Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec
draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec
Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck
Internet-Draft Verisign Labs
Intended status: Standards Track N. Kong
Expires: June 5, 2015 CNNIC
December 2, 2014
Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol
draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-12
Abstract
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web
services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and
regional internet registries. This document describes information
security services including access control, authentication,
authorization, availability, data confidentiality, and data integrity
for RDAP.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 5, 2015.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2.1. Federated Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.6. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Privacy Threats Associated with Registration Data . . . . . . 8
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) is specified in multiple
documents, including "Registration Data Access Protocol Lookup
Format" [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query], "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)"
[I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response], and "HTTP usage in the Registration
Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http].
One goal of RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in
the WHOIS [RFC3912] protocol, including access control,
authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
and data integrity. This document describes how each of these
services is achieved by RDAP using features that are available in
other protocol layers. Additional or alternative mechanisms can be
added in the future. Where applicable, informational references to
requirements for a WHOIS replacement service [RFC3707] are noted.
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2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations
DNR: Domain Name Registry
HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol
JSON: JavaScript Object Notation
RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol
RIR: Regional Internet Registry
TLS: Transport Layer Security
3. Information Security Services and RDAP
RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP
relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to
provide needed security services including access control,
authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
and data integrity. A description of each of these security services
can be found in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949].
No requirements have been identified for other security services.
3.1. Access Control
WHOIS does not include specific features to control access to
registration information. As described in the following sections,
RDAP includes features to identify, authenticate, and authorize
clients, allowing server operators to control access to information
based on a client's identity and associated authorizations.
Information returned to a client can be clearly marked with a status
value (see Section 10.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]) that
identifies the access granted to the client.
3.2. Authentication
This section describes security authentication mechanisms and the
need for authorization policies to include them. It describes
requirements for the implementations of clients and servers, but does
not dictate the policies of server operators. For example, a server
operator with no policy regarding differentiated or tiered access to
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data will have no authorization mechanisms and will have no need for
any type of authentication. A server operator with policies on
differentiated access will have to construct an authorization scheme
and will need to follow the specified authentication requirements.
WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients.
As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service
Protocol (CRISP) Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in
allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access
depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and
authenticated to provide that utility.
RDAP's authentication framework needs to accommodate anonymous access
as well as verification of identities using a range of authentication
methods and credential services. To that end, RDAP clients and
servers MUST implement the authentication framework specified in
"HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication"
[RFC7235]. The "basic" scheme can be used to send a client's user
name and password to a server in plaintext, based64-encoded form.
The "digest" scheme can be used to authenticate a client without
exposing the client's plaintext password. If the "basic" scheme is
used, HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] MUST be used to protect the client's
credentials from disclosure while in transit (see Section 3.5).
Servers MUST support either Basic or Digest authentication; they are
not required to support both. Clients MUST support both to
interoperate with servers that support one or the other. Servers may
provide a login page that triggers HTTP authentication. Clients
should continue sending the HTTP authentication header once they
receive an initial 401 (Unauthorized) response from the HTTP server
as long as the scheme portion of the URL doesn't change.
The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes an optional
feature to identify and authenticate clients who possess and present
a valid X.509 digital certificate [RFC5280]. Support for this
feature is OPTIONAL.
RDAP does not impose any unique server authentication requirements.
The server authentication provided by TLS fully addresses the needs
of RDAP. In general, transports for RDAP must either provide a TLS-
protected transport (e.g., HTTPS) or a mechanism that provides an
equivalent level of server authentication.
Work on HTTP authentication methods continues. RDAP is designed to
be agile enough to support additional methods as they are defined.
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3.2.1. Federated Authentication
The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients
to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This
situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers
increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use
one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client
credential management complexity. RDAP MAY include a federated
authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple
RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential.
Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP MUST be fully
supported by HTTP. OAuth, OpenID, Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML), and CA-based mechanisms are all possible approaches to
provide federated authentication. At the time of this document's
publication, negotiation or advertisement of federated authentication
services is still an undefined mechanism by the noted federated
authentication protocols. Developing this mechanism is beyond the
scope of this document.
The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749] describes a method for
users to access protected web resources without having to hand out
their credentials. Instead, clients are issued access tokens by
authorization servers with the permission of the resource owners.
Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a federation and the
clients can access any server in the same federation by providing one
credential registered in any server in that federation. The OAuth
authorization framework is designed for use with HTTP and thus can be
used with RDAP.
OpenID [OpenID] is a decentralized single sign-on authentication
system that allows users to log in at multiple web sites with one ID
instead of having to create multiple unique accounts. An end user
can freely choose which OpenID provider to use, and can preserve
their Identifier if they switch OpenID providers.
Note that OAuth and OpenID do not consistently require data
confidentiality services to protect interactions between providers
and consumers. HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] can be used as needed to
provide protection against man-in-the-middle attacks.
SAML 2.0 [SAML] is an XML-based protocol that can be used to
implement web-based authentication and authorization services,
including single sign-on. It uses security tokens containing
assertions to exchange information about an end user between an
identity provider and a service provider.
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The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246], Section 7.4.6,
describes the specification of a client certificate. Clients who
possess and present a valid X.509 digital certificate, issued by an
entity called a "Certification Authority" (CA), could be identified
and authenticated by a server who trusts the corresponding CA. A
certificate authentication method can be used to achieve federated
authentication in which multiple RDAP servers all trust the same CAs
and then any client with a certificate issued by a trusted CA can
access any RDAP server in the federation. This certificate-based
mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be used with RDAP.
3.3. Authorization
WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access
to clients based on a client's authenticated identity. As noted in
section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol (CRISP)
Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in allowing server
operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on policy and
need". Access control decisions can be made once a client's identity
has been established and authenticated (see Section 3.2).
Server operators MAY offer varying degrees of access depending on
policy and need in conjunction with the authentication methods
described in Section 3.2. If such varying degrees of access are
supported, an RDAP server MUST provide granular access controls (that
is, on a per registration data object basis) in order to implement
authorization policies. Some examples:
- Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a
relationship.
- Unauthenticated or anonymous access status may not yield any
contact information.
- Full access may be granted to a special group of authenticated
clients.
The type of access allowed by a server will most likely vary from one
operator to the next. A description of the response privacy
considerations associated with different levels of authorization can
be found in Section 13 of [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response].
3.4. Availability
An RDAP service has to be available to be useful. There are no RDAP-
unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general
security consideration a service operator needs to be aware of the
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issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of
"Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations" [RFC4732] is advised.
An RDAP service MAY use an HTTP throttling mechanism to limit the
number of queries that a single client can send in a given period of
time. If used, the server SHOULD return an HTTP 429 (Too Many
Requests) response code as described in "Additional HTTP Status
Codes" [RFC6585]. A client that receives a 429 response SHOULD
decrease its query rate, and honor the Retry-After header field if
one is present. Note that this is not a defense against denial-of-
service attacks, since a malicious client could ignore the code and
continue to send queries at a high rate. A server might use another
response code if it did not wish to reveal to a client that rate
limiting is the reason for the denial of a reply.
3.5. Data Confidentiality
WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from inadvertent
disclosure while in transit. RDAP uses HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to
provide that protection by encrypting all traffic sent on the
connection between client and server. HTTP Over TLS MUST be used to
protect all client-server exchanges unless operational constraints
make it impossible to meet this requirement. It is also possible to
encrypt discrete objects (such as command path segments and JSON-
encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the other
endpoint via an unprotected transport protocol, and decrypt the
object on receipt. Encryption algorithms as described in "Internet
Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly used to provide
data confidentiality at the object level.
There are no current requirements for object-level data
confidentiality using encryption. Support for this feature could be
added to RDAP in the future.
As noted in Section 3.2, the HTTP "basic" authentication scheme can
be used to authenticate a client. When this scheme is used, HTTP
Over TLS MUST be used to protect the client's credentials from
disclosure while in transit. If the policy of the server operator
requires encryption to protect client-server data exchanges (such as
to protect non-public data that can not be accessed without client
identification and authentication), HTTP Over TLS MUST be used to
protect those exchanges.
A description of privacy threats that can be addressed with
confidentiality services can be found in Section 5. Section 10.2.2
of [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response] describes status values that can
be used to describe operator actions used to protect response data
from disclosure to unauthorized clients.
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3.6. Data Integrity
WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from modification
while in transit. Web services such as RDAP commonly use HTTP Over
TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection by using a keyed Message
Authentication Code (MAC) to detect modifications. It is also
possible to sign discrete objects (such as command path segments and
JSON-encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the
other endpoint via a transport protocol, and validate the signature
of the object on receipt. Digital signature algorithms as described
in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly
used to provide data integrity at the object level.
There are no current requirements for object-level data integrity
using digital signatures. Support for this feature could be added to
RDAP in the future.
The most specific need for this service is to provide assurance that
HTTP 30x redirection hints [RFC7231] and response elements returned
from the server are not modified while in transit. If the policy of
the server operator requires message integrity for client-server data
exchanges, HTTP Over TLS MUST be used to protect those exchanges.
4. IANA Considerations
This document does not specify any IANA actions. This section can be
removed if this document is published as an RFC.
5. Privacy Threats Associated with Registration Data
Registration data has historically included personal data about
registrants. WHOIS services have historically made this information
available to the public, creating a privacy risk by revealing the
personal details of registrants. WHOIS services have not had the
benefit of authentication or access control mechanisms to gate access
to registration data. As a result of this, proxy and privacy
services have arisen to shield the identities of registrants.
The standardization of RDAP does not change or impact the data that
operators may require to be collected from registrants, but it
provides support for a number of mechanisms that may be used to
mitigate privacy threats to registrants should operators choose to
use them.
RDAP includes mechanisms that can be used to authenticate clients,
allowing servers to support tiered access based on local policy.
This means that all registration data need no longer be public, and
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personal data or data that may be considered more sensitive can have
its access restricted to specifically privileged clients.
RDAP data structures allow servers to indicate via status values when
data returned to clients has been made private, redacted, obscured,
or registered by a proxy. "Private" means that the data is not
designated for public consumption. "Redacted" means that some
registration data fields are not being made available. "Obscured"
means that data has been altered for the purposes of not readily
revealing the actual registration information. One option that
operators have available to them to reduce privacy risks to
registrants is to adopt policies that make use of these status values
to restrict the registrant data shared with any or all clients
according to the sensitivity of the data, the privileges of the
clients, or some other heuristics.
RDAP uses the jCard [RFC7095] standard format for entity
representation. Operators may find that many of the jCard fields are
irrelevant for registry operation purposes or that they have no
reason to collect information from registrants that would correspond
to certain fields. Operators wishing to reduce privacy risks for
registrants may restrict which information they collect and/or which
fields they populate in responses.
In addition to privacy risks to registrants, there are also potential
privacy risks for those who query registration data. For example,
the fact that a registry employee performs a particular query may
reveal information about the employee's activities that he or she
would have preferred to keep private. RDAP supports the use of HTTP
over TLS to provide privacy protection for those querying registrant
data as well as registrants, unless operational constraints make it
impossible to meet this requirement.
6. Security Considerations
One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not
exist in the WHOIS protocol. This document describes the security
services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including
authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality,
and data integrity. Non-repudiation services were also considered
and ultimately rejected due to a lack of requirements. There are,
however, currently-deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed
responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. RDAP
might need to be extended to provide this service in the future.
As an HTTP-based protocol RDAP is susceptible to code injection
attacks. Code injection refers to adding code into a computer system
or program to alter the course of execution. There are many types of
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code injection, including SQL injection, dynamic variable or function
injection, include file injection, shell injection, and HTML-script
injection among others. Data confidentiality and integrity services
provide a measure of defense against man-in-the-middle injection
attacks, but vulnerabilities in both client-side and server-side
software make it possible for injection attacks to succeed.
Consistently checking and validating server credentials can help
detect man-in-the-middle attacks.
As noted in Section 3.2.1, digital certificates can be used to
implement federated authentication. There is a risk of too-
promiscuous, or even rogue, CAs being included in the list of
acceptable CAs that the TLS server sends the client as part of the
TLS client-authentication handshake and lending the appearance of
trust to certificates signed by those CAs. Periodic monitoring of
the list of CAs that RDAP servers trust for client authentication can
help reduce this risk.
The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes a null
cipher suite that does not encrypt data and thus does not provide
data confidentiality. This option MUST NOT be used when data
confidentiality services are needed. Additional considerations for
secure use of TLS are described in [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp].
Data integrity services are sometimes mistakenly associated with
directory service operational policy requirements focused on data
accuracy. "Accuracy" refers to the truthful association of data
elements (such as names, addresses, and telephone numbers) in the
context of a particular directory object (such as a domain name).
Accuracy requirements are out of scope for this protocol.
Additional security considerations are described in the
specifications for HTTP [RFC7231], HTTP basic and digest access
authentication [RFC7235], HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818], and additional
HTTP status codes [RFC6585]. Security considerations for federated
authentication systems can be found in the OAuth [RFC6749] and OpenID
[OpenID] specifications.
7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for
their contributions to this document: Richard Barnes, Marc Blanchet,
Alissa Cooper, Ernie Dainow, Spencer Dawkins, Jean-Philippe Dionne,
Byron Ellacott, Stephen Farrell, Tony Hansen, Peter Koch, Murray
Kucherawy, Barry Leiba, Andrew Newton, and Linlin Zhou.
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8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]
Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf-
weirds-json-response-12 (work in progress), November 2014.
[I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query]
Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access
Protocol Query Format", draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-16
(work in progress), October 2014.
[I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http]
Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP usage in the
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf-
weirds-using-http-15 (work in progress), November 2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
[RFC6585] Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status
Codes", RFC 6585, April 2012.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, June 2014.
[RFC7235] Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol
(HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, June 2014.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]
Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft-
ietf-uta-tls-bcp-07 (work in progress), November 2014.
[OpenID] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final",
December 2007, <http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0>.
[RFC3707] Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol
(CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004.
[RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912,
September 2004.
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[RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., and IAB, "Internet Denial-of-
Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
6749, October 2012.
[RFC7095] Kewisch, P., "jCard: The JSON Format for vCard", RFC 7095,
January 2014.
[SAML] OASIS, "Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) v2.0",
March 2005, <https://www.oasis-open.org/
standards#samlv2.0>.
Appendix A. Change Log
Initial -00: Adopted as working group document.
-01: Extensive text additions and revisions based on in-room
discussion at IETF-85. Sections for data integrity and non-
repudiation have been removed due to a lack of requirements, but
both topics are now addressed in the Security Considerations
section.
-02: Fixed document names in the Introduction. Modified text in
Section 3.2.1 to clarify requirement. Added text to Section 3.4
to describe rate limiting. Added new data integrity section.
Updated security considerations to describe injection attacks.
-03: Extensive updates to address WG last call comments: rewrote
introduction, removed references to draft documents, changed
"HTML" to "HTTP" in Section 6, eliminated upper case words that
could be misunderstood to be normative guidance, rewrote
Section 3.5 and Section 3.6.
-04: Address AD evaluation comments: In Section 3.2 change "RDAP
MUST include an authentication framework that can accommodate" to
"RDAP's authentication framework needs to accommodate"; in
Section 3.3 change "RDAP MUST include an authorization framework
that is capable of providing granular (per registration data
object) access controls according to the policies of the operator"
to "An RDAP server MUST provide granular access controls (that is,
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on a per registration data object basis) in order to implement
authorization policies"; move RFCs 4732, 5280, and 6749 from
normative to informative subsection.
-05: Address IETF last call comments: Added text to Section 3.2.1 to
recommend the use of HTTP over TLS. Modified Section 3.3 to
clarify granular access control text. Added additional Security
Considerations. Made references to RFC 5246 and OpenID
informative. Minor typo fixes.
-06: Keepalive refresh. No content updates.
-07: Keepalive refresh. No content updates.
-08: Updated HTTP references. 2616 -> 7231, 2617 -> 7235.
-09: Address WG last call comments.
-10: Address IETF last call comments.
-11: Address IESG review comments.
-12: Added "access control" where it was missing in the abstract and
introduction. Minor IESG DISCUSS edits.
Authors' Addresses
Scott Hollenbeck
Verisign Labs
12061 Bluemont Way
Reston, VA 20190
US
Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com
URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/
Ning Kong
China Internet Network Information Center
4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun, Haidian District
Beijing 100190
China
Phone: +86 10 5881 3147
Email: nkong@cnnic.cn
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