Internet DRAFT - draft-ingles-eap-edhoc
draft-ingles-eap-edhoc
EMU Working Group E. Ingles-Sanchez
Internet-Draft University of Murcia
Intended status: Standards Track D. Garcia-Carrillo
Expires: 15 March 2024 University of Oviedo
R. Marin-Lopez
University of Murcia
G. Selander
J. Preuß Mattsson
Ericsson
12 September 2023
Using the Extensible Authentication Protocol with Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman over COSE (EDHOC)
draft-ingles-eap-edhoc-05
Abstract
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in RFC 3748,
provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication
methods. This document specifies the use of EAP-EDHOC with Ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC). EDHOC provides a lightweight
authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange with ephemeral keys, using
COSE (RFC 8152) to provide security services efficiently encoded in
CBOR (RFC 8949). This document also provides guidance on
authentication and authorization for EAP-EDHOC.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 15 March 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Overview of the EAP-EDHOC Conversation . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.2. Transport and Message Correlation . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.4. Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.5. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.6. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2. Identity Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3. Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.4. Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements . . . . 15
3.5. EAP State Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Detailed Description of the EAP-EDHOC Protocol . . . . . . . 15
4.1. EAP-EDHOC Request Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2. EAP-EDHOC Response Packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1. EAP Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.2. EDHOC Exporter Label Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.1. Security Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Introduction
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC3748],
provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication
methods. This document specifies the EAP authentication method EAP-
EDHOC which uses COSE defined credential-based mutual authentication,
utilizing the EDHOC protocol cipher suite negotiation and
establishment of shared secret keying material. Ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC, [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]) is a very compact
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and lightweight authenticated key exchange protocol designed for
highly constrained settings. The main objective for EDHOC is to be a
matching security handshake protocol to OSCORE [RFC8613], i.e., to
provide authentication and session key establishment for IoT use
cases such as those built on CoAP [RFC7252] involving 'things' with
embedded microcontrollers, sensors, and actuators. EDHOC reuses the
same lightweight primitives as OSCORE, CBOR [RFC8949] and COSE
[RFC8152], and specifies the use of CoAP but is not bound to a
particular transport. The EAP-EDHOC method will enable the
integration of EDHOC in different applications and use cases making
use of the EAP framework.
2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Protocol Overview
3.1. Overview of the EAP-EDHOC Conversation
The EDHOC protocol running between an Initiator and a Responder
consists of three mandatory messages (message_1, message_2,
message_3), an optional message_4, and an error message. EAP-EDHOC
uses all messages in the exchange, and message_4 is mandatory, as an
alternate success indication.
After receiving an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC as
described in this document, the conversation will continue with the
EDHOC protocol encapsulated in the data fields of EAP-Response and
EAP-Request packets. When EAP-EDHOC is used, the formatting and
processing of the EDHOC message SHALL be done as specified in
[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]. This document only lists additional and
different requirements, restrictions, and processing compared to
[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc].
3.1.1. Authentication
EAP-EDHOC authentication credentials can be of any type supported by
COSE and be transported or referenced by EDHOC.
EAP-EDHOC provides forward secrecy by exchange of ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman public keys in message_1 and message_2.
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The optimization combining the execution of EDHOC with the first
subsequent OSCORE transaction specified in
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc] is not supported in this EAP method.
Figure 1 shows an example message flow for a successful EAP-EDHOC.
EAP-EDHOC Peer EAP-EDHOC Server
| EAP-Request/Identity |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity (Privacy-Friendly) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC Start) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_1) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_2) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_3) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_4) |
| <--------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| ---------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Success |
| <--------------------------------------------------- |
+ +
Figure 1: EAP-EDHOC Mutual Authentication
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3.1.2. Transport and Message Correlation
EDHOC is not bound to a particular transport layer and can even be
used in environments without IP. Nonetheless, EDHOC specification
has a set of requirements for its transport protocol
[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]. These include handling message loss,
reordering, duplication, fragmentation, demultiplex EDHOC messages
from other types of messages, denial-of-service protection, and
message correlation. All these requirements are fulfilled either by
the EAP protocol, EAP method or EAP lower layer, as specified in
[RFC3748].
For message loss, this can be either fulfilled by the EAP protocol or
the EAP lower layer, as retransmissions can occur both in the lower
layer and the EAP layer when EAP is run over a reliable lower layer.
In other words, the EAP layer will do the retransmissions if the EAP
lower layer cannot do it.
For reordering, EAP is reliant on the EAP lower layer ordering
guarantees for correct operation.
For duplication and message correlation, EAP has the Identifier
field, which provides both the peer and authenticator with the
ability to detect duplicates and match a request with a response.
Fragmentation is defined by this EAP method, see Section 3.1.6. The
EAP framework [RFC3748] specifies that EAP methods need to provide
fragmentation and reassembly if EAP packets can exceed the minimum
MTU of 1020 octets.
To demultiplex EDHOC messages from other types of messages, EAP
provides the Code field.
This method does not provide other mitigation against denial-of-
service than EAP [RFC3748].
3.1.3. Termination
If the EAP-EDHOC peer authenticates successfully, the EAP-EDHOC
server MUST send an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC
containing message_4 as a protected success indication.
If the EAP-EDHOC server authenticates successfully, the EAP-EDHOC
peer MUST send an EAP-Response message with EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC
containing no data. Finally, the EAP-EDHOC server sends an EAP-
Success.
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Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate message flows in several
cases where the EAP-EDHOC peer or EAP-EDHOC server sends an EDHOC
error message.
Figure 2 shows an example message flow where the EAP-EDHOC server
rejects message_1 with an EDHOC error message.
EAP-EDHOC Peer EAP-EDHOC Server
| EAP-Request/Identity |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity (Privacy-Friendly) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC Start) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_1) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC error) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Failure |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
Figure 2: EAP-EDHOC Server rejection of message_1
Figure 3 shows an example message flow where the EAP-EDHOC server
authentication is unsuccessful and the EAP-EDHOC peer sends an EDHOC
error message.
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EAP-EDHOC Peer EAP-EDHOC Server
| EAP-Request/Identity |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity (Privacy-Friendly) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC Start) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_1) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_2) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC error) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Failure |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
Figure 3: EAP-EDHOC Peer rejection of message_2
Figure 4 shows an example message flow where the EAP-EDHOC server
authenticates to the EAP-EDHOC peer successfully, but the EAP-EDHOC
peer fails to authenticate to the EAP-EDHOC server and the server
sends an EDHOC error message.
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EAP-EDHOC Peer EAP-EDHOC Server
| EAP-Request/Identity |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity (Privacy-Friendly) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC Start) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_1) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_2) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_3) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC error) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| |
| EAP-Failure |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
Figure 4: EAP-EDHOC Server rejection of message_3
Figure 4 shows an example message flow where the EAP-EDHOC server
sends the EDHOC message_4 to the EAP peer, but the success indication
fails, and the peer sends an EDHOC error message.
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EAP-EDHOC Peer EAP-EDHOC Server
| EAP-Request/Identity |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| EAP-Response/Identity (Privacy-Friendly) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC Start) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_1) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_2) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_3) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_4) |
| <--------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC error) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Failure |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| |
Figure 5: EAP-EDHOC Peer rejection of message_4
3.1.4. Identity
It is RECOMMENDED to use anonymous NAIs [RFC7542] in the Identity
Response as such identities are routable and privacy-friendly.
While opaque blobs are allowed by [RFC3748], such identities are NOT
RECOMMENDED as they are not routable and should only be considered in
local deployments where the EAP-EDHOC peer, EAP authenticator, and
EAP-EDHOC server all belong to the same network.
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Many client certificates contain an identity such as an email
address, which is already in NAI format. When the client certificate
contains an NAI as subject name or alternative subject name, an
anonymous NAI SHOULD be derived from the NAI in the certificate; See
Section 3.1.5.
3.1.5. Privacy
EAP-EDHOC peer and server implementations supporting EAP-EDHOC MUST
support anonymous Network Access Identifiers (NAIs) (Section 2.4 of
[RFC7542]). A client supporting EAP-EDHOC MUST NOT send its username
(or any other permanent identifiers) in cleartext in the Identity
Response (or any message used instead of the Identity Response).
Following [RFC7542], it is RECOMMENDED to omit the username (i.e.,
the NAI is @realm), but other constructions such as a fixed username
(e.g., anonymous@realm) or an encrypted username (e.g.,
xCZINCPTK5+7y81CrSYbPg+RKPE3OTrYLn4AQc4AC2U=@realm) are allowed.
Note that the NAI MUST be a UTF-8 string as defined by the grammar in
Section 2.2 of [RFC7542].
EAP-EDHOC is always used with privacy. This does not add any extra
round trips and the message flow with privacy is just the normal
message flow as shown in Figure 1.
3.1.6. Fragmentation
EAP-EDHOC fragmentation support is provided through the addition of a
flags octet within the EAP-Response and EAP-Request packets, as well
as a (conditional) EAP-EDHOC Message Length field of four octets. To
do so, the EAP request and response messages of EAP-EDHOC have a set
of information fields that allow for the specification of the
fragmentation process (See Section 4 for the detailed description).
Of these fields, we will highlight the one that contains the flag
octet, which is used to steer the fragmentation process. If the L
bit is set, we are specifying that the next message will be
fragmented and that in such a message we can also find the length of
the message.
Implementations MUST NOT set the L bit in unfragmented messages, but
they MUST accept unfragmented messages with and without the L bit
set. Some EAP implementations and access networks may limit the
number of EAP packet exchanges that can be handled. To avoid
fragmentation, it is RECOMMENDED to keep the sizes of EAP-EDHOC peer,
EAP-EDHOC server, and trust anchor authentication credentials small
and the length of the certificate chains short. In addition, it is
RECOMMENDED to use mechanisms that reduce the sizes of Certificate
messages.
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EDHOC is designed to perform well in constrained networks where
message sizes are restricted for performance reasons. In the basic
message construction, the size of plaintext in message_2 is limited
to the length of the output of the key derivation function which in
turn is decided by the EDHOC hash function. For example, with
SHA-256 as EDHOC hash algorithm the maximum size of plaintext in
message_2 is 8160 bytes. However, EDHOC also defines an optional
backwards compatible method for handling arbitrarily long message_2
plaintext sizes, see Appendix G in [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]. The other
three EAP-EDHOC messages do not have an upper bound.
Furthermore, in the case of sending a certificate in a message
instead of a reference, a certificate may in principle be as long as
16 MB. Hence, the EAP-EDHOC messages sent in a single round may thus
be larger than the MTU size or the maximum Remote Authentication
Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) packet size of 4096 octets. As a
result, an EAP-EDHOC implementation MUST provide its own support for
fragmentation and reassembly.
Since EAP is a simple ACK-NAK protocol, fragmentation support can be
added in a simple manner. In EAP, fragments that are lost or damaged
in transit will be retransmitted, and since sequencing information is
provided by the Identifier field in EAP, there is no need for a
fragment offset field as is provided in IPv4 EAP-EDHOC fragmentation
support is provided through the addition of a flags octet within the
EAP-Response and EAP-Request packets, as well as a EDHOC Message
Length field of four octets. Flags include the Length included (L),
More fragments (M), and EAP-EDHOC Start (S) bits. The L flag is set
to indicate the presence of the four-octet EDHOC Message Length
field, and MUST be set for the first fragment of a fragmented EDHOC
message or set of messages. The M flag is set on all but the last
fragment. The S flag is set only within the EAP-EDHOC start message
sent from the EAP server to the peer. The EDHOC Message Length field
is four octets, and provides the total length of the EDHOC message or
set of messages that is being fragmented; this simplifies buffer
allocation.
When an EAP-EDHOC peer receives an EAP-Request packet with the M bit
set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Response with EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC and
no data. This serves as a fragment ACK. The EAP server MUST wait
until it receives the EAP-Response before sending another fragment.
In order to prevent errors in the processing of fragments, the EAP
server MUST increment the Identifier field for each fragment
contained within an EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this
Identifier value in the fragment ACK contained within the EAP-
Response. Retransmitted fragments will contain the same Identifier
value.
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Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with the M
bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC
and no data. This serves as a fragment ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait
until it receives the EAP-Request before sending another fragment.
In order to prevent errors in the processing of fragments, the EAP
server MUST increment the Identifier value for each fragment ACK
contained within an EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this
Identifier value in the subsequent fragment contained within an EAP-
Response.
In the case where the EAP-EDHOC mutual authentication is successful,
and fragmentation is required, the conversation will appear as
follows:
EAP-EDHOC Peer EAP-EDHOC Server
| EAP-Request/Identity |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/Identity (Privacy-Friendly) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC Start, S bit set) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_1) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_2, |
| Fragment 1: L,M bits set) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (Fragment 2: M bits set) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (Fragment 3) |
| <---------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
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| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_3, |
| Fragment 1: L,M bits set) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| <--------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_3, |
| Fragment 2: M bits set) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| <--------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_3, |
| Fragment 3) |
| ----------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Request/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| (EDHOC message_4) |
| <--------------------------------------------------- |
| EAP-Response/ |
| EAP-Type=EAP-EDHOC |
| ---------------------------------------------------> |
| EAP-Success |
| <--------------------------------------------------- |
+ +
Figure 6: Fragmentation example of EAP-EDHOC Authentication
3.2. Identity Verification
The EAP peer identity provided in the EAP-Response/Identity is not
authenticated by EAP-EDHOC. Unauthenticated information MUST NOT be
used for accounting purposes or to give authorization. The
authenticator and the EAP-EDHOC server MAY examine the identity
presented in EAP-Response/Identity for purposes such as routing and
EAP method selection. EAP-EDHOC servers MAY reject conversations if
the identity does not match their policy.
The EAP server identity in the EDHOC server certificate is typically
a fully qualified domain name (FQDN) in the SubjectAltName (SAN)
extension. Since EAP-EDHOC deployments may use more than one EAP
server, each with a different certificate, EAP peer implementations
SHOULD allow for the configuration of one or more trusted root
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certificates (CA certificate) to authenticate the server certificate
and one or more server names to match against the SubjectAltName
(SAN) extension in the server certificate. If any of the configured
names match any of the names in the SAN extension, then the name
check passes. To simplify name matching, an EAP-EDHOC deployment can
assign a name to represent an authorized EAP server and EAP Server
certificates can include this name in the list of SANs for each
certificate that represents an EAP-EDHOC server. If server name
matching is not used, then it degrades the confidence that the EAP
server with which it is interacting is authoritative for the given
network. If name matching is not used with a public root CA, then
effectively any server can obtain a certificate that will be trusted
for EAP authentication by the peer.
The process of configuring a root CA certificate and a server name is
non-trivial; therefore, automated methods of provisioning are
RECOMMENDED. For example, the eduroam federation [RFC7593] provides
a Configuration Assistant Tool (CAT) to automate the configuration
process. In the absence of a trusted root CA certificate (user-
configured or system-wide), EAP peers MAY implement a trust on first
use (TOFU) mechanism where the peer trusts and stores the server
certificate during the first connection attempt. The EAP peer
ensures that the server presents the same stored certificate on
subsequent interactions. The use of a TOFU mechanism does not allow
for the server certificate to change without out-of-band validation
of the certificate and is therefore not suitable for many deployments
including ones where multiple EAP servers are deployed for high
availability. TOFU mechanisms increase the susceptibility to traffic
interception attacks and should only be used if there are adequate
controls in place to mitigate this risk.
3.3. Key Hierarchy
The key schedule for EDHOC is described in Section 4 of
[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]. The Key_Material and Method-Id SHALL be
derived from the PRK_exporter using the EDHOC-Exporter interface, see
Section 4.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc].
Type is the value of the EAP Type field defined in Section 2 of
[RFC3748]. For EAP-EDHOC, the Type field has the value TBD1.
Type = TBD1
MSK = EDHOC-Exporter(TBD2 ,<< Type >>, 64)
EMSK = EDHOC-Exporter(TBD3 ,<< Type >>, 64)
Method-Id = EDHOC-Exporter(TBD4, << Type >>, 64)
Session-Id = Type || Method-Id
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EAP-EDHOC exports the MSK and the EMSK and does not specify how it is
used by lower layers.
3.4. Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements
The EAP-EDHOC peers and EAP-EDHOC servers MUST comply with the
compliance requirements (mandatory-to-implement cipher suites,
signature algorithms, key exchange algorithms, extensions, etc.)
defined in Section 7 of [I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc].
3.5. EAP State Machines
The EAP-EDHOC server sends message_4 in an EAP-Request as a protected
success result indication.
EDHOC error messages SHOULD be considered failure result indication,
as defined in [RFC3748]. After sending or receiving an EDHOC error
message, the EAP-EDHOC server may only send an EAP-Failure. EDHOC
error messages are unprotected.
The keying material can be derived after the EDHOC message_2 has been
sent or received. Implementations following [RFC4137] can then set
the eapKeyData and aaaEapKeyData variables.
The keying material can be made available to lower layers and the
authenticator after the authenticated success result indication has
been sent or received (message_4). Implementations following
[RFC4137] can set the eapKeyAvailable and aaaEapKeyAvailable
variables.
4. Detailed Description of the EAP-EDHOC Protocol
4.1. EAP-EDHOC Request Packet
A summary of the EAP-EDHOC Request packet format is shown below. The
fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Flags | EDHOC Message Length
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| EDHOC Message Length | EDHOC Data...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
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1
Identifier
The Identifier field is one octet and aids in matching responses
with requests. The Identifier field MUST be changed on each
Request packet.
Length
The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and Data
fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field should be
treated as Data Link Layer padding and MUST be ignored on
reception.
Type
TBD1 -- EAP-EDHOC
Flags
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|L M S R R R R R|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
L = Length included
M = More fragments
S = EAP-EDHOC start
R = Reserved
The L bit (length included) is set to indicate the presence of the
four-octet EDHOC Message Length field and MUST be set for the first
fragment of a fragmented EDHOC message or set of messages. The M
bit (more fragments) is set on all but the last fragment. The S
bit (EAP-EDHOC start) is set in an EAP-EDHOC Start message. This
differentiates the EAP-EDHOC Start message from a fragment
acknowledgement. Implementations of this specification MUST set
the reserved bits to zero and MUST ignore them on reception.
EDHOC Message Length
The EDHOC Message Length field is four octets and is present only
if the L bit is set. This field provides the total length of the
EDHOC message or set of messages that is being fragmented.
EDHOC data
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The EDHOC data consists of the encapsulated EDHOC packet in EDHOC
message format.
4.2. EAP-EDHOC Response Packet
A summary of the EAP-EDHOC Response packet format is shown below.
The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Code | Identifier | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Flags | EDHOC Message Length
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| EDHOC Message Length | EDHOC Data...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Code
2
Identifier
The Identifier field is one octet and MUST match the Identifier
field from the corresponding request.
Length
The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and Data
fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field should be
treated as Data Link Layer padding and MUST be ignored on
reception.
Type
TBD1 -- EAP-EDHOC
Flags
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|L M R R R R R R|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
L = Length included
M = More fragments
R = Reserved
The L bit (length included) is set to indicate the presence of the
four-octet EDHOC Message Length field,
and MUST be set for the first
fragment of a fragmented EDHOC message or set of messages. The M
bit (more fragments) is set on all but the last fragment.
Implementations of this specification MUST set the reserved bits
to zero and MUST ignore them on reception.
EDHOC Message Length
The EDHOC Message Length field is four octets and is present only
if the L bit is set. This field provides the total length of the
EDHOC message or set of messages that is being fragmented.
EDHOC data
The EDHOC data consists of the encapsulated EDHOC message.
5. IANA Considerations
5.1. EAP Type
IANA has allocated EAP Type TBD1 for method EAP-EDHOC. The
allocation has been updated to reference this document.
5.2. EDHOC Exporter Label Registry
IANA has registered the following new labels in the "EDHOC Exporter
Label" registry under the group name "Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over
COSE (EDHOC)":
Label: TBD2
Description: MSK of EAP method EAP-EDHOC
Label: TBD3
Description: EMSK of EAP method EAP-EDHOC
Label: TBD4
Description: Method-Id of EAP method EAP-EDHOC
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The allocations have been updated to reference this document.
6. Security Considerations
TBD.
[Editor's note: More security considerations to be added.]
6.1. Security Claims
Using EAP-EDHOC provides the security claims of EDHOC, which are
described next.
[1] Mutual authentication: The initiator and responder authenticate
each other through the EDHOC exchange.
[2] Forward secrecy: Only ephemeral Diffie-Hellman methods are
supported by EDHOC, which ensures that the compromise of one session
key does not also compromise earlier sessions' keys.
[3] Identity protection: EDHOC secures the Responder's credential
identifier against passive attacks and the Initiator's credential
identifier against active attacks. An active attacker can get the
credential identifier of the Responder by eavesdropping on the
destination address used for transporting message_1 and then sending
its own message_1 to the same address.
[4] Cipher suite negotiation: The Initiator's list of supported
cipher suites and order of preference is fixed and the selected
cipher suite is the first cipher suite that the Responder supports.
[5] Integrity protection: EDHOC integrity protects all message
content using transcript hashes for key derivation and as additional
authenticated data, including, e.g., method type, ciphersuites, and
external authorization data.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc]
Selander, G., Mattsson, J. P., and F. Palombini,
"Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman Over COSE (EDHOC)", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-lake-edhoc-22, 25
August 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
ietf-lake-edhoc-22>.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
[RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba,
"State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4137, August 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4137>.
[RFC7542] DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7542>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-core-oscore-edhoc]
Palombini, F., Tiloca, M., Höglund, R., Hristozov, S., and
G. Selander, "Using EDHOC with CoAP and OSCORE", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-core-oscore-edhoc-08,
8 August 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-ietf-core-oscore-edhoc-08>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC7593] Wierenga, K., Winter, S., and T. Wolniewicz, "The eduroam
Architecture for Network Roaming", RFC 7593,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7593, September 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7593>.
[RFC8152] Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)",
RFC 8152, DOI 10.17487/RFC8152, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152>.
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[RFC8613] Selander, G., Mattsson, J., Palombini, F., and L. Seitz,
"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments
(OSCORE)", RFC 8613, DOI 10.17487/RFC8613, July 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8613>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
Acknowledgments
Work on this document has in part been supported by the H2020
Projects IoTCrawler (grant agreement no. 779852) and INSPIRE-5Gplus
(grant agreement no. 871808).
Authors' Addresses
Eduardo Ingles-Sanchez
University of Murcia
Murcia 30100
Spain
Email: eduardo.ingles@um.es
Dan Garcia-Carrillo
University of Oviedo
Gijon, Asturias 33203
Spain
Email: garciadan@uniovi.es
Rafael Marin-Lopez
University of Murcia
Murcia 30100
Spain
Email: rafa@um.es
Göran Selander
Ericsson
SE-164 80 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com
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John Preuß Mattsson
Ericsson
SE-164 80 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
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