Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-teep-usecase-for-cc-in-network
draft-ietf-teep-usecase-for-cc-in-network
TEEP Working Group P. Yang
Internet-Draft Dawning Information Industry Co., Ltd.
Intended status: Informational M. Chen
Expires: 23 August 2024 L. Su
China Mobile
T. Pang
Huawei Technology Co.,Ltd.
20 February 2024
TEEP Usecase for Confidential Computing in Network
draft-ietf-teep-usecase-for-cc-in-network-06
Abstract
Confidential computing is the protection of data in use by performing
computation in a hardware-based Trusted Execution Environment.
Confidential computing could provide integrity and confidentiality
for users who want to run applications and process data in that
environment. When confidential computing is used in scenarios which
need network to provision user data and applications, TEEP
architecture and protocol could be used. This usecase illustrates
the steps of how to deploy applications, containers, VMs and data in
different confidential computing hardware in network. This document
is a use case and extension of TEEP architecture and could provide
guidance for cloud computing, MEC and other scenarios to use
confidential computing in network.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 August 2024.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Notional Architecture of using confidential computing in
network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Case 1: UA, TA and PD are bundled as a package . . . . . 5
4.2. Case 2: PD is a separate package, TA and UA are
integrated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Case 3: TA and PD are separate packages, with or without
UA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.4. Case 4: TA and PD are bundled as a package, with or without
UA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.5. Case 5: PD and UA are bundled as a package, TA is a
separate package . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.1. Normative Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8.2. Informative Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Submodules in TEEP Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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1. Introduction
The Confidential Computing Consortium defined the concept of
confidential computing as the protection of data in use by performing
computation in a hardware-based Trusted Execution Environment
[CCC-White-Paper]. In detail, computing unit with confidential
computing feature could generate an isolated hardware-protected area,
in which data and applications could be protected from illegal access
or tampering. When using network to provision confidential
computing, users need to choose appropriate steps to deploy their
data and applications. This network could be in a cloud, MEC [MEC]
or other network that provide confidential computing resource to
users. For example in MEC, the autonomous vehicles could deploy
private applications and data in confidential computing device to
calculate on-vehicle and destination road information without knowing
by MEC platform.
The TEEP WG defined the standardization of an architecture and
protocol for managing the lifecycle of trusted applications running
inside a TEE. In confidential computing, the TEE can also be
provisioned and managed by TEEP architecture
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] and protocol [I-D.ietf-teep-protocol].
By referring TEEP architecture and protocol, applications and data
could be provisioned in confidential process, confidential container
and confidential VM in different hardware architecture. The intended
audiences for this use case are network users and operators who are
interested in using confidential computing in network.
2. Terminology
2.1. Terms
The following terms are used in this document.
* Network Management/Orchestration Center(Network M/OC): M/OC exists
in the management and orchestration layer of network. Network
User uses the M/OC to request for computing resource. The TAM is
inside the M/OC to provide management function to TEEP Agent via
TEEP broker.
* Network User: Network User possesses personalization data and/or
applications that need to be deployed on confidential computing
device.
* Confidential Computing Device: Confidential Computing Device is
connected by the network and can provide confidential computing
service to Network User.
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* Package: Package is a unit that is owned by Network User or TAM,
and could be deployed on TEE/REE or treated as application data.
If the TAM owns the Package, there must have no Personalization
Data inside this Package. TA (Trusted Application) in
confidential computing could be an application, or packaged with
other components like library, TEE shim or even Guest OS. The
specific package of confidential computing could refers to the
white paper of [CCC_Common_Terminology] by CCC.
* Personalization Data(PD): Data that holds by Network User and
needs to be protected by TEE during processing. Other terms like
TAM, TEE, REE, TA will reuse the term definition defined in
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture].
2.2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Notional Architecture of using confidential computing in network
Figure 1 is the architecture of confidential computing in network.
Two new components Network User and Network M/OC are introduced in
this document. The connection between Network User and Network M/OC
depends on the implementation of specific network. The connection
between Network User and UA (Untrusted Application) or TA depends on
the implementation of application. The connection between TAM, TEEP
Broker and TEEP Agent refers to the TEEP protocol. Interactions of
all components in this scenario are described in the Usecase section.
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+--------------------------------------+
| Confidential Computing Device |
| +--------+ | +------------+
| +-------------+ | | | |Network M/OC|
| | TEE | | TEEP | | | +-------+ |
| | +--------+ | +---> Broker <-----------> | |
| | | TEEP | | | | | | | | TAM | |
| | | Agent |<----+ | | | | | | |
| | +--------+ | | <--+ | | +---^---+ |
| | | +--------+ | | +-----|------+
| | +--------+ | | | |
| | | TA | | +-------+ | | |
| | | |<--------> |<--+ | |
| | +--------+ | | UA | | +-----V------+
| +-------------+ | |<--------->Network User|
| +-------+ | | (Package) |
+--------------------------------------+ +------------+
Figure 1: notional architecture of confidential computing in network
4. Use Cases
The basic process of how a Network User utilizes confidential
computing is shown below. At present, the main confidential
instances types exist in industry are confidential process,
confidential container and confidential VM. The definition of these
instances could be found at [CCC-White-Paper]. Since confidential
computing is a hardware-based technology, different hardware could
support different confidential instances. This document gathers the
main hardware architectures that support confidential computing,
which include [TrustZone], [SGX], [SEV-SNP], [CCA] and [TDX]. The
following use cases are possible packaging models and how to deploy
them in different hardware architecture. In the following tables,
the brace means the operation steps to deploy packages. The arrow
means deploy package to a destination. The "att" means attestation
challenge for the target. All these actions in the following use
cases could be expressed by TEEP protocol.
4.1. Case 1: UA, TA and PD are bundled as a package
In this case, UA, TA and PD are bundled as a package. This package
is bundled by Network User and sends to TAM by specific netwwork.
When TAM tries to deploy this package in confidential computing
device, the process of TEEP is as follow.
1. Network User requests for confidential computing resource to
Network M/OC.
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2. M/OC orchestrates confidential computing device to undertake the
request.
3. TAM requests remote attestation to TEEP Agent, TEEP Agent then
sends the evidence to TAM. TAM works as Verifier in [RFC9334].
4. After verification, Network User works as Relying Party to
receive the attestation result. If positive, Network User
establishes secure channel [NIST-Special-Publication-800-133-V2]
with TEEP Agent, and transfers this package to TEEP Agent.
5. TEEP Agent deploys TA and personalization data in TEE, then
deploy UA in REE.
As for informing Network Users to develop their applications and
data, the mapping of UA, TA and implementations are shown in figure
2.
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------+
|Package Model| Case 1 (UA, TA, PD) |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| | Confidential | Confidential | |
| Instance | Process in | Container in | Confidential |
| Type | Physical or | Physical or | VM |
| | Virtual Machine| Virtual Machine| |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Hardware | TrustZone, | TrustZone,SGX,| |
| Architecture| SGX | SEV-SNP, CCA, | SEV-SNP,CCA,TDX|
| | | TDX | |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| |{att TEEP Agent,|{att TEEP Agent,|{att TEEP Agent,|
| Load | (UA,TA,PD)-> | (UA,TA,PD)-> | (UA,TA,PD)-> |
| Sequence | Confidential | Confidential | Confidential |
| | Process, | Container, | VM, |
| | UA->REE} | UA->REE} | UA->REE} |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
Figure 2: TEEP Implementation of Case 1
4.2. Case 2: PD is a separate package, TA and UA are integrated
In this use case, PD is a separate package, the UA and TA are
integrated as a package. If Network User provides packages like
this, the process of TEEP is as follow.
1. Network User requests for confidential computing resource to
Network M/OC.
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2. M/OC orchestrates confidential computing device to undertake the
request.
3. Network User transfers UA and TA to confidential computing device
via TAM. TAM then deploys these two applications in REE and TEE
respectively. (In SGX, UA must be deployed first, then let UA to
load TA in SGX.)
4. TAM requests remote attestation to TEEP Agent, TEEP Agent then
sends the evidence to TAM. TAM works as Verifier in RATs
architecture.
5. After verification, Network User works as Relying Party to
receive the attestation result. If positive, Network User
establishes secure channel with TA, and deploys personalization
data to TA.
The mapping of UA, TA and implementations are shown in figure 3.
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------+
|Package Mode | Case 2 (UA, TA) (PD) |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| | Confidential | Confidential | |
| Instance | Process in | Container in | Confidential |
| Type | Physical or | Physical or | VM |
| | Virtual Machine| Virtual Machine| |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Hardware | TrustZone, | TrustZone, SGX,| |
| Architecture| SGX | SEV-SNP, CCA, | SEV,CCA,TDX |
| | | TDX | |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| | {UA->REE, | {UA->REE, | {UA->REE, |
| |TA->Confidential|TA->Confidential|TA->Confidential|
| Load | Process, | Container, | VM, |
| Sequence | att TEEP Agent,| att TEEP Agent,| att TEEP Agent,|
| | PD->TA} | PD->TA} | PD->TA} |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
Figure 3: TEEP Implementation of Case 2
4.3. Case 3: TA and PD are separate packages, with or without UA
In this case, Network User provides TA and PD as separate packages
with or without UA. The process of TEEP in this case is as follow.
1. Network User requests for confidential computing resource to
Network M/OC.
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2. TAM in M/OC orchestrates confidential computing device to
undertake the request.
3. Network User transfers UA to TAM, then TAM deploys UA in REE.
4. Network User transfers TA to TAM, then TAM transfers TA to TEEP
Agent.
5. TAM requests remote attestation to TEEP Agent, TEEP Agent then
sends the evidence to TAM. TAM works as Verifier in RATs
architecture.
6. After verification, Network User works as Relying Party to
receive the attestation result. If positive, Network User
establishes secure channel with TA and transfers PD to it.
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------+
|Package Mode | Case 3 (TA),(PD) or (TA),(PD),(UA) |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| | Confidential | Confidential | |
| Instance | Process in | Container in | Confidential |
| Type | Physical or | Physical or | VM |
| | Virtual Machine| Virtual Machine| |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Hardware | TrustZone, | TrustZone, SGX,| SEV,CCA,TDX |
| Architecture| SGX | SEV, CCA, TDX | |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Load | {UA->REE, | {UA->REE, | {UA->REE, |
| Sequence |TA->Confidential|TA->Confidential|TA->Confidential|
| | Process, | Container | VM, |
| | att TEEP Agent,| att TEEP Agent,| att TEEP Agent,|
| | PD->TA} | PD->TA} | PD->TA} |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
Figure 4: TEEP Implementation of Case 3
4.4. Case 4: TA and PD are bundled as a package, with or without UA
In this case, the process of TEEP is as follow.
1. Network User requests for confidential computing resource to
Network M/OC.
2. TAM in M/OC orchestrates confidential computing device to
undertake the request.
3. If there has UA, Network User deploys UA in REE.
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4. TAM requests remote attestation to TEEP Agent, TEEP Agent then
sends the evidence to TAM. The TAM works as Verifier in RATs
architecture.
5. After verification, Network User works as Relying Party to
receive the attestation result. If positive, Network User
establishes secure channel with TEEP Agent and transfers TA and
PD package to TEEP Agent.
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------+
|Package Mode | Case 4 (TA, PD) (UA) or (TA, PD) |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| | Confidential | Confidential | |
| Instance | Process in | Container in | Confidential |
| Type | Physical or | Physical or | VM |
| | Virtual Machine| Virtual Machine| |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Hardware | TrustZone, | TrustZone, SGX,| |
| Architecture| SGX | SEV-SNP, CCA, | SEV,CCA,TDX |
| | | TDX | |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| | {UA->REE, | {UA->REE, | {UA->REE, |
| Load | att TEEP Agent,| att TEEP Agent,| att TEEP Agent,|
| Sequence | (TA,PD)-> | (TA,PD)-> | (TA,PD)-> |
| | Confidential | Confidential | Confidential |
| | Process} | Container} | VM} |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
Figure 5: TEEP Implementation of Case 4
4.5. Case 5: PD and UA are bundled as a package, TA is a separate
package
In this case, the process of TEEP is as follow.
1. Network User requests for confidential computing resource to
Network M/OC.
2. TAM in M/OC orchestrates confidential computing device to
undertake the request.
3. TAM requests remote attestation to TEEP Agent, TEEP Agent then
sends the evidence to TAM. The TAM works as Verifier in RATs
architecture.
4. After verification, Network User works as Relying Party to
receive the attestation result. If positive, TAM deploys TA in
TEE.
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5. TA decrypts the PD and UA package inside TEE.
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------+
|Package Mode | Case 5 (UA, PD) (TA) |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| | Confidential | Confidential | |
| Instance | Process in | Container in | Confidential |
| Type | Physical or | Physical or | VM |
| | Virtual Machine| Virtual Machine| |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| Hardware | TrustZone, | TrustZone, SGX,| |
| Architecture| SGX | SEV-SNP, CCA, | SEV,CCA,TDX |
| | | TDX | |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
| |{att TEEP Agent,|{att TEEP Agent,|{att TEEP Agent,|
| Load | TA-> | TA-> | TA-> |
| Sequence | Confidential | Confidential | Confidential |
| | Process, | Container, | VM, |
| | (UA,PD)->TA} | (UA,PD)->TA} | (UA,PD)->TA} |
+-------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+
Figure 6: TEEP Implementation of Case 5
5. IANA Considerations
This document does not require actions by IANA.
6. Security Considerations
Besides the security considerations in TEEP architecture, there is no
more security and privacy issues in this document.
7. Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Dave Thaler, Eric Voit, Hannes Tschofenig, the CCC TAC
meeting and other people who provide comments and suggestions.
8. References
8.1. Normative Reference
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. M. Wheeler,
"Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-teep-architecture-19, 24 October 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-teep-
architecture-19>.
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[I-D.ietf-teep-protocol]
Tschofenig, H., Pei, M., Wheeler, D. M., Thaler, D., and
A. Tsukamoto, "Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning
(TEEP) Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-teep-protocol-18, 6 November 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-teep-
protocol-18>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS)
Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January
2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9334>.
8.2. Informative Reference
[CCA] ARM, "Arm Confidential Computing Architecture", March
2022, <https://www.arm.com/architecture/security-features/
arm-confidential-compute-architecture>.
[CCC-White-Paper]
Confidential Computing Consortium, "Confidential
Computing: Hardware-Based Trusted Execution for
Applications and Data", January 2021,
<https://confidentialcomputing.io/white-papers-reports/>.
[CCC_Common_Terminology]
Confidential Computing Consortium, "Common Terminology for
Confidential Computing", October 2022,
<https://github.com/confidentialcomputing/governance/blob/
main/terminology/commonterminology.md>.
[MEC] ETSI, "Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC);Framework and
Reference Architecture", March 2022,
<https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gs/
MEC/001_099/003/03.01.01_60/gs_MEC003v030101p.pdf>.
[NIST-Special-Publication-800-133-V2]
NIST, "Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation",
June 2020,
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/
NIST.SP.800-133r2.pdf>.
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[SEV-SNP] Advanced Micro Devices, "AMD SEV-SNP: Strengthening VM-
isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-more", January
2020, <https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/SEV-SNP-
strengthening-vm-isolation-with-integrity-protection-and-
more.pdf>.
[SGX] Intel, "Overview of Intel Software Guard Extension", June
2016,
<https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/tools/
software-guard-extensions/overview.html>.
[TDX] Intel, "Intel Trust Domain Extensions", August 2021,
<https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/
articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html>.
[TrustZone]
HUAWEI Technologies, "Kunpeng BoostKit for Confidential
Computing TrustZone Kit", January 2022,
<https://www.hikunpeng.com/document/detail/en/
kunpengcctrustzone/overview/kunpengcctrustzone.html>.
Appendix A. Submodules in TEEP Agent
The original design of TEEP only includes TEEP Agent and TA inside
TEE. While in confidential computing implementation, other
submodules may also be involved in the TEE. In TEEP, these
submodules could be covered by TEEP Agent.
In SGX based confidential computing, submodule could provide
convenient environment or API in which TA does not have to modify its
source code to fit into SGX instructions. Submodules like Gramine
and Occlum .etc are examples that could be included in TEEP Agent.
If there is no submodule in TEEP Agent, the TA and UA need to be
customized applications which fit into the SGX architecture.
In SEV and other architectures that support whole guest VM as a TEE,
TEEP Agent doesn't have to use extra submodule to work as a
middleware or API. However with some submodules like Enarx which
works as a runtime JIT compiler, TA could be deployed in a hardware
independent way. In this scenario, TA could be deployed in different
hardware architecture without re-compiling.
Authors' Addresses
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Penglin Yang
Dawning Information Industry Co., Ltd.
No. 36, Zhongguancun Software Park, No.8, West Dongbeiwang Road, Haidian District
Beijing
100193
China
Email: ypl_ietf@163.com
Meiling Chen
China Mobile
32 Xuanwumen West Street, Xicheng District
Beijing
100053
China
Email: chenmeiling@chinamobile.com
Li Su
China Mobile
32 Xuanwumen West Street, Xicheng District
Beijing
100053
China
Email: suli@chinamobile.com
Ting Pang
Huawei Technology Co.,Ltd.
127 Jinye Road, Yanta District
Xi'an
710077
China
Email: pangting@huawei.com
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