Internet DRAFT - draft-irtf-rrg-ilnp-noncev6
draft-irtf-rrg-ilnp-noncev6
Internet Draft RJ Atkinson
draft-irtf-rrg-ilnp-noncev6-06.txt Consultant
Expires: 10 JAN 2013 SN Bhatti
Category: Experimental U. St Andrews
10 July 2012
IPv6 Nonce Destination Option for ILNPv6
draft-irtf-rrg-ilnp-noncev6-06.txt
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documents as Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six
months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other
documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use
Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other
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The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
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This document is not on the IETF standards-track and does not
specify any level of standard. This document merely provides
information for the Internet community.
This document is part of the ILNP document set, which has had
extensive review within the IRTF Routing Research Group. ILNP is
one of the recommendations made by the RG Chairs. Separately,
various refereed research papers on ILNP have also been published
during this decade. So the ideas contained herein have had much
broader review than the IRTF Routing RG. The views in this
document were considered controversial by the Routing RG, but the
RG reached a consensus that the document still should be
published. The Routing RG has had remarkably little consensus on
anything, so virtually all Routing RG outputs are considered
controversial.
Abstract
The Identifier-Locator Network Protocol (ILNP) is an
experimental, evolutionary enhancement to IP. ILNP has multiple
instantiations. This document describes an experimental Nonce
Destination Option used only with ILNP for IPv6 (ILNPv6). This
document is a product of the IRTF Routing RG.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ...............................................2
2. Syntax......................................................3
3. Transport Protocol Effects..................................5
4. Location Changes............................................5
5. Implementation Considerations...............................6
6. Backwards Compatibility.....................................6
7. Security Considerations ....................................8
8. IANA Considerations ........................................9
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9. References .................................................9
1. INTRODUCTION
At present, the Internet research and development community are
exploring various approaches to evolving the Internet
Architecture to solve a variety of issues including, but not
limited to, scalability of inter-domain routing [RFC4984]. A wide
range of other issues (e.g. site multi-homing, node multi-homing,
site/subnet mobility, node mobility) are also active concerns at
present. Several different classes of evolution are being
considered by the Internet research & development community. One
class is often called "Map and Encapsulate", where traffic would
be mapped and then tunnelled through the inter-domain core of the
Internet. Another class being considered is sometimes known as
"Identifier/Locator Split". This document relates to a proposal
that is in the latter class of evolutionary approaches.
This document describes a new option for the IPv6 Destination
Options header that is used with the Identifier Locator Network
Protocol for IPv6 (ILNPv6). ILNPv6 is an experimental protocol
that is backwards compatible with, and incrementally upgradable
from, IPv6. This option is ONLY used in ILNPv6 sessions and is
never used with classic IPv6 sessions.
The Nonce option for the IPv6 Destination Options Header that is
described in this document provides two functions. First, it
provides protection against off-path attacks for packets when
ILNPv6 is in use. Second, it provides a signal during initial
network-layer session creation that ILNPv6 is proposed for use
with this network-layer session, rather than classic IPv6. This
last function is particularly important for ensuring that ILNP
is both incrementally deployable and backwards compatible with
IPv6. Consequently, this option MUST NOT be used except by an
ILNPv6-capable node.
Further, each Nonce value is unidirectional. Since packets often
travel asymmetric paths between two correspondents, having
separate Nonces for each direction limits the number of on-path
nodes that can easily learn an ILNP session's nonce. So a
typical TCP session will have 2 different nonce values in use:
one nonce is used from Local Node to the Correspondent Node and
a different nonce is used from the Correspondent Node to the
Local Node.
1.1 ILNP Document Roadmap
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The Identifier-Locator Network Protocol (ILNP), is described in
the ILNP Architecture [ILNP-ARCH] document, which should be read
first. ILNP can have multiple instantiations. [ILNP-ENG]
discusses engineering and implementation aspects common to all
ILNP instantiations. [ILNP-DNS] defines new Domain Name System
(DNS) resource records for ILNP. [ILNP-ICMPv6] defines a new
ICMPv6 Locator Update message for use with ILNPv6. Other
documents describe ILNP for IPv4 (ILNPv4).
1.2 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described
in RFC 2119. [RFC2119]
2. Syntax
The Nonce Option is carried within an IPv6 Destination Option
Header. Section 4 of [RFC2460] provides much more information
on the various options and optional headers used with IPv6.
More than one option might be inside the IPv6 Destination Option
Header, however at most 1 Nonce Option exists in a given IPv6
packet.
A system that receives a packet containing more than one Nonce
option SHOULD discard the packet as "Authentication Failed"
(instead of passing the packet up to the appropriate
transport-layer protocol or to ICMP) and SHOULD log the event,
including the Source Locator, Source Identifier, Destination
Locator, Destination Identifier, upper-layer protocol (e.g. OSPF,
TCP, UDP) if any, and transport-layer port numbers (if any),
as a security fault in accordance with local logging policies.
As of this writing, IPv6 Destination Option Headers, and the
options carried by such headers, are extremely uncommon in the
deployed Internet. So, it is expected that this Nonce Option
commonly would be the only IPv6 Destination Option present in a
given IPv6 packet. If a CALIPSO label option [RFC5570] is also
present in the same IPv6 Destination Option Header, the CALIPSO
option SHOULD precede the Nonce option. The Nonce option SHOULD
precede other possible options in the same IPv6 Destination
Option Header.
In the diagram below, we show not only the Nonce Option, but also
the IPv6 Destination Option Header that carries the Nonce Option.
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Header | Hdr Ext Len | Option Type | Option Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ Nonce Value /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Next Header: 8-bit selector. Identifies the type of header
immediately following the Destination Options
header. Uses the same values as the IPv4
Protocol field [RFC2460].
Hdr Ext Len: 8-bit unsigned integer. Length of the
Destination Options header in 8-octet units,
not including the first 8 octets.
Option Type: This contains the value XXX. This is the
first octet of the Nonce Option itself.
Option Length: This indicates the length in 8-bit octets of
the Nonce Value field of the Nonce Option.
This value must be selected so that the
enveloping IPv6 Destination Option complies
with the IPv6 header alignment rules. Common
values are 4 (when the Nonce Value is
32-bits), and 12 (when the Nonce value is
96-bits).
Nonce Value: An unpredictable cryptographically random value
used to prevent off-path attacks on an ILNP
session [RFC4086]. This field has variable
length, with the length indicated by the
Option Length field preceding it. Note that
the overall IPv6 IPv6 Destination Option MUST
comply with IPv6 header alignment rules.
Implementations MUST support sending and
receiving 32-bit and 96-bit Nonce values.
3. Transport Protocol Effects
When the initial packet(s) of an IPv6 session contain this Nonce
Destination Option, then ILNPv6 is in use for that network-layer
session. (NOTE: Backwards compatibility and incremental
deployment are discussed in more detail in Section 6 below.)
When a network-layer session is using ILNPv6, then the
transport-layer pseudo-header calculations MUST set to zero the
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high-order 64-bits ("Locator" or "Routing Prefix") of each IPv6
address. This has the effect that the transport-layer is no
longer aware of the topological network location of either node
in that transport-layer session.
The preceding rule applies not only to unicast ILNPv6 sessions,
but also to multicast or anycast ILNPv6 sessions.
4. Location Changes
When a node has a change in its Locator set that causes all
previously valid Locators to become invalid, the node MUST send
an ICMP Locator Update message (containing the Nonce Option with
the appropriate nonce value) to each of its correspondents
[]ILNP-ARCH] [ILNP-ICMPv6].
In the deployed Internet, packets sometimes arrive at a
destination out of order. A receiving node MUST drop a packet
arriving from a correspondent if the Source Locator of the
received packet is not in the receiving node's Identifier Locator
Communication Cache's (ILCC's) Set of Correspondent Locator(s)
UNLESS that packet contains a Nonce Option with the appropriate
nonce value for that Source Identifier and Destination Identifier
pair. This is done to reduce the risk of ILNP session hijacking
or ILNP session interference attacks.
Hence, the node that has had all previously valid Locators become
invalid MUST include the Nonce Option with the appropriate nonce
value in all packets (data or otherwise) to all correspondents
for at least 3 round-trip times for each correspondent. (NB: An
implementation need not actually calculate RTT values; it could
just use a fixed timer with a time long enough to cover the
longest RTT path, such as 1 minute.) This 'gratuitous
authentication' ensures that the correspondent can authenticate
any received packet, even if the ICMP Locator Update control
message arrives and is processed AFTER some other packet using
the new Source Locator(s). If an ILNP session is using IP
Security, then, of course, IP Security SHOULD continue to be used
even if one or more participating nodes change location. Because
IP Security for ILNP [ILNP-ENG] binds only to the Identifiers,
and not to the Locators in the packet, changes in Locator value
have no impact on IP Security for ILNP sessions.
As mobility and multi-homing are functionally equivalent for
ILNP, this section applies equally to either situation, and also
to any other situation in which a node's set of Locators might
change over time.
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5. Implementation Considerations
Implementers may use any internal implementation they wish,
PROVIDED that the externally visible behaviour is the same as
this implementation approach.
5.1 ILNP Communication Cache
As described in [ILNP-ENG], ILNP nodes maintain an Identifier-Locator
Communication Cache (ILCC) that contains several variables for
each correspondent. The ILNP Nonce value is an important part of
that cache.
5.2 Mode Indicator
To support ILNP, and to retain needed incremental deployability
and backwards compatibility, the network layer needs a (logical)
mode bit in the Transport Control Block (or equivalent for one's
implementation) to track which IP sessions are using traditional
IPv6 and which IP sessions are using ILNPv6.
If a given transport-layer session is using ILNP, then an entry
corresponding to the network-layer components of that
transport-layer session also will exist in the ILNP Communication
Cache. Multiple transport-layer sessions between a given pair of
nodes normally share a single entry in the ILNP Communication
Cache, provided their network-layer details (e.g. Identifiers,
Nonces) are identical. Because two different ILNP nodes at two
different locations might share the same Identifier value, it is
important for an ILNP implementation to use the ILNP Nonce values
to distinguish between different ILNP nodes that happen to be
using the (some of) the same Identifier value(s).
5.3 IP Security
Whether or not ILNP is in use, the IPsec subsystem MUST maintain
an IPsec Security Association Database (SAD) and also MUST
maintain information about which IPsec Selectors apply to traffic
received by or sent from the local node [RFC4301]. By combining
the information in the IPsec SAD, of what IPsec Selectors apply,
and the information in the ILCC, an implementation has sufficient
knowledge to apply IPsec properly to both received and
transmitted packets.
6. Backwards Compatibility
This option MUST NOT be present in an IPv6 packet unless the
packet is part of an ILNPv6 session. As is explained below in
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more detail, the presence or absence of this option from the
initial packets of a new IPv6 session is an important indication
of whether the session is using classic IPv6 or ILNPv6.
ILNPv6 nodes MUST include this option in the first few packets
of each ILNPv6 session, MUST include this option in all ICMP
messages generated by endpoints participating in an ILNPv6
session, and MAY include this option in any and all packets of an
ILNPv6 session. It is recommended that this option be included
in all packets of the ILNPv6 session if the packet loss for that
session is known to be much higher than normal.
If a node supports ILNP and the node wishes to be able to receive
incoming new ILNP sessions, then that node's fully-qualified
domain name SHOULD have one or more NID records and also one or
more Locator (e.g. L64 or LP) records associated with it in the
DNS [ILNP-DNS].
When a host ("initiator") initiates a new IP session with a
correspondent ("responder"), it normally will perform a DNS
lookup to determine the address(es) of the responder. A host
that has been enhanced to support the Identifier/Locator Split
operating mode SHOULD look for Node Identifier ("NID") and
Locator ("L64") records in any received DNS replies. DNS servers
that support Identifier and Locator (i.e., L64 or LP) records
might include them (when they exist) as additional data in all
DNS replies to DNS queries for DNS A or AAAA records associated
with a specified DNS Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN).
If the initiator supports ILNP, and from DNS data learns that the
responder also supports ILNP, then the initiator SHOULD attempt
to use ILNP for new sessions with that responder. In such cases,
the initiator MUST generate an unpredictable, cryptographically
random, ILNP Nonce value, MUST store that ILNP Nonce value in the
local ILCC, and MUST include the ILNP Nonce Destination Option in
its initial packet(s) to the responder. The IETF has provided
advice on generating cryptographically random numbers, such as
this nonce value [RFC4086].
If the responder supports ILNP and receives initial packet(s)
containing the ILNP Nonce Destination Option, the responder will
thereby learn that the initiator supports ILNP and the responder
also will use ILNP for this new IP session.
If the responder supports ILNP and receives initial IP packet(s)
NOT containing the Nonce Destination Option, the responder will
thereby learn that the initiator does NOT support ILNP and the
responder will use classic IPv6 for this new IP session.
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If the responder does not support ILNP and receives initial
packet(s) containing the ILNP Nonce Destination Option, the
responder MUST drop the packet and MUST send an ICMP "Parameter
Problem" error message back to the initiator [RFC4443]. Indeed,
it is not expected that this behaviour will need to be coded into
non-ILNP nodes, as this is the normal behaviour for nodes
receiving unknown option headers.
If the initiator EITHER does not receive a response from the
responder in a timely manner (e.g. within the applicable TCP
timeout for a TCP session), and also does not receive an ICMP
Unreachable error message for that packet, OR if the initiator
receives an ICMP Parameter Problem error message for that packet,
then the initiator infers that the responder is not able to
support ILNP. In this case, the initiator should try again to
create the new IP session, but this time use classic IPv6 and
hence MUST NOT include the ILNP Nonce Destination Option.
7. Security Considerations
The ILNPv6 Nonce Destination Option is used ONLY for ILNPv6
sessions, because this option is part of the backwards-
compatibility and incremental-deployment approach for the
Identifier-Locator Network Protocol (ILNP). This option
MUST NOT be used with classic IPv6 sessions.
The ILNPv6 Nonce Destination Option only seeks to provide
protection against off-path attacks on an IP session. Ordinary
IPv6 is vulnerable to on-path attacks unless IP Security is in
use [CA-1995-01] [RFC4301]. This option exists to provide non-
cryptographic protection for ILNP sessions, protection equivalent
to the security of IP sessions that do NOT use IPsec.
When ILNPv6 is in use, the ILNP Nonce Destination Option MUST be
included in any ICMP control messages (e.g. ICMP Unreachable,
ICMP Locator Update) sent by participants in that ILNPv6 session,
even if IP Security also is in use for that ILNPv6 session. Note that
certain ICMP messages, for example a "Path Too Big" message,
might be generated by transit devices that are not aware of the
ILNP Nonce in use for that ILNPv6 session and hence are not able to
include the ILNP Nonce. Again, this also is true of classic IPv6
in the same operational situations, so this does not create a new
security issue.
For ILNPv6 sessions, any ICMP control messages received from a
participant in that ILNPv6 session that lack a Nonce Destination
Option MUST be discarded as forgeries. This security event
SHOULD be logged in accordance with local security logging
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policies, including details of the received packet (i.e. Source
Locator, Source Identifier, Destination Locator, Destination
Identifier, upper-layer protocol (e.g. TCP, UDP, OSPF) if any,
transport-layer port numbers if any, and the date and time the
packet was received).
For ILNPv6 sessions, ICMP control messages received from a
participant in that ILNPv6 session that have a Nonce Destination
Option, but do NOT have the correct nonce value inside the Nonce
Destination Option, MUST be discarded as forgeries. This
security event SHOULD be logged as described above.
Of course, longer nonce values provide greater resistance to
random guessing of the nonce value. However, ILNPv6 sessions
operating in higher risk environments SHOULD also use the
cryptographic authentication provided by IP Security for ILNP
[ILNP-ENG] [RFC4301]. Use of IP Security for ILNP for an ILNPv6
session does not eliminate the need for the ILNPv6 Nonce Option
to be included as described here or as described in [ILNP-
ICMPv6].
As a performance optimisation, it is suggested that when both the
Nonce Option and IP Security are present in a packet and the
Nonce Option has not been encrypted, that the Nonce Option value
be checked for validity before beginning IP Security processing.
This minimises the ability of an off-path attacker to force the
recipient to perform expensive cryptographic computations on
received control packets.
For environments with data at differing Sensitivity Levels
operating over common infrastructure (e.g. when the IPv6 CALIPSO
is deployed), it is recommended that the ILNP Nonce Option be
encrypted by using ESP Transport-Mode or ESP Tunnel-Mode in order
to reduce the covert channel bandwidth potential created by the
Nonce Option, and to prevent a node at one sensitivity level from
attacking a ILNP session at a different sensitivity level
[RFC5570]. Further, Multi-Level Secure (MLS) systems SHOULD use
different nonce values for ILNP sessions having different
Sensitivity Levels [RFC5570]. Also, an MLS implementation of
ILNP will also store the Sensitivity Label information associated
with each ILNP session in the implementation's ILCC. When the
Nonce option and the CALIPSO option are present in the same IPv6
Destination Options Header, the CALIPSO option SHOULD appear
before the Nonce option.
In all cases, the ILNP Nonce Value MUST be unpredictable and
cryptographically random. [RFC4086] provides concrete advice on
how to generate a suitable nonce value.
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As this is an option within the IPv6 Destination Option Header,
rather than an option within the IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Option Header,
the presence of this option in an IPv6 packet ought not disturb
routers along the path an IP packet containing this option
happens to travel. Further, many deployed modern IP routers
(both IPv4 and IPv6) have been explicitly configured to ignore
all IP options, even including the "Router Alert" option, when
forwarding packets not addressed to the router itself. Reports
indicate this has been done to preclude use of IP options as a
(Distributed) Denial-of-Service (D)DOS attack vector on backbone
routers.
As the Nonce is used in the checksum of all AH protected packets,
as an implementation hint, it would seem sensible to include the
Nonce value from the ILCC for that ILNP session.
8. IANA Considerations
Subject to IESG Approval, and consistent with the procedures of
[RFC2780], IANA is requested to assign a new IPv6 Destination
Option Type value (replacing XXX, in Section 2 above).
The Nonce Option MUST NOT change in transit and MUST be included
in IP Authentication Header calculations.
Further, if an end system receives an IPv6 packet containing this
option, but does not recognise this option, the end system MUST
discard the packet and, regardless of whether or not the received
packet's Destination Address was a multicast address, send an
ICMPv6 Parameter Problem, Code 2 ("Unrecognised IPv6 Option
Encountered"), message to the received packet's Source IPv6
Address, pointing to the unrecognised Option Type.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to
Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
March 1997.
[RFC2460] S. Deering & R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol
Version 6 Specification", RFC 2460,
December 1998.
[RFC4301] S. Kent & K. Seo, "Security Architecture for
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the Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
[RFC4443] A. Conta, S. Deering, M. Gupta, Ed.,
"Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
for IPv6 Specification", RFC 4443, March 2006.
[ILNP-ARCH] R.J. Atkinson & S.N. Bhatti,
"ILNP Architectural Description",
draft-irtf-rrg-ilnp-arch, 10 July 2012.
[ILNP-ENG] R.J. Atkinson & S.N. Bhatti,
"ILNP Engineering and Implementation Considerations",
draft-irtf-rrg-ilnp-eng, 10 July 2012.
[ILNP-ICMPv6] R.J. Atkinson & S.N. Bhatti,
"ICMPv6 Locator Update message"
draft-irtf-rrg-ilnp-icmpv6, 10 July 2012.
9.2. Informative References
[CA-1995-01] US CERT, "CERT Advisory 1995-01", Pittsburgh,
PA, USA, 1995.
[RFC4086] D. Eastlake 3rd, J. Schiller, & S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security",
RFC 4086, June 2005.
[RFC5570] M. StJohns, R. Atkinson, and G. Thomas, "Common
Architecture Label IPv6 Security Option (CALIPSO)",
RFC 5570, July 2009.
[ILNP-ADV] R.J. Atkinson & S.N. Bhatti,
"Optional Advanced Deployment Scenarios for ILNP",
draft-irtf-rrg-ilnp-adv, 10 July 2012.
[ILNP-ARP] R.J. Atkinson & S.N. Bhatti, "ARP Extension for
ILNPv4", draft-irtf-rrg-ilnp-arp, 10 July 2012.
[ILNP-DNS] R.J. Atkinson, S.N. Bhatti, & S Rose,
"DNS Resource Records for ILNP",
draft-irtf-rrg-ilnp-dns, 10 July 2012.
[ILNP-ICMPv4] R.J. Atkinson & S.N. Bhatti,
"ICMPv4 Locator Update message"
draft-irtf-rrg-ilnp-icmpv4, 10 July 2012.
[ILNP-v4OPTS] R.J. Atkinson & S.N. Bhatti,
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"IPv4 Options for ILNP",
draft-irtf-rrg-ilnp-v4opts, 10 July 2012.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Steve Blake, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Mohamed Boucadair, Noel
Chiappa, Wes George, Steve Hailes, Joel Halpern, Mark Handley,
Volker Hilt, Paul Jakma, Dae-Young Kim, Tony Li, Yakov Rehkter,
Bruce Simpson, Robin Whittle and John Wroclawski (in alphabetical
order) provided review and feedback on earlier versions of this
document. Steve Blake provided an especially thorough review of
an early version of the entire ILNP document set, which was
extremely helpful. We also wish to thank the anonymous reviewers
of the various ILNP papers for their feedback.
Roy Arends provided expert guidance on technical and procedural
aspects of DNS issues.
RFC EDITOR NOTE
This section is to be removed prior to publication.
Please note that this document is written in British English, so
British English spelling is used throughout. This is consistent
with existing practice in several other RFCs, for example
RFC-5887.
This document tries to be very careful with history, in the
interest of correctly crediting ideas to their earliest
identifiable author(s). So in several places the first published
RFC about a topic is cited rather than the most recent published
RFC about that topic.
Authors' Addresses:
RJ Atkinson
Consultant
San Jose, CA
95125 USA
rja.lists@gmail.com
SN Bhatti
School of Computer Science
University of St Andrews
North Haugh, St Andrews
Fife, Scotland, UK
KY16 9SX
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