Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-tcpm-generalized-ecn
draft-ietf-tcpm-generalized-ecn
Network Working Group M. Bagnulo
Internet-Draft UC3M
Obsoletes: 5562 (if approved) B. Briscoe, Ed.
Intended status: Experimental Independent
Expires: 4 June 2024 2 December 2023
ECN++: Adding Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to TCP Control
Packets
draft-ietf-tcpm-generalized-ecn-15
Abstract
This document specifies an experimental modification to ECN when used
with TCP. It allows the use of ECN in the IP header of the following
TCP packets: SYNs, SYN/ACKs, pure ACKs, Window probes, FINs, RSTs and
retransmissions. This specification obsoletes RFC5562, which
described a different way to use ECN on SYN/ACKs alone.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 4 June 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Experiment Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Document Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Network (e.g. Firewall) Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Sender Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.1. SYN (Send) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.2. SYN-ACK (Send) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.2.3. Pure ACK (Send) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2.4. Window Probe (Send) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.5. FIN (Send) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2.6. RST (Send) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2.7. Retransmissions (Send) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2.8. General Fall-back for any Control Packet or
Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3. Receiver Behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3.1. Receiver Behaviour for Any TCP Control Packet or
Retransmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3.2. SYN (Receive) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3.3. Pure ACK (Receive) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.3.4. FIN (Receive) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3.5. RST (Receive) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.3.6. Retransmissions (Receive) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4. Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.1. The Reliability Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.2. SYNs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2.1. Argument 1a: Unrecognized CE on the SYN . . . . . . . 24
4.2.2. Argument 1b: ECT Considered Invalid on the SYN . . . 25
4.2.3. Caching Strategies for ECT on SYNs . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2.4. Argument 2: DoS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.3. SYN-ACKs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.3.1. Possibility of Unrecognized CE on the SYN-ACK . . . . 30
4.3.2. Response to Congestion on a SYN-ACK . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3.3. Fall-Back if ECT SYN-ACK Fails . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4. Pure ACKs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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4.4.1. Arguments against ECT on Pure ACKS . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4.2. Counter-arguments for ECT on Pure ACKs . . . . . . . 33
4.4.3. Summary: Enabling ECN on Pure ACKs . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4.4. Pure ACKs: DupACK Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.5. Window Probes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.6. FINs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.7. RSTs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.8. Retransmitted Packets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.9. General Fall-back for any Control Packet . . . . . . . . 41
5. Interaction with popular variants or derivatives of TCP . . . 42
5.1. IW10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.2. TFO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.3. L4S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.4. Other transport protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1. Introduction
RFC 3168 [RFC3168] specifies support of Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) in IP (v4 and v6). By using the ECN capability,
network elements (e.g. routers, switches) performing Active Queue
Management (AQM) can use ECN marks instead of packet drops to signal
congestion to the endpoints of a communication. This results in
lower packet loss and increased performance. RFC 3168 also specifies
support for ECN in TCP, but solely on data packets. For various
reasons it precludes the use of ECN on TCP control packets (TCP SYN,
TCP SYN-ACK, pure ACKs, Window probes) and on retransmitted packets.
RFC 3168 is silent about the use of ECN on RST and FIN packets. RFC
5562 [RFC5562] is an experimental modification to ECN that enables
ECN support for TCP SYN-ACK packets.
This document defines an experimental modification to ECN [RFC3168]
that shall be called ECN++. It enables ECN support on all the
aforementioned types of TCP packet. RFC 5562 (which was called ECN+)
is obsoleted by the present specification, because it has the same
goal of enabling ECT, but on only one type of control packet. The
mechanisms proposed in this document have been defined conservatively
and with safety in mind, possibly in some cases at the expense of
performance.
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ECN++ uses a sender-only deployment model. It works whether the two
ends of the TCP connection use classic ECN feedback [RFC3168] or the
updated scheme called Accurate ECN feedback
(AccECN [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]). {This is written assuming that
AccECN will have been published as an RFC before ECN++, and that
AccECN does indeed update RFC 3168, as intended at the time of
writing. This note to be removed by the RFC Editor.}
Using ECN on initial SYN packets provides significant benefits, as we
describe in the next subsection. However, only AccECN provides a way
to feed back whether the SYN was CE marked, and RFC 3168 does not.
Therefore, this spec recommends that implementers of ECN++ also
implement AccECN. Conversely, if AccECN (or an equivalent safety
mechanism) is not implemented with ECN++, this specification rules
out ECN on the SYN.
ECN++ is designed for compatibility with a number of latency
improvements to TCP such as TCP Fast Open (TFO [RFC7413]), initial
window of 10 SMSS (IW10 [RFC6928]) and Low latency Low Loss Scalable
Transport (L4S) [RFC9330], but they can all be implemented and
deployed independently. [RFC8311] is a standards track procedural
device that relaxes requirements in RFC 3168 and other standards
track RFCs that would otherwise preclude the experimental
modifications needed for ECN++ and other ECN experiments.
1.1. Motivation
The absence of ECN support on TCP control packets and retransmissions
has a potential harmful effect. In any ECN deployment, non-ECN-
capable packets suffer a penalty when they traverse a congested
bottleneck. For instance, with a drop probability of 1%, 1% of
connection attempts suffer a timeout of about 1 second before the SYN
is retransmitted, which is highly detrimental to the performance of
short flows. TCP control packets, particularly TCP SYNs and SYN-
ACKs, are important for performance, so dropping them is best
avoided.
Not using ECN on control packets can be particularly detrimental to
performance in environments where the ECN marking level is high. For
example, [judd-nsdi] shows that in a controlled private data centre
(DC) environment where ECN is used (in conjunction with DCTCP
[RFC8257]), the probability of being able to establish a new
connection using a non-ECN SYN packet drops to close to zero even
when there are only 16 ongoing TCP flows transmitting at full speed.
The issue is that DCTCP exhibits a much more aggressive response to
packet marking (which is why it is only applicable in controlled
environments). This leads to a high marking probability for ECN-
capable packets, and in turn a high drop probability for non-ECN
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packets. Therefore non-ECN SYNs are dropped aggressively, rendering
it nearly impossible to establish a new connection in the presence of
even mild traffic load.
Finally, there are ongoing experimental efforts to promote the
adoption of a slightly modified variant of DCTCP (and similar
congestion controls) over the Internet to achieve low latency, low
loss and scalable throughput (L4S) for all communications [RFC9330].
In such an approach, L4S packets identify themselves using an ECN
codepoint [RFC9331]. With L4S, preventing TCP control packets from
obtaining the benefits of ECN would not only expose them to the
prevailing level of congestion loss, but it would also classify them
into a different queue. Then only L4S data packets would be
classified into the L4S queue that is expected to have lower latency,
while the packets controlling and retransmitting these data packets
would still get stuck behind the queue induced by non-L4S-enabled TCP
traffic.
1.2. Experiment Goals
The goal of the experimental modifications defined in this document
is to allow the use of ECN on all TCP packets. Experiments are
expected in the public Internet as well as in controlled environments
to understand the following issues:
* How SYNs, Window probes, pure ACKs, FINs, RSTs and retransmissions
that carry the ECT(0), ECT(1) or CE codepoints are processed by
the TCP endpoints and the network (including routers, firewalls
and other middleboxes). In particular we would like to learn if
these packets are frequently blocked or if these packets are
usually forwarded and processed.
* The scale of deployment of the different flavours of ECN,
including [RFC3168], [RFC5562], [RFC3540] and
[I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn].
* How much the performance of TCP communications is improved by
allowing ECN marking of each packet type.
* To identify any issues (including security issues) raised by
enabling ECN marking of these packets.
* To conduct the specific experiments identified in the text by the
strings "EXPERIMENTATION NEEDED" or "MEASUREMENTS NEEDED".
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The data gathered through the experiments described in this document,
particularly under the first 2 bullets above, will help in the
redesign of the final mechanism (if needed) for adding ECN support to
the different packet types considered in this document.
Success criteria: The experiment will be a success if we obtain
enough data to have a clearer view of the deployability and benefits
of enabling ECN on all TCP packets, as well as any issues. If the
results of the experiment show that it is feasible to deploy such
changes; that there are gains to be achieved through the changes
described in this specification; and that no other major issues may
interfere with the deployment of the proposed changes; then it would
be reasonable to adopt the proposed changes in a standards track
specification that would update RFC 3168.
1.3. Document Structure
The remainder of this document is structured as follows. In
Section 2, we present the terminology used in the rest of the
document. In Section 3, we specify the modifications to provide ECN
support to TCP SYNs, pure ACKs, Window probes, FINs, RSTs and
retransmissions. We describe both the network behaviour and the
endpoint behaviour. Section 5 discusses variations of the
specification that will be necessary to interwork with a number of
popular variants or derivatives of TCP. RFC 3168 provides a number
of specific reasons why ECN support is not appropriate for each
packet type. In Section 4, we revisit each of these arguments for
each packet type to justify why it is reasonable to conduct this
experiment.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Pure ACK: A TCP segment with the ACK flag set and no data payload.
SYN: A TCP segment with the SYN (synchronize) flag set.
Window probe: Defined in [RFC9293], a window probe is a regular TCP
segment, but with only one octet of new data that is sent to learn if
the receive window is still zero.
FIN: A TCP segment with the FIN (finish) flag set.
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RST: A TCP segment with the RST (reset) flag set.
Retransmission: A TCP segment that has been retransmitted by the TCP
sender.
TCP client: The initiating end of a TCP connection. Also called the
initiator.
TCP server: The responding end of a TCP connection. Also called the
responder or listener.
ECT: ECN-Capable Transport. One of the two codepoints ECT(0) or
ECT(1) in the ECN field [RFC3168] of the IP header (v4 or v6). An
ECN-capable sender sets one of these to indicate that both transport
endpoints support ECN. When this specification says the sender sets
an ECT codepoint, by default it means ECT(0). Optionally, it could
mean ECT(1), which has been redefined for use by L4S experiments
[RFC8311] [RFC9331].
Not-ECT: The ECN codepoint set by senders that indicates that the
transport is not ECN-capable.
CE: Congestion Experienced. The ECN codepoint that an intermediate
node sets to indicate congestion [RFC3168]. A node sets an
increasing proportion of ECT packets to CE as the level of congestion
increases.
3. Specification
The experimental ECN++ changes to the specification of TCP over ECN
[RFC3168] defined here primarily alter the behaviour of the sending
host for each half-connection. However, there are subsections for
forwarding elements and receivers below, which recommend that they
accept the new packets - they should do already, but might not. This
will prompt implementers to check the receive side code while they
are altering the send-side code. All changes can be deployed at each
endpoint independently of others and independent of any network
behaviour.
The feedback behaviour at the receiver depends on whether classic ECN
TCP feedback [RFC3168] or Accurate ECN (AccECN) TCP feedback
[I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] has been negotiated. Nonetheless,
neither receiver feedback behaviour is altered by the present
specification.
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3.1. Network (e.g. Firewall) Behaviour
Previously the specification of ECN for TCP [RFC3168] required the
sender to set not-ECT on TCP control packets and retransmissions.
Some readers of RFC 3168 might have erroneously interpreted this as a
requirement for firewalls, intrusion detection systems, etc. to check
and enforce this behaviour. Section 4.3 of [RFC8311] updates RFC
3168 to remove this ambiguity. It requires firewalls or any
intermediate nodes not to treat certain types of ECN-capable TCP
segment differently (except potentially in one attack scenario).
This is likely to only involve a firewall rule change in a fraction
of cases (at most 0.4% of paths according to the tests reported in
Section 4.2.2).
In case a TCP sender encounters a middlebox blocking ECT on certain
TCP segments, the specification below includes behaviour to fall back
to non-ECN. However, this loses the benefit of ECN on control
packets. So operators are RECOMMENDED to alter their firewall rules
to comply with the requirement referred to above (section 4.3 of
[RFC8311]).
3.2. Sender Behaviour
For each type of control packet or retransmission, the following
sections detail changes to the sender's behaviour in two respects: i)
whether it sets ECT; and ii) its response to congestion feedback.
Table 1 summarises these two behaviours for each type of packet, but
the relevant subsection below should be referred to for the detailed
behaviour. The subsection on the SYN is more complex than the
others, because it has to include fall-back behaviour if the ECT
packet appears not to have got through, and caching of the outcome to
detect persistent failures.
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+============+==============+==============+======================+
| TCP packet | ECN field if | ECN field if | Congestion Response |
| type | AccECN f/b | RFC3168 f/b | |
| | negotiated* | negotiated* | |
+============+==============+==============+======================+
| SYN | ECT** | not-ECT | If AccECN, reduce IW |
+------------+--------------+--------------+----------------------+
| SYN-ACK | ECT | ECT | Reduce IW |
+------------+--------------+--------------+----------------------+
| Pure ACK | ECT | not-ECT | If AccECN, usual |
| | | | cwnd response and |
| | | | optionally [RFC5690] |
+------------+--------------+--------------+----------------------+
| W Probe | ECT | ECT | Usual cwnd response |
+------------+--------------+--------------+----------------------+
| FIN | ECT | ECT | None or optionally |
| | | | [RFC5690] |
+------------+--------------+--------------+----------------------+
| RST | ECT | ECT | N/A |
+------------+--------------+--------------+----------------------+
| Re-XMT | ECT | ECT | Usual cwnd response |
+------------+--------------+--------------+----------------------+
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
| W Probe and Re-XMT stand for Window Probe and Retransmission. |
| * For a SYN, "negotiated" means "requested". |
| ** AccECN or equivalent safety (see Section 3.2.1.1.2) |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
Table 1: Summary of sender behaviour. In each case the
relevant section below should be referred to for the detailed
behaviour
It can be seen that we recommend against the sender setting ECT on
the SYN if it is not requesting AccECN feedback. Therefore it is
RECOMMENDED that the AccECN specification
[I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] is implemented, along with the ECN++
experiment, because it is expected that ECT on the SYN will give the
most significant performance gain, particularly for short flows.
Nonetheless, this specification also caters for the case where an
ECN++ TCP sender is not using AccECN. This could be because it does
not support AccECN or because its peer does not (AccECN can only be
used if both ends of a connection support it).
Note that Table 1 does not imply any obligation to set any packet to
ECT. ECN++ removes the restrictions that RFC 3168 places against
setting ECT on these types of packets, and an implementation would
normally be expected to take advantage of this, but it does not have
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to. Therefore, an implementation of the ECN++ experiment would be
compliant if, for instance, it set ECT on some types of control
packets but not others. If it did not set ECT on any control packets
or retransmissions, it would not be compliant.
3.2.1. SYN (Send)
3.2.1.1. Setting ECT on the SYN
With classic [RFC3168] ECN feedback, the SYN was not expected to be
ECN-capable, so the flag provided to feed back congestion was put to
another use (it is used in combination with other flags to indicate
that the responder supports ECN). In contrast, Accurate ECN (AccECN)
feedback [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] provides a codepoint in the
SYN-ACK for the responder to feed back whether the SYN arrived marked
CE. Therefore the setting of the IP/ECN field on the SYN is
specified separately for each case in the following two subsections.
3.2.1.1.1. ECN++ TCP Client also Supports AccECN
For the ECN++ experiment, if the SYN is requesting AccECN feedback,
the TCP sender will also set ECT on the SYN. Section 4.3 of
[RFC8311] allows an ECN experiment to use ECT on a SYN, by updating
Section 6.1.1 of RFC 3168 (which prohibited it).
3.2.1.1.2. ECN++ TCP Client does not Support AccECN
If the SYN sent by a TCP initiator does not attempt to negotiate
Accurate ECN feedback, or does not use an equivalent safety
mechanism, it MUST NOT set ECT on a SYN. This follows section 6.1.1
of [RFC3168], because, in this case, it would not be safe to use the
extra flexibility to set ECT on a SYN that [RFC8311] allows.
The only envisaged examples of "equivalent safety mechanisms" are: a)
some future TCP ECN feedback protocol, perhaps evolved from AccECN,
that feeds back CE marking on a SYN; b) setting the initial window to
1 SMSS. IW=1 is NOT RECOMMENDED because it could degrade
performance, but might be appropriate for certain lightweight TCP
implementations.
See Section 4.2 for discussion and rationale.
If the TCP initiator does not set ECT on the SYN, the rest of
Section 3.2.1 does not apply.
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3.2.1.2. Caching where to use ECT on SYNs
This subsection only applies if the ECN++ TCP client sets ECT on the
SYN and supports AccECN.
Until AccECN servers become widely deployed, a TCP initiator that
sets ECT on a SYN (which typically implies the same SYN also requests
AccECN, as above) SHOULD also maintain a cache entry per server to
record servers that it is not worth sending an ECT SYN to,
e.g. because they do not support AccECN and therefore have no logic
for congestion markings on the SYN. Mobile hosts MAY maintain a
cache entry per access network to record 'non-ECT SYN' entries
against proxies (see Section 4.2.3). This cache can be implemented
as part of the shared state across multiple TCP connections, if it is
following [RFC9040].
Subsequently the initiator will not set ECT on a SYN to such a server
or proxy, but it can still always request AccECN support (because the
response will state any earlier stage of ECN evolution that the
server supports with no performance penalty). If a server
subsequently upgrades to support AccECN, the initiator will discover
this as soon as it next connects, then it can remove the server from
its cache and subsequently always set ECT for that server.
The client can limit the size of its cache of 'non-ECT SYN' servers.
Then, while AccECN is not widely deployed, it will only cache the
'non-ECT SYN' servers that are most used and most recently used by
the client. As the client accesses servers that have been expelled
from its cache, it will simply use ECT on the SYN by default.
Servers that do not support ECN as a whole do not need to be recorded
separately from non-support of AccECN because the response to a
request for AccECN immediately states which stage in the evolution of
ECN the server supports (AccECN [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn], classic
ECN [RFC3168] or no ECN).
The above strategy is named "optimistic ECT and cache failures". It
is believed to be sufficient based on three measurement studies and
assumptions detailed in Section 4.2.3. However, Section 4.2.3 gives
two other strategies and the choice between them depends on the
implementer's goals (e.g., see Section 5.3 if using L4S) and the
deployment prevalence of ECN variants in the network and on servers,
not to mention the prevalence of some significant bugs.
If the initiator times out without seeing a SYN-ACK, it will
separately cache this fact (see fall-back in Section 3.2.1.4 for
details).
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3.2.1.3. SYN Congestion Response
As explained above, this subsection only applies if the ECN++ TCP
client sets ECT on the initial SYN.
If the SYN-ACK returned to the TCP initiator confirms that the server
supports AccECN, it will also be able to indicate whether or not the
SYN was CE-marked. If the SYN was CE-marked, and if the initial
window is greater than 1 MSS, then, the initiator MUST reduce its
Initial Window (IW) and SHOULD reduce it to 1 SMSS (sender maximum
segment size). The rationale is the same as that for the response to
CE on a SYN-ACK (Section 4.3.2).
If the initiator has set ECT on the SYN and if the SYN-ACK shows that
the server does not support feedback of a CE on the SYN (e.g. it does
not support AccECN) and if the initial congestion window of the
initiator is greater than 1 MSS, then the TCP initiator MUST
conservatively reduce its Initial Window and SHOULD reduce it to 1
SMSS. A reduction to greater than 1 SMSS MAY be appropriate (see
Section 4.2.1). Conservatism is necessary because the SYN-ACK cannot
show whether the SYN was CE-marked.
If the TCP initiator (host A) receives a SYN from the remote end
(host B) after it has sent a SYN to B, it indicates the (unusual)
case of a simultaneous open. Host A will respond with a SYN-ACK.
Host A will probably then receive a SYN-ACK in response to its own
SYN, after which it can follow the appropriate one of the two
paragraphs above.
In all the above cases, the initiator does not have to back off its
retransmission timer as it would in response to a timeout following
no response to its SYN [RFC6298], because both the SYN and the SYN-
ACK have been successfully delivered through the network. Also, the
initiator does not need to exit slow start or reduce ssthresh, which
is not even required when a SYN is lost [RFC5681].
If an initial window of more than 3 segments is implemented
(e.g. IW10 [RFC6928]), Section 5 gives additional recommendations.
3.2.1.4. Fall-Back Following No Response to an ECT SYN
As explained above, this subsection only applies if the ECN++ TCP
client also sets ECT on the initial SYN.
An ECT SYN might be lost due to an over-zealous path element (or
server) blocking ECT packets that do not conform to RFC 3168. Some
evidence of this was found in a 2014 study [ecn-pam], but in a more
recent study using 2017 data [Mandalari18] extensive measurements
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found no case where ECT on TCP control packets was treated any
differently from ECT on TCP data packets. Loss is commonplace for
numerous other reasons, e.g. congestion loss at a non-ECN queue on
the forward or reverse path, transmission errors, etc.
Alternatively, the cause of the loss might be the associated attempt
to negotiate AccECN, or possibly other unrelated options on the SYN.
Therefore, if the timer expires after the TCP initiator has sent the
first ECT SYN, it SHOULD make one more attempt to retransmit the SYN
with ECT set (backing off the timer as usual). If the retransmission
timer expires again, it SHOULD retransmit the SYN with the not-ECT
codepoint in the IP header, to expedite connection set-up. If other
experimental fields or options were on the SYN, it will also be
necessary to follow their specifications for fall-back too. It would
make sense to coordinate all the strategies for fall-back in order to
isolate the specific cause of the problem.
If the TCP initiator is caching failed connection attempts, it SHOULD
NOT give up using ECT on the first SYN of subsequent connection
attempts until it is clear that a blockage persistently and
specifically affects ECT on SYNs. This is because loss is so
commonplace for other reasons. Even if it does eventually decide to
give up setting ECT on the SYN, it will probably not need to give up
on AccECN on the SYN. In any case, if a cache is used, it SHOULD be
arranged to expire so that the initiator will infrequently attempt to
check whether the problem has been resolved.
Other fall-back strategies MAY be adopted where applicable (see
Section 4.2.2 for suggestions, and the conditions under which they
would apply).
3.2.2. SYN-ACK (Send)
3.2.2.1. Setting ECT on the SYN-ACK
For the ECN++ experiment, the TCP implementation will set ECT on SYN-
ACKs. Section 4.3 of [RFC8311] allows an ECN experiment to use ECT
on a SYN-ACK, by updating Section 6.1.1 of RFC 3168 (which prohibited
it).
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3.2.2.2. SYN-ACK Congestion Response
A host that sets ECT on SYN-ACKs MUST reduce its initial window in
response to any congestion feedback, whether using classic ECN or
AccECN (see Section 4.3.1). It SHOULD reduce it to 1 SMSS. This is
different to the behaviour specified in an earlier experiment that
set ECT on the SYN-ACK [RFC5562]. This is justified in
Section 4.3.2.
The responder does not have to back off its retransmission timer
because the ECN feedback proves that the network is delivering
packets successfully and is not severely overloaded. Also the
responder does not have to leave slow start or reduce ssthresh, which
is not even required when a SYN-ACK has been lost.
The congestion response to CE-marking on a SYN-ACK for a server that
implements either the TCP Fast Open experiment (TFO [RFC7413]) or
experimentation with an initial window of more than 3 segments
(e.g. IW10 [RFC6928]) is discussed in Section 5.
3.2.2.3. Fall-Back Following No Response to an ECT SYN-ACK
After the responder sends a SYN-ACK with ECT set, if its
retransmission timer expires it SHOULD retransmit one more SYN-ACK
with ECT set (and back-off its timer as usual). If the timer expires
again, it SHOULD retransmit the SYN-ACK with not-ECT in the IP
header. If other experimental fields or options were on the initial
SYN-ACK, it will also be necessary to follow their specifications for
fall-back. It would make sense to co-ordinate all the strategies for
fall-back in order to isolate the specific cause of the problem.
This fall-back strategy attempts to use ECT one more time than the
strategy for ECT SYN-ACKs in [RFC5562] (which is made obsolete, being
superseded by the present specification). Other fall-back strategies
MAY be adopted if found to be more effective, e.g. fall-back to not-
ECT on the first retransmission attempt.
The server MAY cache failed connection attempts, e.g. per client
access network. If the TCP server is caching failed connection
attempts, it SHOULD NOT give up using ECT on the first SYN-ACK of
subsequent connection attempts until it is clear that the blockage
persistently and specifically affects ECT on SYN-ACKs. This is
because loss is so commonplace for other reasons (see
Section 3.2.1.4).
A client-based alternative to caching at the server is given in
Section 4.3.3.
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If either endpoint caches failed attempts, the cache SHOULD be
arranged to expire so that the endpoint will infrequently attempt to
check whether the problem has been resolved.
3.2.3. Pure ACK (Send)
A Pure ACK is an ACK packet that does not carry data, which includes
the Pure ACK at the end of TCP's 3-way handshake.
For the ECN++ experiment, whether a TCP implementation sets ECT on a
Pure ACK depends on whether or not Accurate ECN TCP feedback
[I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] has been successfully negotiated for a
particular TCP connection, as specified in the following two
subsections.
3.2.3.1. Pure ACK without AccECN Feedback
If AccECN has not been successfully negotiated for a connection, ECT
MUST NOT be set on Pure ACKs by either end.
3.2.3.2. Pure ACK with AccECN Feedback
For the ECN++ experiment, a host can only set ECT on outgoing Pure
ACKs if it satisfies the following three conditions:
* it MUST have successfully negotiated AccECN feedback for the
connection;
* it MUST have successfully negotiated SACK [RFC2018] for the
connection;
* when it checks whether incoming pure ACKs are duplicates it MUST
apply the additional test in Section 3.3.3.1.
If the host satisfies all these requirements, it can then set ECT on
a pure ACK. Section 4.3 of [RFC8311] allows an ECN experiment to use
ECT on a pure ACK, by updating Sections 5.2 and 6.1.4 of RFC 3168
(which prohibited it).
MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Measurements are needed to learn how the
deployed base of network elements and RFC 3168 servers react to
pure ACKs marked with the ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints,
i.e. whether they are dropped, codepoint cleared or processed and
the congestion indication fed back on a subsequent packet.
See Section 3.3.3 for the implications if a host receives a CE-marked
Pure ACK.
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3.2.3.2.1. Pure ACK Congestion Response
This subsection only applies for a host that is setting ECT on
outgoing pure ACKs, which is conditional on it satisfying the three
conditions in Section 3.2.3.2.
A host that sets ECT on pure ACKs SHOULD respond to the congestion
signal resulting from pure ACKs being marked with the CE codepoint.
The specific response will need to be defined as an update to each
congestion control specification. Possible responses to congestion
feedback include reducing the congestion window (CWND) and/or
regulating the pure ACK rate (see Section 4.4.2.1).
Note that, in comparison, TCP Congestion Control [RFC5681] does not
require a TCP to detect or respond to loss of pure ACKs at all; it
requires no reduction in congestion window or ACK rate.
3.2.4. Window Probe (Send)
For the ECN++ experiment, the TCP sender will set ECT on window
probes. Section 4.3 of [RFC8311] allows an ECN experiment to use ECT
on a window probe, by updating Section 6.1.6 of RFC 3168 (which
prohibited it).
A window probe contains a single octet, so it is no different from a
regular TCP data segment. Therefore a TCP receiver will feed back
any CE marking on a window probe as normal (either using classic ECN
feedback or AccECN feedback). The sender of the probe will then
reduce its congestion window as normal.
A receive window of zero indicates that the receiving application is
not consuming data fast enough and does not imply anything about
network congestion. Once the receive window opens, the congestion
window might become the limiting factor, so it is correct that CE-
marked probes reduce the congestion window. This complements cwnd
validation [RFC7661], which reduces cwnd as more time elapses without
having used available capacity. However, CE-marking on window probes
does not reduce the rate of the probes themselves. This is unlikely
to present a problem, given the duration between window probes
doubles [RFC1122] as long as the receiver is advertising a zero
window (currently minimum 1 second, maximum at least 1 minute
[RFC6298]).
MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Measurements are needed to learn how the
deployed base of network elements and servers react to Window
probes marked with the ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints, i.e. whether
they are dropped, codepoint cleared or processed.
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3.2.5. FIN (Send)
A TCP implementation can set ECT on a FIN.
See Section 3.3.4 for the implications if a host receives a CE-marked
FIN.
A congestion response to a CE-marking on a FIN is not required.
After sending a FIN, the endpoint will not send any more data in the
connection. Therefore, even if the FIN-ACK indicates that the FIN
was CE-marked (whether using classic or AccECN feedback), reducing
the congestion window will not affect anything.
After sending a FIN, a host might send one or more pure ACKs. If it
is using one of the techniques in Section 3.2.3 to regulate the
delayed ACK ratio for pure ACKs, it could equally be applied after a
FIN. But this is not required.
MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Measurements are needed to learn how the
deployed base of network elements and servers react to FIN packets
marked with the ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints, i.e. whether they are
dropped, codepoint cleared or processed.
3.2.6. RST (Send)
A TCP implementation can set ECT on a RST.
See Section 3.3.5 for the implications if a host receives a CE-marked
RST.
A congestion response to a CE-marking on a RST is not required (and
actually not possible).
MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Measurements are needed to learn how the
deployed base of network elements and servers react to RST packets
marked with the ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints, i.e. whether they are
dropped, codepoint cleared or processed.
Implementers SHOULD ensure that RST packets are always sent out with
the same ECN field regardless of the TCP state machine. Otherwise
the ECN field could reveal internal TCP state. For instance, the ECN
field on a RST ought not to reveal any distinction between a non-
listening port, a recently in-use port, and a closed session port.
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3.2.7. Retransmissions (Send)
For the ECN++ experiment, the TCP sender will set ECT on
retransmitted segments. Section 4.3 of [RFC8311] allows an ECN
experiment to use ECT on a retransmission, by updating Sections 6.1.5
of RFC 3168 (which prohibited it).
See Section 3.3.6 for the implications if a host receives a CE-marked
retransmission.
If the TCP sender receives feedback that a retransmitted packet was
CE-marked, it will react as it would to any feedback of CE-marking on
a data packet.
MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Measurements are needed to learn how the
deployed base of network elements and servers react to
retransmissions marked with the ECT(0)/ECT(1)/CE codepoints,
i.e. whether they are dropped, codepoint cleared or processed.
3.2.8. General Fall-back for any Control Packet or Retransmission
Extensive measurements in fixed and mobile networks [Mandalari18]
have found no evidence of blockages due to ECT being set on any type
of TCP control packet.
In case traversal problems arise in future, fall-back measures have
been specified above, but only for the cases regarding the initial
packet of a half-connection (SYN or SYN-ACK) where ECT is
persistently failing to get through.
Fall-back measures for blockage of ECT on other TCP control packets
MAY be implemented. However they are not specified here given the
lack of any evidence they will be needed. Section 4.9 justifies this
advice in more detail.
3.3. Receiver Behaviour
The present ECN++ specification primarily concerns the behaviour for
sending TCP control packets or retransmissions. Below are a few
changes to the receive side of an implementation that are recommended
while updating its send side. Nonetheless, where deployment is
concerned, ECN++ is still a sender-only deployment, because it does
not depend on receivers complying with any of these recommendations.
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3.3.1. Receiver Behaviour for Any TCP Control Packet or Retransmission
RFC8311 is a standards track update to RFC 3168 in order to (amongst
other things) "...allow the use of ECT codepoints on SYN packets,
pure acknowledgement packets, window probe packets, and
retransmissions of packets..., provided that the changes from RFC
3168 are documented in an Experimental RFC in the IETF document
stream."
Section 4.3 of RFC 8311 amends every statement in RFC 3168 that
precludes the use of ECT on control packets and retransmissions to
add "unless otherwise specified by an Experimental RFC in the IETF
document stream". The present specification is such an Experimental
RFC. Therefore, In order for the present RFC 8311 experiment to be
useful, TCP receivers will need to satisfy the following
requirements:
* Any TCP implementation SHOULD accept receipt of any valid TCP
control packet or retransmission irrespective of its IP/ECN field.
If any existing implementation does not, it SHOULD be updated to
do so.
* A TCP implementation taking part in the experiments proposed here
MUST accept receipt of any valid TCP control packet or
retransmission irrespective of its IP/ECN field.
The following sections give further requirements specific to each
type of control packet.
These measures are derived from the robustness principle of "... be
liberal in what you accept from others", not only to ensure
compatibility with the present experimental specification, but also
any future protocol changes that allow ECT on any TCP packet.
3.3.2. SYN (Receive)
RFC 3168 negotiates the use of ECN for the connection end-to-end
using the ECN flags in the TCP header. RFC 3168 originally said that
"A host MUST NOT set ECT on SYN ... packets." but it was silent as to
what a TCP server ought to do if it receives a SYN packet with a non-
zero IP/ECN field anyway.
For the avoidance of doubt, the normative statements for all TCP
control packets in Section 3.3.1 are interpreted for the specific
case when a SYN is received as follows:
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* Any TCP server implementation SHOULD accept receipt of a valid SYN
that requests ECN support for the connection, irrespective of the
IP/ECN field of the SYN. If any existing implementation does not,
it SHOULD be updated to do so.
* A TCP implementation taking part in the ECN++ experiment MUST
accept receipt of a valid SYN, irrespective of its IP/ECN field.
* If the SYN is CE-marked and the server has no logic to feed back a
CE mark on a SYN-ACK (e.g. it does not support AccECN), it has to
ignore the CE-mark (the client detects this case and behaves
conservatively in mitigation - see Section 3.2.1.3).
Rationale: At the time of the writing, some implementations of TCP
servers (see Section 4.2.2.2) assume that, if a host receives a SYN
with a non-zero IP/ECN field, it must be due to network mangling, and
they disable ECN for the rest of the connection. Section 4.2.2.2
cites a measurement study run in 2017 that found no occurrence of
this type of network mangling. However, a year earlier, when ECN was
enabled on connections from Apple clients, there was a case of a
whole network that re-marked the ECN field of every packet to CE (it
was rapidly fixed).
When ECN was not allowed on SYNs, it made sense to look for a non-
zero ECN field on the SYN to detect this type of network mangling.
But now that ECN is being allowed on a SYN, detection needs to be
more nuanced. A server needs to disable the test on the SYN alone
for AccECN SYNs (which was done for Linux RFC 3168 servers in 2019
[relax-strict-ecn]) and for RFC 3168 SYNs it needs to watch for three
or four packets all set to CE at the start of a flow. If such
mangling is indeed now so rare, it would also be preferable to log
each case detected and manually report it to the responsible network,
so that the problem will eventually be eliminated.
3.3.3. Pure ACK (Receive)
For the avoidance of doubt, the normative statements for all TCP
control packets in Section 3.3.1 are interpreted for the specific
case when a Pure ACK is received as follows:
* Any TCP implementation SHOULD accept receipt of a pure ACK with a
non-zero IP-ECN field, as now allowed by [RFC8311], which updated
section 6.1.4 of [RFC3168] (which previously required the ECN
field to be cleared to zero on all pure ACKs).
* A TCP implementation taking part in the ECN++ experiment MUST
accept receipt of a pure ACK with a non-zero ECN field.
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The question of whether and how the receiver of pure ACKs is required
to feed back any CE marks on them is outside the scope of the present
specification because it is a matter for the relevant feedback
specification ([RFC3168] or [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]). AccECN
feedback mandates counting of CE marks on any control packets
including pure ACKs. Whereas RFC 3168 is silent on this point, so
feedback of CE-markings might be implementation specific (see
Section 4.4.2.1).
3.3.3.1. Additional DupACK Check
A TCP implementation that is sending ECN-capable pure ACKs MUST add
the following check to all its algorithms that detect duplicate ACKs
(defined in Section 2 of [RFC5681]):
* If there is no SACK option on an incoming pure ACK (ECN-capable or
not) despite SACK having been negotiated, it is not counted as a
duplicate ACK.
SACK blocks are known to be stripped on some paths through the public
Internet, or some implementations are known to negotiate SACK but
never send SACK blocks. Therefore, if a TCP implementation is
sending ECN-capable pure ACKs, it SHOULD check for these pathologies
(unless it is intended solely for an environment known to be clear of
them), as follows:
* If an incoming pure ACK appears to be a duplicate, but:
- it does not carry any SACK blocks (despite SACK having been
negotiated)
- and AccECN [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] has been negotiated but
the ACE field has increased by less than 3 (after allowing for
wrap)
then the implementation can deem that SACK blocks are being
stripped. In this case, for the rest of the connection, it
SHOULD:
- either disable the sending of ECN-capable pure ACKs;
- or replace any instance of the above additional DupACK check
with heuristics such as the following examples:
o If the ACE field [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] has
incremented by at least 3, an incoming ACK is not counted as
a duplicate ACK;
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o if the Timestamp option (TSopt) is available [RFC7323], and
the echoed timestamp (TSecr) increments relative to the
previous ACK, an incoming ACK is not counted as a Duplicate
ACK.
An additional DupACK check is one of the mandatory conditions
specified in Section 3.2.3.2 for sending ECN-capable pure ACKs (the
others are AccECN mode and SACK-negotiated mode).
See Section 4.4.4 for rationale.
3.3.4. FIN (Receive)
The normative statements for all TCP control packets in Section 3.3.1
apply for the specific case when a FIN is received, with 'valid'
defined as follows:
The TCP data receiver MUST ignore the CE codepoint on incoming FINs
that fail any validity check. The validity check in section 5.2 of
[RFC5961] is RECOMMENDED.
3.3.5. RST (Receive)
The normative statements for all TCP control packets in Section 3.3.1
apply for the specific case when a RST is received, with 'valid'
defined as follows:
The "challenge ACK" approach to checking the validity of RSTs
(section 3.2 of [RFC5961]) is RECOMMENDED at the data receiver.
3.3.6. Retransmissions (Receive)
The normative statements for all TCP control packets in Section 3.3.1
apply for the specific case when a retransmission is received, with
'valid' defined as follows:
The TCP data receiver MUST ignore the CE codepoint on incoming
segments that fail any validity check. The validity check in section
5.2 of [RFC5961] is RECOMMENDED. This will effectively mitigate an
attack that uses spoofed data packets to fool the receiver into
feeding back spoofed congestion indications to the sender, which in
turn would be fooled into continually reducing its congestion window.
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4. Rationale
This section is informative, not normative. It presents counter-
arguments against the justifications in the RFC series for disabling
ECN on TCP control segments and retransmissions. It also gives
rationale for why ECT is safe on control segments that have not, so
far, been mentioned in the RFC series (FINs and RSTs). First it
addresses over-arching arguments used for most packet types, then it
addresses the specific arguments for each packet type in turn.
4.1. The Reliability Argument
Section 5.2 of RFC 3168 states:
"To ensure the reliable delivery of the congestion indication of
the CE codepoint, an ECT codepoint MUST NOT be set in a packet
unless the loss of that packet [at a subsequent node] in the
network would be detected by the end nodes and interpreted as an
indication of congestion."
We believe this argument is misplaced. TCP does not deliver most
control packets reliably. So it is more important to allow control
packets to be ECN-capable, which greatly improves reliable delivery
of the control packets themselves (see motivation in Section 1.1).
ECN also improves the reliability and latency of delivery of any
congestion notification on control packets, particularly where TCP
does not detect the loss of certain types of control packet anyway.
Both these points outweigh by far the concern that a CE marking
applied to a control packet by one node might subsequently be dropped
by another node.
The principle to determine whether a packet can be ECN-capable ought
to be "do no extra harm", meaning that the reliability of a
congestion signal's delivery ought to be no worse with ECN than
without.
It will help to first compare with the case of a reliably delivered
packet (e.g. a SYN or data packet) that is made ECN-capable. If it
is CE-marked at two buffers in succession, it is not discarded by the
first buffer so it goes on to help congest the second. But it
delivers only one congestion signal. Similarly, if instead it is
marked at the first buffer and dropped at the second, it still helps
congest the second buffer, but it still delivers only one congestion
signal (the loss).
Some non-ECN TCP control packets (e.g. pure ACKs or FINs) certainly
do not reliably deliver a congestion signal if they are discarded.
But, making such control packets ECN-capable upgrades their ability
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to deliver a congestion signal from a buffer with ECN support.
However, as before, they still cannot reliably deliver a loss signal
from a non-ECN buffer. This includes the case where one congested
buffer CE-marks such a packet, then a second congested buffer without
ECN support discards it.
Thus ECN is always more and never less reliable for delivery of
congestion notification.
4.2. SYNs
RFC 5562 presents two arguments against ECT marking of SYN packets
(quoted verbatim):
"First, when the TCP SYN packet is sent, there are no guarantees
that the other TCP endpoint (node B in Figure 2) is ECN-Capable,
or that it would be able to understand and react if the ECN CE
codepoint was set by a congested router.
Second, the ECN-Capable codepoint in TCP SYN packets could be
misused by malicious clients to "improve" the well-known TCP SYN
attack. By setting an ECN-Capable codepoint in TCP SYN packets, a
malicious host might be able to inject a large number of TCP SYN
packets through a potentially congested ECN-enabled router,
congesting it even further."
The first point actually describes two subtly different issues. So
below three arguments are countered in turn.
4.2.1. Argument 1a: Unrecognized CE on the SYN
This argument certainly applied at the time RFC 5562 was written,
when no ECN responder mechanism had any logic to recognize a CE
marking on a SYN and, even if logic were added, there was no field in
the SYN-ACK to feed it back. The problem was that, during the 3WHS,
the flag in the TCP header for ECN feedback (called Echo Congestion
Experienced) had been overloaded to negotiate the use of ECN itself.
The accurate ECN (AccECN) protocol [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] has
since been designed to solve this problem. Two features are
important here:
1. An AccECN server uses the 3 AccECN flags in the TCP header of the
SYN-ACK to respond to the client. 4 of the possible 8 codepoints
provide enough space for the server to feed back which of the 4
IP/ECN codepoints was on the incoming SYN (including CE of
course).
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2. If any of these 4 codepoints are in the SYN-ACK, it confirms that
the server supports AccECN and, if another codepoint is returned,
it confirms that the server does not support AccECN.
This still does not seem to allow a client to set ECT on a SYN, it
only finds out whether the server would have supported it afterwards.
The trick the client uses for ECN++ is to set ECT on the SYN
optimistically then, if the SYN-ACK reveals that the server wouldn't
have understood CE on the SYN, the client responds conservatively as
if the SYN was marked with CE.
The recommended conservative congestion response is to reduce the
initial window, which does not affect the performance of very popular
protocols such as HTTP, since it is currently extremely rare for an
HTTP client to send more than one packet as its initial request
anyway (for data on HTTP/1 & HTTP/2 request sizes see Fig 3 in
[Manzoor17]). Any clients that do frequently use a larger initial
window for their first message to the server can cache which servers
will not understand ECT on a SYN (see Section 4.2.3 below). If
caching is not practical, such clients could reduce the initial
window to say IW2 or IW3.
EXPERIMENTATION NEEDED: Experiments will be needed to determine
any better strategy for reducing IW in response to congestion on a
SYN, when the server does not support congestion feedback on the
SYN-ACK (whether cached or discovered explicitly).
4.2.2. Argument 1b: ECT Considered Invalid on the SYN
Given that prior to [RFC8311] ECT-marked SYN packets were prohibited,
it cannot be assumed they will be accepted, by TCP middleboxes or
servers.
4.2.2.1. ECT on SYN Considered Invalid by Middleboxes
According to a study using 2014 data [ecn-pam] from a limited range
of fixed vantage points, for the top 1M Alexa web sites, adding the
ECN capability to SYNs increased connection establishment failures by
about 0.4%.
From a wider range of fixed and mobile vantage points, a more recent
study in Jan-May 2017 [Mandalari18] found no occurrences of blocking
of ECT on SYNs. However, in more than half the mobile networks
tested it found wiping of the ECN codepoint at the first hop.
MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: As wiping at the first hop is remedied,
measurements will be needed to check whether SYNs with ECT are
sometimes blocked deeper into the path.
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Silent failures introduce a retransmission timeout delay (default 1
second) at the initiator before it attempts any fall back strategy
(whereas explicit RSTs can be dealt with immediately). Ironically,
making SYNs ECN-capable is intended to avoid the timeout when a SYN
is lost due to congestion. Fortunately, if there is any discard of
ECN-capable SYNs due to policy, it will occur predictably, not
randomly like congestion. So the initiator should be able to avoid
it by caching paths or servers that do not support ECN-capable SYNs
(see the last paragraph of Section 3.2.1.2).
4.2.2.2. ECT on SYN Considered Invalid by Servers
A study conducted in Nov 2017 [Kuehlewind18] found that, of the 82%
of the Alexa top 50k web servers that supported ECN, 84% disabled ECN
if the IP/ECN field on the SYN was ECT0, CE or either. Given most
web servers use Linux, this behaviour can most likely be traced to a
patch contributed in May 2012 that was first distributed in v3.5 of
the Linux kernel [strict-ecn]. The comment says "RFC3168 : 6.1.1 SYN
packets must not have ECT/ECN bits set. If we receive a SYN packet
with these bits set, it means a network is playing bad games with TOS
bits. In order to avoid possible false congestion notifications, we
disable TCP ECN negociation." Of course, some of the 84% might be
due to similar code in other OSs.
For brevity we shall call this the "over-strict" ECN test, because it
is over-conservative with what it accepts, contrary to Postel's
robustness principle. A robust protocol will not usually assume
network mangling without comparing with the value originally sent,
and one packet is not sufficient to make an assumption with such
irreversible consequences anyway.
Ironically, networks rarely seem to alter the IP/ECN field on a SYN
from zero to non-zero anyway. In a study conducted in Jan-May 2017
over millions of paths from vantage points in a few dozen mobile and
fixed networks [Mandalari18], no such transition was observed. With
such a small or non-existent incidence of this sort of network
mangling, it would be preferable to report any residual problem paths
so that they can be fixed.
Whatever, the widespread presence of this 'over-strict' test proves
that RFC 5562 was correct to expect that ECT would be considered
invalid on SYNs. Nonetheless, it is not an insurmountable problem -
the over-strict test in Linux was patched in Apr 2019
[relax-strict-ecn] and caching can work round it where previous
versions of Linux are running. The prevalence of these "over-strict"
ECN servers makes it challenging to cache them all. However,
Section 4.2.3 below explains how a cache of limited size can
alleviate this problem for a client's most popular sites.
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For the future, [RFC8311] updates RFC 3168 to clarify that the IP/ECN
field does not have to be zero on a SYN if documented in an
experimental RFC such as the present ECN++ specification.
4.2.3. Caching Strategies for ECT on SYNs
Given the server handling of ECN on SYNs outlined in Section 4.2.2.2
above, an initiator might combine AccECN with three candidate
strategies for setting ECT on a SYN and caching the outcome:
(S1): Pessimistic ECT and cache successes: The initiator always
requests AccECN, but by default without ECT on the SYN. Then
it caches those servers that confirm that they support AccECN
as 'ECT SYN OK'. On a subsequent connection to any server
that supports AccECN, the initiator can then set ECT on the
SYN. When connecting to other servers (non-ECN or classic
ECN) it will not set ECT on the SYN, so it will not fail the
'over-strict' ECN test.
Longer term, as servers upgrade to AccECN, the initiator is
still requesting AccECN, so it will add them to the cache and
use ECT on subsequent SYNs to those servers. However,
assuming it has to cap the size of the cache, the client will
not have the benefit of ECT SYNs to those less frequently used
AccECN servers expelled from its cache.
(S2): Optimistic ECT: The initiator always requests AccECN and by
default sets ECT on the SYN. Then, if the server response
shows it has no AccECN logic (so it cannot feed back a CE
mark), the initiator conservatively behaves as if the SYN was
CE-marked, by reducing its initial window. Two caching sub-
strategies are feasible:
a. No cache.
b. Cache failures: The optimistic ECT strategy can be
improved by caching solely those servers that do not
support AccECN as 'ECT SYN NOK'. This would include non-
ECN servers and all Classic ECN servers whether 'over-
strict' or not. On subsequent connections to these non-
AccECN servers, the initiator will still request AccECN
but not set ECT on the SYN. Then, the connection can
still fall back to Classic ECN, if the server supports it,
and the initiator can use its full initial window (if it
has enough request data to need it).
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Longer term, as servers upgrade to AccECN, the initiator
will remove them from the cache and use ECT on subsequent
SYNs to that server.
Where an access network operator mediates Internet access
via a proxy that does not support AccECN, the optimistic
ECT strategy will always fail. This scenario is more
likely in mobile networks. Therefore, a mobile host could
cache lack of AccECN support per attached access network
operator. Whenever it attached to a new operator, it
could check a well-known AccECN test server and, if it
found no AccECN support, it would add a cache entry for
the attached operator. It would only use ECT when neither
network nor server were cached. It would only populate
its per server cache when not attached to a non-AccECN
proxy.
(S3): ECT by configuration: In a controlled environment, the
administrator can make sure that servers support ECN-capable
SYN packets. Examples of controlled environments are single-
tenant DCs, and possibly multi-tenant DCs if it is assumed
that each tenant mostly communicates with its own VMs.
For unmanaged environments like the public Internet, pragmatically
the choice is between strategies (S1), (S2A) and (S2B). The
normative specification for ECT on a SYN in Section 3.2.1 recommends
the "optimistic ECT and cache failures" strategy (S2B) but the choice
depends on the implementer's motivation for using ECN++, and the
deployment prevalence of different technologies and bug-fixes.
* The "pessimistic ECT and cache successes" strategy (S1) suffers
from exposing the initial SYN to the prevailing loss level, even
if the server supports ECT on SYNs, but only on the first
connection to each AccECN server. If AccECN becomes widely
deployed on servers, SYNs to those AccECN servers that are less
frequently used by the client and therefore don't fit in the cache
will not benefit from ECN protection at all.
* The "optimistic ECT without a cache" strategy (S2A) is the
simplest. It would satisfy the goal of an implementer who is
solely interested in low latency using AccECN and ECN++ and is not
concerned about fall-back to Classic ECN.
* The "optimistic ECT and cache failures" strategy (S2B) exploits
ECT on SYNs from the very first attempt. But if the server turns
out to be 'over-strict' it will disable ECN for the connection,
but only for the first connection if it's one of the client's more
popular servers that fits in the cache. If the server turns out
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not to support AccECN, the initiator has to conservatively limit
its initial window, but again only for the first connection if
it's one of the client's more popular servers (and anyway this
rarely makes any difference when most client requests fit in a
single packet).
Note that, if AccECN deployment grows, storage for 'caching
successes' (S1) starts off small then grows, while with 'caching
failures' (S2B) it is large at first, then shrinks. At half-way, the
size of the cache has to be capped with either approach, so the
default behaviour for all the servers that do not fit in the cache is
as important as the behaviour for the popular servers that do fit.
MEASUREMENTS NEEDED: Measurements are needed to determine which
strategy would be sufficient for any particular client, whether a
particular client would need different strategies in different
circumstances and how many occurrences of problems would be masked
by how few cache entries.
Another strategy would be to send a not-ECT SYN a short delay (below
the typical lowest RTT) after an ECT SYN and only accept the non-ECT
connection if it returned first. This would reduce the performance
penalty for those deploying ECT SYN support. However, this 'happy
eyeballs' approach becomes complex when multiple optional features
are all tried on the first SYN (or on multiple SYNs), so it is not
recommended.
4.2.4. Argument 2: DoS Attacks
[RFC5562] says that ECT SYN packets could be misused by malicious
clients to augment "the well-known TCP SYN attack". It goes on to
say "a malicious host might be able to inject a large number of TCP
SYN packets through a potentially congested ECN-enabled router,
congesting it even further."
We assume this is a reference to the TCP SYN flood attack (see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SYN_flood), which is an attack against
a responder end point. We assume the idea of this attack is to use
ECT to get more packets through an ECN-enabled router in preference
to other non-ECN traffic so that they can go on to use the SYN
flooding attack to inflict more damage on the responder end point.
This argument could apply to flooding with any type of packet, but we
assume SYNs are singled out because their source address is easier to
spoof, whereas floods of other types of packets are easier to block.
Mandating Not-ECT in an RFC does not stop attackers using ECT for
flooding. Nonetheless, if a standard says SYNs are not meant to be
ECT it would make it legitimate for firewalls to discard them.
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However this would negate the considerable benefit of ECT SYNs for
compliant transports and seems unnecessary because RFC 3168 already
provides the means to address this concern. In section 7, RFC 3168
says "During periods where ... the potential packet marking rate
would be high, our recommendation is that routers drop packets rather
then set the CE codepoint..." and this advice is repeated in
[RFC7567] (section 4.2.1). This makes it harder for flooding packets
to gain from ECT.
[ecn-overload] showed that ECT can only slightly augment flooding
attacks relative to a non-ECT attack. It was hard to overload the
link without causing the queue to grow, which in turn caused the AQM
to disable ECN and switch to drop, thus negating any advantage of
using ECT. This was true even with the switch-over point set to 25%
drop probability (i.e. the arrival rate was 133% of the link rate).
4.3. SYN-ACKs
The proposed approach in Section 3.2.2 for experimenting with ECN-
capable SYN-ACKs is effectively identical to the scheme called ECN+
[ECN-PLUS]. In 2005, the ECN+ paper demonstrated that it could
reduce the average Web response time by an order of magnitude. It
also argued that adding ECT to SYN-ACKs did not raise any new
security vulnerabilities.
4.3.1. Possibility of Unrecognized CE on the SYN-ACK
The feedback behaviour by the initiator in response to a CE-marked
SYN-ACK from the responder depends on whether classic ECN feedback
[RFC3168] or AccECN feedback [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] has been
negotiated. In either case no change is required to RFC 3168 or the
AccECN specification.
Some classic ECN client implementations might ignore a CE-mark on a
SYN-ACK, or even ignore a SYN-ACK packet entirely if it is set to ECT
or CE. This is a possibility because an RFC 3168 implementation
would not necessarily expect a SYN-ACK to be ECN-capable. This issue
already came up when the IETF first decided to experiment with ECN on
SYN-ACKs [RFC5562] and it was decided to go ahead without any extra
precautionary measures. This was because the probability of
encountering the problem was believed to be low and the harm if the
problem arose was also low (see Appendix B of RFC 5562).
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4.3.2. Response to Congestion on a SYN-ACK
The IETF has already specified an experiment with ECN-capable SYN-ACK
packets [RFC5562]. It was inspired by the ECN+ paper, but it
specified a much more conservative congestion response to a CE-marked
SYN-ACK, called ECN+/TryOnce. This required the server to reduce its
initial window to 1 segment (like ECN+), but then the server had to
send a second SYN-ACK and wait for its ACK before it could continue
with its initial window of 1 SMSS. The second SYN-ACK of this 5-way
handshake had to carry no data, and had to disable ECN, but no
justification was given for these last two aspects.
The present ECN++ experimental specification obsoletes RFC 5562
because it uses the ECN+ congestion response, not ECN+/TryOnce.
First we argue against the rationale for ECN+/TryOnce given in
sections 4.4 and 6.2 of [RFC5562]. It starts with a rather too
literal interpretation of the requirement in RFC 3168 that says TCP's
response to a single CE mark has to be "essentially the same as the
congestion control response to a *single* dropped packet." TCP's
response to a dropped initial (SYN or SYN-ACK) packet is to wait for
the retransmission timer to expire (currently 1s). However, this
long delay assumes the worst case between two possible causes of the
loss: a) heavy overload; or b) the normal capacity-seeking behaviour
of other TCP flows. When the network is still delivering CE-marked
packets, it implies that there is an AQM at the bottleneck and that
it is not overloaded. This is because an AQM under overload will
disable ECN (as recommended in section 7 of RFC 3168 and repeated in
section 4.2.1 of RFC 7567). So scenario (a) can be ruled out.
Therefore, TCP's response to a CE-marked SYN-ACK can be similar to
its response to the loss of _any_ packet, rather than backing off as
if the special _initial_ packet of a flow has been lost.
How TCP responds to the loss of any single packet depends what it has
just been doing. But there is not really a precedent for TCP's
response when it experiences a CE mark having sent only one (small)
packet. If TCP had been adding one segment per RTT, it would have
halved its congestion window, but it hasn't established a congestion
window yet. If it had been exponentially increasing it would have
exited slow start, but it hasn't started exponentially increasing yet
so it hasn't established a slow-start threshold.
Therefore, we have to work out a reasoned argument for what to do.
If an AQM is CE-marking packets, it implies there is already a queue
and it is probably already somewhere around the AQM's operating point
- it is unlikely to be well below and it might be well above. So,
the more data packets that the client sends in its IW, the more
likely at least one will be CE marked, leading it to exit slow-start
early. On the other hand, it is highly unlikely that the SYN-ACK
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itself pushed the AQM into congestion, so it will be safe to
introduce another single segment immediately (1 RTT after the SYN-
ACK). Therefore, starting to probe for capacity with a slow start
from an initial window of 1 segment seems appropriate to the
circumstances. This is the approach adopted in Section 3.2.2.
EXPERIMENTATION NEEDED: Experiments will be needed to check the
above reasoning and determine any better strategy for reducing IW
in response to congestion on a SYN-ACK (or a SYN).
4.3.3. Fall-Back if ECT SYN-ACK Fails
Section 3.2.2.3 describes how a server could cache failed connection
attempts. As an alternative, the server could rely on the client to
cache failed attempts (on the basis that the client would cache a
failure whether ECT was blocked on the SYN or the SYN-ACK). This
strategy cannot be used if the SYN does not request AccECN support.
It works as follows. If a server would rather not maintain its own
cache, when it receives a SYN that requests AccECN support but is set
to not-ECT, the server replies with a SYN-ACK also set to not-ECT.
This gives the client the power to disable ECT on both the SYN and
SYN-ACK, if it has cached knowedge that there were previous problems.
If a middlebox only blocks ECT on SYNs, not SYN-ACKs, this strategy
might disable ECN on a SYN-ACK when it did not need to, but at least
it saves the server from maintaining a cache. However, a client
cannot rely on all non-caching servers suppressing ECT on SYN/ACKs
when they might not need to.
Therefore, a more practical way for a client to cache failures on
behalf of the server would be for the client to initially fall-back
to Not-ECT on the SYN after multiple timeouts, then if that doesn't
resolve the problem, the client could disable ECN completely at the
TCP layer, and if the connection then works, it could cache to
disable ECN in future. With this approach, it is still preferable
but optional for the server to also cache failure to deliver ECN-
capable SYN-ACKs.
4.4. Pure ACKs
4.4.1. Arguments against ECT on Pure ACKS
After the general reliability argument already quoted in Section 4.1,
Section 5.2 of RFC 3168 goes on to use ECT marking of pure ACKs as a
specific example of the reliability argument:
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"Transport protocols such as TCP do not necessarily detect all
packet drops, such as the drop of a "pure" ACK packet; for
example, TCP does not reduce the arrival rate of subsequent ACK
packets in response to an earlier dropped ACK packet. Any
proposal for extending ECN-Capability to such packets would have
to address issues such as the case of an ACK packet that was
marked with the CE codepoint but was later dropped in the network.
We believe that this aspect is still the subject of research, so
this document specifies that at this time, "pure" ACK packets MUST
NOT indicate ECN-Capability."
Later on, in section 6.1.4 it reads:
"For the current generation of TCP congestion control algorithms,
pure acknowledgement packets (e.g., packets that do not contain
any accompanying data) MUST be sent with the not-ECT codepoint.
Current TCP receivers have no mechanisms for reducing traffic on
the ACK-path in response to congestion notification. Mechanisms
for responding to congestion on the ACK-path are areas for current
and future research. (One simple possibility would be for the
sender to reduce its congestion window when it receives a pure ACK
packet with the CE codepoint set). For current TCP
implementations, a single dropped ACK generally has only a very
small effect on the TCP's sending rate."
4.4.2. Counter-arguments for ECT on Pure ACKs
The first argument above is a specific instance of the reliability
argument for the case of pure ACKs. This has already been addressed
by countering the general reliability argument in Section 4.1.
The second argument says that ECN ought not to be enabled on Pure
ACKs unless there is a mechanism to respond to it. Although the
above passage from RFC 3168 envisages the possibility of ECN on pure
ACKs in the future, it is silent on how its ECN feedback mechanisms
would be used if CE markings did arrive on pure ACKs. In contrast,
the position of AccECN with respect to the three parts of a
congestion response mechanism is as follows:
Detection: The AccECN spec requires the receiver of any TCP packets
including pure ACKs to count any CE marks on them (whether or not
it sends ECN-capable control packets itself).
Feedback: The AccECN Data Receiver continually feeds back a count of
the number of CE-marked packets (including pure ACKs) that it has
received.
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Even if the receiver of a CE-mark on a pure ACK does not feed it
back immediately, it still includes it within subsequent feedback,
for instance when it later sends a data segment. Even if an
AccECN host has no data outstanding, it is still required to send
an 'increment-triggered' pure ACK after every 'n' CE marks it
receives, where 'n' is at least 3.
Congestion response: Once an AccECN Data Sender receives feedback
about CE-markings on pure ACKs, it will be able to reduce the
congestion window (cwnd) and/or the ACK rate. The specific
response to congestion feedback is out of scope of both AccECN and
the present spec, because it would be defined in a base TCP
congestion control spec [RFC5681] [RFC9438] or a variant.
Nonetheless, in order to decide whether the present ECN++
experimental spec should allow a host to set ECT on pure ACKs, we
only need to know whether a congestion response would be feasible
- we do not have to standardize it. Possible responses are
discussed in the following subsections,
4.4.2.1. Congestion Window Response to CE-Marked Pure ACKs
This subsection explores issues that congestion control designers
will need to consider when defining a cwnd response to CE-marked Pure
ACKs.
A CE-mark on a Pure ACK does not mean that only Pure ACKs are causing
congestion. It only means that the marked Pure ACK is part of an
aggregate that is collectively causing a bottleneck queue to randomly
CE-mark a fraction of the packets. A CE-mark on a Pure ACK might be
due to data packets in other flows through the same bottleneck, due
to data packets interspersed between Pure ACKs in the same half-
connection, or just due to the rate of Pure ACKs alone. (RFC 3168
only considered the last possibility, which led to the argument that
standardization of ECN-enabled Pure ACKs had to be deferred, because
ACK congestion control was a research issue.)
If a host has been sending a mix of Pure ACKs and data, it doesn't
need to work out whether a particular CE mark was on a Pure ACK or
not; it just needs to respond to congestion feedback as a whole by
reducing its congestion window (cwnd), which limits the data it can
launch into flight through the congested bottleneck. If a host is
solely receiving data and sending only Pure ACKs, reducing cwnd will
have no immediate effect (the next subsection addresses that).
Nonetheless, reducing cwnd at one moment would limit its rate if it
was given something to send at a later moment.
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When a host is sending data as well as Pure ACKs, it would not be
right for CE-marks on Pure ACKs and on data packets to induce the
same reduction in cwnd. A possible way to address this issue would
be to weight the response by the size of the marked packets (assuming
the congestion control supports a weighted response, e.g. [RFC8257]).
For instance, one could calculate the fraction of CE-marked bytes
(headers and data) over each round trip (say) as follows:
(CE-marked header bytes + CE-marked data bytes) / (all header
bytes + all data bytes)
Even if the exact header size is not known, header bytes could be
calculated by multiplying a packet count by a nominal header size,
which is possible with AccECN feedback, because it gives a count of
CE-marked packets (as well as CE-marked bytes). The above simple
aggregate calculation caters for the full range of scenarios; from
all Pure ACKs to just a few interspersed with data packets.
Note that any mechanism that reduces cwnd due to CE-marked Pure ACKs
would need to be integrated with the congestion window validation
mechanism [RFC7661], which already conservatively reduces cwnd over
time because cwnd becomes stale if it is not used to fill the pipe.
4.4.2.2. ACK Rate Response to CE-Marked Pure ACKs
Reducing the congestion window will have little effect if the
bottleneck is congested mostly by unresponsive pure ACKs. This could
leave little or no capacity for data transfers that would be
responsive to the congestion.
Since RFC 3168 was published, experimental Acknowledgement Congestion
Control (AckCC) techniques have been documented in [RFC5690]
(informational), which describes how two new TCP options could allow
any pair of TCP endpoints to regulate the delayed ACK ratio in
response to lost or CE-marked pure ACKs. However, this spec did not
ask IANA to actually allocate any option numbers, because the
intention was to describe the scheme and document the unresolved
complications.
AckCC addressed three main problems, namely that TCP had: i) no
mechanism to feed back loss or CE-marking of pure ACKs; ii)
consequently, no mechanism to allow ECT to be set on pure ACKs; and
iii) no mechanism to regulate the ACK rate. A combination of AccECN
and the present specification addresses the first two problems, at
least for ECN marking. So, with the addition of an ACK rate
mechanism, it might now be possible to design an ECN-specific ACK
congestion control scheme along similiar lines to RFC 5690. However,
such a mechanism is out of scope of the present document.
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Setting aside the unfinished nature of RFC 5690, the need for AckCC
has not been conclusively demonstrated. It has been argued that the
Internet has survived so far with no mechanism to even detect loss of
pure ACKs. However, it has also been argued that ECN is not the same
as loss. Packet discard can naturally thin the ACK load to whatever
the bottleneck can support, whereas ECN marking does not (it queues
the ACKs instead). Nonetheless, RFC 3168 (section 7) recommends that
an AQM switches over from ECN marking to discard when the marking
probability becomes high. Therefore discard can still be relied on
to thin out ECN-enabled pure ACKs as a last resort.
4.4.3. Summary: Enabling ECN on Pure ACKs
In the case when AccECN has been negotiated, it provides a feasible
congestion response mechanism for Pure ACKs, so the arguments for ECT
on pure ACKs outweigh those against. ECN is always more and never
less reliable for delivery of congestion notification. A cwnd
reduction needs to be considered by congestion control designers as a
response to congestion on pure ACKs. Separately, AckCC (or an
improved variant exploiting AccECN) could optionally be used to
regulate the spacing between pure ACKs. However, it is not clear
whether AckCC is justified. If it is not, packet discard will still
act as the "congestion response of last resort" by thinning out the
ACK traffic. In contrast, not setting ECT on pure ACKs is certainly
detrimental to performance, because when a pure ACK is lost it can
prevent the release of new data.
In the case when Classic ECN has been negotiated, the argument for
ECT on pure ACKs is less clear-cut. Some of the installed base of
RFC 3168 implementations might happen to (unintentionally) provide a
feedback mechanism to support a cwnd response. For those that did
not, setting ECT on pure ACKs would be better for the flow's own
performance than not setting it. However, where there was no
feedback mechanism, setting ECT could do slightly more harm than not
setting it. AckCC could provide a complementary response mechanism,
because it is designed to work with RFC 3168 ECN, but it is
incomplete. In summary, a congestion response mechanism for Pure
ACKs is unlikely to be feasible with the installed base of classic
ECN.
Section 3.2.3 of this specification uses a safe approach where it
allows ECT on Pure ACKs if AccECN feedback has been negotiated, but
not with classic RFC 3168 ECN feedback. Allowing hosts to set ECT on
Pure ACKs without a feasible response mechanism could result in risk.
It would certainly improve the flow's own performance, but it would
slightly increase potential harm to others. Morevoer, if would set
an undesirable precedent for setting ECT on packets with no mechanism
to respond to any resulting congestion signals.
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4.4.4. Pure ACKs: DupACK Tests
This section justifies the requirement for a host to use the
additional test for incoming duplicate pure ACKs in Section 3.3.3.1,
which is one of the mandatory conditions for a host to set ECT on its
outgoing pure ACKs. See Section 3.2.3.2 for all three conditions,
the other two being to have successfully negotiated SACK and AccECN
feedback.
The AccECN spec [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn] mandates the 'increment-
triggered ACK' rule where, "an AccECN Data Receiver MUST emit an ACK
if 'n' CE marks have arrived since the previous ACK." The value of
'n' depends on whether there is newly delivered data to acknowledge.
If there is not, "'n' MUST be no less than 3".
Use of ECN-capable pure ACKs by the ECN++ experiment combined with
congestion at an ECN AQM at the bottleneck of the ACK path can cause
AccECN to acknowledge ACKs that carry new CE information, by the
above rule. This leads to repetition of the ACK of a segment, which
is an exception to the requirement in the last paragraph of Sec 4.2
of [RFC5681].
This exception is justified because, although there is no new data
for the receiver to acknowledge, there is new IP-ECN information to
feed back. When such new IP-ECN information arrives on an ACK, it is
not possible to feed it back without also repeating the
acknowledgement of the latest data segment (if ECN++ had been part of
TCP from the start, a logical approach would have been to clear the
ACK flag, but nowadays such an unorthodox segment would be rejected).
Therefore, to distinguish these ACKs of ACKs from genuine duplicate
ACKs, it was necessary to introduce the test for the absence of SACK.
To justify adding this test, we use the same scenario as in
Section 3.2.2.5.1 of the AccECN spec [I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]
with volleys of unidirectional data initially from host A to B then
from B to A. In response to the first volley, B emits ECN-capable
pure ACKs as feedback (as per the present ECN++ spec). If the ACK
stream from B experiences congestion at an ECN-enabled buffer, some
of these ACKs will be CE-marked once they arrive at A.
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Host A would normally inform B about the congested ACK path by
piggybacking AccECN feedback on the data packets from A to B.
However, once A stops sending data, it still needs to inform B about
any CE-marked ACKs continuing to arrive from B in the subsequent
round trip (so that B has up to date congestion information, in case
it starts sending data). AccECN's 'increment-triggered ACK' rule
ensures that A emits a pure ACK at least every third incoming CE
mark. However, as each 'increment-triggered ACK' from A arrives at
B, it will not only feed back CE markings, but it will also
repeatedly acknowledge whatever the last sequence number was from B.
Then, if SACK had not been negotiated for the connection, and if B
started sending its volley of new data packets, the ACKs from A could
imply to B that its first new data packet had been lost and A was
then emitting duplicate ACKs triggered by the rest of B's volley
arriving. Then, as well as detecting CE marking, B could falsely
detect loss, leading to spurious retransmission and potentially
incorrect congestion response. Similarly, false detection of
duplicate ACKs could confuse other algorithms, such as Limited
Transmit, Fast Recovery, PRR, etc.
This is why Section 3.3.3.1 requires B to negotiate SACK and to use
lack of SACK options as an additional check for a duplicate ACK.
4.5. Window Probes
Section 6.1.6 of RFC 3168 presents only the reliability argument for
prohibiting ECT on Window probes:
"If a window probe packet is dropped in the network, this loss is
not detected by the receiver. Therefore, the TCP data sender MUST
NOT set either an ECT codepoint or the CWR bit on window probe
packets.
However, because window probes use exact sequence numbers, they
cannot be easily spoofed in denial-of-service attacks. Therefore,
if a window probe arrives with the CE codepoint set, then the
receiver SHOULD respond to the ECN indications."
The reliability argument has already been addressed in Section 4.1.
Allowing ECT on window probes could considerably improve performance
because, once the receive window has reopened, if a window probe is
lost the sender will stall until the next window probe reaches the
receiver, which might be after the maximum retransmission timeout (at
least 1 minute [RFC6928]).
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On the bright side, RFC 3168 at least specifies the receiver
behaviour if a CE-marked window probe arrives, so changing the
behaviour ought to be less painful than for other packet types.
4.6. FINs
RFC 3168 is silent on whether a TCP sender can set ECT on a FIN. A
FIN is considered as part of the sequence of data, and the rate of
pure ACKs sent after a FIN could be controlled by a CE marking on the
FIN. Therefore there is no reason not to set ECT on a FIN.
4.7. RSTs
RFC 3168 is silent on whether a TCP sender can set ECT on a RST. The
host generating the RST message does not have an open connection
after sending it (either because there was no such connection when
the packet that triggered the RST message was received or because the
packet that triggered the RST message also triggered the closure of
the connection).
Moreover, the receiver of a CE-marked RST message can either: i)
accept the RST message and close the connection; ii) emit a so-called
challenge ACK in response (with suitable throttling) [RFC5961] and
otherwise ignore the RST (e.g. because the sequence number is in-
window but not the precise number expected next); or iii) discard the
RST message (e.g. because the sequence number is out-of-window). In
the first two cases there is no point in echoing any CE mark received
because the sender closed its connection when it sent the RST. In
the third case, given the RST is deemed invalid, any CE marking on it
could also be invalid, so it makes sense to discard the CE signal as
well as the RST.
Although a congestion response following a CE-marking on a RST does
not appear to make sense, the following factors have been considered
before deciding whether the sender ought to set ECT on a RST message:
* As explained above, a congestion response by the sender of a CE-
marked RST message is not possible;
* So the only reason for the sender setting ECT on a RST would be to
improve the reliability of the message's delivery;
* RST messages are used to both mount and mitigate attacks:
- Spoofed RST messages are used by attackers to terminate ongoing
connections, although the mitigations in RFC 5961 have
considerably raised the bar against off-path RST attacks;
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- Legitimate RST messages allow endpoints to inform their peers
to eliminate existing state that correspond to non existing
connections, liberating resources e.g. in DoS attacks
scenarios;
* AQMs are advised to disable ECN marking during persistent
overload, so:
- it is harder for an attacker to exploit ECN to intensify an
attack;
- it is harder for a legitimate user to exploit ECN to more
reliably mitigate an attack
* Prohibiting ECT on a RST would deny the benefit of ECN to
legitimate RST messages, but not to attackers who can disregard
RFCs;
* If ECT were prohibited on RSTs
- it would be easy for security middleboxes to discard all ECN-
capable RSTs;
- However, unlike a SYN flood, it is already easy for a security
middlebox (or host) to distinguish a RST flood from legitimate
traffic [RFC5961], and even if a some legitimate RSTs are
accidentally removed as well, legitimate connections still
function.
So, on balance, it has been decided that it is worth experimenting
with ECT on RSTs. During experiments, if the ECN capability on RSTs
is found to open a vulnerability that is hard to close, this decision
can be reversed, before it is specified for the standards track.
4.8. Retransmitted Packets.
RFC 3168 says the sender "MUST NOT" set ECT on retransmitted packets.
The rationale for this consumes nearly 2 pages of RFC 3168, so the
reader is referred to section 6.1.5 of RFC 3168, rather than quoting
it all here. There are essentially three arguments, namely:
reliability; DoS attacks; and unnecessary retransmissions. We
address them in order below.
The reliability argument has already been addressed in Section 4.1.
Protection against DoS attacks is not afforded by prohibiting ECT on
retransmitted packets. An attacker can set ECT or CE on spoofed
retransmissions whether or not it is prohibited by an RFC.
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Protection against the DoS attack described in section 6.1.5 of RFC
3168 is solely afforded by the requirement that "the TCP data
receiver SHOULD ignore the CE codepoint on out-of-window packets".
Therefore in Section 3.2.7 the sender is allowed to set ECT on
retransmitted packets, in order to reduce the chance of them being
dropped. We also strengthen the receiver's requirement from "SHOULD
ignore" to "MUST ignore". And we generalize the receiver's
requirement to include failure of any validity check, not just out-
of-window checks, in order to include the more stringent validity
checks in RFC 5961 that have been developed since RFC 3168.
Finally, the third argument is about unnecessary retransmissions.
For those retransmitted packets that arrive at the receiver after the
original packet has been properly received (so-called spurious
retransmissions), RFC 3168 raises the concern that any CE marking
will be ignored, because any spurious retransmission is out of window
and CE markings on out of window packets will be ignored (by the
above rule). In mitigation against this argument, the fact that the
original packet has been delivered implies that the sender's original
congestion response (when it deemed the packet to be lost and
retransmitted it) was unnecessary. However, omitting a congestion
response to the CE one round trip later does not strictly compensate
for the previous unnecessary response, because the response should be
in the same round as the congestion occurs. Nonetheless, there is a
stronger argument against the concern in RFC 3168: TCP does not
detect the loss of a spurious retransmission, and therefore does not
respond to this congestion loss. So not responding to CE on ECN-
capable supurious retransmissions is no worse than TCP's existing
lack of response to loss of spurious retransmissions.
Therefore, in all three cases, it is not incorrect to set ECT on
retransmissions.
4.9. General Fall-back for any Control Packet
Extensive experiments have found no evidence of any traversal
problems with ECT on any TCP control packet [Mandalari18].
Nonetheless, Sections 3.2.1.4 and 3.2.2.3 specify fall-back measures
if ECT on the first packet of either half-connection (SYN or SYN-ACK)
appears to be blocking progress. Here, the question of fall-back
measures for ECT on other control packets is explored. It supports
the advice given in Section 3.2.8, paraphrased here as, "Until
there's evidence that something's broken, don't fix it."
If an implementation has had to disable ECT to ensure the first
packet of a flow (SYN or SYN-ACK) gets through, the question arises
whether it ought to disable ECT on all subsequent control packets
within the same TCP connection. Without evidence of any such
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problems, this seems unnecessarily cautious. Particularly given it
would be hard to detect loss of most other types of TCP control
packets that are not ACK'd. And particularly given that
unnecessarily removing ECT from other control packets could lead to
performance problems, e.g. by directing them into another queue
[RFC9331] or over a different path, because some broken multipath
equipment (erroneously) routes based on all 8 bits of the ex-Traffic
Class octet (IPv6) or the ex-ToS octet (IPv4).
In the case where a connection starts without ECT on the SYN (perhaps
because problems with previous connections had been cached), there
will have been no test for ECT traversal in the client-server
direction until the pure ACK that completes the handshake. It is
possible that some middlebox might block ECT on this pure ACK or on
later retransmissions of lost packets. Similarly, after a route
change, the new path might include some middlebox that blocks ECT on
some or all TCP control packets. However, without evidence of such
problems, the complexity of a fix does not seem worthwhile.
MORE MEASUREMENTS NEEDED (?): If further two-ended measurements do
find evidence for these traversal problems, measurements would be
needed to check for correlation of ECT traversal problems between
different control packets. It might then be necessary to
introduce a catch-all fall-back rule that disables ECT on certain
subsequent TCP control packets based on some criteria developed
from these measurements.
5. Interaction with popular variants or derivatives of TCP
The designs of the following TCP variants have been assessed and
found not to interact adversely with ECT on TCP control packets: SYN
cookies (see Appendix A of [RFC4987] and section 3.1 of [RFC5562]),
Initial Window of ten (IW10 [RFC6928], TCP Fast Open (TFO [RFC7413]),
DCTCP [RFC8257] and L4S [RFC9330].
The following subsections assess the interaction between setting ECT
on all packets and each of these variants (except SYN cookies where
no detail is necessary). A final subsection briefly notes the
possibility that the principles applied here should translate to
protocols derived from TCP.
This section is informative not normative, because no interactions
have been identified that require any change to specifications. The
subsection on IW10 discusses potential changes to specifications but
recommends that no changes are needed.
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5.1. IW10
IW10 is an experiment to determine whether it is safe for TCP to use
an initial window of 10 SMSS [RFC6928].
This subsection does not recommend any additions to the present
specification in order to interwork with IW10. The specifications as
they stand are safe, and there is only a corner-case with ECT on the
SYN where performance could be occasionally improved, as explained
below.
As specified in Section 3.2.1.1, a TCP initiator will typically only
set ECT on the SYN if it requests AccECN support. If, however, the
SYN-ACK tells the initiator that the responder does not support
AccECN, Section 3.2.1.1 advises the initiator to conservatively
reduce its initial window, preferably to 1 SMSS because, if the SYN
was CE-marked, the SYN-ACK has no way to feed that back.
If the initiator implements IW10, it seems rather over-conservative
to reduce IW from 10 to 1 just in case a congestion marking was
missed. Nonetheless, a reduction to 1 SMSS will rarely harm
performance, because:
* as long as the initiator is caching failures to negotiate AccECN,
subsequent attempts to access the same server will not use ECT on
the SYN anyway, so there will no longer be any need to
conservatively reduce IW;
* currently, at least for web sessions, it is extremely rare for a
TCP initiator (client) to have more than one data segment to send
at the start of a TCP connection (see Fig 3 in [Manzoor17]) - IW10
is primarily exploited by TCP servers.
If a responder receives feedback that the SYN-ACK was CE-marked,
Section 3.2.2.2 recommends that it reduces its initial window,
preferably to 1 SMSS. When the responder also implements IW10, it
might again seem rather over-conservative to reduce IW from 10 to 1.
But in this case the rationale is somewhat different:
* The IW10 spec [RFC6928] recommends not reducing cwnd to 1 segment
on the grounds that it is uncertain whether absence of feedback
implies loss. However, in contrast, explicit feedback that the
SYN-ACK was CE-marked is a positive indication that the queue has
been building.
* Given it is now likely that a queue already exists, the more data
packets that the server sends in its IW, the more likely at least
one will be CE marked, leading it to exit slow-start early.
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Experimentation will be needed to determine the best strategy.
It should be noted that experience from recent congestion avoidance
experiments where the window is reduced by less than half in response
to ECN marking [RFC8511] is not necessarily applicable to a flow
start scenario.
5.2. TFO
TCP Fast Open (TFO [RFC7413]) is an experiment to remove the round
trip delay of TCP's 3-way hand-shake (3WHS). A TFO initiator caches
a cookie from a previous connection with a TFO-enabled server. Then,
for subsequent connections to the same server, any data included on
the SYN can be passed directly to the server application, which can
then return up to an initial window of response data on the SYN-ACK
and on data segments straight after it, without waiting for the ACK
that completes the 3WHS.
The TFO experiment and the present experiment to add ECN-support for
TCP control packets can be combined without altering either
specification, which is justified as follows:
* The handling of ECN marking on a SYN is no different whether or
not it carries data.
* In response to any CE-marking on the SYN-ACK, the responder adopts
the normal response to congestion, as discussed in Section 7.2 of
[RFC7413].
5.3. L4S
A Low Latency, Low Loss, and Scalable throughput (L4S) variant of TCP
such as TCP Prague [I-D.briscoe-iccrg-prague-congestion-control]
requires AccECN feedback and uses ECN++. Also the spec of the L4S-ECN
protocol [RFC9331] mentions ECN++ as a useful performance
optimization.
Therefore, the L4S experiment and the present ECN++ experiment can be
combined without altering any of the specifications. The only
difference would be in the recommendation of the best SYN cache
strategy.
The normative specification for ECT on a SYN in Section 3.2.1.2
recommends the "optimistic ECT and cache failures" strategy (S2B
defined in Section 4.2.3) for the general Internet. However, if a
user's Internet access bottleneck supported L4S ECN but not Classic
ECN, the "optimistic ECT without a cache" strategy (S2A) would make
most sense, because there would be little point trying to avoid the
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'over-strict' test and negotiate Classic ECN, if L4S ECN but not
Classic ECN was available on that user's access link (as is the case
with Low Latency DOCSIS [DOCSIS3.1]).
Strategy (S2A) is the simplest, because it requires no cache. It
would satisfy the goal of an implementer who is solely interested in
ultra-low latency using AccECN and ECN++ (e.g. accessing L4S servers)
and is not concerned about fall-back to Classic ECN (e.g. when
accessing other servers).
5.4. Other transport protocols
Experience from experiments on adding ECN support to all TCP packets
ought to be directly transferable between TCP and derivatives of TCP,
like SCTP.
Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [RFC9260] is a standards
track transport protocol derived from TCP. SCTP currently does not
include ECN support, but Appendix A of an obsoleted earlier version
of the spec [RFC4960] broadly describes how it would be supported and
a draft on the addition of ECN to SCTP has been produced
[I-D.stewart-tsvwg-sctpecn]. The question of whether SCTP ought to
set ECT on retransmissions and control packets is work in progress.
QUIC [RFC9000] is another standards track transport protocol offering
similar services to TCP but intended to exploit some of the benefits
of running over UDP. Building on the arguments in the current draft,
a QUIC sender sets ECT on all packets unless it fails the test for
path support.
6. Security Considerations
There are several security arguments presented in RFC 3168 for
preventing the ECN marking of TCP control packets and retransmitted
segments. We believe all of them have been properly countered in
Section 4, particularly Section 4.2.4 and Section 4.8 on DoS attacks
using spoofed ECT-marked SYNs and spoofed CE-marked retransmissions.
In both cases, RFC 3168 attempted to legislate against the sender
setting ECT, which degrades the performance of genuine senders, but
will not be heeded by attackers. Instead, the approach adopted is to
specify reinforced defences against such attacks that already reside
in the network and at the receiver.
Section 3.2.6 on sending TCP RSTs considers the question of whether
ECT on RSTs will allow RST attacks to be intensified. It also points
out that implementers need to take care to ensure that the ECN field
on a RST does not depend on TCP's state machine. Otherwise the
internal information revealed could be of use to potential attackers.
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This point actually applies more generally to all control packets
(unless it has become necessary to disable ECN to evade path
traversal problems).
If each TCP implementation chooses to make different control packets
ECN-capable, it could contribute to easier fingerprinting of TCP
stacks.
7. IANA Considerations
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
There are no IANA considerations in this memo.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2018] Mathis, M., Mahdavi, J., Floyd, S., and A. Romanow, "TCP
Selective Acknowledgment Options", RFC 2018,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2018, October 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2018>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC3168] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP",
RFC 3168, DOI 10.17487/RFC3168, September 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3168>.
[RFC5961] Ramaiah, A., Stewart, R., and M. Dalal, "Improving TCP's
Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks", RFC 5961,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5961, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5961>.
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[I-D.ietf-tcpm-accurate-ecn]
Briscoe, B., Kühlewind, M., and R. Scheffenegger, "More
Accurate Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) Feedback
in TCP", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
tcpm-accurate-ecn-28, 17 November 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tcpm-
accurate-ecn-28>.
[RFC8311] Black, D., "Relaxing Restrictions on Explicit Congestion
Notification (ECN) Experimentation", RFC 8311,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8311, January 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8311>.
[RFC9293] Eddy, W., Ed., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)",
STD 7, RFC 9293, DOI 10.17487/RFC9293, August 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9293>.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC1122] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1122, October 1989,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1122>.
[RFC3540] Spring, N., Wetherall, D., and D. Ely, "Robust Explicit
Congestion Notification (ECN) Signaling with Nonces",
RFC 3540, DOI 10.17487/RFC3540, June 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3540>.
[RFC4960] Stewart, R., Ed., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
RFC 4960, DOI 10.17487/RFC4960, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4960>.
[RFC9260] Stewart, R., Tüxen, M., and K. Nielsen, "Stream Control
Transmission Protocol", RFC 9260, DOI 10.17487/RFC9260,
June 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9260>.
[I-D.stewart-tsvwg-sctpecn]
Stewart, R. R. and M. Tüxen, "Explicit Congestion
Notification for the Stream Control Transmission
Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
stewart-tsvwg-sctpecn-06, 20 October 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-stewart-
tsvwg-sctpecn-06>.
[RFC4987] Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common
Mitigations", RFC 4987, DOI 10.17487/RFC4987, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4987>.
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[RFC5562] Kuzmanovic, A., Mondal, A., Floyd, S., and K.
Ramakrishnan, "Adding Explicit Congestion Notification
(ECN) Capability to TCP's SYN/ACK Packets", RFC 5562,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5562, June 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5562>.
[RFC5681] Allman, M., Paxson, V., and E. Blanton, "TCP Congestion
Control", RFC 5681, DOI 10.17487/RFC5681, September 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5681>.
[RFC5690] Floyd, S., Arcia, A., Ros, D., and J. Iyengar, "Adding
Acknowledgement Congestion Control to TCP", RFC 5690,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5690, February 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5690>.
[RFC6298] Paxson, V., Allman, M., Chu, J., and M. Sargent,
"Computing TCP's Retransmission Timer", RFC 6298,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6298, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6298>.
[RFC6928] Chu, J., Dukkipati, N., Cheng, Y., and M. Mathis,
"Increasing TCP's Initial Window", RFC 6928,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6928, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6928>.
[RFC7323] Borman, D., Braden, B., Jacobson, V., and R.
Scheffenegger, Ed., "TCP Extensions for High Performance",
RFC 7323, DOI 10.17487/RFC7323, September 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7323>.
[RFC7413] Cheng, Y., Chu, J., Radhakrishnan, S., and A. Jain, "TCP
Fast Open", RFC 7413, DOI 10.17487/RFC7413, December 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7413>.
[RFC7567] Baker, F., Ed. and G. Fairhurst, Ed., "IETF
Recommendations Regarding Active Queue Management",
BCP 197, RFC 7567, DOI 10.17487/RFC7567, July 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7567>.
[RFC7661] Fairhurst, G., Sathiaseelan, A., and R. Secchi, "Updating
TCP to Support Rate-Limited Traffic", RFC 7661,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7661, October 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7661>.
[RFC8257] Bensley, S., Thaler, D., Balasubramanian, P., Eggert, L.,
and G. Judd, "Data Center TCP (DCTCP): TCP Congestion
Control for Data Centers", RFC 8257, DOI 10.17487/RFC8257,
October 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8257>.
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[RFC8511] Khademi, N., Welzl, M., Armitage, G., and G. Fairhurst,
"TCP Alternative Backoff with ECN (ABE)", RFC 8511,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8511, December 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8511>.
[RFC9040] Touch, J., Welzl, M., and S. Islam, "TCP Control Block
Interdependence", RFC 9040, DOI 10.17487/RFC9040, July
2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9040>.
[RFC9331] De Schepper, K. and B. Briscoe, Ed., "The Explicit
Congestion Notification (ECN) Protocol for Low Latency,
Low Loss, and Scalable Throughput (L4S)", RFC 9331,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9331, January 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9331>.
[RFC9330] Briscoe, B., Ed., De Schepper, K., Bagnulo, M., and G.
White, "Low Latency, Low Loss, and Scalable Throughput
(L4S) Internet Service: Architecture", RFC 9330,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9330, January 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9330>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
[RFC9438] Xu, L., Ha, S., Rhee, I., Goel, V., and L. Eggert, Ed.,
"CUBIC for Fast and Long-Distance Networks", RFC 9438,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9438, August 2023,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9438>.
[I-D.briscoe-iccrg-prague-congestion-control]
De Schepper, K., Tilmans, O., Briscoe, B., and V. Goel,
"Prague Congestion Control", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-briscoe-iccrg-prague-congestion-control-03,
14 October 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-briscoe-iccrg-prague-congestion-control-03>.
[judd-nsdi]
Judd, G.J., "Attaining the promise and avoiding the
pitfalls of TCP in the Datacenter", USENIX Symposium on
Networked Systems Design and Implementation
(NSDI'15) pp.145-157, May 2015,
<https://www.usenix.org/node/188966>.
[ecn-pam] Trammell, B., Kühlewind, M., Boppart, D., Learmonth, I.,
Fairhurst, G., and R. Scheffenegger, "Enabling Internet-
Wide Deployment of Explicit Congestion Notification",
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Int'l Conf. on Passive and Active Network Measurement
(PAM'15) pp193-205, 2015, <https://link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-15509-8_15>.
[ECN-PLUS] Kuzmanovic, A., "The Power of Explicit Congestion
Notification", ACM SIGCOMM 35(4):61--72, 2005,
<https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1080100>.
[Mandalari18]
Mandalari, A., Lutu, A., Briscoe, B., Bagnulo, M., and Ö.
Alay, "Measuring ECN++: Good News for ++, Bad News for ECN
over Mobile", IEEE Communications Magazine , March 2018,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8316790>.
[Manzoor17]
Manzoor, J., Drago, I., and R. Sadre, "How HTTP/2 is
changing Web traffic and how to detect it", In Proc:
Network Traffic Measurement and Analysis Conference (TMA)
2017 pp.1-9, June 2017,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8002899>.
[Kuehlewind18]
Kühlewind, M., Walter, M., Learmonth, I., and B. Trammell,
"Tracing Internet Path Transparency", In Proc: Network
Traffic Measurement and Analysis Conference (TMA) 2018 ,
June 2018, <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8506532>.
[strict-ecn]
Dumazet, E., "tcp: be more strict before accepting ECN
negociation", Linux netdev patch list , 4 May 2012,
<https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/156953/>.
[relax-strict-ecn]
Tilmans, O., "tcp: Accept ECT on SYN in the presence of
RFC8311", Linux netdev patch list , 3 April 2019,
<https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1057812/>.
[ecn-overload]
Steen, H., "Destruction Testing: Ultra-Low Delay using
Dual Queue Coupled Active Queue Management", Masters
Thesis, Uni Oslo , May 2017,
<https://urn.nb.no/URN:NBN:no-60155>.
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[DOCSIS3.1]
CableLabs, "MAC and Upper Layer Protocols Interface
(MULPI) Specification, CM-SP-MULPIv3.1", Data-Over-Cable
Service Interface Specifications DOCSIS® 3.1 Version i17
or later, 21 January 2019, <https://specification-
search.cablelabs.com/CM-SP-MULPIv3.1>.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Mirja Kühlewind, David Black, Padma Bhooma, Gorry
Fairhurst, Michael Scharf, Yuchung Cheng and Christophe Paasch for
their useful reviews. Richard Scheffenegger provided useful advice
gained from implementing ECN++ for FreeBSD.
The work of Marcelo Bagnulo has been partially funded by EU under
projects Stand-ICT CCI and H2020-ICT-2014-2 5G NORMA.
Bob Briscoe's contribution was partly funded by Apple Inc, partly by
the Research Council of Norway through the TimeIn project, partly by
CableLabs and partly by the Comcast Innovation Fund. The views
expressed here are solely those of the authors.
Authors' Addresses
Marcelo Bagnulo
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Av. Universidad 30
28911 Leganes Madrid
Spain
Phone: 34 91 6249500
Email: marcelo@it.uc3m.es
URI: https://www.it.uc3m.es
Bob Briscoe (editor)
Independent
United Kingdom
Email: ietf@bobbriscoe.net
URI: https://bobbriscoe.net/
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