Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-xmpp-dna
draft-ietf-xmpp-dna
Network Working Group P. Saint-Andre
Internet-Draft &yet
Intended status: Standards Track M. Miller
Expires: March 4, 2016 Cisco Systems, Inc.
P. Hancke
&yet
September 1, 2015
Domain Name Associations (DNA) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP)
draft-ietf-xmpp-dna-11
Abstract
This document improves the security of the Extensible Messaging and
Presence Protocol (XMPP) in two ways. First, it specifies how to
establish a strong association between a domain name and an XML
stream, using the concept of "prooftypes". Second, it describes how
to securely delegate a service domain name (e.g., example.com) to a
target server host name (e.g., hosting.example.net), which is
especially important in multi-tenanted environments where the same
target server hosts a large number of domains.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 4, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Client-to-Server (C2S) DNA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. C2S Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. C2S Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Server-to-Server (S2S) DNA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. S2S Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. A Simple S2S Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3. No Mutual PKIX Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.4. Piggybacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4.1. Assertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4.2. Supposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Alternative Prooftypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. DANE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. POSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Secure Delegation and Multi-Tenancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Prooftype Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Guidance for Server Operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9.1. POSH Service Name for xmpp-client Service . . . . . . . . 18
9.2. POSH Service Name for xmpp-server Service . . . . . . . . 19
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction
In systems that use the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol
(XMPP) [RFC6120], it is important to establish a strong association
between the DNS domain name of an XMPP service (e.g., example.com)
and the XML stream that a client or peer server initiates with that
service. In other words, the client or peer server needs to verify
the identity of the server to which it connects. Additionally,
servers need to verify incoming connections from other servers.
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To date, such verification has been established based on information
obtained from the Domain Name System (DNS), the Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), or similar sources. In particular, XMPP as
defined in [RFC6120] assumed that domain name associations are to be
proved using the "PKIX prooftype"; that is, the server's proof
consists of a PKIX certificate that is checked according to the XMPP
profile of the matching rules from [RFC6125] (and the overall
validation rules from [RFC5280]), the client's verification material
is obtained out of band in the form of a trusted root, and secure DNS
is not necessary.
By extending the concept of a domain name association within XMPP,
this document does the following:
1. Generalizes the model currently in use so that additional
prooftypes can be defined if needed.
2. Provides a basis for modernizing some prooftypes to reflect
progress in underlying technologies such as DNS Security
[RFC4033].
3. Describes the flow of operations for establishing a domain name
association (DNA).
This document also provides guidelines for secure delegation of a
service domain name (e.g., example.com) to a target server host name
(e.g., hosting.example.net). The need for secure delegation arises
because the process for resolving the domain name of an XMPP service
into the IP address at which an XML stream will be negotiated (see
[RFC6120]) can involve delegation of a service domain name to a
target server host name using technologies such as DNS SRV records
[RFC2782]. A more detailed description of the delegation problem can
be found in [I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh]. The domain name association can be
verified only if the delegation is done in a secure manner.
2. Terminology
This document inherits XMPP terminology from [RFC6120] and
[XEP-0220], DNS terminology from [RFC1034], [RFC1035], [RFC2782] and
[RFC4033], and security terminology from [RFC4949] and [RFC5280].
The terms "reference identity", and "presented identity" are used as
defined in the "CertID" specification [RFC6125]. For the sake of
consistency with [I-D.ietf-dane-srv], this document uses the terms
"service domain name" and "target server host name" to refer to the
same entities identified by the terms "source domain" and "derived
domain" from [RFC6125].
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3. Client-to-Server (C2S) DNA
The client-to-server case is much simpler than the server-to-server
case because the client does not assert a domain name, which means
verification happens in only one direction. Therefore we describe
this case first to help the reader understand domain name
associations in XMPP.
3.1. C2S Flow
The following flow chart illustrates the protocol flow for
establishing a domain name association for an XML stream from a
client (C) to a server (S) using the standard PKIX prooftype
specified in [RFC6120].
|
DNS RESOLUTION ETC.
|
+-----------------STREAM HEADERS---------------------+
| |
| C: <stream to='a.example'> |
| |
| S: <stream from='a.example'> |
| |
+----------------------------------------------------+
|
+-----------------TLS NEGOTIATION--------------------+
| |
| S: Server Certificate |
| |
+----------------------------------------------------+
|
(client checks certificate and
establishes DNA for a.example)
3.2. C2S Description
The simplified order of events (see [RFC6120] for details) in
establishing an XML stream from a client (user@a.exmaple) to a server
(a.example) is as follows:
1. The client resolves via DNS the service _xmpp-
client._tcp.a.example.
2. The client opens a TCP connection to the resolved IP address.
3. The client sends an initial stream header to the server:
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<stream:stream to='a.example'>
4. The server sends a response stream header to the client,
asserting that it is a.example:
<stream:stream from='a.example'>
5. The parties attempt TLS negotiation, during which the XMPP server
(acting as a TLS server) presents a PKIX certificate proving that
it is a.example.
6. The client checks the PKIX certificate that the server provided;
if the proof is consistent with the XMPP profile of the matching
rules from [RFC6125] and the certificate is otherwise valid
according to [RFC5280], the client accepts that there is a strong
domain name association between its stream to the target server
and the DNS domain name of the XMPP service.
The certificate that the server presents might not be acceptable to
the client. As one example, the server might be hosting multiple
domains and secure delegation as described in Section 6 is necessary.
As another example, the server might present a self-signed
certificate, which requires the client to apply either the fallback
process described in section 6.6.4 of [RFC6125] or prompt the user to
accept an unauthenticated connection as described in Section 3.4 of
[RFC7590].
4. Server-to-Server (S2S) DNA
The server-to-server case is significantly more complex than the
client-to-server case, and involves checking of domain name
associations in both directions along with other "wrinkles" described
in the following sections. In some parts of the flow, server-to-
server communications use the Server Dialback protocol first
specified in (the now obsolete) [RFC3920] and since moved to
[XEP-0220]. See "Impact of TLS and DNSSEC on Dialback" [XEP-0344]
for considerations when using it together with TLS and DNSSEC. Also,
"Bidirectional Server-to-Server Connections" [XEP-0288] provides a
way to use the server-to-server connections for bidirectional
exchange of XML stanzas, which reduces the complexity of some of the
processes involved.
4.1. S2S Flow
The following flow charts illustrate the protocol flow for
establishing domain name associations between Server 1 (the
initiating entity) and Server 2 (the receiving entity), as described
in the remaining sections of this document.
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A simple S2S scenario would be as follows.
|
DNS RESOLUTION ETC.
|
+-------------STREAM HEADERS--------------------+
| |
| A: <stream from='a.example' to='b.example'> |
| |
| B: <stream from='b.example' to='a.example'> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-------------TLS NEGOTIATION-------------------+
| |
| B: Server Certificate |
| B: Certificate Request |
| A: Client Certificate |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
(A establishes DNA for b.example)
|
After the domain name association has been established in one
direction, it is possible to perform mutual authentication using
Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [RFC4422] and thus
establish domain name associations in both directions.
|
+-------------AUTHENTICATION--------------------+
| | |
| {valid client certificate?} --+ |
| | | |
| | yes no | |
| v | |
| SASL EXTERNAL | |
| (mutual auth) | |
| (B establishes DNA for a.example) | |
+-------------------------------------|---------+
|
However, if mutual authentication cannot be completed using SASL, the
receiving server needs to establish a domain name association in
another way. This scenario is described in Section 4.3.
|
+-----------------+
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|
(Section 4.3: No Mutual PKIX authentication)
|
| B needs to establish DNA
| for this stream from a.example,
| so A asserts its identity
|
+----------DIALBACK IDENTITY ASSERTION----------+
| |
| A: <db:result from='a.example' |
| to='b.example'> |
| some-dialback-key |
| </db:result> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
DNS RESOLUTION ETC.
|
+-------------STREAM HEADERS--------------------+
| |
| B: <stream from='b.example' to='a.example'> |
| |
| A: <stream from='a.example' to='b.example'> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-------------TLS NEGOTIATION-------------------+
| |
| A: Server Certificate |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+----------DIALBACK IDENTITY VERIFICATION-------+
| |
| B: <db:verify from='b.example' |
| to='a.example' |
| id='...'> |
| some-dialback-key |
| </db:verify> |
| |
| A: <db:verify from='a.example' |
| to='b.example' |
| type='valid' |
| id='...'> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
(B establishes DNA for a.example)
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|
If one of the servers hosts additional service names (e.g., Server 2
might host c.example in addition to b.example and Server 1 might host
rooms.a.example in addition to a.example), then the servers can use
Server Dialback "piggybacking" to establish additional domain name
associations for the stream, as described in Section 4.4.
There are two varieties of piggybacking. The first is here called
"assertion".
|
(Section 4.4.1: Piggybacking Assertion)
|
+----------DIALBACK IDENTITY ASSERTION----------+
| |
| B: <db:result from='c.example' |
| to='a.example'/> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-----------DNA DANCE AS ABOVE------------------+
| |
| DNS RESOLUTION, STREAM HEADERS, |
| TLS NEGOTIATION, AUTHENTICATION |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+----------DIALBACK IDENTITY VERIFICATION-------+
| |
| A: <db:result from='a.example' |
| to='c.example' |
| type='valid'/> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
The second variety of piggybacking is here called "supposition".
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|
(Section 4.4.2: Piggybacking Supposition)
|
+-----------SUBSEQUENT CONNECTION---------------+
| |
| B: <stream from='c.example' |
| to='rooms.a.example'> |
| |
| A: <stream from='rooms.a.example' |
| to='c.example'> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-----------DNA DANCE AS ABOVE------------------+
| |
| DNS RESOLUTION, STREAM HEADERS, |
| TLS NEGOTIATION, AUTHENTICATION |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
|
+-----------DIALBACK OPTIMIZATION---------------+
| |
| B: <db:result from='c.example' |
| to='rooms.a.example'/> |
| |
| B: <db:result from='rooms.a.example' |
| to='c.example' |
| type='valid'/> |
| |
+-----------------------------------------------+
4.2. A Simple S2S Scenario
To illustrate the problem, consider the simplified order of events
(see [RFC6120] for details) in establishing an XML stream between
Server 1 (a.example) and Server 2 (b.example):
1. Server 1 resolves via DNS the service _xmpp-
server._tcp.b.example.
2. Server 1 opens a TCP connection to the resolved IP address.
3. Server 1 sends an initial stream header to Server 2, asserting
that it is a.example:
<stream:stream from='a.example' to='b.example'>
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4. Server 2 sends a response stream header to Server 1, asserting
that it is b.example:
<stream:stream from='b.example' to='a.example'>
5. The servers attempt TLS negotiation, during which Server 2
(acting as a TLS server) presents a PKIX certificate proving that
it is b.example and Server 1 (acting as a TLS client) presents a
PKIX certificate proving that it is a.example.
6. Server 1 checks the PKIX certificate that Server 2 provided and
Server 2 checks the PKIX certificate that Server 1 provided; if
these proofs are consistent with the XMPP profile of the matching
rules from [RFC6125] and are otherwise valid according to
[RFC5280], each server accepts that there is a strong domain name
association between its stream to the other party and the DNS
domain name of the other party (i.e., mutual authentication is
achieved).
Several simplifying assumptions underlie the happy scenario just
outlined:
o The PKIX certificate presented by Server 2 during TLS negotiation
is acceptable to Server 1 and matches the expected identity.
o The PKIX certificate presented by Server 1 during TLS negotiation
is acceptable to Server 2, which enables the parties to complete
mutual authentication.
o There are no additional domains associated with Server 1 and
Server 2 (say, a subdomain rooms.a.example on Server 1 or a second
domain c.example on Server 2).
o The server administrators are able to obtain PKIX certificates
issued by a widely-accepted certification authority (CA) in the
first place.
o The server administrators are running their own XMPP servers,
rather than using hosting services.
Let's consider each of these "wrinkles" in turn.
4.3. No Mutual PKIX Authentication
If the PKIX certificate presented by Server 1 during TLS negotiation
is not acceptable to Server 2, Server 2 is unable to mutually
authenticate Server 1. Therefore, Server 2 needs to verify the
asserted identity of Server 1 by other means.
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1. Server 1 asserts it is a.example using the Server Dialback
protocol:
<db:result from='a.example' to='b.example' id='...'>some-
dialback-key</db:result>
2. Server 2 resolves via DNS the service _xmpp-
server._tcp.a.example.
3. Server 2 opens a TCP connection to the resolved IP address.
4. Server 2 sends an initial stream header to Server 1, asserting
that it is b.example:
<stream:stream from='b.example' to='a.example'>
5. Server 1 sends a response stream header to Server 2, asserting
that it is a.example:
<stream:stream from='a.example' to='b.example'>
6. The servers attempt TLS negotiation, during which Server 1
(acting as a TLS server) presents a PKIX certificate.
7. Server 2 checks the PKIX certificate that Server 1 provided (this
might be the same certificate presented by Server 1 as a client
certificate in the initial connection). However, Server 2 does
not accept this certificate as proving that Server 1 is
authorized as a.example and therefore uses another method (here,
the Server Dialback protocol) to establish the domain name
association.
8. Server 2 proceeds with Server Dialback in order to establish the
domain name association. In order to do this it sends a request
for verification as described in [XEP-0220]:
<db:verify from='b.example' to='a.example' id='...'>some-
dialback-key</db:verify>
9. Server 1 responds to this:
<db:verify from='a.example' to='b.example' id='...' type='valid/>
allowing Server 2 to establish the domain name association.
In some situations (e.g., if the Authoritative Server in Server
Dialback presents the same certificate as the Originating Server), it
is the practice of some XMPP server implementations to skip steps 8
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and 9. These situations are discussed in "Impact of TLS and DNSSEC
on Dialback" [XEP-0344].
4.4. Piggybacking
4.4.1. Assertion
Consider the common scenario in which Server 2 hosts not only
b.example but also a second domain c.example (often called a "multi-
tenanted" environment). If a user of Server 2 associated with
c.example wishes to communicate with a friend at a.example, Server 2
needs to send XMPP stanzas from the domain c.example rather than
b.example. Although Server 2 could open a new TCP connection and
negotiate new XML streams for the domain pair of c.example and
a.example, that is wasteful (especially if Server 2 hosts a large
number of domains). Server 2 already has a connection to a.example,
so how can it assert that it would like to add a new domain pair to
the existing connection?
The traditional method for doing so is the Server Dialback protocol
[XEP-0220]. Here, Server 2 can send a <db:result/> element for the
new domain pair over the existing stream.
<db:result from='c.example' to='a.example'>
some-dialback-key
</db:result>
This element functions as Server 2's assertion that it is (also)
c.example, and thus is functionally equivalent to the 'from' address
of an initial stream header as previously described.
In response to this assertion, Server 1 needs to obtain some kind of
proof that Server 2 really is also c.example. If the certificate
presented by Server 2 is also valid for c.example then no further
action is necessary. However, if not then Server 1 needs to do a bit
more work. Specifically, Server 1 can pursue the same strategy it
used before:
1. Server 1 resolves via DNS the service _xmpp-
server._tcp.c.example.
2. Server 1 opens a TCP connection to the resolved IP address (which
might be the same IP address as for b.example).
3. Server 1 sends an initial stream header to Server 2, asserting
that it is a.example:
<stream:stream from='a.example' to='c.example'>
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4. Server 2 sends a response stream header to Server 1, asserting
that it is c.example:
<stream:stream from='c.example' to='a.example'>
5. The servers attempt TLS negotiation, during which Server 2
(acting as a TLS server) presents a PKIX certificate proving that
it is c.example.
6. At this point, Server 1 needs to establish that, despite
different certificates, c.example is associated with the origin
of the request. This is done using Server Dialback [XEP-0220]:
<db:verify from='a.example' to='c.example' id='...'>some-
dialback-key</db:verify>
7. Server 2 responds to this:
<db:verify from='c.example' to='a.example' id='...' type='valid/>
allowing Server 1 to establish the domain name association.
Now that Server 1 accepts the domain name association, it informs
Server 2 of that fact:
<db:result from='a.example' to='c.example' type='valid'/>
The parties can then terminate the second connection, since it was
used only for Server 1 to associate a stream with the domain name
c.example (the dialback key links the original stream to the new
association).
4.4.2. Supposition
Piggybacking can also occur in the other direction. Consider the
common scenario in which Server 1 provides XMPP services not only for
a.example but also for a subdomain such as a Multi-User Chat
[XEP-0045] service at rooms.a.example. If a user from c.example at
Server 2 wishes to join a room on the groupchat sevice, Server 2
needs to send XMPP stanzas from the domain c.example to the domain
rooms.a.example rather than a.example.
First, Server 2 needs to determine whether it can piggyback the
domain rooms.a.example on the connection to a.example:
1. Server 2 resolves vua DNS the service _xmpp-
server._tcp.rooms.a.example.
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2. Server 2 determines this resolves to an IP address and port that
it is already connected to.
3. Server 2 determines that the PKIX certificate for that active
connection would also be valid for the rooms.a.example domain and
that Server 1 has announced support for dialback errors.
Server 2 sends a dialback key to Server 1 over the existing
connection.
<db:result from='c.example' to='rooms.a.example'>
some-dialback-key
</db:result>
Server 1 then informs Server 2 that it accepts the domain name
association:
<db:result from='rooms.a.example' to='c.example' type='valid'/>
5. Alternative Prooftypes
The foregoing protocol flows assumed that domain name associations
were proved using the PKIX prooftype. However, sometimes XMPP server
administrators are unable or unwilling to obtain valid PKIX
certificates for all of the domains they host at their servers. For
example:
o In order to issue a PKIX certificate, a CA might try to send email
messages to authoritative mailbox names [RFC2142], but the
administrator of a subsidiary service such as im.cs.podunk.example
cannot receive email sent to mailto:hostmaster@podunk.example.
o A hosting provider such as hosting.example.net might not want to
take on the liability of holding the certificate and private key
for a tenant such as example.com (or the tenant might not want the
hosting provider to hold its certificate and private key).
o Even if PKIX certificates for each tenant can be obtained, the
management of so many certificates can introduce a large
administrative load.
(Additional discussion can be found in [I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh].)
In these circumstances, prooftypes other than PKIX are desirable or
necessary. As described below, two alternatives have been defined so
far: DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) and PKIX Over
Secure HTTP (POSH).
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5.1. DANE
The DANE prooftype is defined as follows:
1. The server's proof consists of either a service certificate or
domain-issued certificate (TLSA usage PKIX-EE or DANE-EE, see
[RFC6698] and [RFC7218]).
2. The proof is checked by verifying an exact match or a hash of
either the SubjectPublicKeyInfo or the full certificate.
3. The client's verification material is obtained via secure DNS
[RFC4033] as described in [I-D.ietf-dane-srv].
4. Secure DNS is necessary in order to effectively establish an
alternative chain of trust from the service certificate or
domain-issued certificate to the DNS root.
The DANE prooftype makes use of DNS-Based Authentication of Named
Entities [RFC6698], specifically the use of DANE with DNS SRV records
[I-D.ietf-dane-srv]. For XMPP purposes, the following rules apply:
o If there is no SRV resource record, pursue the fallback methods
described in [RFC6120].
o Use the 'to' address of the initial stream header to determine the
domain name of the TLS client's reference identifier (since use of
the Server Name Indication extension (TLS SNI) [RFC6066] is purely
discretionary in XMPP, as mentioned in [RFC6120]).
5.2. POSH
The POSH prooftype is defined as follows:
1. The server's proof consists of a PKIX certificate.
2. The proof is checked according to the rules from [RFC6120] and
[RFC6125].
3. The client's verification material is obtained by retrieving a
hash of the PKIX certificate over HTTPS at a well-known URI
[RFC5785].
4. Secure DNS is not necessary since the HTTPS retrieval mechanism
relies on the chain of trust from the public key infrastructure.
POSH is defined in [I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh]. For XMPP purposes, the
following rules apply:
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o If no verification material is found via POSH, pursue the fallback
methods described in [RFC6120].
o Use the 'to' address of the initial stream header to determine the
domain name of the TLS client's reference identifier (since use of
the Server Name Indication extension (TLS SNI) [RFC6066] is purely
discretionary in XMPP, as mentioned in [RFC6120]).
The well-known URIs [RFC5785] to be used for POSH are:
o "/.well-known/posh/xmpp-client.json" for client-to-server
connections
o "/.well-known/posh/xmpp-server.json" for server-to-server
connections
6. Secure Delegation and Multi-Tenancy
One common method for deploying XMPP services is multi-tenancy: e.g.,
XMPP services for the service domain example.com are actually hosted
at the target server hosting.example.net. Such an arrangement is
relatively convenient in XMPP given the use of DNS SRV records
[RFC2782], such as the following delegation from example.com to
hosting.example.net:
_xmpp-server._tcp.example.com. 0 IN SRV 0 0 5269 hosting.example.net
Secure connections with multi-tenancy can work using the PKIX
prooftype on a small scale if the provider itself wishes to host
several domains (e.g., related domains such as jabber-de.example and
jabber-ch.example). However, in practice the security of multi-
tenancy has been found to be unwieldy when the provider hosts large
numbers of XMPP services on behalf of multiple tenants (see
[I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh] for a detailed description). As a result,
server-to-server communications to example.com go unencrypted or the
communications are TLS-encrypted but the certificates are not checked
(which is functionally equivalent to a connection using an anonymous
key exchange). This is also true of client-to-server communications,
forcing end users to override certificate warnings or configure their
clients to accept or "pin" certificates for hosting.example.net
instead of example.com. The fundamental problem here is that if
DNSSEC is not used then the act of delegation via DNS SRV records is
inherently insecure.
The specification for use of SRV records with DANE
[I-D.ietf-dane-srv] explains how to use DNSSEC for secure delegation
with the DANE prooftype, and the POSH specification
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[I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh] explains how to use HTTPS redirects for secure
delegation with the POSH prooftype.
7. Prooftype Model
In general, a domain name association (DNA) prooftype conforms to the
following definition:
prooftype: A mechanism for proving an association between a domain
name and an XML stream, where the mechanism defines (1) the nature
of the server's proof, (2) the matching rules for comparing the
client's verification material against the server's proof, (3) how
the client obtains its verification material, and (4) whether the
mechanism depends on secure DNS.
The PKIX, DANE, and POSH prooftypes adhere to this model. (Some
prooftypes depend on, or are enhanced by, secure DNS [RFC4033] and
thus also need to describe how they ensure secure delegation.)
Other prooftypes are possible; examples might include TLS with PGP
keys [RFC6091], a token mechanism such as Kerberos [RFC4120] or OAuth
[RFC6749], and Server Dialback keys [XEP-0220].
Although the PKIX prooftype reuses the syntax of the XMPP Server
Dialback protocol [XEP-0220] for signaling between servers, this
framework document does not define how the generation and validation
of Server Dialback keys (also specified in [XEP-0220]) is a DNA
prooftype. However, nothing in this document prevents the continued
use of Server Dialback for signaling, and a future specification (or
an updated version of [XEP-0220]) might define a DNA prooftype for
Server Dialback keys in a way that is consistent with this framework.
8. Guidance for Server Operators
This document introduces the concept of a prooftype in order to
explain and generalize the approach to establishing a strong
association between the DNS domain name of an XMPP service and the
XML stream that a client or peer server initiates with that service.
The operations and management implications of DNA prooftypes will
depend on the particular prooftypes that an operator supports. For
example:
o To support the PKIX prooftype [RFC6120], an operator needs to
obtain certificates for the XMPP server from a certification
authority (CA). However, DNS security is not required.
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o To support the DANE prooftype [I-D.ietf-dane-srv], an operator can
generate its own certificates for the XMPP server or obtain them
from a CA. In addition, DNS security is required.
o To support the POSH prooftype [I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh], an operator
can generate its own certificates for the XMPP server or obtain
them from a CA, but in addition needs to deploy the web server for
POSH files with certificates obtained from a CA. However, DNS
security is not required.
Considerations for use of the foregoing prooftypes are explained in
the relevant specifications. See in particular Section 13.7 of
[RFC6120], Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-dane-srv], and Section 8 of
[I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh].
Naturally, these operations and management considerations are
additive: if an operator wishes to use multiple prooftypes, the
complexity of deployment increases (e.g., the operator might want to
obtain a PKIX certificate from a certification authority for use in
the PKIX prooftype and generate its own certificate for use in the
DANE prooftype). This is an unavoidable aspect of supporting as many
prooftypes as needed in order to ensure that domain name associations
can be established in the largest possible percentage of cases.
9. IANA Considerations
The POSH specification [I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh] establishes a registry
for POSH service names to be used in well-known URIs [RFC5785]. This
specification registers two such URIs for use in XMPP: "xmpp-client"
and "xmpp-server". The completed registration templates follow.
9.1. POSH Service Name for xmpp-client Service
Service name: xmpp-client
Change controller: IETF
Definition and usage: Specifies the location of a POSH file
containing verification material or a reference thereto that enables
a client to verify the identity of a server for a client-to-server
stream in XMPP
Specification: [[ this document ]]
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9.2. POSH Service Name for xmpp-server Service
Service name: xmpp-server
Change controller: IETF
Definition and usage: Specifies the location of a POSH file
containing verification material or a reference thereto that enables
a server to verify the identity of a peer server for a server-to-
server stream in XMPP
Specification: [[ this document ]]
10. Security Considerations
With regard to the PKIX prooftype, this document supplements but does
not supersede the security considerations of [RFC6120] and [RFC6125].
With regard to the DANE and PKIX prooftypes, the reader is referred
to [I-D.ietf-dane-srv] and [I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh], respectively.
Any future prooftypes need to thoroughly describe how they conform to
the prooftype model specified in Section 7 of this document.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-dane-srv]
Finch, T., Miller, M., and P. Saint-Andre, "Using DNS-
Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) TLSA Records
with SRV Records", draft-ietf-dane-srv-14 (work in
progress), April 2015.
[I-D.ietf-xmpp-posh]
Miller, M. and P. Saint-Andre, "PKIX over Secure HTTP
(POSH)", draft-ietf-xmpp-posh-04 (work in progress),
February 2015.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
November 1987, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.
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[RFC2782] Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P., and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2782, February 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2782>.
[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.
[RFC4422] Melnikov, A., Ed. and K. Zeilenga, Ed., "Simple
Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, DOI
10.17487/RFC4422, June 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4422>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI
36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785, DOI
10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, DOI 10.17487/RFC6120,
March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6120>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.
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[RFC7218] Gudmundsson, O., "Adding Acronyms to Simplify
Conversations about DNS-Based Authentication of Named
Entities (DANE)", RFC 7218, DOI 10.17487/RFC7218, April
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7218>.
[XEP-0220]
Miller, J., Saint-Andre, P., and P. Hancke, "Server
Dialback", XSF XEP 0220, August 2014.
11.2. Informative References
[RFC2142] Crocker, D., "Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and
Functions", RFC 2142, DOI 10.17487/RFC2142, May 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2142>.
[RFC3920] Saint-Andre, P., Ed., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 3920, DOI 10.17487/RFC3920,
October 2004, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3920>.
[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4120, July 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4120>.
[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, DOI
10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.
[RFC6091] Mavrogiannopoulos, N. and D. Gillmor, "Using OpenPGP Keys
for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authentication", RFC
6091, DOI 10.17487/RFC6091, February 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6091>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7590] Saint-Andre, P. and T. Alkemade, "Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) in the Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP)", RFC 7590, DOI 10.17487/RFC7590, June
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7590>.
[XEP-0045]
Saint-Andre, P., "Multi-User Chat", XSF XEP 0045, February
2012.
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[XEP-0288]
Hancke, P. and D. Cridland, "Bidirectional Server-to-
Server Connections", XSF XEP 0288, September 2013.
[XEP-0344]
Hancke, P. and D. Cridland, "Impact of TLS and DNSSEC on
Dialback", XSF XEP 0344, March 2015.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
Richard Barnes, Stephen Farrell, and Jonas Lindberg contributed as
co-authors to earlier draft versions of this document.
Derek Atkins, Mahesh Jethanandani, and Dan Romascanu reviewed the
document on behalf of the Security Directorate, the Operations and
Management Directorate, and the General Area Review Team,
respectively.
During IESG review, Stephen Farrell and Barry Leiba provided helpful
input that led to improvements in the specification.
Thanks to Dave Cridland as document shepherd, Joe Hildebrand as
working group chair, and Ben Campbell as area director.
Peter Saint-Andre wishes to acknowledge Cisco Systems, Inc., for
employing him during his work on earlier draft versions of this
document.
Authors' Addresses
Peter Saint-Andre
&yet
Email: peter@andyet.com
URI: https://andyet.com/
Matthew Miller
Cisco Systems, Inc.
1899 Wynkoop Street, Suite 600
Denver, CO 80202
USA
Email: mamille2@cisco.com
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Philipp Hancke
&yet
Email: fippo@andyet.com
URI: https://andyet.com/
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