Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension
draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension
TLS M. Shore
Internet-Draft Fastly
Intended status: Standards Track R. Barnes
Expires: September 22, 2018 Mozilla
S. Huque
Salesforce
W. Toorop
NLnet Labs
March 21, 2018
A DANE Record and DNSSEC Authentication Chain Extension for TLS
draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension-07
Abstract
This draft describes a new TLS extension for transport of a DNS
record set serialized with the DNSSEC signatures needed to
authenticate that record set. The intent of this proposal is to
allow TLS clients to perform DANE authentication of a TLS server
without needing to perform additional DNS record lookups. It is not
intended to be used to validate the TLS server's address records.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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publication of this document. Please review these documents
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Requirements Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. DNSSEC Authentication Chain Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Protocol, TLS 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Protocol, TLS 1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Raw Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.4. DNSSEC Authentication Chain Data . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Construction of Serialized Authentication Chains . . . . . . 7
5. Caching and Regeneration of the Authentication Chain . . . . 8
6. Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Trust Anchor Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Mandating use of this extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. DANE and Traditional PKIX Interoperation . . . . . . . . . . 10
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
12. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Test vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.1. _443._tcp.www.example.com . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.2. _25._tcp.example.com wildcard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.3. _443._tcp.www.example.org CNAME . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.4. _443._tcp.www.example.net DNAME . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Requirements Notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Introduction
This draft describes a new TLS [RFC5246] [TLS13] extension for
transport of a DNS record set serialized with the DNSSEC signatures
[RFC4034] needed to authenticate that record set. The intent of this
proposal is to allow TLS clients to perform DANE Authentication
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[RFC6698] [RFC7671] of a TLS server without performing additional DNS
record lookups and incurring the associated latency penalty. It also
provides the ability to avoid potential problems with TLS clients
being unable to look up DANE records because of an interfering or
broken middlebox on the path between the client and a DNS server
[HAMPERING]. And lastly, it allows a TLS client to validate the
server's DANE (TLSA) records itself without needing access to a
validating DNS resolver to which it has a secure connection.
This mechanism is useful for TLS applications that need to address
the problems described above, typically web browsers or SIP/VoIP
[RFC3261] and XMPP [RFC7590]. It may not be relevant for many other
applications. For example, SMTP MTAs are usually located in data
centers, may tolerate extra DNS lookup latency, are on servers where
it is easier to provision a validating resolver, or are less likely
to experience traffic interference from misconfigured middleboxes.
Furthermore, SMTP MTAs usually employ Opportunistic Security
[RFC7672], in which the presence of the DNS TLSA records is used to
determine whether to enforce an authenticated TLS connection. Hence
DANE authentication of SMTP MTAs will typically not use this
mechanism.
The extension described here allows a TLS client to request that the
TLS server return the DNSSEC authentication chain corresponding to
its DANE record. If the server is configured for DANE
authentication, then it performs the appropriate DNS queries, builds
the authentication chain, and returns it to the client. The server
will usually use a previously cached authentication chain, but it
will need to rebuild it periodically as described in Section 5. The
client then authenticates the chain using a pre-configured trust
anchor.
This specification is based on Adam Langley's original proposal for
serializing DNSSEC authentication chains and delivering them in an
X.509 certificate extension [I-D.agl-dane-serializechain]. It
modifies the approach by using wire format DNS records in the
serialized data (assuming that the data will be prepared and consumed
by a DNS-specific library), and by using a TLS extension to deliver
the data.
As described in the DANE specification [RFC6698] [RFC7671], this
procedure applies to the DANE authentication of X.509 certificates or
raw public keys [RFC7250].
3. DNSSEC Authentication Chain Extension
3.1. Protocol, TLS 1.2
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A client MAY include an extension of type "dnssec_chain" in the
(extended) ClientHello. The "extension_data" field of this extension
MUST be empty.
Servers receiving a "dnssec_chain" extension in the ClientHello and
which are capable of being authenticated via DANE, return a
serialized authentication chain in the extended ServerHello message
using the format described below. If a server is unable to return an
authentication chain, or does not wish to return an authentication
chain, it does not include a dnssec_chain extension. As with all TLS
extensions, if the server does not support this extension it will not
return any authentication chain.
3.2. Protocol, TLS 1.3
A client MAY include an extension of type "dnssec_chain" in the
ClientHello. The "extension_data" field of this extension MUST be
empty.
Servers receiving a "dnssec_chain" extension in the ClientHello, and
which are capable of being authenticated via DANE, return a
serialized authentication chain in the extension block of the
Certificate message containing the end entity certificate being
validated, using the format described below.
The extension protocol behavior otherwise follows that specified for
TLS version 1.2.
3.3. Raw Public Keys
[RFC7250] specifies the use of raw public keys for both server and
client authentication in TLS 1.2. It points out that in cases where
raw public keys are being used, code for certificate path validation
is not required. However, DANE, when used in conjunction with the
dnssec_chain extension, provides a mechanism for securely binding a
raw public key to a named entity in the DNS, and when using DANE for
authentication a raw key may be validated using a path chaining back
to a DNSSEC trust root. This has the added benefit of mitigating an
unknown key share attack, as described in [I-D.barnes-dane-uks],
since it effectively augments the raw public key with the server's
name and provides a means to commit both the server and the client to
using that binding.
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The UKS attack is possible in situations in which the association
between a domain name and a public key is not tightly bound, as in
the case in DANE in which a client either ignores the name in the
certificate (as specified in [RFC7671]) or there is no attestation of
trust outside of the DNS. The vulnerability arises in the following
situations:
o If the client does not verify the identity in the server's
certificate (as recommended in Section 5.1 of [RFC7671]), then an
attacker can induce the client to accept an unintended identity
for the server,
o If the client allows the use of raw public keys in TLS, then it
will not receive any indication of the server's identity in the
TLS channel, and is thus unable to check that the server's
identity is as intended.
The mechanism for conveying DNSSEC validation chains described in
this document results in a commitment by both parties, via the TLS
handshake, to a validated domain name and EE key.
The mechanism for encoding DNSSEC authentication chains in a TLS
extension, as described in this document, is not limited to public
keys encapsulated in X.509 containers but MAY be applied to raw
public keys and other representations, as well.
3.4. DNSSEC Authentication Chain Data
The "extension_data" field of the "dnssec_chain" extension MUST
contain a DNSSEC Authentication Chain encoded in the following form:
opaque AuthenticationChain<1..2^16-1>
The AuthenticationChain structure is composed of a sequence of
uncompressed wire format DNS resource record sets (RRset) and
corresponding signatures (RRSIG) record sets.
This sequence of native DNS wire format records enables easier
generation of the data structure on the server and easier
verification of the data on client by means of existing DNS library
functions.
Each RRset in the chain is composed of a sequence of wire format DNS
resource records. The format of the resource record is described in
RFC 1035 [RFC1035], Section 3.2.1.
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RR(i) = owner | type | class | TTL | RDATA length | RDATA
where RR(i) denotes the ith RR.
The resource records that make up a RRset all have the same owner,
type and class, but different RDATA as specified RFC 2181 [RFC2181],
Section 5. Each RRset in the sequence is followed by its associated
RRsig record set. This RRset has the same owner and class as the
preceding RRset, but has type RRSIG. The Type Covered field in the
RDATA of the RRsigs identifies the type of the preceding RRset as
described in RFC 4034 [RFC4034], Section 3. The RRsig record wire
format is described in RFC 4034 [RFC4034], Section 3.1. The
signature portion of the RDATA, as described in the same section, is
the following:
signature = sign(RRSIG_RDATA | RR(1) | RR(2)... )
where RRSIG_RDATA is the wire format of the RRSIG RDATA fields with
the Signer's Name field in canonical form and the signature field
excluded.
The first RRset in the chain MUST contain the TLSA record set being
presented. However, if the owner name of the TLSA record set is an
alias (CNAME or DNAME), then it MUST be preceded by the chain of
alias records needed to resolve it. DNAME chains SHOULD omit
unsigned CNAME records that may have been synthesized in the response
from a DNS resolver. (If unsigned synthetic CNAMES are present, then
the TLS client will just ignore them, as they are not necessary to
validate the chain.)
The subsequent RRsets MUST contain the full set of DNS records needed
to authenticate the TLSA record set from the server's trust anchor.
Typically this means a set of DNSKEY and DS RRsets that cover all
zones from the target zone containing the TLSA record set to the
trust anchor zone. The TLS client should be prepared to receive this
set of RRsets in any order.
Names that are aliased via CNAME and/or DNAME records may involve
multiple branches of the DNS tree. In this case, the authentication
chain structure needs to include DS and DNSKEY record sets that cover
all the necessary branches.
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If the TLSA record set was synthesized by a DNS wildcard, the chain
MUST include the signed NSEC or NSEC3 [RFC5155] records that prove
that there was no explicit match of the TLSA record name and no
closer wildcard match.
The final DNSKEY RRset in the authentication chain corresponds to the
trust anchor (typically the DNS root). This trust anchor is also
preconfigured in the TLS client, but including it in the response
from the server permits TLS clients to use the automated trust anchor
rollover mechanism defined in RFC 5011 [RFC5011] to update their
configured trust anchor.
The following is an example of the records in the AuthenticationChain
structure for the HTTPS server at www.example.com, where there are
zone cuts at "com." and "example.com." (record data are omitted here
for brevity):
_443._tcp.www.example.com. TLSA
RRSIG(_443._tcp.www.example.com. TLSA)
example.com. DNSKEY
RRSIG(example.com. DNSKEY)
example.com. DS
RRSIG(example.com. DS)
com. DNSKEY
RRSIG(com. DNSKEY)
com. DS
RRSIG(com. DS)
. DNSKEY
RRSIG(. DNSKEY)
4. Construction of Serialized Authentication Chains
This section describes a possible procedure for the server to use to
build the serialized DNSSEC chain.
When the goal is to perform DANE authentication [RFC6698] [RFC7671]
of the server, the DNS record set to be serialized is a TLSA record
set corresponding to the server's domain name, protocol, and port
number.
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The domain name of the server MUST be that included in the TLS
server_name extension [RFC6066] when present. If the server_name
extension is not present, or if the server does not recognize the
provided name and wishes to proceed with the handshake rather than to
abort the connection, the server picks one of its configured domain
names associated with the server IP address to which the connection
has been established.
The TLSA record to be queried is constructed by prepending the _port
and _transport labels to the domain name as described in [RFC6698],
where "port" is the port number associated with the TLS server. The
transport is "tcp" for TLS servers, and "udp" for DTLS servers. The
port number label is the left-most label, followed by the transport,
followed by the base domain name.
The components of the authentication chain are typically built by
starting at the target record set and its corresponding RRSIG. Then
traversing the DNS tree upwards towards the trust anchor zone
(normally the DNS root), for each zone cut, the DNSKEY and DS RRsets
and their signatures are added. However, see Section 3.4 for
specific processing needed for aliases and wildcards. If DNS
response messages contain any domain names utilizing name compression
[RFC1035], then they MUST be uncompressed.
Newer DNS protocol enhancements, such as the EDNS Chain Query
extension [RFC7901] if supported, may offer easier ways to obtain all
of the chain data in one transaction with an upstream DNSSEC aware
recursive server.
5. Caching and Regeneration of the Authentication Chain
DNS records have Time To Live (TTL) parameters, and DNSSEC signatures
have validity periods (specifically signature expiration times).
After the TLS server constructs the serialized authentication chain,
it SHOULD cache and reuse it in multiple TLS connection handshakes.
However, it MUST refresh and rebuild the chain as TTLs and signature
validity periods dictate. A server implementation could carefully
track these parameters and requery component records in the chain
correspondingly. Alternatively, it could be configured to rebuild
the entire chain at some predefined periodic interval that does not
exceed the DNS TTLs or signature validity periods of the component
records in the chain.
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6. Verification
A TLS client making use of this specification, and which receives a
DNSSEC authentication chain extension from a server, MUST use this
information to perform DANE authentication of the server. In order
to do this, it uses the mechanism specified by the DNSSEC protocol
[RFC4035] [RFC5155]. This mechanism is sometimes implemented in a
DNSSEC validation engine or library.
If the authentication chain is correctly verified, the client then
performs DANE authentication of the server according to the DANE TLS
protocol [RFC6698] [RFC7671].
Clients MAY cache the server's validated TLSA RRset or other
validated portions of the chain as an optimization to save signature
verification work for future connections. The period of such caching
MUST NOT exceed the TTL associated with those records. A client that
possesses a validated and unexpired TLSA RRset or the full chain in
its cache does not need to send the dnssec_chain extension for
subsequent connections to the same TLS server. It can use the cached
information to perform DANE authentication.
7. Trust Anchor Maintenance
The trust anchor may change periodically, e.g. when the operator of
the trust anchor zone performs a DNSSEC key rollover. TLS clients
using this specification MUST implement a mechanism to keep their
trust anchors up to date. They could use the method defined in
[RFC5011] to perform trust anchor updates inband in TLS, by tracking
the introduction of new keys seen in the trust anchor DNSKEY RRset.
However, alternative mechanisms external to TLS may also be utilized.
Some operating systems may have a system-wide service to maintain and
keep the root trust anchor up to date. In such cases, the TLS client
application could simply reference that as its trust anchor,
periodically checking whether it has changed. Some applications may
prefer to implement trust anchor updates as part of their automated
software updates.
8. Mandating use of this extension
Green field applications that are designed to always employ this
extension, could of course unconditionally mandate its use.
If TLS applications want to mandate the use of this extension for
specific servers, clients could maintain a whitelist of sites where
the use of this extension is forced. The client would refuse to
authenticate such servers if they failed to deliver this extension.
Client applications could also employ a Trust on First Use (TOFU)
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like strategy, whereby they would record the fact that a server
offered the extension and use that knowledge to require it for
subsequent connections.
This protocol currently provides no way for a server to prove that it
doesn't have a TLSA record. Hence absent whitelists, a client
misdirected to a server that has fraudulently acquired a public CA
issued certificate for the real server's name, could be induced to
establish a PKIX verified connection to the rogue server that
precluded DANE authentication. This could be solved by enhancing
this protocol to require that servers without TLSA records need to
provide a DNSSEC authentication chain that proves this (i.e. the
chain includes NSEC or NSEC3 records that demonstrate either the
absence of the TLSA record, or the absence of a secure delegation to
the associated zone). Such an enhancement would be impossible to
deploy incrementally though since it requires all TLS servers to
support this protocol.
One possible way to address the threat of attackers that have
fraudulently obtained valid PKIX credentials, is to use current PKIX
defense mechanisms, such as checking Certificate Transparency logs to
detect certificate misissuance. This may be necessary anyway, as TLS
servers may support both DANE and PKIX authentication. Even TLS
servers that support only DANE may be interested in detecting PKIX
adversaries impersonating their service to DANE unaware TLS clients.
9. DANE and Traditional PKIX Interoperation
When DANE is being introduced incrementally into an existing PKIX
environment, there may be scenarios in which DANE authentication for
a server fails but PKIX succeeds, or vice versa. What happens here
depends on TLS client policy. If DANE authentication fails, the
client may decide to fallback to traditional PKIX authentication. In
order to do so efficiently within the same TLS handshake, the TLS
server needs to have provided the full X.509 certificate chain. When
TLS servers only support DANE-EE or DANE-TA modes, they have the
option to send a much smaller certificate chain: just the EE
certificate for the former, and a short certificate chain from the
DANE trust anchor to the EE certificate for the latter. If the TLS
server supports both DANE and traditional PKIX, and wants to allow
efficient PKIX fallback within the same handshake, they should always
provide the full X.509 certificate chain.
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10. Security Considerations
The security considerations of the normatively referenced RFCs all
pertain to this extension. Since the server is delivering a chain of
DNS records and signatures to the client, it MUST rebuild the chain
in accordance with TTL and signature expiration of the chain
components as described in Section 5. TLS clients need roughly
accurate time in order to properly authenticate these signatures.
This could be achieved by running a time synchronization protocol
like NTP [RFC5905] or SNTP [RFC5905], which are already widely used
today. TLS clients MUST support a mechanism to track and rollover
the trust anchor key, or be able to avail themselves of a service
that does this, as described in Section 7. Security considerations
related to mandating the use of this extension are described in
Section 8.
11. IANA Considerations
This extension requires the registration of a new value in the TLS
ExtensionsType registry. The value requested from IANA is 53, and
the extension should be marked "Recommended" in accordance with "IANA
Registry Updates for TLS and DTLS" [TLSIANA].
12. Acknowledgments
Many thanks to Adam Langley for laying the groundwork for this
extension. The original idea is his but our acknowledgment in no way
implies his endorsement. This document also benefited from
discussions with and review from the following people: Viktor
Dukhovni, Daniel Kahn Gillmor, Jeff Hodges, Allison Mankin, Patrick
McManus, Rick van Rein, Ilari Liusvaara, Eric Rescorla, Gowri
Visweswaran, Duane Wessels, Nico Williams, and Paul Wouters.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2181] Elz, R. and R. Bush, "Clarifications to the DNS
Specification", RFC 2181, DOI 10.17487/RFC2181, July 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2181>.
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[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, March 2005.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.
[RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC6066] Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, January 2011.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, August 2012.
[RFC7671] Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "The DNS-Based
Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol: Updates
and Operational Guidance", RFC 7671, DOI 10.17487/RFC7671,
October 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7671>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[TLS13] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", March 2018, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-tls-tls13>.
[TLSIANA] Salowey, J. and S. Turner, "IANA Registry Updates for TLS
and DTLS", , <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-
iana-registry-updates>.
13.2. Informative References
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, June 2002, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc3261>.
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[RFC5011] StJohns, M., "Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC)
Trust Anchors", STD 74, RFC 5011, September 2007.
[RFC5905] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch, "Network
Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
Specification", RFC 5905, June 2010.
[RFC7120] Cotton, M., "Early IANA Allocation of Standards Track Code
Points", BCP 100, RFC 7120, January 2014.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Tschofenig, H., Gilmore, J., Weiler, S., and
T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", RFC 7250, June 2014.
[RFC7590] Saint-Andre, P. and T. Alkemade, "Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP)", RFC 7590, DOI 10.17487/RFC7590, June
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7590>.
[RFC7672] Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "SMTP Security via
Opportunistic DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities
(DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7672, DOI
10.17487/RFC7672, October 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7672>.
[RFC7901] Wouters, P., "CHAIN Query Requests in DNS", RFC 7901, DOI
10.17487/RFC7901, June 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7901>.
[I-D.agl-dane-serializechain]
Langley, A., "Serializing DNS Records with DNSSEC
Authentication", draft-agl-dane-serializechain-01 (work in
progress), July 2011.
[I-D.barnes-dane-uks]
Barnes, R., Thomson, M., and E. Rescorla, "Unknown Key-
Share Attacks on DNS-based Authentications of Named
Entities (DANE)", draft-barnes-dane-uks-00 (work in
progress), October 2016.
[HAMPERING]
Gorjon, X. and W. Toorop, "Discovery method for a DNSSEC
validating stub resolver", July 2015, <http://
www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/publications/os3-2015-rp2
-xavier-torrent-gorjon.pdf>.
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Appendix A. Test vectors
The provided test vectors will authenticate the certificate used with
https://example.com/, https://example.net/ and https://example.org/
at the time of writing:
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
For brevity and reproducability all DNS zones involved with the test
vectors are signed using keys with algorithm 13: ECDSA Curve P-256
with SHA-256.
To reflect operational practice, different zones in the examples are
in different phases of rolling their signing keys:
Shore, et al. Expires September 22, 2018 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension March 2018
All zones use a Key Signing Key (KSK) and Zone Signing Key (ZSK),
except for the example.com and example.net zones which use a
Combined Signing Key (CSK).
The root and org zones are rolling their ZSK's.
The com and org zones are rolling their KSK's.
The test vectors are DNSSEC valid in the same period as the
certificate is valid, which is in between November 3 2015 and
November 28 2018, with the following root trust anchor:
. IN DS ( 47005 13 2 2eb6e9f2480126691594d649a5a613de3052e37861634
641bb568746f2ffc4d4 )
A.1. _443._tcp.www.example.com
_443._tcp.www.example.com. 3600 IN TLSA ( 3 1 1
c66bef6a5c1a3e78b82016e13f314f3cc5fa25b1e52aab9adb9ec5989b165
ada )
_443._tcp.www.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG ( TLSA 13 5 3600
20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com.
uml1DUjp5RfrXn9WtuMxEQV+ygzrONcuzsnyfOGSszwaDdkSOJ0Kndcfbb2Il
LUV04Z+V488+Sd1jr7/21tsKA== )
example.com. 3600 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
JnA1XgyJTZz+psWvbrfUWLV6ULqIJyUS2CQdhUH9VK35bslWeJpRzrlxCUs7s
/TsSfZMaGWVvlsuieh5nHcXzA== ) ; Key ID = 1870
example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 2 3600
20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com.
HujA9vQTbCxMeaYjDOCF0fYyHhajTl5xPztrp5u6P2vYV8naYQLG3zUF1gaer
WBOagXXblaSSbYwB96LU3uSdg== )
example.com. 900 IN DS ( 1870 13 2 e9b533a049798e900b5c29c90cd25a
986e8a44f319ac3cd302bafc08f5b81e16 )
example.com. 900 IN RRSIG ( DS 13 2 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 34327 com.
1tua9ntAqZvOnK5UztzIjN38Bqs6mJ8KAT7L4+AxevDL+z0Jft7RC1/g6Qrfa
In1wqF4U7TvC8PYOD0U/HYtwQ== )
com. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
7IIE5Dol8jSMUqHTvOOiZapdEbQ9wqRxFi/zQcSdufUKLhpByvLpzSAQTqCWj
3URIZ8L3Fa2gBLMOZUzZ1GQCw== ) ; Key ID = 34327
com. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
RbkcO+96XZmnp8jYIuM4lryAp3egQjSmBaSoiA7H76Tm0RLHPNPUxlVk+nQ0f
Ic3I8xfZDNw8Wa0Pe3/g2QA/w== ) ; Key ID = 18931
com. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
szc7biLo5J4OHlkan1vZrF4aD4YYf+NHA/GAqdNslY9xxK9Izg68XHkqck4Rt
DiVk37lNAQmgSlHbrGu0yOTkA== ) ; Key ID = 28809
com. 900 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000
Shore, et al. Expires September 22, 2018 [Page 15]
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20151103000000 18931 com.
lZmTBrfcRgVbqHJIfCVr6c3HUDgy3MlNSCSnrVV2S5/NmB3ZiFcvIDn0iqXPm
7YQfvfWi6utyxBu/fSD6S1ARw== )
com. 900 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 28809 com.
8qZOVM4X8wGt5XPWhG2HO4FAD6Kvs5eIhZUz+7DVCrZ/XMEVrMIHcm1Q+sq0s
hm4cSivK2BxOO24PHJXoZN2Lw== )
com. 86400 IN DS ( 18931 13 2 20f7a9db42d0e2042fbbb9f9ea015941202
f9eabb94487e658c188e7bcb52115 )
com. 86400 IN DS ( 28809 13 2 ad66b3276f796223aa45eda773e92c6d98e
70643bbde681db342a9e5cf2bb380 )
com. 86400 IN RRSIG ( DS 13 1 86400 20181128000000
20151103000000 31918 .
5KQVa0NP+6k7VEGMmeky2/Y3wIGM70Fkm0vp5NmQ6KPk8L1XMJPltcJDWGGjc
EU3Uc4z2DUxzZyWgEDdrSOcdw== )
. 86400 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
zKz+DCWkNA/vuheiVPcGqsH40U84KZAlrMRIyozj9WHzf8PsFp/oR8j8vmjjW
P98cbte4d8NvlGLxzbUzo3+FA== ) ; Key ID = 31918
. 86400 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
8wMZZ4lzHdyKZ4fv8kys/t3QMlgvEadbsbyqWrMhwddSXCZYGRrsAbPpireRW
xbVcd1VtOrlFBcRDMTN0R0XEQ== ) ; Key ID = 2635
. 86400 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
yvX+VNTUjxZiGvtr060hVbrPV9H6rVusQtF9lIxCFzbZOJxMQBFmbqlc8Xclv
Q+gDOXnFOTsgs/frMmxyGOtRg== ) ; Key ID = 47005
. 86400 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 0 86400 20181128000000
20151103000000 47005 .
ehAzuZD3yT0pShXkKavrMdz+DKvvFvbZ+sGRZ5iQTni+ulMzZxHQ5+kSha65B
Y2AIUphjyWcGr6VwP3Ne74iZA== )
A hex dump of the wire format data of this content is:
0000: 04 5f 34 34 33 04 5f 74 63 70 03 77 77 77 07 65
0010: 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 34 00 01 00
0020: 00 0e 10 00 23 03 01 01 c6 6b ef 6a 5c 1a 3e 78
0030: b8 20 16 e1 3f 31 4f 3c c5 fa 25 b1 e5 2a ab 9a
0040: db 9e c5 98 9b 16 5a da 04 5f 34 34 33 04 5f 74
0050: 63 70 03 77 77 77 07 65 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63
0060: 6f 6d 00 00 2e 00 01 00 00 0e 10 00 5f 00 34 0d
0070: 05 00 00 0e 10 5b fd da 80 56 37 f9 00 07 4e 07
0080: 65 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 ba 69 75 0d
0090: 48 e9 e5 17 eb 5e 7f 56 b6 e3 31 11 05 7e ca 0c
00a0: eb 38 d7 2e ce c9 f2 7c e1 92 b3 3c 1a 0d d9 12
00b0: 38 9d 0a 9d d7 1f 6d bd 88 94 b5 15 d3 86 7e 57
00c0: 8f 3c f9 27 75 8e be ff db 5b 6c 28 07 65 78 61
00d0: 6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 30 00 01 00 00 0e
00e0: 10 00 44 01 01 03 0d 26 70 35 5e 0c 89 4d 9c fe
00f0: a6 c5 af 6e b7 d4 58 b5 7a 50 ba 88 27 25 12 d8
Shore, et al. Expires September 22, 2018 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension March 2018
0100: 24 1d 85 41 fd 54 ad f9 6e c9 56 78 9a 51 ce b9
0110: 71 09 4b 3b b3 f4 ec 49 f6 4c 68 65 95 be 5b 2e
0120: 89 e8 79 9c 77 17 cc 07 65 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 03
0130: 63 6f 6d 00 00 2e 00 01 00 00 0e 10 00 5f 00 30
0140: 0d 02 00 00 0e 10 5b fd da 80 56 37 f9 00 07 4e
0150: 07 65 78 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 1e e8 c0
0160: f6 f4 13 6c 2c 4c 79 a6 23 0c e0 85 d1 f6 32 1e
0170: 16 a3 4e 5e 71 3f 3b 6b a7 9b ba 3f 6b d8 57 c9
0180: da 61 02 c6 df 35 05 d6 06 9e ad 60 4e 6a 05 d7
0190: 6e 56 92 49 b6 30 07 de 8b 53 7b 92 76 07 65 78
01a0: 61 6d 70 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 2b 00 01 00 00
01b0: 03 84 00 24 07 4e 0d 02 e9 b5 33 a0 49 79 8e 90
01c0: 0b 5c 29 c9 0c d2 5a 98 6e 8a 44 f3 19 ac 3c d3
01d0: 02 ba fc 08 f5 b8 1e 16 07 65 78 61 6d 70 6c 65
01e0: 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 2e 00 01 00 00 03 84 00 57 00
01f0: 2b 0d 02 00 00 03 84 5b fd da 80 56 37 f9 00 86
0200: 17 03 63 6f 6d 00 d6 db 9a f6 7b 40 a9 9b ce 9c
0210: ae 54 ce dc c8 8c dd fc 06 ab 3a 98 9f 0a 01 3e
0220: cb e3 e0 31 7a f0 cb fb 3d 09 7e de d1 0b 5f e0
0230: e9 0a df 68 89 f5 c2 a1 78 53 b4 ef 0b c3 d8 38
0240: 3d 14 fc 76 2d c1 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 30 00 01 00
0250: 00 03 84 00 44 01 00 03 0d ec 82 04 e4 3a 25 f2
0260: 34 8c 52 a1 d3 bc e3 a2 65 aa 5d 11 b4 3d c2 a4
0270: 71 16 2f f3 41 c4 9d b9 f5 0a 2e 1a 41 ca f2 e9
0280: cd 20 10 4e a0 96 8f 75 11 21 9f 0b dc 56 b6 80
0290: 12 cc 39 95 33 67 51 90 0b 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 30
02a0: 00 01 00 00 03 84 00 44 01 01 03 0d 45 b9 1c 3b
02b0: ef 7a 5d 99 a7 a7 c8 d8 22 e3 38 96 bc 80 a7 77
02c0: a0 42 34 a6 05 a4 a8 88 0e c7 ef a4 e6 d1 12 c7
02d0: 3c d3 d4 c6 55 64 fa 74 34 7c 87 37 23 cc 5f 64
02e0: 33 70 f1 66 b4 3d ed ff 83 64 00 ff 03 63 6f 6d
02f0: 00 00 30 00 01 00 00 03 84 00 44 01 01 03 0d b3
0300: 37 3b 6e 22 e8 e4 9e 0e 1e 59 1a 9f 5b d9 ac 5e
0310: 1a 0f 86 18 7f e3 47 03 f1 80 a9 d3 6c 95 8f 71
0320: c4 af 48 ce 0e bc 5c 79 2a 72 4e 11 b4 38 95 93
0330: 7e e5 34 04 26 81 29 47 6e b1 ae d3 23 93 90 03
0340: 63 6f 6d 00 00 2e 00 01 00 00 03 84 00 57 00 30
0350: 0d 01 00 00 03 84 5b fd da 80 56 37 f9 00 49 f3
0360: 03 63 6f 6d 00 95 99 93 06 b7 dc 46 05 5b a8 72
0370: 48 7c 25 6b e9 cd c7 50 38 32 dc c9 4d 48 24 a7
0380: ad 55 76 4b 9f cd 98 1d d9 88 57 2f 20 39 f4 8a
0390: a5 cf 9b b6 10 7e f7 d6 8b ab ad cb 10 6e fd f4
03a0: 83 e9 2d 40 47 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 2e 00 01 00 00
03b0: 03 84 00 57 00 30 0d 01 00 00 03 84 5b fd da 80
03c0: 56 37 f9 00 70 89 03 63 6f 6d 00 f2 a6 4e 54 ce
03d0: 17 f3 01 ad e5 73 d6 84 6d 87 3b 81 40 0f a2 af
03e0: b3 97 88 85 95 33 fb b0 d5 0a b6 7f 5c c1 15 ac
03f0: c2 07 72 6d 50 fa ca b4 b2 19 b8 71 28 af 2b 60
Shore, et al. Expires September 22, 2018 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension March 2018
0400: 71 38 ed b8 3c 72 57 a1 93 76 2f 03 63 6f 6d 00
0410: 00 2b 00 01 00 01 51 80 00 24 49 f3 0d 02 20 f7
0420: a9 db 42 d0 e2 04 2f bb b9 f9 ea 01 59 41 20 2f
0430: 9e ab b9 44 87 e6 58 c1 88 e7 bc b5 21 15 03 63
0440: 6f 6d 00 00 2b 00 01 00 01 51 80 00 24 70 89 0d
0450: 02 ad 66 b3 27 6f 79 62 23 aa 45 ed a7 73 e9 2c
0460: 6d 98 e7 06 43 bb de 68 1d b3 42 a9 e5 cf 2b b3
0470: 80 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 2e 00 01 00 01 51 80 00 53
0480: 00 2b 0d 01 00 01 51 80 5b fd da 80 56 37 f9 00
0490: 7c ae 00 e4 a4 15 6b 43 4f fb a9 3b 54 41 8c 99
04a0: e9 32 db f6 37 c0 81 8c ef 41 64 9b 4b e9 e4 d9
04b0: 90 e8 a3 e4 f0 bd 57 30 93 e5 b5 c2 43 58 61 a3
04c0: 70 45 37 51 ce 33 d8 35 31 cd 9c 96 80 40 dd ad
04d0: 23 9c 77 00 00 30 00 01 00 01 51 80 00 44 01 00
04e0: 03 0d cc ac fe 0c 25 a4 34 0f ef ba 17 a2 54 f7
04f0: 06 aa c1 f8 d1 4f 38 29 90 25 ac c4 48 ca 8c e3
0500: f5 61 f3 7f c3 ec 16 9f e8 47 c8 fc be 68 e3 58
0510: ff 7c 71 bb 5e e1 df 0d be 51 8b c7 36 d4 ce 8d
0520: fe 14 00 00 30 00 01 00 01 51 80 00 44 01 00 03
0530: 0d f3 03 19 67 89 73 1d dc 8a 67 87 ef f2 4c ac
0540: fe dd d0 32 58 2f 11 a7 5b b1 bc aa 5a b3 21 c1
0550: d7 52 5c 26 58 19 1a ec 01 b3 e9 8a b7 91 5b 16
0560: d5 71 dd 55 b4 ea e5 14 17 11 0c c4 cd d1 1d 17
0570: 11 00 00 30 00 01 00 01 51 80 00 44 01 01 03 0d
0580: ca f5 fe 54 d4 d4 8f 16 62 1a fb 6b d3 ad 21 55
0590: ba cf 57 d1 fa ad 5b ac 42 d1 7d 94 8c 42 17 36
05a0: d9 38 9c 4c 40 11 66 6e a9 5c f1 77 25 bd 0f a0
05b0: 0c e5 e7 14 e4 ec 82 cf df ac c9 b1 c8 63 ad 46
05c0: 00 00 2e 00 01 00 01 51 80 00 53 00 30 0d 00 00
05d0: 01 51 80 5b fd da 80 56 37 f9 00 b7 9d 00 7a 10
05e0: 33 b9 90 f7 c9 3d 29 4a 15 e4 29 ab eb 31 dc fe
05f0: 0c ab ef 16 f6 d9 fa c1 91 67 98 90 4e 78 be ba
0600: 53 33 67 11 d0 e7 e9 12 85 ae b9 05 8d 80 21 4a
0610: 61 8f 25 9c 1a be 95 c0 fd cd 7b be 22 64
A.2. _25._tcp.example.com wildcard
_25._tcp.example.com. 3600 IN TLSA ( 3 1 1
c66bef6a5c1a3e78b82016e13f314f3cc5fa25b1e52aab9adb9ec5989b165
ada )
_25._tcp.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG ( TLSA 13 3 3600
20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com.
e7Q5L2x7Ca3SkSY6pRjqgtRxkEN1uYUcgyMlPp6GQ4zxAZxoO1Y1vGqxN4eNA
+yBnlUSIJQ46KKVS5PC79Qipg== )
*._tcp.example.com. 3600 IN NSEC (
_443._tcp.www.example.com. RRSIG NSEC TLSA )
*._tcp.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG ( NSEC 13 3 3600
Shore, et al. Expires September 22, 2018 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension March 2018
20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com.
FlTtPqEPUPAQozlbt7bD9s2XIxdVPJ3nb+jK94Fxa2JsaZChH1n/DsYb5KS7J
G5GyubhMFTLeIqwTngx6JCktg== )
example.com. 3600 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
JnA1XgyJTZz+psWvbrfUWLV6ULqIJyUS2CQdhUH9VK35bslWeJpRzrlxCUs7s
/TsSfZMaGWVvlsuieh5nHcXzA== ) ; Key ID = 1870
example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 2 3600
20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com.
HujA9vQTbCxMeaYjDOCF0fYyHhajTl5xPztrp5u6P2vYV8naYQLG3zUF1gaer
WBOagXXblaSSbYwB96LU3uSdg== )
example.com. 900 IN DS ( 1870 13 2 e9b533a049798e900b5c29c90cd25a
986e8a44f319ac3cd302bafc08f5b81e16 )
example.com. 900 IN RRSIG ( DS 13 2 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 34327 com.
1tua9ntAqZvOnK5UztzIjN38Bqs6mJ8KAT7L4+AxevDL+z0Jft7RC1/g6Qrfa
In1wqF4U7TvC8PYOD0U/HYtwQ== )
com. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
7IIE5Dol8jSMUqHTvOOiZapdEbQ9wqRxFi/zQcSdufUKLhpByvLpzSAQTqCWj
3URIZ8L3Fa2gBLMOZUzZ1GQCw== ) ; Key ID = 34327
com. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
RbkcO+96XZmnp8jYIuM4lryAp3egQjSmBaSoiA7H76Tm0RLHPNPUxlVk+nQ0f
Ic3I8xfZDNw8Wa0Pe3/g2QA/w== ) ; Key ID = 18931
com. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
szc7biLo5J4OHlkan1vZrF4aD4YYf+NHA/GAqdNslY9xxK9Izg68XHkqck4Rt
DiVk37lNAQmgSlHbrGu0yOTkA== ) ; Key ID = 28809
com. 900 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 18931 com.
lZmTBrfcRgVbqHJIfCVr6c3HUDgy3MlNSCSnrVV2S5/NmB3ZiFcvIDn0iqXPm
7YQfvfWi6utyxBu/fSD6S1ARw== )
com. 900 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 28809 com.
8qZOVM4X8wGt5XPWhG2HO4FAD6Kvs5eIhZUz+7DVCrZ/XMEVrMIHcm1Q+sq0s
hm4cSivK2BxOO24PHJXoZN2Lw== )
com. 86400 IN DS ( 18931 13 2 20f7a9db42d0e2042fbbb9f9ea015941202
f9eabb94487e658c188e7bcb52115 )
com. 86400 IN DS ( 28809 13 2 ad66b3276f796223aa45eda773e92c6d98e
70643bbde681db342a9e5cf2bb380 )
com. 86400 IN RRSIG ( DS 13 1 86400 20181128000000
20151103000000 31918 .
5KQVa0NP+6k7VEGMmeky2/Y3wIGM70Fkm0vp5NmQ6KPk8L1XMJPltcJDWGGjc
EU3Uc4z2DUxzZyWgEDdrSOcdw== )
. 86400 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
zKz+DCWkNA/vuheiVPcGqsH40U84KZAlrMRIyozj9WHzf8PsFp/oR8j8vmjjW
P98cbte4d8NvlGLxzbUzo3+FA== ) ; Key ID = 31918
. 86400 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
8wMZZ4lzHdyKZ4fv8kys/t3QMlgvEadbsbyqWrMhwddSXCZYGRrsAbPpireRW
xbVcd1VtOrlFBcRDMTN0R0XEQ== ) ; Key ID = 2635
. 86400 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
Shore, et al. Expires September 22, 2018 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension March 2018
yvX+VNTUjxZiGvtr060hVbrPV9H6rVusQtF9lIxCFzbZOJxMQBFmbqlc8Xclv
Q+gDOXnFOTsgs/frMmxyGOtRg== ) ; Key ID = 47005
. 86400 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 0 86400 20181128000000
20151103000000 47005 .
ehAzuZD3yT0pShXkKavrMdz+DKvvFvbZ+sGRZ5iQTni+ulMzZxHQ5+kSha65B
Y2AIUphjyWcGr6VwP3Ne74iZA== )
A.3. _443._tcp.www.example.org CNAME
_443._tcp.www.example.org. 3600 IN CNAME (
dane311.example.org. )
_443._tcp.www.example.org. 3600 IN RRSIG ( CNAME 13 5 3600
20181128000000 20151103000000 56566 example.org.
wLQYbRNMqrXCD65GZJqwwsD0TDF2VQTklBYdYCMo+JTjqvZw1UFYmcJXmwJsL
KezLIzSdKW6jK0LMJ3YUw3Bmw== )
dane311.example.org. 3600 IN TLSA ( 3 1 1
c66bef6a5c1a3e78b82016e13f314f3cc5fa25b1e52aab9adb9ec5989b165
ada )
dane311.example.org. 3600 IN RRSIG ( TLSA 13 3 3600
20181128000000 20151103000000 56566 example.org.
AllKVcpLz/9vG/xJQFwWEK0cHbjO6lI65ELWSoWxPvYJ5o8QnSbRkzfCM4lTs
g94s5VvzMLYIbSZ1TWo2hcCdg== )
example.org. 3600 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
NrbL6utGqIW1wrhhjeexdA6bMdD1lC1hj0Fnpevaa1AMyY2uy83TmoGnR996N
UR5TlG4Zh+YPbbmUIixe4nS3w== ) ; Key ID = 56566
example.org. 3600 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
uspaqp17jsMTX6AWVgmbog/3Sttz+9ANFUWLn6qKUHr0BOqRuChQWj8jyYUUr
Wy9txxesNQ9MkO4LUrFght1LQ== ) ; Key ID = 44384
example.org. 3600 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 2 3600
20181128000000 20151103000000 44384 example.org.
ZsQ5wl2ZvofwDq7uYlvoqEeq9byHbl59Ap4EPXdB4PpnWy2dJkIElgXCfILrU
EUCD1aKb2SoRZe18EJ8LMVJuw== )
example.org. 900 IN DS ( 44384 13 2 ec307e2efc8f0117ed96ab48a513c
8003e1d9121f1ff11a08b4cdd348d090aa6 )
example.org. 900 IN RRSIG ( DS 13 2 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 9523 org.
15KUWAaNkJehAUdqm46TdeGg6mVm6bVKeaWLr34FTJlfMWWij+kmA6SM/bZbq
kZBjtMWT55XersA+llFQNQI/Q== )
org. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
fuLp60znhSSEr9HowILpTpyLKQdM6ixcgkTE0gqVdsLx+DSNHSc69o6fLWC0e
HfWx7kzlBBoJB0vLrvsJtXJ6g== ) ; Key ID = 47417
org. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
zTHbb7JM627Bjr8CGOySUarsic91xZU3vvLJ5RjVix9YH6+iwpBXb6qfHyQHy
mlMiAAoaoXh7BUkEBVgDVN8sQ== ) ; Key ID = 9523
org. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
Uf24EyNt51DMcLV+dHPInhSpmjPnqAQNUTouU+SGLu+lFRRlBetgw1bJUZNI6
Dlger0VJTm0QuX/JVXcyGVGoQ== ) ; Key ID = 49352
Shore, et al. Expires September 22, 2018 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension March 2018
org. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
0SZfoe8Yx+eoaGgyAGEeJax/ZBV1AuG+/smcOgRm+F6doNlgc3lddcM1MbTvJ
HTjK6Fvy8W6yZ+cAptn8sQheg== ) ; Key ID = 12651
org. 900 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 12651 org.
G9I7dIh5Zn2hBu8jhgnLDTXZUpnPRkOMHjl1RcyHNbvJGLIiaPRVtcJXW0Vr+
arygWmsHrDgWz0vw2IXZr3qKw== )
org. 900 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 49352 org.
iQmYWqUdU07Syw1Fqwx+8+hSk0w06tCGmkwdppyxUSFESumEhkOXgOv6NuIEn
eKjwMIaLj5HFB+9WnOkzgGE5Q== )
org. 86400 IN DS ( 12651 13 2 3979a51f98bbf219fcaf4a4176e766dfa8f
9db5c24a75743eb1e704b97a9fabc )
org. 86400 IN DS ( 49352 13 2 03d11a1aa114abbb8f708c3c0ff0db765fe
f4a2f18920db5f58710dd767c293b )
org. 86400 IN RRSIG ( DS 13 1 86400 20181128000000
20151103000000 31918 .
JGPMvEbfLoWNUELn/5cjjdRZx2CmdikbHuH6N/1BrxACWrGy05NuPvBPTEVOr
mPFfm5SIMLLTWgxf0K0FsNHoQ== )
. 86400 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
zKz+DCWkNA/vuheiVPcGqsH40U84KZAlrMRIyozj9WHzf8PsFp/oR8j8vmjjW
P98cbte4d8NvlGLxzbUzo3+FA== ) ; Key ID = 31918
. 86400 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
8wMZZ4lzHdyKZ4fv8kys/t3QMlgvEadbsbyqWrMhwddSXCZYGRrsAbPpireRW
xbVcd1VtOrlFBcRDMTN0R0XEQ== ) ; Key ID = 2635
. 86400 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
yvX+VNTUjxZiGvtr060hVbrPV9H6rVusQtF9lIxCFzbZOJxMQBFmbqlc8Xclv
Q+gDOXnFOTsgs/frMmxyGOtRg== ) ; Key ID = 47005
. 86400 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 0 86400 20181128000000
20151103000000 47005 .
ehAzuZD3yT0pShXkKavrMdz+DKvvFvbZ+sGRZ5iQTni+ulMzZxHQ5+kSha65B
Y2AIUphjyWcGr6VwP3Ne74iZA== )
A.4. _443._tcp.www.example.net DNAME
example.net. 3600 IN DNAME example.com.
example.net. 3600 IN RRSIG ( DNAME 13 2 3600 20181128000000
20151103000000 48085 example.net.
+MJa5ZEmYh/kHYOhabF3ibfJ5xhJDJAA76Sugc/LFyTDJbmYW/nlYf3XLdcDh
7lv6NfCkPuv6eCkSFGnVVvriA== )
_443._tcp.www.example.net. 3600 IN CNAME (
_443._tcp.www.example.com. )
_443._tcp.www.example.com. 3600 IN TLSA ( 3 1 1
c66bef6a5c1a3e78b82016e13f314f3cc5fa25b1e52aab9adb9ec5989b165
ada )
_443._tcp.www.example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG ( TLSA 13 5 3600
20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com.
Shore, et al. Expires September 22, 2018 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension March 2018
uml1DUjp5RfrXn9WtuMxEQV+ygzrONcuzsnyfOGSszwaDdkSOJ0Kndcfbb2Il
LUV04Z+V488+Sd1jr7/21tsKA== )
example.net. 3600 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
X9GHpJcS7bqKVEsLiVAbddHUHTZqqBbVa3mzIQmdp+5cTJk7qDazwH68Kts8d
9MvN55HddWgsmeRhgzePz6hMg== ) ; Key ID = 48085
example.net. 3600 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 2 3600
20181128000000 20151103000000 48085 example.net.
Qu7q2IheqxAKGnchYSvQeJuXdnBj/+wJoEmv67wemOUI6qvWWIo535w+hguUV
mZm/W5rp3qWBGChLxxfqIK13g== )
example.net. 900 IN DS ( 48085 13 2 7c1998ce683df60e2fa41460c453f
88f463dac8cd5d074277b4a7c04502921be )
example.net. 900 IN RRSIG ( DS 13 2 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 10713 net.
xxSlIJlpOSmrUgwR++os2SHTpRf53SO95G6FQyH5lEslnTnbZoq0p/AVrlB8q
Qw3qmSXjRwGW3VFbkV60/tWCg== )
net. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
061EoQs4sBcDsPiz17vt4nFSGLmXAGguqLStOesmKNCimi4/lw/vtyfqALuLF
JiFjtCK3HMPi8HQ1jbGEwbGCA== ) ; Key ID = 10713
net. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
LkNCPE+v3S4MVnsOqZFhn8n2NSwtLYOZLZjjgVsAKgu4XZncaDgq1R/7ZXRO5
oVx2zthxuu2i+mGbRrycAaCvA== ) ; Key ID = 485
net. 900 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 485 net.
CC494bZrtBHXImEZpe6E3h6NL0R5fRR/MEuC1f2sfC6/dlCjRwFjCy9eOKnFL
ar4Rxbpf7dvEwqGHNTawEo6jw== )
net. 86400 IN DS ( 485 13 2 ab25a2941aa7f1eb8688bb783b25587515a0c
d8c247769b23adb13ca234d1c05 )
net. 86400 IN RRSIG ( DS 13 1 86400 20181128000000
20151103000000 31918 .
q+G4l97pYbFgAUhzzOW5+YoFiJc5omUbe20H28AwMHOrx19BdGp/2XhKDQ5F3
tUTNerRmklzYm+7J/XtLpGXAw== )
. 86400 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
zKz+DCWkNA/vuheiVPcGqsH40U84KZAlrMRIyozj9WHzf8PsFp/oR8j8vmjjW
P98cbte4d8NvlGLxzbUzo3+FA== ) ; Key ID = 31918
. 86400 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
8wMZZ4lzHdyKZ4fv8kys/t3QMlgvEadbsbyqWrMhwddSXCZYGRrsAbPpireRW
xbVcd1VtOrlFBcRDMTN0R0XEQ== ) ; Key ID = 2635
. 86400 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
yvX+VNTUjxZiGvtr060hVbrPV9H6rVusQtF9lIxCFzbZOJxMQBFmbqlc8Xclv
Q+gDOXnFOTsgs/frMmxyGOtRg== ) ; Key ID = 47005
. 86400 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 0 86400 20181128000000
20151103000000 47005 .
ehAzuZD3yT0pShXkKavrMdz+DKvvFvbZ+sGRZ5iQTni+ulMzZxHQ5+kSha65B
Y2AIUphjyWcGr6VwP3Ne74iZA== )
example.com. 3600 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
JnA1XgyJTZz+psWvbrfUWLV6ULqIJyUS2CQdhUH9VK35bslWeJpRzrlxCUs7s
/TsSfZMaGWVvlsuieh5nHcXzA== ) ; Key ID = 1870
example.com. 3600 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 2 3600
Shore, et al. Expires September 22, 2018 [Page 22]
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20181128000000 20151103000000 1870 example.com.
HujA9vQTbCxMeaYjDOCF0fYyHhajTl5xPztrp5u6P2vYV8naYQLG3zUF1gaer
WBOagXXblaSSbYwB96LU3uSdg== )
example.com. 900 IN DS ( 1870 13 2 e9b533a049798e900b5c29c90cd25a
986e8a44f319ac3cd302bafc08f5b81e16 )
example.com. 900 IN RRSIG ( DS 13 2 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 34327 com.
1tua9ntAqZvOnK5UztzIjN38Bqs6mJ8KAT7L4+AxevDL+z0Jft7RC1/g6Qrfa
In1wqF4U7TvC8PYOD0U/HYtwQ== )
com. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 256 3 13
7IIE5Dol8jSMUqHTvOOiZapdEbQ9wqRxFi/zQcSdufUKLhpByvLpzSAQTqCWj
3URIZ8L3Fa2gBLMOZUzZ1GQCw== ) ; Key ID = 34327
com. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
RbkcO+96XZmnp8jYIuM4lryAp3egQjSmBaSoiA7H76Tm0RLHPNPUxlVk+nQ0f
Ic3I8xfZDNw8Wa0Pe3/g2QA/w== ) ; Key ID = 18931
com. 900 IN DNSKEY ( 257 3 13
szc7biLo5J4OHlkan1vZrF4aD4YYf+NHA/GAqdNslY9xxK9Izg68XHkqck4Rt
DiVk37lNAQmgSlHbrGu0yOTkA== ) ; Key ID = 28809
com. 900 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 18931 com.
lZmTBrfcRgVbqHJIfCVr6c3HUDgy3MlNSCSnrVV2S5/NmB3ZiFcvIDn0iqXPm
7YQfvfWi6utyxBu/fSD6S1ARw== )
com. 900 IN RRSIG ( DNSKEY 13 1 900 20181128000000
20151103000000 28809 com.
8qZOVM4X8wGt5XPWhG2HO4FAD6Kvs5eIhZUz+7DVCrZ/XMEVrMIHcm1Q+sq0s
hm4cSivK2BxOO24PHJXoZN2Lw== )
com. 86400 IN DS ( 18931 13 2 20f7a9db42d0e2042fbbb9f9ea015941202
f9eabb94487e658c188e7bcb52115 )
com. 86400 IN DS ( 28809 13 2 ad66b3276f796223aa45eda773e92c6d98e
70643bbde681db342a9e5cf2bb380 )
com. 86400 IN RRSIG ( DS 13 1 86400 20181128000000
20151103000000 31918 .
5KQVa0NP+6k7VEGMmeky2/Y3wIGM70Fkm0vp5NmQ6KPk8L1XMJPltcJDWGGjc
EU3Uc4z2DUxzZyWgEDdrSOcdw== )
Authors' Addresses
Melinda Shore
Fastly
EMail: mshore@fastly.com
Richard Barnes
Mozilla
EMail: rlb@ipv.sx
Shore, et al. Expires September 22, 2018 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft TLS DNSSEC Chain Extension March 2018
Shumon Huque
Salesforce
EMail: shuque@gmail.com
Willem Toorop
NLnet Labs
EMail: willem@nlnetlabs.nl
Shore, et al. Expires September 22, 2018 [Page 24]