata.
* Added an example ROA eContent payload and an ROA.
* Specified a canonicalization procedure for the content of
ipAddrBlocks.
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2. Related Work
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts
described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280] and "X.509
Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779].
Additionally, this document makes use of the RPKI signed object
profile [RFC6488]; thus, familiarity with that document is assumed.
Note that the RPKI signed object profile makes use of certificates
adhering to the RPKI Resource Certificate Profile [RFC6487]; thus,
familiarly with that profile is also assumed.
3. The ROA ContentType
The content-type for a ROA is defined as routeOriginAuthz and has the
numerical value of 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24.
This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the
encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute
in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).
4. The ROA eContent
The content of a ROA identifies a single AS that has been authorized
by the address space holder to originate routes and a list of one or
more IP address prefixes that will be advertised. If the address
space holder needs to authorize multiple ASes to advertise the same
set of address prefixes, the holder issues multiple ROAs, one per AS
number. A ROA is formally defined as:
RPKI-ROA-2023 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0) id-mod-rpkiROA-2023(TBD) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) } ;
ct-routeOriginAttestation CONTENT-TYPE ::=
{ TYPE RouteOriginAttestation
IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-routeOriginAuthz }
id-ct-routeOriginAuthz OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
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{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) routeOriginAuthz(24) }
RouteOriginAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
asID ASID,
ipAddrBlocks SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..2)) OF ROAIPAddressFamily }
ASID ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
ROAIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
addressFamily ADDRESS-FAMILY.&afi ({AddressFamilySet}),
addresses ADDRESS-FAMILY.&Addresses ({AddressFamilySet}{@addressFamily}) }
ADDRESS-FAMILY ::= CLASS {
&afi OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)) UNIQUE,
&Addresses
} WITH SYNTAX { AFI &afi ADDRESSES &Addresses }
AddressFamilySet ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ addressFamilyIPv4 | addressFamilyIPv6 }
addressFamilyIPv4 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ AFI afi-IPv4 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv4 }
addressFamilyIPv6 ADDRESS-FAMILY ::=
{ AFI afi-IPv6 ADDRESSES ROAAddressesIPv6 }
afi-IPv4 OCTET STRING ::= '0001'H
afi-IPv6 OCTET STRING ::= '0002'H
ROAAddressesIPv4 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{32}
ROAAddressesIPv6 ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ROAIPAddress{128}
ROAIPAddress {INTEGER: len} ::= SEQUENCE {
address BIT STRING (SIZE(0..len)),
maxLength INTEGER (0..len) OPTIONAL }
END
4.1. Element version
The version number of the RouteOriginAttestation MUST be 0.
4.2. Element asID
The asID element contains the AS number that is authorized to
originate routes to the given IP address prefixes.
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4.3. Element ipAddrBlocks
The ipAddrBlocks element encodes the set of IP address prefixes to
which the AS is authorized to originate routes. Note that the syntax
here is more restrictive than that used in the IP Address Delegation
extension defined in [RFC3779]. That extension can represent
arbitrary address ranges, whereas ROAs need to represent only IP
prefixes.
4.3.1. Type ROAIPAddressFamily
Within the ROAIPAddressFamily structure, the addressFamily element
contains the Address Family Identifier (AFI) of an IP address family.
This specification only supports IPv4 and IPv6, therefore
addressFamily MUST be either 0001 or 0002. IPv4 prefixes MUST NOT
appear as IPv4-Mapped IPv6 Addresses (section 2.5.5.2 of [RFC4291]).
There MUST be only one instance of ROAIPAddressFamily per unique AFI
in the ROA. Thus, the ROAIPAddressFamily structure MUST NOT appear
more than twice.
The addresses element represents IP prefixes as a sequence of type
ROAIPAddress.
4.3.2. Type ROAIPAddress
A ROAIPAddress structure is a sequence containing an address element
of type IPAddress and an optional maxLength element of type INTEGER.
See section 2.2.3.8 of [RFC3779] for more details on type IPAddress.
4.3.2.1. Element address
The address element is of type IPAddress and represents a single IP
address prefix.
4.3.2.2. Element maxLength
When present, the maxLength specifies the maximum length of the IP
address prefix that the AS is authorized to advertise. The maxLength
element SHOULD NOT be encoded if the maximum length is equal to the
prefix length. Certification Authorities SHOULD anticipate that
future Relying Parties will become increasingly stringent in
considering the presence of superfluous maxLength elements an
encoding error.
If present, the maxLength MUST be:
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* an integer greater than or equal to the length of the accompanying
prefix, and
* less than or equal to the maximum length (in bits) of an IP
address in the applicable address family: 32 in case of IPv4 and
128 in case of IPv6.
For example, if the IP address prefix is 203.0.113.0/24 and the
maxLength is 26, the AS is authorized to advertise any more specific
prefix with a maximum length of 26. In this example, the AS would be
authorized to advertise 203.0.113.0/24, 203.0.113.128/25, or
203.0.113.192/26; but not 203.0.113.0/27. See [RFC9319] for more
information on the use of maxLength.
When the maxLength is not present, the AS is only authorized to
advertise the exact prefix specified in the ROAIPAddress' address
element.
4.3.2.3. Note on overlapping or superfluous information encoding
Note that a valid ROA may contain an IP address prefix (within a
ROAIPAddress element) that is encompassed by another IP address
prefix (within a separate ROAIPAddress element). For example, a ROA
may contain the prefix 203.0.113.0/24 with maxLength 26, as well as
the prefix 203.0.113.0/28 with maxLength 28. This ROA would
authorize the indicated AS to advertise any prefix beginning with
203.0.113 with a minimum length of 24 and a maximum length of 26, as
well as the specific prefix 203.0.113.0/28.
Additionally, a ROA MAY contain two ROAIPAddress elements, where the
IP address prefix is identical in both cases. However, this is NOT
RECOMMENDED as, in such a case, the ROAIPAddress with the shorter
maxLength grants no additional privileges to the indicated AS and
thus can be omitted without changing the meaning of the ROA.
4.3.3. Canonical form for ipAddrBlocks
As the data structure described by the ROA ASN.1 module allows for
many different ways to represent the same set of IP address
information, a canonical form is defined such that every set of IP
address information has a unique representation. In order to produce
and verify this canonical form, the process described in this section
SHOULD be used to ensure information elements are unique with respect
to one another and sorted in ascending order. Certification
Authorities SHOULD anticipate that future Relying Parties will impose
a strict requirement for the ipAddrBlocks field to be in this
canonical form. This canonicalization procedure builds upon the
canonicalization procedure specified in section 2.2.3.6 of [RFC3779].
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In order to semantically compare, sort, and deduplicate the contents
of the ipAddrBlocks field, each ROAIPAddress element is mapped to an
abstract data element composed of four integer values:
afi The AFI value appearing in the addressFamily field of the
containing ROAIPAddressFamily as an integer.
addr The first IP address of the IP prefix appearing in the
ROAIPAddress address field, as a 32-bit (IPv4) or 128-bit (IPv6)
integer value.
plen The prefix length of the IP prefix appearing in the
ROAIPAddress address field as an integer value.
mlen The value appearing in the maxLength field of the ROAIPAddress,
if present, otherwise the above prefix length value.
Thus, the equality or relative order of two ROAIPAddress elements can
be tested by comparing their abstract representations.
4.3.3.1. Comparator
The set of ipAddrBlocks is totally ordered. The order of two
ipAddrBlocks is determined by the first non-equal comparison in the
following list.
1. Data elements with a lower afi value precede data elements with a
higher afi value.
2. Data elements with a lower addr value precede data elements with
a higher addr value.
3. Data elements with a lower plen value precede data elements with
a higher plen value.
4. Data elements with a lower mlen value precede data elements with
a higher mlen value.
Data elements for which all four values compare equal are duplicates
of one another.
4.3.3.2. Example implementations
A sorting implementation [roasort-c] in ISO/IEC 9899:1999
("ANSI C99").
A sorting implementation [roasort-rs] in Rust 2021 Edition.
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5. ROA Validation
Before a relying party can use a ROA to validate a routing
announcement, the relying party MUST first validate the ROA. To
validate a ROA, the relying party MUST perform all the validation
checks specified in [RFC6488] as well as the following additional
ROA-specific validation steps:
* The IP Address Delegation extension [RFC3779] is present in the
end-entity (EE) certificate (contained within the ROA), and every
IP address prefix in the ROA payload is contained within the set
of IP addresses specified by the EE certificate's IP Address
Delegation extension.
* The EE certificate's IP Address Delegation extension MUST NOT
contain "inherit" elements described in [RFC3779].
* The Autonomous System Identifier Delegation Extension described in
[RFC3779] is not used in Route Origin Authorizations and MUST NOT
be present in the EE certificate.
* The ROA content fully conforms with all requirements specified in
Section 3 and Section 4.
If any of the above checks fail, the ROA in its entirety MUST be
considered invalid and an error SHOULD be logged.
6. Security Considerations
There is no assumption of confidentiality for the data in a ROA; it
is anticipated that ROAs will be stored in repositories that are
accessible to all ISPs, and perhaps to all Internet users. There is
no explicit authentication associated with a ROA, since the PKI used
for ROA validation provides authorization but not authentication.
Although the ROA is a signed, application-layer object, there is no
intent to convey non-repudiation via a ROA.
The purpose of a ROA is to convey authorization for an AS to
originate a route to the prefix(es) in the ROA. Thus, the integrity
of a ROA MUST be established. The ROA specification makes use of the
RPKI signed object format; thus, all security considerations in
[RFC6488] also apply to ROAs. Additionally, the signed object
profile uses the CMS signed message format for integrity; thus, ROAs
inherit all security considerations associated with that data
structure.
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The right of the ROA signer to authorize the target AS to originate
routes to the prefix(es) is established through use of the address
space and AS number PKI described in [RFC6480]. Specifically, one
MUST verify the signature on the ROA using an X.509 certificate
issued under this PKI, and check that the prefix(es) in the ROA are
contained within those in the certificate's IP Address Delegation
Extension.
7. IANA Considerations
7.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)
The IANA is requested to update the id-ct-routeOriginAuthz entry in
the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry as follows:
Decimal Description References
---------------------------------------------------------------
24 id-ct-routeOriginAuthz [RFC-to-be]
Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to reference the
RFC publication instead of this draft.
7.2. RPKI Signed Objects sub-registry
The IANA is requested to update the entry for the Route Origination
Authorization in the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by
[RFC6488] as follows:
Name OID Specification
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Route Origination Authorization 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.24 [RFC-to-be]
7.3. File Extension
The IANA is requested to update the entry for the ROA file extension
in the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry created by [RFC6481]
as follows:
Filename Extension RPKI Object Reference
------------------------------------------------------------------------
.roa Route Origination Authorization [RFC-to-be]
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Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to make this
addition permanent and to reference the RFC publication instead of
this draft.
7.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)
The IANA is requested to allocate for this document in the "SMI
Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)"
registry:
Decimal Description Reference
--------------------------------------------
TBD id-mod-rpkiROA-2023 [RFC-to-be]
7.5. Media Type
The IANA is requested to update the media type application/rpki-roa
in the "Media Type" registry as follows:
Type name: application
Subtype name: rpki-roa
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: Carries an RPKI ROA [RFC-to-be].
This media type contains no active content. See
Section 6 of [RFC-to-be] for further information.
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: [RFC-to-be]
Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators
Additional information:
Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
prefixes and an AS identifer as defined in [RFC-to-be].
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .roa
Macintosh file type code(s):
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Change controller: IETF
8. References
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8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
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[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[X.690] ITU-T, "Information Technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical
Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules
(DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2015.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC9319] Gilad, Y., Goldberg, S., Sriram, K., Snijders, J., and B.
Maddison, "The Use of maxLength in the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 185, RFC 9319,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9319, October 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9319>.
[roasort-c]
Snijders, J., "ROA sorter in C",
<https://github.com/job/roasort>.
[roasort-rs]
Maddison, B., "ROA sorter in Rust",
<https://github.com/benmaddison/roasort>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank Theo Buehler, Ties de Kock, Martin
Hoffmann, Charles Gardiner, Russ Housley, Jeffrey Haas, and Bob Beck
for their help and contributions. Additionally, the authors thank
Jim Fenton, Vijay Gurbani, Haoyu Song, Rob Austein, Roque Gagliano,
Danny McPherson, Sam Weiler, Jasdip Singh, and Murray S. Kucherawy
for their careful reviews and helpful comments.
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Appendix B. Example ROA eContent Payload
Below an example of a DER encoded ROA eContent is provided with
annotation following the '#' character.
$ echo 302402023CCA301E301C04020002301630090307002001067C208C30090307002A0EB2400000 \
| xxd -r -ps \
| openssl asn1parse -i -dump -inform DER
0:d=0 hl=2 l= 36 cons: SEQUENCE # RouteOriginAttestation
2:d=1 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER :3CCA # asID 15562
6:d=1 hl=2 l= 30 cons: SEQUENCE # ipAddrBlocks
8:d=2 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddressFamily
10:d=3 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING # addressFamily
0000 - 00 02 .. # IPv6
14:d=3 hl=2 l= 22 cons: SEQUENCE # addresses
16:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddress
18:d=5 hl=2 l= 7 prim: BIT STRING # address
0000 - 00 20 01 06 7c 20 8c . ..| . # 2001:67c:208c::/48
27:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE # ROAIPAddress
29:d=5 hl=2 l= 7 prim: BIT STRING # address
0000 - 00 2a 0e b2 40 .*..@ # 2a0e:b240::/48
0007 - <SPACES/NULS>
Below is a complete Base64 [RFC4648] encoded RPKI ROA Signed Object.
Snijders, et al. Expires 16 June 2024 [Page 14]
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MIIHCwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIG/DCCBvgCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwNwYLKoZIhvcNAQkQ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The object in Appendix B has the following properties:
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Object
SHA256 hash: 13afbad09ed59b315efd8722d38b09fd02962e376e4def32247f9de905649b47
Size: 1807 octets
CMS signing time: Fri 17 Jun 2022 00:24:22 +0000
X.509 end-entity certificate
Subject key id: A3D964245749BB6DD5AB1F2E830E33A6C5146E8F
Authority key id: 38E14F92FDC7CCFBFC182361523AE27D697E952F
Issuer: /CN=38e14f92fdc7ccfbfc182361523ae27d697e952f
Serial: 86F9
Not before: Fri 17 Jun 2022 00:24:22 +0000
Not after: Sat 01 Jul 2023 00:00:00 +0000
IP address delegation: 2001:67c:208c::/48, 2a0e:b240::/48
eContent
asID: 15562
addresses: 2001:67c:208c::/48, 2a0e:b240::/48
Authors' Addresses
Job Snijders
Fastly
Amsterdam
Netherlands
Email: job@fastly.com
Ben Maddison
Workonline
Cape Town
South Africa
Email: benm@workonline.africa
Matthew Lepinski
Carleton College
Email: mlepinski@carleton.edu
Derrick Kong
Raytheon
Email: derrick.kong@raytheon.com
Stephen Kent
Independent
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Email: kent@alum.mit.edu
Snijders, et al. Expires 16 June 2024 [Page 17]
