Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-tree-validation
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-tree-validation
SIDR Operations O. Muravskiy
Internet-Draft RIPE NCC
Intended status: Informational T. Bruijnzeels
Expires: March 20, 2019 NLNetLabs
September 16, 2018
RPKI Certificate Tree Validation by the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator
draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-tree-validation-03
Abstract
This document describes the approach to validate the content of the
RPKI certificate tree, as it is implemented in the RIPE NCC RPKI
Validator. This approach is independent of a particular object
retrieval mechanism. This allows it to be used with repositories
available over the rsync protocol, the RPKI Repository Delta
Protocol, and repositories that use a mix of both.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 20, 2019.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Scope of this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Hash comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Discovery of RPKI objects issued by a CA . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Manifest entries versus repository content . . . . . . . 4
4. Top-down Validation of a Single Trust Anchor Certificate Tree 5
4.1. Fetching the Trust Anchor Certificate Using the Trust
Anchor Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. CA Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.1. Finding the most recent valid manifest and CRL . . . 7
4.2.2. Manifest entries validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Object Store Cleanup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Remote Objects Fetcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Fetcher Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.1. Fetch repository objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.1.2. Fetch single repository object . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Local Object Store . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1. Store Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.1. Store Repository Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.2. Get objects by hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.3. Get certificate objects by URI . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.4. Get manifest objects by AKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6.1.5. Delete objects for a URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.6. Delete outdated objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.1.7. Update object's validation time . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. Hash collisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2. Algorithm agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.3. Mismatch between the expected and the actual location of
an object in the repository . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9.4. Manifest content versus publication point content . . . . 13
9.5. Possible denial of service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Scope of this document
This document describes how the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator version 2.23
has been implemented. Source code to this software can be found at
[github]. The purpose of this document is to provide transparency to
users of (and contributors to) this software tool, as well as serve
to be subjected to scrutiny by the SIDR Operations Working Group. It
is not intended as a document that describes a standard or best
practices on how validation should be done in general.
2. Introduction
In order to use information published in RPKI repositories, Relying
Parties (RP) need to retrieve and validate the content of
certificates, certificate revocation lists (CRLs), and other RPKI
signed objects. To validate a particular object, one must ensure
that all certificates in the certificate chain up to the Trust Anchor
(TA) are valid. Therefore the validation of a certificate tree is
performed top-down, starting from the TA certificate and descending
down the certificate chain, validating every encountered certificate
and its products. The result of this process is a list of all
encountered RPKI objects with a validity status attached to each of
them. These results may later be used by a Relying Party in taking
routing decisions, etc.
Traditionally RPKI data is made available to RPs through the
repositories [RFC6481] accessible over [rsync] protocol. Relying
parties are advised to keep a local copy of repository data, and
perform regular updates of this copy from the repository (Section 5
of [RFC6481]). The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol [RFC8182]
introduces another method to fetch repository data and keep the local
copy up to date with the repository.
This document describes how the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator discovers
RPKI objects to download, builds certificate paths, and validates
RPKI objects, independently from what repository access protocol is
used. To achieve this, it puts downloaded RPKI objects in an object
store, where each RPKI object can be found by its URI, the hash of
its content, value of its Authority Key Identifier (AKI) extension,
or a combination of these. It also keeps track of the download and
the validation time for every object, to decide which locally stored
objects are not used in the RPKI tree validation and could be
removed.
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3. General Considerations
3.1. Hash comparisons
This algorithm relies on the collision resistance properties of the
file hash algorithm (defined in [RFC7935]) to compute the hash of
repository objects. It assumes that any two objects for which the
hash value is the same, are identical.
The hash comparison is used when matching objects in the repository
with entries on the manifest (Section 4.2.2), and when looking up
objects in the object store (Section 6).
3.2. Discovery of RPKI objects issued by a CA
There are several possible ways of discovering potential products of
a CA certificate: one could use all objects located in a repository
directory designated as a publication point for a CA, or only objects
mentioned on the manifest located at that publication point (see
Section 6 of[RFC6486]), or use all known repository objects whose AKI
extension matches the Subject Key Identifier (SKI) extension
(Section 4.2.1 of[RFC5280]) of a CA certificate.
For publication points whose content is consistent with the manifest
and issuing certificate all of these approaches should produce the
same result. For inconsistent publication points the results might
be different. Section 6 of [RFC6486] leaves the decision on how to
deal with inconsistencies to a local policy.
The implementation described here does not rely on content of
repository directories, but uses the Authority Key Identifier (AKI)
extension of a manifest and a certificate revocation list (CRL) to
find in an object store (Section 6) a manifest and a CRL issued by a
particular Certification Authority (CA) (see Section 4.2.1). It
further uses the hashes of manifest's fileList entries (Section 4.2.1
of [RFC6486]) to find other objects issued by the CA, as described in
Section 4.2.2.
3.3. Manifest entries versus repository content
Since the current set of RPKI standards requires use of the manifest
[RFC6486] to describe the content of a publication point, this
implementation requires strict consistency between the publication
point content and manifest content. (This is a more stringent
requirement than established in [RFC6486].) Therefore it will not
process objects that are found in the publication point but do not
match any of the entries of that publication point's manifest (see
Section 4.2.2). It will also issue warnings for all found
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mismatches, so that the responsible operators could be made aware of
inconsistencies and fix them.
4. Top-down Validation of a Single Trust Anchor Certificate Tree
1. The validation of a Trust Anchor (TA) certificate tree starts
from its TA certificate. To retrieve the TA certificate, a Trust
Anchor Locator (TAL) object is used, as described in Section 4.1.
2. If the TA certificate is retrieved, it is validated according to
Section 7 of [RFC6487] and Section 2.2 of [RFC7730]. Otherwise
the validation of certificate tree is aborted and an error is
issued.
3. If the TA certificate is valid, then all its subordinate objects
are validated as described in Section 4.2. Otherwise the
validation of certificate tree is aborted and an error is issued.
4. For each repository object that was validated during this
validation run, its validation timestamp is updated in the object
store (see Section 6.1.7).
5. Outdated objects are removed from the store as described in
Section 4.3. This completes the validation of the TA certificate
tree.
4.1. Fetching the Trust Anchor Certificate Using the Trust Anchor
Locator
The following steps are performed in order to fetch a Trust Anchor
Certificate:
1. (Optional) If the Trust Anchor Locator contains a "prefetch.uris"
field, pass the URIs contained in that field to the fetcher (see
Section 5.1.1). (This field is a non-standard addition to the
TAL format. It helps fetching non-hierarchical rsync
repositories more efficiently.)
2. Extract the first TA certificate URI from the TAL's URI section
(see Section 2.1 of [RFC7730]) and pass it to the object fetcher
(Section 5.1.2). If the fetcher returns an error, repeat this
step for every URI in the URI section, until no error is
encountered, or no more URIs left.
3. Retrieve from the object store (see Section 6.1.3) all
certificate objects, for which the URI matches the URI extracted
from the TAL in the previous step, and the public key matches the
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subjectPublicKeyInfo extension of the TAL (see Section 2.1 of
[RFC7730]).
4. If no, or more than one such objects are found, issue an error
and abort certificate tree validation process with an error.
Otherwise, use the single found object as the Trust Anchor
certificate.
4.2. CA Certificate Validation
The following steps describe the validation of a single CA Resource
certificate:
1. If both the caRepository (Section 4.8.8.1 of [RFC6487]), and the
id-ad-rpkiNotify (Section 3.2 of [RFC8182]) SubjectInfoAccess
(SIA) pointers are present in the CA certificate, use a local
policy to determine which pointer to use. Extract the URI from
the selected pointer and pass it to the object fetcher (that will
then fetch all objects available from that repository, see
Section 5.1.1).
2. For the CA certificate, find the current manifest and certificate
revocation list (CRL), using the procedure described in
Section 4.2.1. If no such manifest and CRL could be found, stop
validation of this certificate, consider it invalid, and issue an
error.
3. Compare the URI found in the id-ad-rpkiManifest field
(Section 4.8.8.1 of [RFC6487]) of the SIA extension of the
certificate with the URI of the manifest found in the previous
step. If they are different, issue a warning, but continue
validation process using the manifest found in the previous step.
(This warning indicates that there is a mismatch between the
expected and the actual location of an object in a repository.
See Section 9 for the explanation of this mismatch and the
decision taken.)
4. Perform manifest entries discovery and validation as described in
Section 4.2.2.
5. Validate all resource certificate objects found on the manifest,
using the CRL object found on the manifest:
* if the strict validation option is enabled by the operator,
the validation is performed according to Section 7 of
[RFC6487],
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* otherwise, the validation is performed according to Section 7
of [RFC6487], with the exception of the resource certification
path validation, that is performed according to
Section 4.2.4.4 of [RFC8360].
(Note that this implementation uses the operator configuration to
decide which algorithm to use for path validation. It applies
the selected algorithm to all resource certificates, rather than
applying appropriate algorithm per resource certificate, based on
the object identifier (OID) for the Certificate Policy found in
that certificate, as specified in [RFC8360].)
6. Validate all Route Origin Authorization (ROA) objects found on
the manifest, using the CRL object found on the manifest,
according to Section 4 of [RFC6482].
7. Validate all Ghostbusters Record objects found on the manifest,
using the CRL object found on the manifest, according to
Section 7 of [RFC6493].
8. For every valid CA certificate object found on the manifest,
apply the procedure described in this section (Section 4.2),
recursively, provided that this CA certificate (identified by its
SKI) has not yet been validated during current tree validation
run.
4.2.1. Finding the most recent valid manifest and CRL
1. Fetch from the store (see Section 6.1.4) all objects of type
manifest, whose certificate's AKI extension matches the SKI of
the current CA certificate. If no such objects are found, stop
processing the current CA certificate and issue an error.
2. Find among found objects the manifest object with the highest
manifestNumber field (Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6486]), for which all
following conditions are met:
* There is only one entry in the manifest for which the store
contains exactly one object of type CRL, the hash of which
matches the hash of the entry.
* The manifest's certificate AKI equals the above CRL's AKI.
* The above CRL is a valid object according to Section 6.3 of
[RFC5280].
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* The manifest is a valid object according to Section 4.4 of
[RFC6486], and its EE certificates is not in the CRL found
above.
3. If there is an object that matches above criteria, consider this
object to be the valid manifest, and the CRL found at the
previous step - the valid CRL for the current CA certificate's
publication point.
4. Report an error for every other manifest with a number higher
than the number of the valid manifest.
4.2.2. Manifest entries validation
For every entry in the manifest object:
1. Construct an entry's URI by appending the entry name to the
current CA's publication point URI.
2. Get all objects from the store whose hash attribute equals
entry's hash (see Section 6.1.2).
3. If no such objects are found, issue an error for this manifest
entry and progress to the next entry. This case indicates that
the repository does not have an object at the location listed in
the manifest, or that the object's hash does not match the hash
listed in the manifest.
4. For every found object, compare its URI with the URI of the
manifest entry.
* For every object with a non-matching URI issue a warning.
This case indicates that the object from the manifest entry is
(also) found at a different location in a (possibly different)
repository.
* If no objects with a matching URI are found, issue a warning.
This case indicates that there is no object found in the
repository at the location listed in the manifest entry (but
there is at least one matching object found at a different
location).
5. Use all found objects for further validation as per Section 4.2.
Please note that the above steps will not reject objects whose hash
matches the hash listed in the manifest, but the URI does not. See
Section 9.3 for additional information.
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4.3. Object Store Cleanup
At the end of every TA tree validation some objects are removed from
the store using the following rules:
1. Given all objects that were encountered during the current
validation run, remove from the store (Section 6.1.6) all objects
whose URI attribute matches the URI of one of the encountered
objects, but the content's hash is different. This removes from
the store objects that were replaced in the repository by their
newer versions with the same URIs.
2. Remove from the store all objects that were last encountered
during validation a long time ago (as specified by the local
policy). This removes objects that do not appear on any valid
manifest anymore (but possibly are still published in a
repository).
3. Remove from the store all objects that were downloaded recently
(as specified by the local policy), but have never been used in
the validation process. This removes objects that have never
appeared on any valid manifest.
Shortening the time interval used in step 2 will free more disk space
used by the store, at the expense of downloading removed objects
again if they are still published in the repository.
Extending the time interval used in step 3 will prevent repeated
downloads of repository objects, with the risk that such objects, if
created massively by mistake or by an adversary, will fill up local
disk space, if they are not cleaned up promptly.
5. Remote Objects Fetcher
The fetcher is responsible for downloading objects from remote
repositories (described in Section 3 of [RFC6481]) using rsync
protocol ([rsync]), or RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)
([RFC8182]).
5.1. Fetcher Operations
For every visited URI the fetcher keeps track of the last time a
successful fetch occurred.
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5.1.1. Fetch repository objects
This operation receives one parameter - a URI. For an rsync
repository this URI points to a directory. For an RRDP repository it
points to the repository's notification file.
The fetcher performs following steps:
1. If data associated with the URI has been downloaded recently (as
specified by the local policy), skip following steps.
2. Download remote objects using the URI provided (for an rsync
repository use recursive mode). If the URI contains schema
"https" and download has failed, issue a warning, replace "https"
schema in the URI by "http", and try to download objects again,
using the resulting URI.
3. If remote objects can not be downloaded, issue an error and skip
following steps.
4. Perform syntactic verification of fetched objects. The type of
every object (certificate, manifest, CRL, ROA, or Ghostbusters
record), is determined based on the object's filename extension
(.cer, .mft, .crl, .roa, and .gbr, respectively). The syntax of
the object is described in Section 4 of [RFC6487] for resource
certificates, step 1 of Section 3 of [RFC6488] for signed
objects, and specifically, Section 4 of [RFC6486] for manifests,
[RFC5280] for CRLs, Section 3 of [RFC6482] for ROAs, and
Section 5 of [RFC6493] for Ghostbusters records.
5. Put every downloaded and syntactically correct object in the
object store (Section 6.1.1).
The time interval used in the step 1 should be chosen based on the
acceptable delay in receiving repository updates.
5.1.2. Fetch single repository object
This operation receives one parameter - a URI that points to an
object in a repository.
The fetcher performs following operations:
1. Download remote object using the URI provided. If the URI
contains "https" schema and download failed, issue a warning,
replace "https" schema in the URI by "http", and try to download
the object using the resulting URI.
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2. If the remote object can not be downloaded, issue an error and
skip following steps.
3. Perform syntactic verification of fetched object. The type of
object (certificate, manifest, CRL, ROA, or Ghostbusters record),
is determined based on the object's filename extension (.cer,
.mft, .crl, .roa, and .gbr, respectively). The syntax of the
object is described in Section 4 of [RFC6487] for resource
certificates, step 1 of Section 3 of [RFC6488] for signed
objects, and specifically, Section 4 of [RFC6486] for manifests,
[RFC5280] for CRLs, Section 3 of [RFC6482] for ROAs, and
Section 5 of [RFC6493] for Ghostbusters records.
4. If the downloaded object is not syntactically correct, issue an
error and skip further steps.
5. Delete all objects from the object store (Section 6.1.5) whose
URI matches the URI given.
6. Put the downloaded object in the object store (Section 6.1.1).
6. Local Object Store
6.1. Store Operations
6.1.1. Store Repository Object
Put given object in the store, along with its type, URI, hash, and
AKI, if there is no record with the same hash and URI fields. Note
that in the (unlikely) event of hash collision the given object will
not replace the object in the store.
6.1.2. Get objects by hash
Retrieve all objects from the store whose hash attribute matches the
given hash.
6.1.3. Get certificate objects by URI
Retrieve from the store all objects of type certificate, whose URI
attribute matches the given URI.
6.1.4. Get manifest objects by AKI
Retrieve from the store all objects of type manifest, whose AKI
attribute matches the given AKI.
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6.1.5. Delete objects for a URI
For a given URI, delete all objects in the store with matching URI
attribute.
6.1.6. Delete outdated objects
For a given URI and a list of hashes, delete all objects in the store
with matching URI, whose hash attribute is not in the given list of
hashes.
6.1.7. Update object's validation time
For all objects in the store whose hash attribute matches the given
hash, set the last validation time attribute to the given timestamp.
7. Acknowledgements
This document describes the algorithm as it is implemented by the
software development team at the RIPE NCC, which included over time:
Mikhail Puzanov, Erik Rozendaal, Miklos Juhasz, Misja Alma, Thiago da
Cruz Pereira, Yannis Gonianakis, Andrew Snare, Varesh Tapadia, Paolo
Milani, Thies Edeling, Hans Westerbeek, Rudi Angela, and Constantijn
Visinescu. The authors would also like to acknowledge contributions
by Carlos Martinez, Andy Newton, Rob Austein, and Stephen Kent.
8. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
9. Security Considerations
9.1. Hash collisions
This implementation will not detect possible hash collisions in the
hashes of repository objects (calculated using the file hash
algorithm specified in [RFC7935]). It considers objects with same
hash values as identical.
9.2. Algorithm agility
This implementation only supports hash algorithms and key sizes
specified in [RFC7935]). Algorithm agility described in [RFC6916] is
not supported.
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9.3. Mismatch between the expected and the actual location of an object
in the repository
According to Section 2 of [RFC6481], all objects issued by a
particular CA certificate are expected to be located in one
repository publication point, specified in the SIA extension of that
CA certificate. The manifest object issued by that CA certificate
enumerates all other issued objects, listing their file names and
content hashes.
However, it is possible that an object whose content hash matches the
hash listed in the manifest, has either a different file name, or is
located at a different publication point in a repository.
On the other hand, all RPKI objects, either explicitly or within
their embedded EE certificate, have an Authority Key Identifier
extension that contains the key identifier of their issuing CA
certificate. Therefore it is always possible to perform an RPKI
validation of the object whose expected location does not match its
actual location, provided that the certificate that matches the AKI
of the object in question is known to the system that performs
validation.
In case of a mismatch described above this implementation will not
exclude an object from further validation merely because its actual
location or file name does not match the expected location or file
name. This decision was chosen because the actual location of a file
in a repository is taken from the repository retrieval mechanism,
which, in case of an rsync repository, does not provide any
cryptographic security, and in case of an RRDP repository, provides
only a transport layer security, with the fallback to unsecured
transport. On the other hand, the manifest is an RPKI signed object,
and its content could be verified in the context of the RPKI
validation.
9.4. Manifest content versus publication point content
This algorithm uses the content of a manifest object to determine
other objects issued by a CA certificate. It verifies that the
manifest is located in the publication point designated in the CA
Certificate's SIA extension. However, if there are other (not listed
in the manifest) objects located in the same publication point
directory, they are ignored, even if they might be valid and issued
by the same CA as the manifest. (This RP behavior is allowed, but
not required, by [RFC6486].)
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9.5. Possible denial of service
The store cleanup procedure described in Section 4.3 tries to
minimise removal and subsequent re-fetch of objects that are
published in a repository, but not used in the validation. Once such
objects are removed from the remote repository, they will be
discarded from the local object store after a period of time
specified by a local policy. By generating an excessive amount of
syntactically valid RPKI objects, a man-in-the-middle attack between
a validating tool and a repository could force an implementation to
fetch and store those objects in the object store (see Section 5.1.1)
before they are validated and discarded, leading to an out-of-memory
or out-of-disk-space conditions, and, subsequently, a denial of
service.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
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[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, DOI 10.17487/RFC6493,
February 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6493>.
[RFC6916] Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.
[RFC7730] Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent,
"Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor
Locator", RFC 7730, DOI 10.17487/RFC7730, January 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7730>.
[RFC7935] Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for
Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public
Key Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935,
August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.
[RFC8182] Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., and R. Austein,
"The RPKI Repository Delta Protocol (RRDP)", RFC 8182,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8182, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8182>.
[RFC8360] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., Martinez, C., Bruijnzeels, T.,
Newton, A., and D. Shaw, "Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) Validation Reconsidered", RFC 8360,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8360, April 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8360>.
10.2. Informative References
[github] "RIPE NCC RPKI Validator on GitHub",
<https://github.com/RIPE-NCC/rpki-validator>.
[rsync] "Rsync home page", <https://rsync.samba.org>.
Authors' Addresses
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Oleg Muravskiy
RIPE NCC
Email: oleg@ripe.net
URI: https://www.ripe.net/
Tim Bruijnzeels
NLNetLabs
Email: tim@nlnetlabs.nl
URI: https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/
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