Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc
Network Working Group J. Snijders
Internet-Draft Fastly
Intended status: Standards Track T. Harrison
Expires: 12 March 2023 APNIC
B. Maddison
Workonline
8 September 2022
A profile for Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signed
Checklists (RSC)
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc-11
Abstract
This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) protected
content type for use with the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI) to carry a general purpose listing of checksums (a
'checklist'). The objective is to allow an attestation, termed an
RPKI Signed Checklist (RSC), which contains one or more checksums of
arbitrary digital objects (files) that are signed "with resources",
and which, when validated, confirms that the respective Internet
Resource Holder produced the RSC.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 12 March 2023.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. RSC Profile and Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. RSC End-Entity Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. The RSC ContentType . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. The RSC eContent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2.1. ConstrainedASIdentifiers type . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.2. ConstrainedIPAddrBlocks type . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. digestAlgorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. checkList . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4.1. FileNameAndHash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. RSC Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Verifying files or data using RSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Implementation status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.2. RPKI Signed Objects sub-registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10.3. File Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10.5. Media Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix B. Document changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B.1. changes from -10 -> -11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B.2. changes from -09 -> -10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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B.3. changes from -08 -> -09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B.4. changes from -07 -> -08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
B.5. changes from -06 -> -07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.6. changes from -05 -> -06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.7. changes from -04 -> -05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.8. changes from -03 -> -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.9. changes from -02 -> -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.10. changes from -01 -> -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.11. changes from -00 -> -01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B.12. individual submission phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
This document defines a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652]
[RFC6268] protected content type for a general purpose listing of
checksums (a 'checklist'), for use with the Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. The protected CMS content type is
intended to provide for the creation and validation of an RPKI Signed
Checklist (RSC): a checksum listing signed with a specific set of
Internet Number Resources. The objective is to allow an attestation
that, when validated, provides a means to confirm a given Internet
Resource Holder produced the RPKI Signed Checklist (RSC).
Signed Checklists are expected to facilitate inter-domain business
use-cases which depend on an ability to verify resource holdership.
RPKI-based validation processes are expected to become the industry
norm for automated Bring Your Own IP (BYOIP) on-boarding or
establishment of physical interconnection between Autonomous Systems.
The RSC concept borrows heavily from RTA [I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta],
Manifests [RFC9286], and OpenBSD's [signify] utility. The main
difference between RSC and RTA is that the RTA profile allows
multiple signers to attest a single digital object through a checksum
of its content, while the RSC profile allows a single signer to
attest the content of multiple digital objects. A single signer
profile is considered a simplification for both implementers and
operators.
2. RSC Profile and Distribution
RSC follows the Signed Object Template for the RPKI [RFC6488] with
one exception: because RSCs MUST NOT be distributed through the
global RPKI Repository system, the Subject Information Access (SIA)
extension MUST be omitted from the RSC's X.509 End-Entity (EE)
certificate.
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What constitutes suitable transport for RSC files is deliberately
unspecified. For example, it might be a USB stick, a web interface
secured with HTTPS, a PGP-signed email, a T-shirt printed with a QR
code, or a carrier pigeon.
2.1. RSC End-Entity Certificates
The Certification Authority (CA) MUST only sign one RSC with each
End-Entity (EE) Certificate, and MUST generate a new key pair for
each new RSC. This form of use of the associated EE Certificate is
termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate Section 3 of [RFC6487].
3. The RSC ContentType
The ContentType for an RSC is defined as rpkiSignedChecklist, with
Object Identifier (OID) 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.48.
This OID MUST appear both within the eContentType in the
encapContentInfo object as well as the ContentType signed attribute
in the signerInfo object (see [RFC6488]).
4. The RSC eContent
The content of an RSC indicates that a checklist for arbitrary
digital objects has been signed "with resources". An RSC is formally
defined as:
RpkiSignedChecklist-2022
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) mod(0)
id-mod-rpkiSignedChecklist-2022(73) }
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
CONTENT-TYPE, Digest, DigestAlgorithmIdentifier
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010 -- in [RFC6268]
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }
IPAddressOrRange, ASIdOrRange
FROM IPAddrAndASCertExtn -- in [RFC3779]
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) mod(0)
id-mod-ip-addr-and-as-ident(30) } ;
ct-rpkiSignedChecklist CONTENT-TYPE ::=
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{ TYPE RpkiSignedChecklist
IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-signedChecklist }
id-ct-signedChecklist OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
pkcs-9(9) id-smime(16) id-ct(1) 48 }
RpkiSignedChecklist ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
resources ResourceBlock,
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
checkList SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF FileNameAndHash }
FileNameAndHash ::= SEQUENCE {
fileName PortableFilename OPTIONAL,
hash Digest }
PortableFilename ::=
IA5String (FROM("a".."z" | "A".."Z" | "0".."9" | "." | "_" | "-"))
ResourceBlock ::= SEQUENCE {
asID [0] ConstrainedASIdentifiers OPTIONAL,
ipAddrBlocks [1] ConstrainedIPAddrBlocks OPTIONAL }
-- at least one of asID or ipAddrBlocks MUST be present
( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., asID PRESENT} |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., ipAddrBlocks PRESENT } )
ConstrainedIPAddrBlocks ::=
SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ConstrainedIPAddressFamily
ConstrainedIPAddressFamily ::= SEQUENCE {
addressFamily OCTET STRING (SIZE(2)),
addressesOrRanges SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF IPAddressOrRange }
ConstrainedASIdentifiers ::= SEQUENCE {
asnum [0] SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF ASIdOrRange }
END
4.1. version
The version number of the RpkiSignedChecklist MUST be 0.
4.2. resources
The resources contained here are the resources used to mark the
attestation, and MUST be a subset of the set of resources listed by
the EE Certificate carried in the CMS certificates field.
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If the asID field is present, it MUST contain an instance of
ConstrainedASIdentifiers.
If the ipAddrBlocks field is present, it MUST contain an instance of
ConstrainedIPAddrBlocks.
At least one of asID or ipAddrBlocks MUST be present.
Each of ConstrainedASIdentifiers and ConstrainedIPAddrBlocks are
specified such that the resulting DER-encoded data instances are
binary compatible with, respectively, ASIdentifiers and IPAddrBlocks
defined in [RFC3779].
Implementations encountering decoding errors whilst attempting to
read DER-encoded data using this specification should be aware of the
possibility that the data may have been encoded using an
implementation intended for use with [RFC3779]. Such data may
contain elements prohibited by the current specification.
Attempting to decode the errored data using the more permissive
specification contained in [RFC3779] may enable implementors to
gather additional context for use when reporting errors to the user.
However, implementations MUST NOT ignore errors resulting from the
more restrictive definitions contained herein: in particular, such
errors MUST cause the validation procedure described in Section 5 to
fail.
4.2.1. ConstrainedASIdentifiers type
ConstrainedASIdentifiers is a SEQUENCE, consisting of a single field
"asnum", itself containing a SEQUENCE OF one or more ASIdOrRange
instances as defined in [RFC3779].
ConstrainedASIdentifiers is defined such that the resulting DER-
encoded data are binary compatible with ASIdentifiers defined in
[RFC3779].
4.2.2. ConstrainedIPAddrBlocks type
ConstrainedIPAddrBlocks is a SEQUENCE OF one or more instances of
ConstrainedIPAddressFamily.
There MUST be only one instance of ConstrainedIPAddressFamily per
unique AFI.
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The elements of ConstrainedIPAddressFamily MUST be ordered by
ascending addressFamily values (treating the octets as unsigned
numbers). Thus, when both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses are specified, the
IPv4 addresses MUST precede the IPv6 addresses (since the IPv4 AFI of
0001 is less than the IPv6 AFI of 0002).
ConstrainedIPAddrBlocks is defined such that the resulting DER-
encoded data are binary compatible with IPAddrBlocks defined in
[RFC3779].
4.2.2.1. ConstrainedIPAddressFamily type
4.2.2.1.1. addressFamily field
The addressFamily field is an OCTET STRING containing a two-octet
Address Family Identifier (AFI), in network byte order. Unlike
IPAddrBlocks [RFC3779], a third octet containing a Subsequent Address
Family Identifier (SAFI) MUST NOT be present. AFIs are specified in
the Address Family Numbers registry [IANA.ADDRESS-FAMILY-NUMBERS]
maintained by IANA.
4.2.2.1.2. addressesOrRanges field
The addressesOrRanges element is a SEQUENCE OF one or more
IPAddressOrRange values, as defined in [RFC3779]. The rules for
canonicalization and encoding defined in Section 2.2.3.6 of [RFC3779]
apply to the value of addressesOrRanges.
4.3. digestAlgorithm
The digest algorithm used to create the message digest of the
attested digital object(s). This algorithm MUST be a hashing
algorithm defined in [RFC7935].
4.4. checkList
This field is a SEQUENCE OF one or more FileNameAndHash values.
There is one FileNameAndHash entry for each digital object referenced
on the Signed Checklist.
4.4.1. FileNameAndHash
Each FileNameAndHash is an ordered pair of the name of the directory
entry containing the digital object, and the message digest of the
digital object.
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The hash field is mandatory. The value of the hash field is the
calculated message digest of the digital object. The hashing
algorithm is specified in the digestAlgorithm field.
The fileName field is OPTIONAL. This is to allow Signed Checklists
to be used in a "stand-alone" fashion in which nameless digital
objects are addressed directly through their respective message
digest rather than through a file system abstraction.
If the fileName field is present then its value:
* MUST contain only characters specified in the Portable Filename
Character Set as defined in [POSIX].
* MUST be unique with respect to the other FileNameAndHash elements
of checkList for which the fileName field is also present.
Conversely, if the fileName field is omitted, then the value of the
hash field MUST be unique with respect to the other FileNameAndHash
elements of checkList for which the fileName field is also omitted.
5. RSC Validation
Before a Relying Party can use an RSC to validate a set of digital
objects, the Relying Party MUST first validate the RSC. To validate
an RSC, the Relying Party MUST perform all the validation checks
specified in [RFC6488] (except checking for the presence of an SIA
extension, which MUST NOT be present in the EE X.509 certificate
Section 4.8.8.2 of [RFC6487]), and perform the following additional
RSC-specific validation steps:
1. The contents of the CMS eContent field MUST conform to all of the
constraints described in Section 4 including the constraints
described in Section 4.4.1.
2. If the asID field is present within the contents of the
'resources' field, then the AS Resources extension [RFC3779] MUST
be present in the EE certificate contained in the CMS
certificates field. The AS identifiers present in the eContent
'resources' field MUST be a subset of those present in the
certificate extension. The EE certificate's AS Resources
extension MUST NOT contain "inherit" elements.
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3. If the ipAddrBlocks field is present within the contents of the
'resources' field, then the IP Resources extension [RFC3779] MUST
be present in the EE certificate contained in the CMS
certificates field. The IP addresses present in the eContent
'resources' field MUST be a subset of those present in the
certificate extension. The EE certificate's IP Resources
extension MUST NOT contain "inherit" elements.
6. Verifying files or data using RSC
To verify a set of digital objects with an RSC:
* The RSC MUST be validated according to the procedure described in
Section 5. If the RSC cannot be validated, verification MUST
fail. This error SHOULD be reported to the user.
* For every digital object to be verified:
1. If the verification procedure is provided with a file name for
the object being verified (e.g. because the user has provided
a file system path from which to read the object) then
verification SHOULD proceed in "filename-aware" mode.
Otherwise, verification SHOULD proceed in "filename-unaware"
mode.
Implementations MAY provide an option to override the
verification mode, for example to ignore the fact that the
object is to be read from a file.
2. The message digest MUST be computed from the file contents or
data using the digest algorithm specified in the
digestAlgorithm field of the RSC.
3. The digest computed in step 2 MUST be compared to the value
appearing in the hash field of all FileNameAndHash elements of
the checkList field of the RSC.
One or more FileNameAndHash elements MUST be found with a
matching hash value, otherwise verification MUST fail and the
error SHOULD be reported to the user.
4. If the mode selected in step 1 is "filename-aware" then
exactly one of the FileNameAndHash elements matched in step 3
MUST contain a fileName field value exactly matching the file
name of the object being verified.
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Alternatively, if the mode selected in step 1 is "filename-
unaware" then exactly one of the FileNameAndHash elements
matched in step 3 MUST have the fileName field omitted.
Otherwise, verification MUST fail, and the error SHOULD be
reported to the user.
Note that in the above procedure, not all elements of checkList
necessarily need be used. That is, it is not an error if the length
of checkList is greater than the size of the set of digital objects
to be verified. However, in this situation, implementations SHOULD
issue a warning to the user, allowing for corrective action to be
taken if necessary.
7. Operational Considerations
When creating digital objects of a plain-text nature (such as ASCII,
UTF-8, HTML, Javascript, XML, etc.) converting such objects into a
lossless compressed form is RECOMMENDED. Distributing plain-text
objects within a compression envelope (such as GZIP [RFC1952]) might
help avoid unexpected canonicalization at intermediate systems (which
in turn would lead to checksum verification errors). Validator
implementations are expected to treat a checksummed digital object as
string of arbitrary single octets.
If a fileName field is present, but no digital object within the set
of to-be-verified digital objects has a filename that matches the
content of that field, a validator implementation SHOULD compare the
message digest of each digital object to the value from the hash
field of the associated FileNameAndHash and report matches to the
user for further consideration; or report an error indicating no file
by that name exists.
8. Security Considerations
Relying parties are hereby warned that the data in a RPKI Signed
Checklist is self-asserted. When determining the meaning of any data
contained in an RPKI Signed Checklist, Relying Parties MUST NOT make
any assumptions about the signer beyond the fact that it had
sufficient control of the issuing CA to create the object. These
data have not been verified by the Certificate Authority (CA) that
issued the CA certificate to the entity that issued the EE
Certificate used to validate the Signed Checklist.
RPKI Certificates are not bound to real world identities, see
[RFC9255] for an elaboration. Relying Parties can only associate
real world entities to Internet Number Resources by additionally
consulting an exogenous authority. Signed Checklists are a tool to
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communicate assertions 'signed with Internet Number Resources', not
about any other aspect of the resource holder's business operations
such as the identity of the resource holder itself.
RSC objects are not distributed through the RPKI Repository system.
From this, it follows that third parties who do not have a copy of a
given RSC, may not be aware of the existence of that RSC. Since RSC
objects use EE Certificates, but all other currently defined types of
RPKI object profiles are published in public CA repositories, an
observer may infer from discrepancies in the Repository that RSC
object(s) may exist. For example, if a CA does not use random serial
numbers for Certificates, an observer could detect gaps between the
serial numbers of the published EE Certificates. Similarly, if the
CA includes a serial number on a CRL that does not match any
published object, an observer could postulate an RSC EE Certificate
was revoked.
Conversely, a gap in serial numbers does not imply that an RSC
exists. Nor does an arbitrary (to the RP unknown) serial in a CRL
imply an RSC object exists: the implicitly referenced object might
not be an RSC, it might have never been published, or was revoked
before it was visible to RPs. In general, it is not possible to
confidently infer the existence or non-existence of RSCs from the
Repository state without access to a given RSC.
While a one-time-use EE Certificate must only be used to generate and
sign a single RSC object, CAs technically are not restricted from
generating and signing multiple different RSC objects with a single
keypair. Any RSC objects sharing the same EE Certificate can not be
revoked individually.
9. Implementation status
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942.
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist.
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According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit".
* A signer and validator implementation [rpki-rsc-demo] written in
Perl based on OpenSSL was provided by Tom Harrison from APNIC.
* A signer implementation [rpkimancer] written in Python was
developed by Ben Maddison.
* Example .sig files were created by Job Snijders with the use of
OpenSSL.
* A validator implementation based on OpenBSD rpki-client and
LibreSSL was developed by Job Snijders.
* A validator implementation [FORT] based on the FORT validator was
developed by Alberto Leiva for a previous version of this
specification.
* A validator implementation [prover] was developed by Mikhail
Puzanov.
10. IANA Considerations
10.1. SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)
The IANA has allocated for this document in the "SMI Security for S/
MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry:
Decimal Description References
---------------------------------------------------------------
48 id-ct-signedChecklist [draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc]
Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to reference the
RFC publication instead of this draft.
10.2. RPKI Signed Objects sub-registry
The IANA is requested to register the OID for the RPKI Signed
Checklist in the "RPKI Signed Objects" registry created by [RFC6488]
as follows:
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Name OID Specification
-------------------------------------------------------------
Signed Checklist 1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.48 [RFC-TBD]
10.3. File Extension
The IANA has temporarily added an item for the Signed Checklist file
extension to the "RPKI Repository Name Schemes" registry created by
[RFC6481] as follows:
Filename Extension RPKI Object Reference
-------------------------------------------------------------------
.sig Signed Checklist [draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc]
Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to make this
addition permanent and to reference the RFC publication instead of
this draft.
10.4. SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier
(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)
The IANA has permanently allocated for this document in the "SMI
Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0)"
registry:
Decimal Description References
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
73 id-mod-rpkiSignedChecklist-2021 [draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rsc]
Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to update the
"Description" column to read "id-mod-rpkiSignedChecklist-2022", and
to reference the RFC publication instead of this draft.
10.5. Media Type
The IANA has registered the media type application/rpki-checklist in
the "Provisional Standard Media Type" registry as follows:
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Type name: application
Subtype name: rpki-checklist
Required parameters: N/A
Optional parameters: N/A
Encoding considerations: binary
Security considerations: Carries an RPKI Signed Checklist
[RFC-to-be]. This media type contains no active
content. See Section 5 of [RFC-to-be] for further
information.
Interoperability considerations: None
Published specification: This document.
Applications that use this media type: RPKI operators.
Additional information:
Content: This media type is a signed object, as defined
in [RFC6488], which contains a payload of a list of
checksums as defined above in this document.
Magic number(s): None
File extension(s): .sig
Macintosh file type code(s):
Person & email address to contact for further information:
Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
Intended usage: COMMON
Restrictions on usage: None
Author: Job Snijders <job@fastly.com>
Change controller: IETF
Upon publication of this document, IANA is requested to move this
registration to the "Media Types" registry and to reference the RFC
publication instead of this draft.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[POSIX] IEEE and The Open Group, "The Open Group's Base
Specifications, Issue 7", 2016,
<https://publications.opengroup.org/standards/unix/c165>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
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[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70,
RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[RFC7935] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for
Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935,
August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC9286] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 9286, DOI 10.17487/RFC9286, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9286>.
11.2. Informative References
[FORT] LACNIC and NIC.MX, "FORT", May 2021,
<https://github.com/NICMx/FORT-validator>.
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta]
Michaelson, G. G., Huston, G., Harrison, T., Bruijnzeels,
T., and M. Hoffmann, "A profile for Resource Tagged
Attestations (RTAs)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-rta-00, 21 January 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-
rta-00.txt>.
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[IANA.ADDRESS-FAMILY-NUMBERS]
IANA, "Address Family Numbers", 19 October 2021,
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers>.
[prover] Puzanov, M., "rpki-prover", September 2022,
<https://github.com/lolepezy/rpki-prover/pull/126/files>.
[RFC1952] Deutsch, P., "GZIP file format specification version 4.3",
RFC 1952, DOI 10.17487/RFC1952, May 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1952>.
[RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules
for the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public
Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6268>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC9255] Bush, R. and R. Housley, "The 'I' in RPKI Does Not Stand
for Identity", RFC 9255, DOI 10.17487/RFC9255, June 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9255>.
[rpki-rsc-demo]
Harrison, T., "A proof-of-concept for constructing and
validating RPKI Signed Checklists (RSCs).", February 2021,
<https://github.com/APNIC-net/rpki-rsc-demo>.
[rpkimancer]
Maddison, B., "rpkimancer", May 2021,
<https://github.com/benmaddison/rpkimancer>.
[signify] Unangst, T. and M. Espie, "signify - cryptographically
sign and verify files", May 2014,
<https://man.openbsd.org/signify>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The authors wish to thank George Michaelson, Geoff Huston, Randy
Bush, Stephen Kent, Matt Lepinski, Rob Austein, Ted Unangst, and Marc
Espie for prior art. The authors thank Russ Housley for reviewing
the ASN.1 notation and providing suggestions. The authors would like
to thank Nimrod Levy, Tim Bruijnzeels, Alberto Leiva, Ties de Kock,
Peter Peele, Claudio Jeker, Theo Buehler, Donald Eastlake, Erik
Kline, Robert Wilton, Roman Danyliw, Éric Vyncke, Lars Eggert,
Paul Wouters, and Murray S. Kucherawy for document review and
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suggestions.
Appendix B. Document changelog
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
B.1. changes from -10 -> -11
* Incorporate feedback from Robert Wilton.
* Incorporate feedback from Roman Danyliw.
* Incorporate feedback from Éric Vyncke.
* Add Mikhail Puzanov's implementation.
* Incorporate feedback from Lars Eggert's review.
* Incorporate feedback from Paul Wouters.
* Incorporate feedback from Murray S. Kucherawy.
B.2. changes from -09 -> -10
* Incorporate SECDIR feedback.
B.3. changes from -08 -> -09
* Updated manifests refs to RFC9286
* Added normative ref to RFC6268 (CMS)
* Cleaned up ASN.1 formatting
* Updated ASN.1 module OID following early allocation
* Updated draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-has-no-identity to RFC9255
* Clean up IANA considerations
B.4. changes from -07 -> -08
* Theo requested explanation as to why fileName is OPTIONAL
* Russ & Randy requested implementor guidance when RFC3779-generated
data fails to decode
* Added uniqueness constraints for fileName and hash contents
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* Improved validation and verification procedure description
* Incorporated character-set constraints for fileName in ASN.1
module
B.5. changes from -06 -> -07
* Change wire format to allow use of commonly deployed libcrypto
APIs.
B.6. changes from -05 -> -06
* Non-content-related updates.
B.7. changes from -04 -> -05
* Ties contributed clarifications.
B.8. changes from -03 -> -04
* Alberto pointed out the asID validation also needs to be
documented.
B.9. changes from -02 -> -03
* Reference the IANA assigned OID
* Clarify validation rules
B.10. changes from -01 -> -02
* Clarify RSC is part of a puzzle, not panacea. Thanks Randy &
Russ.
B.11. changes from -00 -> -01
* Readability improvements
* Update document category to match the registry allocation policy
requirement.
B.12. individual submission phase
* On-the-wire change: the 'Filename' switched from 'required' to
'optional'. Some SIDROPS Working Group participants proposed a
checksum itself is the most minimal information required to
address digital objects.
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Authors' Addresses
Job Snijders
Fastly
Amsterdam
Netherlands
Email: job@fastly.com
Tom Harrison
Asia Pacific Network Information Centre
6 Cordelia St
South Brisbane QLD 4101
Australia
Email: tomh@apnic.net
Ben Maddison
Workonline Communications
Cape Town
South Africa
Email: benm@workonline.africa
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