Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-sipcore-sip-websocket
draft-ietf-sipcore-sip-websocket
SIPCORE Working Group I. Baz Castillo
Internet-Draft J. Millan Villegas
Intended status: Standards Track Versatica
Expires: June 2, 2014 V. Pascual
Quobis
November 29, 2013
The WebSocket Protocol as a Transport for the Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP)
draft-ietf-sipcore-sip-websocket-10
Abstract
The WebSocket protocol enables two-way realtime communication between
clients and servers in web-based applications. This document
specifies a WebSocket sub-protocol as a reliable transport mechanism
between SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) entities to enable usage of
SIP in web-oriented deployments.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 2, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The WebSocket Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. The WebSocket SIP Sub-Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Handshake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. SIP Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. SIP WebSocket Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Via Transport Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. SIP URI Transport Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.3. Via received Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.4. SIP Transport Implementation Requirements . . . . . . . . 7
5.5. Locating a SIP Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Connection Keep-Alive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1. Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. INVITE Dialog through a Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.1. Secure WebSocket Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. Usage of SIPS Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.1. Registration of the WebSocket SIP Sub-Protocol . . . . . . 16
10.2. Registration of new NAPTR Service Field Values . . . . . . 16
10.3. SIP/SIPS URI Parameters Sub-Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.4. Header Fields Sub-Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.5. Header Field Parameters and Parameter Values
Sub-Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.6. SIP Transport Sub-Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Authentication Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.1. Just SIP Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.2. Just Web Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.3. Cookie Based Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix B. Implementation Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
B.1. SIP WebSocket Client Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B.2. SIP WebSocket Server Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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1. Introduction
The WebSocket [RFC6455] protocol enables message exchange between
clients and servers on top of a persistent TCP connection (optionally
secured with TLS [RFC5246]). The initial protocol handshake makes
use of HTTP [RFC2616] semantics, allowing the WebSocket protocol to
reuse existing HTTP infrastructure.
Modern web browsers include a WebSocket client stack complying with
the WebSocket API [WS-API] as specified by the W3C. It is expected
that other client applications (those running in personal computers
and devices such as smartphones) will also make a WebSocket client
stack available. The specification in this document enables usage of
SIP in these scenarios.
This specification defines a WebSocket sub-protocol (as defined in
section 1.9 in [RFC6455]) for transporting SIP messages between a
WebSocket client and server, a reliable and message-boundary
preserving transport for SIP, DNS NAPTR [RFC3403] service values and
procedures for SIP entities implementing the WebSocket transport.
Media transport is out of the scope of this document.
Section 3 in this specification relaxes the requirement in [RFC3261]
by which the SIP server transport MUST add a "received" parameter in
the top Via header in certain circumstances.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2.1. Definitions
SIP WebSocket Client: A SIP entity capable of opening outbound
connections to WebSocket servers and communicating using the
WebSocket SIP sub-protocol as defined by this document.
SIP WebSocket Server: A SIP entity capable of listening for inbound
connections from WebSocket clients and communicating using the
WebSocket SIP sub-protocol as defined by this document.
3. The WebSocket Protocol
The WebSocket protocol [RFC6455] is a transport layer on top of TCP
(optionally secured with TLS [RFC5246]) in which both client and
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server exchange message units in both directions. The protocol
defines a connection handshake, WebSocket sub-protocol and extensions
negotiation, a frame format for sending application and control data,
a masking mechanism, and status codes for indicating disconnection
causes.
The WebSocket connection handshake is based on HTTP [RFC2616] and
utilizes the HTTP GET method with an "Upgrade" request. This is sent
by the client and then answered by the server (if the negotiation
succeeded) with an HTTP 101 status code. Once the handshake is
completed the connection upgrades from HTTP to the WebSocket
protocol. This handshake procedure is designed to reuse the existing
HTTP infrastructure. During the connection handshake, client and
server agree on the application protocol to use on top of the
WebSocket transport. Such application protocol (also known as a
"WebSocket sub-protocol") defines the format and semantics of the
messages exchanged by the endpoints. This could be a custom protocol
or a standardized one (as the WebSocket SIP sub-protocol defined in
this document). Once the HTTP 101 response is processed both client
and server reuse the underlying TCP connection for sending WebSocket
messages and control frames to each other. Unlike plain HTTP, this
connection is persistent and can be used for multiple message
exchanges.
WebSocket defines message units to be used by applications for the
exchange of data, so it provides a message boundary-preserving
transport layer. These message units can contain either UTF-8 text
or binary data, and can be split into multiple WebSocket text/binary
transport frames as needed by the WebSocket stack.
The WebSocket API [WS-API] for web browsers only defines callbacks
to be invoked upon receipt of an entire message unit, regardless
of whether it was received in a single Websocket frame or split
across multiple frames.
4. The WebSocket SIP Sub-Protocol
The term WebSocket sub-protocol refers to an application-level
protocol layered on top of a WebSocket connection. This document
specifies the WebSocket SIP sub-protocol for carrying SIP requests
and responses through a WebSocket connection.
4.1. Handshake
The SIP WebSocket Client and SIP WebSocket Server negotiate usage of
the WebSocket SIP sub-protocol during the WebSocket handshake
procedure as defined in section 1.3 of [RFC6455]. The Client MUST
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include the value "sip" in the Sec-WebSocket-Protocol header in its
handshake request. The 101 reply from the Server MUST contain "sip"
in its corresponding Sec-WebSocket-Protocol header.
The WebSocket Client initiates a WebSocket connection when
attempting to send a SIP request (unless there is an already
established WebSocket connection for sending the SIP request). In
case there is no HTTP 101 response during the WebSocket handshake
it is considered a transaction error as per [RFC3261] section
8.1.3.1 "Transaction Layer Errors".
Below is an example of a WebSocket handshake in which the Client
requests the WebSocket SIP sub-protocol support from the Server:
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: sip-ws.example.com
Upgrade: websocket
Connection: Upgrade
Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==
Origin: http://www.example.com
Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: sip
Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13
The handshake response from the Server accepting the WebSocket SIP
sub-protocol would look as follows:
HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols
Upgrade: websocket
Connection: Upgrade
Sec-WebSocket-Accept: s3pPLMBiTxaQ9kYGzzhZRbK+xOo=
Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: sip
Once the negotiation has been completed, the WebSocket connection is
established and can be used for the transport of SIP requests and
responses. Messages other than SIP requests and responses MUST NOT
be transmitted over this connection.
4.2. SIP Encoding
WebSocket messages can be transported in either UTF-8 text frames or
binary frames. SIP [RFC3261] allows both text and binary bodies in
SIP requests and responses. Therefore SIP WebSocket Clients and SIP
WebSocket Servers MUST accept both text and binary frames.
If there is at least one non-UTF-8 symbol in the whole SIP message
(including headers and body) then the whole message MUST be sent
within a WebSocket binary message. Given the nature of JavaScript
and the WebSocket API it is RECOMMENDED to use UTF-8 encoding (or
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ASCII which is a subset of UTF-8) for SIP messages carried over a
WebSocket connection.
5. SIP WebSocket Transport
WebSocket [RFC6455] is a reliable protocol and therefore the SIP
WebSocket sub-protocol defined by this document is a reliable SIP
transport. Thus, client and server transactions using WebSocket for
transport MUST follow the procedures and timer values for reliable
transports as defined in [RFC3261].
Each SIP message MUST be carried within a single WebSocket message,
and a WebSocket message MUST NOT contain more than one SIP message.
Because the WebSocket transport preserves message boundaries, the use
of the Content-Length header in SIP messages is not necessary when
they are transported using the WebSocket sub-protocol.
This simplifies parsing of SIP messages for both clients and
servers. There is no need to establish message boundaries using
Content-Length headers between messages. Other SIP transports,
such as UDP and SCTP [RFC4168] also provide this benefit.
5.1. Via Transport Parameter
Via header fields in SIP messages carry a transport protocol
identifier. This document defines the value "WS" to be used for
requests over plain WebSocket connections and "WSS" for requests over
secure WebSocket connections (in which the WebSocket connection is
established using TLS [RFC5246] with TCP transport).
The updated augmented BNF (Backus-Naur Form) [RFC5234] for this
parameter is the following (the original BNF for this parameter can
be found in [RFC3261], which was then updated by [RFC4168]):
transport =/ "WS" / "WSS"
5.2. SIP URI Transport Parameter
This document defines the value "ws" as the transport parameter value
for a SIP URI [RFC3986] to be contacted using the SIP WebSocket sub-
protocol as transport.
The updated augmented BNF (Backus-Naur Form) for this parameter is
the following (the original BNF for this parameter can be found in
[RFC3261]):
transport-param =/ "transport=" "ws"
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5.3. Via received Parameter
[RFC3261] section 18.2.1 "Receiving Requests" states the following:
When the server transport receives a request over any transport,
it MUST examine the value of the "sent-by" parameter in the top
Via header field value. If the host portion of the "sent-by"
field contains a domain name, or if it contains an IP address that
differs from the packet source address, the server MUST add a
"received" parameter to that Via header field value. This
parameter MUST contain the source address from which the packet
was received.
The requirement of adding the "received" parameter does not fit well
into the WebSocket protocol design. The WebSocket connection
handshake reuses existing HTTP infrastructure in which there could be
an unknown number of HTTP proxies and/or TCP load balancers between
the SIP WebSocket Client and Server, so the source address the server
would write into the Via "received" parameter would be the address of
the HTTP/TCP intermediary in front of it. This could reveal
sensitive information about the internal topology of the Server's
network to the Client.
Given the fact that SIP responses can only be sent over the existing
WebSocket connection, the Via "received" parameter is of little use.
Therefore, in order to allow hiding possible sensitive information
about the SIP WebSocket Server's network, this document updates
[RFC3261] section 18.2.1 by stating:
When a SIP WebSocket Server receives a request it MAY decide not
to add a "received" parameter to the top Via header. Therefore
SIP WebSocket Clients MUST accept responses without such a
parameter in the top Via header regardless of whether the Via
"sent-by" field contains a domain name.
5.4. SIP Transport Implementation Requirements
[RFC3261] section 18 "Transport" states the following:
All SIP elements MUST implement UDP and TCP. SIP elements MAY
implement other protocols.
The specification of this transport enables SIP to be used as a
session establishment protocol in scenarios where none of other
transport protocols defined for SIP can be used. Since some
environments do not enable SIP elements to use UDP and TCP as SIP
transport protocols, a SIP element acting as a SIP WebSocket Client
is not mandated to implement support of UDP and TCP.
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5.5. Locating a SIP Server
[RFC3263] specifies the procedures which should be followed by SIP
entities for locating SIP servers. This specification defines the
NAPTR service value "SIP+D2W" for SIP WebSocket Servers that support
plain WebSocket connections and "SIPS+D2W" for SIP WebSocket Servers
that support secure WebSocket connections.
At the time this document was written, DNS NAPTR/SRV queries could
not be performed by commonly available WebSocket client stacks (in
JavaScript engines and web browsers).
In the absence of DNS SRV resource records or an explicit port, the
default port for a SIP URI using the "sip" scheme and the "ws"
transport parameter is 80, and the default port for a SIP URI using
the "sips" scheme and the "ws" transport parameter is 443.
6. Connection Keep-Alive
SIP WebSocket Clients and Servers may keep their WebSocket
connections open by sending periodic WebSocket "Ping" frames as
described in [RFC6455] section 5.5.2.
The WebSocket API [WS-API] does not provide a mechanism for
applications running in a web browser to control whether or not
periodic WebSocket "Ping" frames are sent to the server. The
implementation of such a keep-alive feature is the decision of
each web browser manufacturer and may also depend on the
configuration of the web browser.
The indication and use of the CRLF NAT keep-alive mechanism defined
for SIP connection-oriented transports in [RFC5626] section 3.5.1 or
[RFC6223] are, of course, usable over the transport defined in this
specification.
7. Authentication
This section describes how authentication is achieved through the
requirements in [RFC6455], [RFC6265], [RFC2617] and [RFC3261].
WebSocket protocol [RFC6455] does not define an authentication
mechanism, instead it exposes the following text in section 10.5
"WebSocket Client Authentication":
This protocol doesn't prescribe any particular way that servers
can authenticate clients during the WebSocket handshake. The
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WebSocket server can use any client authentication mechanism
available to a generic HTTP server, such as cookies, HTTP
authentication, or TLS authentication.
The following list exposes mandatory to implement and optional
mechanisms for SIP WebSocket Clients and Servers in order to get
interoperability at WebSocket authentication level:
o A SIP WebSocket Client MUST be ready to add a session Cookie when
it runs in a web browser (or behaves like a browser navigating a
website) and has previously retrieved a session Cookie from the
web server whose URL domain matches the domain in the WebSocket
URI. This mechanism is defined by [RFC6265].
o A SIP WebSocket Client MUST be ready to be challenged with HTTP
401 status code by the SIP WebSocket Server when performing the
WebSocket handshake as stated in [RFC2617].
o A SIP WebSocket Client MAY use TLS client authentication (when in
a secure WebSocket connection) as an optional authentication
mechanism.
Note however that TLS client authentication in WebSocket
protocol is governed by the rules of HTTP protocol rather than
the rules of SIP protocol.
o A SIP WebSocket Server MUST be ready to read session Cookies when
present in the WebSocket handshake request, and use such a Cookie
value for determining whether the WebSocket connection has been
initiated by a HTTP client navigating a website in the same domain
(or subdomain) as the SIP WebSocket Server.
o A SIP WebSocket Server SHOULD be able to reject a WebSocket
handshake request with HTTP 401 status code by providing a Basic/
Digest challenge as defined for HTTP protocol.
Regardless of whether the SIP WebSocket Server requires
authentication during the WebSocket handshake or not, authentication
MAY be requested at SIP protocol level.
Some authentication use cases are exposed in Appendix A.
8. Examples
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8.1. Registration
Alice (SIP WSS) proxy.example.com
| |
|HTTP GET (WS handshake) F1 |
|---------------------------->|
|101 Switching Protocols F2 |
|<----------------------------|
| |
|REGISTER F3 |
|---------------------------->|
|200 OK F4 |
|<----------------------------|
| |
Alice loads a web page using her web browser and retrieves JavaScript
code implementing the WebSocket SIP sub-protocol defined in this
document. The JavaScript code (a SIP WebSocket Client) establishes a
secure WebSocket connection with a SIP proxy/registrar (a SIP
WebSocket Server) at proxy.example.com. Upon WebSocket connection,
Alice constructs and sends a SIP REGISTER request including Outbound
and GRUU support. Since the JavaScript stack in a browser has no way
to determine the local address from which the WebSocket connection
was made, this implementation uses a random ".invalid" domain name
for the Via header sent-by parameter and for the hostport of the URI
in the Contact header (see Appendix B.1).
Message details (authentication and SDP bodies are omitted for
simplicity):
F1 HTTP GET (WS handshake) Alice -> proxy.example.com (TLS)
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: proxy.example.com
Upgrade: websocket
Connection: Upgrade
Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==
Origin: https://www.example.com
Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: sip
Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13
F2 101 Switching Protocols proxy.example.com -> Alice (TLS)
HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols
Upgrade: websocket
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Connection: Upgrade
Sec-WebSocket-Accept: s3pPLMBiTxaQ9kYGzzhZRbK+xOo=
Sec-WebSocket-Protocol: sip
F3 REGISTER Alice -> proxy.example.com (transport WSS)
REGISTER sip:proxy.example.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/WSS df7jal23ls0d.invalid;branch=z9hG4bKasudf
From: sip:alice@example.com;tag=65bnmj.34asd
To: sip:alice@example.com
Call-ID: aiuy7k9njasd
CSeq: 1 REGISTER
Max-Forwards: 70
Supported: path, outbound, gruu
Contact: <sip:alice@df7jal23ls0d.invalid;transport=ws>
;reg-id=1
;+sip.instance="<urn:uuid:f81-7dec-14a06cf1>"
F4 200 OK proxy.example.com -> Alice (transport WSS)
SIP/2.0 200 OK
Via: SIP/2.0/WSS df7jal23ls0d.invalid;branch=z9hG4bKasudf
From: sip:alice@example.com;tag=65bnmj.34asd
To: sip:alice@example.com;tag=12isjljn8
Call-ID: aiuy7k9njasd
CSeq: 1 REGISTER
Supported: outbound, gruu
Contact: <sip:alice@df7jal23ls0d.invalid;transport=ws>
;reg-id=1
;+sip.instance="<urn:uuid:f81-7dec-14a06cf1>"
;pub-gruu="sip:alice@example.com;gr=urn:uuid:f81-7dec-14a06cf1"
;temp-gruu="sip:87ash54=3dd.98a@example.com;gr"
;expires=3600
8.2. INVITE Dialog through a Proxy
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Alice (SIP WSS) proxy.example.com (SIP UDP) Bob
| | |
|INVITE F1 | |
|---------------------------->| |
|100 Trying F2 | |
|<----------------------------| |
| |INVITE F3 |
| |---------------------------->|
| |200 OK F4 |
| |<----------------------------|
|200 OK F5 | |
|<----------------------------| |
| | |
|ACK F6 | |
|---------------------------->| |
| |ACK F7 |
| |---------------------------->|
| | |
| Bidirectional RTP Media |
|<=========================================================>|
| | |
| |BYE F8 |
| |<----------------------------|
|BYE F9 | |
|<----------------------------| |
|200 OK F10 | |
|---------------------------->| |
| |200 OK F11 |
| |---------------------------->|
| | |
In the same scenario Alice places a call to Bob's AoR (Address Of
Record). The SIP WebSocket Server at proxy.example.com acts as a SIP
proxy, routing the INVITE to Bob's contact address (which happens to
be using SIP transported over UDP). Bob answers the call and then
terminates it.
Message details (authentication and SDP bodies are omitted for
simplicity):
F1 INVITE Alice -> proxy.example.com (transport WSS)
INVITE sip:bob@example.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/WSS df7jal23ls0d.invalid;branch=z9hG4bK56sdasks
From: sip:alice@example.com;tag=asdyka899
To: sip:bob@example.com
Call-ID: asidkj3ss
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CSeq: 1 INVITE
Max-Forwards: 70
Supported: path, outbound, gruu
Route: <sip:proxy.example.com:443;transport=ws;lr>
Contact: <sip:alice@example.com
;gr=urn:uuid:f81-7dec-14a06cf1;ob>
Content-Type: application/sdp
F2 100 Trying proxy.example.com -> Alice (transport WSS)
SIP/2.0 100 Trying
Via: SIP/2.0/WSS df7jal23ls0d.invalid;branch=z9hG4bK56sdasks
From: sip:alice@example.com;tag=asdyka899
To: sip:bob@example.com
Call-ID: asidkj3ss
CSeq: 1 INVITE
F3 INVITE proxy.example.com -> Bob (transport UDP)
INVITE sip:bob@203.0.113.22:5060 SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP proxy.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKhjhjqw32c
Via: SIP/2.0/WSS df7jal23ls0d.invalid;branch=z9hG4bK56sdasks
Record-Route: <sip:proxy.example.com;transport=udp;lr>,
<sip:h7kjh12s@proxy.example.com:443;transport=ws;lr>
From: sip:alice@example.com;tag=asdyka899
To: sip:bob@example.com
Call-ID: asidkj3ss
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Max-Forwards: 69
Supported: path, outbound, gruu
Contact: <sip:alice@example.com
;gr=urn:uuid:f81-7dec-14a06cf1;ob>
Content-Type: application/sdp
F4 200 OK Bob -> proxy.example.com (transport UDP)
SIP/2.0 200 OK
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP proxy.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKhjhjqw32c
;received=192.0.2.10
Via: SIP/2.0/WSS df7jal23ls0d.invalid;branch=z9hG4bK56sdasks
Record-Route: <sip:proxy.example.com;transport=udp;lr>,
<sip:h7kjh12s@proxy.example.com:443;transport=ws;lr>
From: sip:alice@example.com;tag=asdyka899
To: sip:bob@example.com;tag=bmqkjhsd
Call-ID: asidkj3ss
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CSeq: 1 INVITE
Contact: <sip:bob@203.0.113.22:5060;transport=udp>
Content-Type: application/sdp
F5 200 OK proxy.example.com -> Alice (transport WSS)
SIP/2.0 200 OK
Via: SIP/2.0/WSS df7jal23ls0d.invalid;branch=z9hG4bK56sdasks
Record-Route: <sip:proxy.example.com;transport=udp;lr>,
<sip:h7kjh12s@proxy.example.com:443;transport=ws;lr>
From: sip:alice@example.com;tag=asdyka899
To: sip:bob@example.com;tag=bmqkjhsd
Call-ID: asidkj3ss
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Contact: <sip:bob@203.0.113.22:5060;transport=udp>
Content-Type: application/sdp
F6 ACK Alice -> proxy.example.com (transport WSS)
ACK sip:bob@203.0.113.22:5060;transport=udp SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/WSS df7jal23ls0d.invalid;branch=z9hG4bKhgqqp090
Route: <sip:h7kjh12s@proxy.example.com:443;transport=ws;lr>,
<sip:proxy.example.com;transport=udp;lr>,
From: sip:alice@example.com;tag=asdyka899
To: sip:bob@example.com;tag=bmqkjhsd
Call-ID: asidkj3ss
CSeq: 1 ACK
Max-Forwards: 70
F7 ACK proxy.example.com -> Bob (transport UDP)
ACK sip:bob@203.0.113.22:5060;transport=udp SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP proxy.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKhwpoc80zzx
Via: SIP/2.0/WSS df7jal23ls0d.invalid;branch=z9hG4bKhgqqp090
From: sip:alice@example.com;tag=asdyka899
To: sip:bob@example.com;tag=bmqkjhsd
Call-ID: asidkj3ss
CSeq: 1 ACK
Max-Forwards: 69
F8 BYE Bob -> proxy.example.com (transport UDP)
BYE sip:alice@example.com;gr=urn:uuid:f81-7dec-14a06cf1;ob SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 203.0.113.22;branch=z9hG4bKbiuiansd001
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Route: <sip:proxy.example.com;transport=udp;lr>,
<sip:h7kjh12s@proxy.example.com:443;transport=ws;lr>
From: sip:bob@example.com;tag=bmqkjhsd
To: sip:alice@example.com;tag=asdyka899
Call-ID: asidkj3ss
CSeq: 1201 BYE
Max-Forwards: 70
F9 BYE proxy.example.com -> Alice (transport WSS)
BYE sip:alice@example.com;gr=urn:uuid:f81-7dec-14a06cf1;ob SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/WSS proxy.example.com:443;branch=z9hG4bKmma01m3r5
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 203.0.113.22;branch=z9hG4bKbiuiansd001
From: sip:bob@example.com;tag=bmqkjhsd
To: sip:alice@example.com;tag=asdyka899
Call-ID: asidkj3ss
CSeq: 1201 BYE
Max-Forwards: 69
F10 200 OK Alice -> proxy.example.com (transport WSS)
SIP/2.0 200 OK
Via: SIP/2.0/WSS proxy.example.com:443;branch=z9hG4bKmma01m3r5
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 203.0.113.22;branch=z9hG4bKbiuiansd001
From: sip:bob@example.com;tag=bmqkjhsd
To: sip:alice@example.com;tag=asdyka899
Call-ID: asidkj3ss
CSeq: 1201 BYE
F11 200 OK proxy.example.com -> Bob (transport UDP)
SIP/2.0 200 OK
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 203.0.113.22;branch=z9hG4bKbiuiansd001
From: sip:bob@example.com;tag=bmqkjhsd
To: sip:alice@example.com;tag=asdyka899
Call-ID: asidkj3ss
CSeq: 1201 BYE
9. Security Considerations
9.1. Secure WebSocket Connection
It is RECOMMENDED that the SIP traffic transported over a WebSocket
communication be protected by using a secure WebSocket connection
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(using TLS [RFC5246] over TCP).
When establishing a connection using SIP over secure WebSocket
transport, the client MUST authenticate the server using the server's
certificate according to the WebSocket validation procedure in
[RFC6455].
Server operators should note that this authentication procedure is
different from the procedure for SIP Domain Certificates defined
in [RFC5922]. Certificates that are appropriate for SIP over TLS
over TCP will probably not be appropriate for SIP over secure
WebSocket connections.
9.2. Usage of SIPS Scheme
The SIPS scheme in a SIP URI dictates that the entire request path to
the target be secure. If such a path includes a WebSocket connection
it MUST be a secure WebSocket connection.
10. IANA Considerations
RFC Editor Note: Please set the RFC number assigned for this document
in the sub-sections below and remove this note.
10.1. Registration of the WebSocket SIP Sub-Protocol
This specification requests IANA to register the WebSocket SIP sub-
protocol under the "WebSocket Subprotocol Name" Registry with the
following data:
Subprotocol Identifier: sip
Subprotocol Common Name: WebSocket Transport for SIP (Session
Initiation Protocol)
Subprotocol Definition: TBD: this document
10.2. Registration of new NAPTR Service Field Values
This document defines two new NAPTR service field values (SIP+D2W and
SIPS+D2W) and requests IANA to register these values under the
"Registry for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) NAPTR Resource
Record Services Field". The resulting entries are as follows:
Services Field Protocol Reference
-------------- -------- ---------
SIP+D2W WS TBD: this document
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SIPS+D2W WS TBD: this document
10.3. SIP/SIPS URI Parameters Sub-Registry
This specification requests IANA to add a reference to this document
under the "SIP/SIPS URI Parameters" Sub-Registry within the "Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) Parameters" Registry:
Parameter Name Predefined Values Reference
-------------- ----------------- ---------
transport Yes [RFC3261][TBD: this document]
10.4. Header Fields Sub-Registry
This specification requests IANA to add a reference to this document
under the "Header Fields" Sub-Registry within the "Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) Parameters" Registry:
Header Name compact Reference
----------- ------- ---------
Via v [RFC3261][TBD: this document]
10.5. Header Field Parameters and Parameter Values Sub-Registry
This specification requests IANA to add a reference to this document
under the "Header Field Parameters and Parameter Values" Sub-Registry
within the "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Parameters" Registry:
Predefined
Header Field Parameter Name Values Reference
------------ -------------- ------ ---------
Via received No [RFC3261][TBD: this document]
10.6. SIP Transport Sub-Registry
This document adds a new registry, "SIP Transport", to the "Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) Parameters" Registry. Its format and
initial values are as shown in the following table:
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+------------+------------------------+
| Transport | Reference |
+------------+------------------------+
| UDP | [RFC 3261] |
| TCP | [RFC 3261] |
| TLS | [RFC 3261] |
| SCTP | [RFC 3261], [RFC 4168] |
| TLS-SCTP | [RFC 4168] |
| WS | [TBD: this document] |
| WSS | [TBD: this document] |
+------------+------------------------+
The policy for registration of values in this registry is "Standards
Action", as that term is defined by [RFC5226].
11. Acknowledgements
Special thanks to the following people who participated in
discussions on the SIPCORE and RTCWEB WG mailing lists and
contributed ideas and/or provided detailed reviews (the list is
likely to be incomplete): Hadriel Kaplan, Paul Kyzivat, Robert
Sparks, Adam Roach, Ranjit Avasarala, Xavier Marjou, Nataraju A. B.,
Martin Vopatek, Alexey Melnikov, Alan Johnston, Christer Holmberg,
Salvatore Loreto, Kevin P. Fleming, Suresh Krishnan, Yaron Sheffer,
Richard Barnes, Barry Leiba, Stephen Farrell, Ted Lemon, Benoit
Claise, Pete Resnick, Binod, Saul Ibarra Corretge.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P., Hostetler, J., Lawrence, S.,
Leach, P., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP
Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication",
RFC 2617, June 1999.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
June 2002.
[RFC3263] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP): Locating SIP Servers", RFC 3263,
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June 2002.
[RFC3403] Mealling, M., "Dynamic Delegation Discovery System (DDDS)
Part Three: The Domain Name System (DNS) Database",
RFC 3403, October 2002.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
April 2011.
[RFC6455] Fette, I. and A. Melnikov, "The WebSocket Protocol",
RFC 6455, December 2011.
12.2. Informative References
[RFC2606] Eastlake, D. and A. Panitz, "Reserved Top Level DNS
Names", BCP 32, RFC 2606, June 1999.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC3327] Willis, D. and B. Hoeneisen, "Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP) Extension Header Field for Registering Non-Adjacent
Contacts", RFC 3327, December 2002.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, January 2005.
[RFC4168] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., and G. Camarillo, "The
Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) as a Transport
for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4168,
October 2005.
[RFC5626] Jennings, C., Mahy, R., and F. Audet, "Managing Client-
Initiated Connections in the Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP)", RFC 5626, October 2009.
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[RFC5627] Rosenberg, J., "Obtaining and Using Globally Routable User
Agent URIs (GRUUs) in the Session Initiation Protocol
(SIP)", RFC 5627, October 2009.
[RFC5922] Gurbani, V., Lawrence, S., and A. Jeffrey, "Domain
Certificates in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)",
RFC 5922, June 2010.
[RFC6223] Holmberg, C., "Indication of Support for Keep-Alive",
RFC 6223, April 2011.
[WS-API] W3C and I. Hickson, Ed., "The WebSocket API", April 2013.
Appendix A. Authentication Use Cases
Sections below briefly describe some SIP over WebSocket scenarios in
which authentication take place in different ways.
A.1. Just SIP Authentication
SIP PBX model A implements the SIP WebSocket transport defined by
this specification. Its implementation is 100% website agnostic as
it does not share information with the web server providing the HTML
code to browsers, meaning that the SIP WebSocket Server (here the PBX
model A) has no knowledge about web login activity within the
website.
In this simple scenario, the SIP WebSocket Server does not inspect
fields in the WebSocket handshake HTTP GET request such as the
request URL, the Origin header value, the Host header value or the
Cookie header value (if present). However some of those fields could
be inspected for a minimal validation (i.e. PBX model A could
require that the Origin header value contains a specific URL so just
users navigating such a website would be able to establish a
WebSocket connection with PBX model A).
Once the WebSocket connection has been established, SIP
authentication is requested by PBX model A for each SIP request
coming over that connection. Therefore SIP WebSocket Clients must be
provisioned with their corresponding SIP password.
A.2. Just Web Authentication
A SIP-to-PSTN provider offers telephony service for clients logged
into its website. The provider does not want to expose SIP passwords
into the web for security/privacy reasons.
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Once the user is logged into the web, the web server provides him
with a SIP identity (SIP URI) and a session temporary token string
(along with the SIP WebSocket Client JavaScript application and SIP
settings). The web server stores the SIP identity and session token
into a database.
The web application adds the SIP identity and session token as URL
query parameters in the WebSocket handshake request and attempts the
connection. The SIP WebSocket Server inspects the handshake request
and validates that the session token matches the value stored in the
database for the given SIP identity. In case the value matches, the
WebSocket connection gets "authenticated" for that SIP identity. The
SIP WebSocket Client can then register and make calls. The SIP
WebSocket Server would however verify that the identity in those SIP
requests (i.e. the From URI value) matches the SIP identity the
WebSocket connection is associated to (otherwise the SIP request is
rejected).
When the user performs logout action in the web, the web server
removes the SIP identity and session token tuple from the database
and notifies it to the SIP WebSocket Server which revokes and closes
the WebSocket connection.
No SIP authentication takes place in this scenario.
A.3. Cookie Based Authentication
Apache web server comes with a new module mod_sip_websocket. The web
server is configured to listen in port 80 for both HTTP common
requests and WebSocket handshake requests. Therefore both the web
server and the SIP WebSocket Server are co-located within the same
host and same domain.
Once the user is logged into the web, he is provided with the SIP
WebSocket Client JavaScript application and SIP settings. The HTTP
200 response after the login procedure also contains a session Cookie
[RFC6265]. The web application attempts then a WebSocket connection
against the same URL/domain of the website and thus, the session
Cookie is automatically added by the browser into the WebSocket
handshake request (as the WebSocket protocol [RFC6455] states).
The web server inspects the Cookie value (as it would do for a common
HTTP request containing a session Cookie, so login procedure is not
required again). If the Cookie is valid the WebSocket connection is
authorized and, as in the previous use case, the connection is also
associated with a specific SIP identity which must be satisfied by
every SIP request coming over that connection.
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No SIP authentication takes place in this scenario but just common
Cookie usage as widely deployed in the WWW.
Appendix B. Implementation Guidelines
Let us assume a scenario in which the users access with their web
browsers (probably behind NAT) an application provided by a server on
an intranet, login by entering their user identifier and credentials,
and retrieve a JavaScript application (along with the HTML)
implementing a SIP WebSocket Client.
Such a SIP stack connects to a given SIP WebSocket Server (an
outbound SIP proxy which also implements classic SIP transports such
as UDP and TCP). The HTTP GET method request sent by the web browser
for the WebSocket handshake includes a Cookie [RFC6265] header with
the value previously provided by the server after the successful
login procedure. The Cookie value is then inspected by the WebSocket
server to authorize the connection. Once the WebSocket connection is
established, the SIP WebSocket Client performs a SIP registration to
a SIP registrar server that is reachable through the proxy. After
registration, the SIP WebSocket Client and Server exchange SIP
messages as would normally be expected.
This scenario is quite similar to ones in which SIP UAs behind NATs
connect to a proxy and must reuse the same TCP connection for
incoming requests (because they are not directly reachable by the
proxy otherwise). In both cases, the SIP UAs are only reachable
through the proxy they are connected to.
The SIP Outbound extension [RFC5626] seems an appropriate solution
for this scenario. Therefore these SIP WebSocket Clients and the SIP
registrar implement both the Outbound and Path [RFC3327] extensions,
and the SIP proxy acts as an Outbound Edge Proxy (as defined in
[RFC5626] section 3.4).
SIP WebSocket Clients in this scenario receive incoming SIP requests
via the SIP WebSocket Server they are connected to. Therefore, in
some call transfer cases the usage of GRUU [RFC5627] (which should be
implemented in both the SIP WebSocket Clients and SIP registrar) is
valuable.
If a REFER request is sent to a third SIP user agent including the
Contact URI of a SIP WebSocket Client as the target in its
Refer-To header field, such a URI will be reachable by the third
SIP UA only if it is a globally routable URI. GRUU (Globally
Routable User Agent URI) is a solution for those scenarios, and
would cause the incoming request from the third SIP user agent to
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be sent to the SIP registrar, which would route the request to the
SIP WebSocket Client via the Outbound Edge Proxy.
B.1. SIP WebSocket Client Considerations
The JavaScript stack in web browsers does not have the ability to
discover the local transport address used for originating WebSocket
connections. A SIP WebSocket client running in such an environment
can construct a domain name consisting of a random token followed by
the ".invalid" top-level domain name, as stated in [RFC2606], and
uses it within its Via and Contact headers.
The Contact URI provided by SIP UAs requesting (and receiving)
Outbound support is not used for routing requests to those UAs,
thus it is safe to set a random domain in the Contact URI
hostport.
Both the Outbound and GRUU specifications require a SIP UA to include
a Uniform Resource Name (URN) in a "+sip.instance" parameter of the
Contact header they include their SIP REGISTER requests. The client
device is responsible for generating or collecting a suitable value
for this purpose.
In web browsers it is difficult to generate or collect a suitable
value to be used as a URN value from the browser itself. This
scenario suggests that value is generated according to [RFC5626]
section 4.1 by the web application running in the browser the
first time it loads the JavaScript SIP stack code, and then it is
stored as a Cookie within the browser.
B.2. SIP WebSocket Server Considerations
The SIP WebSocket Server in this scenario behaves as a SIP Outbound
Edge Proxy, which involves support for Outbound [RFC5626] and Path
[RFC3327].
The proxy performs Loose Routing and remains in the path of dialogs
as specified in [RFC3261]. If it did not do this, in-dialog requests
would fail since SIP WebSocket Clients make use of their SIP
WebSocket Server in order to send and receive SIP messages.
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Authors' Addresses
Inaki Baz Castillo
Versatica
Barakaldo, Basque Country
Spain
Email: ibc@aliax.net
Jose Luis Millan Villegas
Versatica
Bilbao, Basque Country
Spain
Email: jmillan@aliax.net
Victor Pascual
Quobis
Spain
Email: victor.pascual@quobis.com
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