Internet DRAFT - draft-jeong-i2nsf-applicability
draft-jeong-i2nsf-applicability
Network Working Group J. Jeong
Internet-Draft S. Hyun
Intended status: Informational Sungkyunkwan University
Expires: January 18, 2018 T. Ahn
Korea Telecom
S. Hares
Huawei
D. Lopez
Telefonica I+D
July 17, 2017
Applicability of Interfaces to Network Security Functions to Networked
Security Services
draft-jeong-i2nsf-applicability-01
Abstract
This document describes the applicability of Interface to Network
Security Functions (I2NSF) to networked security services in Network
Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments, such as firewall, deep
packet inspection, and attack mitigation.
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
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Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. I2NSF Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE
Security System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Changes from draft-jeong-i2nsf-applicability-00 . . . 13
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1. Introduction
Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) proposes a standard
framework and standard interfaces for networked security services in
Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environments. The I2NSF
enables multiple security-vendor products to be used cost-effectively
in the NFV environment by utilizing the capabilties of such products
and the virtualization of security functions in the NFV platform.
This document describes the applicability of I2NSF to networked
security services with use cases, such as firewall, Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI), and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack
mitigation.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Terminology
This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7149],
[ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-OpenFlow], [ONF-SDN-Architecture],
[ITU-T.X.1252], [ITU-T.X.800], [i2nsf-framework],
[consumer-facing-inf-im], [consumer-facing-inf-dm],
[i2nsf-nsf-cap-im], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], [registration-inf-im],
[registration-inf-dm], and [nsf-triggered-steering]. In addition,
the following terms are defined below:
o Software-Defined Networking: A set of techniques that enables to
directly program, orchestrate, control, and manage network
resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and operation of
network services in a dynamic and scalable manner [ITU-T.Y.3300].
o Firewall: A firewall that is a device or service at the junction
of two network segments that inspects every packet that attempts
to cross the boundary. It also rejects any packet that does not
satisfy certain criteria for disallowed port numbers or IP
addresses.
o Centralized Firewall System: A centralized firewall that can
establish and distribute access control policy rules into network
resources for efficient firewall management. These rules can be
managed dynamically by a centralized server for firewall. SDN can
work as a network-based firewall system through a standard
interface between an SDN switch and a firewall function as a
vitual network function (VNF).
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o Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System: A centralized security
system that handles the security issues related to VoIP and VoLTE
services. SDN can work as a network-based security system through
a standard interface between an SDN switch and a VoIP/VoLTE
security function as a VNF.
o Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System: A centralized mitigator
that can establish and distribute access control policy rules into
network resources for efficient DDoS-attack mitigation. These
rules can be managed dynamically by a centralized server for DDoS-
attack mitigation. SDN can work as a network-based mitigation
system through a standard interface between an SDN switch and a
DDoS-attack mitigation function as a VNF.
4. I2NSF Framework
This section describes an extended I2NSF framework with SDN for I2NSF
applicability and use cases, such as firewall system, deep packet
inspection system, and DDoS-attack mitigation system.
Figure 1 shows an I2NSF framework with SDN networks to support
networked security services [i2nsf-framework]. As shown in Figure 1,
I2NSF User can use security services by delivering their high-level
security policies to Security Controller via Consumer-Facing
Interface [consumer-facing-inf-im][consumer-facing-inf-dm].
Security Controller can translate the high-level security policies
(received from I2NSF User via Consumer-Facing Interface) into low-
level security policies for the corresponding NSFs. These low-level
security policies are sent to NSFs via NSF-Facing Interface
[i2nsf-nsf-cap-im][nsf-facing-inf-dm].
Security Controller asks NSFs to perform low-level security services
via NSF-Facing Interface. The NSFs run as Virtual Network Functions
(VNFs) on top of virtual machines through Network Functions
Virtualization (NFV) [ETSI-NFV]. Security Controller also asks
Switch Controller to perform their required security services on
switches under the supervision of Switch Controller (i.e., SDN
Controller). In addition, Security Controller uses Registration
Interface [registration-inf-im][registration-inf-dm] to communicate
with Developer's Management Aystem for registering (or deregistering)
the developer's NSFs into (or from) the NFV system using the I2NSF
framework.
Consumer-Facing Interface between I2NSF User and Security Controller
can be implemented by RESTCONF [RFC8040], which is a protocol based
on HTTP for configuring data defined in YANG [RFC6020], using the
datastore concepts defined in Network Configuration Protocol
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(NETCONF) [RFC6241]. YANG data models can describe high-level
security services for the sake of I2NSF User. A data model in
[consumer-facing-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing
Interface.
+------------+
| I2NSF User |
+------------+
^
| Consumer-Facing Interface
v
+-------------------+ Registration +-----------------------+
|Security Controller|<-------------------->|Developer's Mgnt System|
+-------------------+ Interface +-----------------------+
^ ^
| | NSF-Facing Interface
| v
| +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+
| | NSF-1 |-| NSF-2 |...| NSF-n |
| | (Firewall) | | (DPI) | |(DDoS-Attack Mitigator)|
| +----------------+ +---------------+ +-----------------------+
|
| NSF-Facing Interface
v SDN Network
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| +-----------------+ |
| |Switch Controller| |
| +-----------------+ |
| ^ |
| | SDN Southbound Interface |
| v |
| +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ |
| |Switch 1|-|Switch 2|......|Switch m| |
| +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: An I2NSF Framework with SDN Networks
NSF-Facing Interface between Security Controller and NSFs can be
implemented by NETCONF [RFC6241] for configuring data defined in YANG
[RFC6020]. YANG data models can describe low-level security services
for the sake of NSFs. A data model in [nsf-facing-inf-dm] can be
used for the I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface.
Registration Interface between Security Controller and Developer's
Management System can be implemented by RESTCONF [RFC8040] for
configuring data defined in YANG [RFC6020]. YANG data models can
describe the NSF capabilities of networked security services. A data
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model in [registration-inf-dm] can be used for the I2NSF Registration
Interface.
Also, the I2NSF framework can enforce mutliple chained NSFs for the
low-level security policies with a service function chaining (SFC)
for the I2NSF architecture in [nsf-triggered-steering].
5. Use Cases
This section introduces three use cases for cloud-based security
services: (i) firewall system, (ii) deep packet inspection system,
and (iii) attack mitigation system.
5.1. Firewall: Centralized Firewall System
For the centralized firewall system, a centralized network firewall
can manage each network resource and firewall rules can be managed
flexibly by a centralized server for firewall (called Firewall). The
centralized network firewall controls each switch for the network
resource management and the firewall rules can be added or deleted
dynamically.
The procedure of firewall operations in the centralized firewall
system is as follows:
1. Switch forwards an unknown flow's packet to Switch Controller.
2. Switch Controller forwards the unknown flow's packet to an
appropriate security service application, such as Firewall.
3. Firewall analyzes the headers and contents of the packet.
4. If Firewall regards the packet as a malware's packet with a
suspicious pattern, it reports the malware's packet to Switch
Controller.
5. Switch Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets with the
suspicious pattern) into switches.
6. The malware's packets are dropped by switches.
For the above centralized firewall system, the existing SDN protocols
can be used through standard interfaces between the firewall
application and switches [RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-OpenFlow]
[ONF-SDN-Architecture].
Legacy firewalls have some challenges such as the expensive cost,
performance, management of access control, establishment of policy,
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and packet-based access mechanism. The proposed framework can
resolve the challenges through the above centralized firewall system
based on SDN as follows:
o Cost: The cost of adding firewalls to network resources such as
routers, gateways, and switches is substantial due to the reason
that we need to add firewall on each network resource. To solve
this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a
single firewall is manipulated by a centralized server.
o Performance: The performance of firewalls is often slower than the
link speed of network interfaces. Every network resource for
firewall needs to check firewall rules according to network
conditions. Firewalls can be adaptively deployed among network
switches, depending on network conditions in the framework.
o The management of access control: Since there may be hundreds of
network resources in an administered network, the dynamic
management of access control for security services like firewall
is a challenge. In the framework, firewall rules can be
dynamically added for new malware.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for firewall within a specific
organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view
is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.
o Packet-based access mechanism: Packet-based access mechanism is
not enough for firewall in practice since the basic unit of access
control is usually users or applications. Therefore, application
level rules can be defined and added to the firewall system
through the centralized server.
5.2. Deep Packet Inspection: Centralized VoIP/VoLTE Security System
For the centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system, a centralized VoIP/
VoLTE security system can monitor each VoIP/VoLTE flow and manage
VoIP/VoLTE security rules controlled by a centralized server for
VoIP/VoLTE security service (called VoIP IPS). The VoIP/VoLTE
security system controls each switch for the VoIP/VoLTE call flow
management by manipulating the rules that can be added, deleted or
modified dynamically.
The procedure of VoIP/VoLTE security operations in the centralized
VoIP/VoLTE security system is as follows:
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1. A switch forwards an unknown call flow's signal packet (e.g., SIP
packet) to Switch Controller. Also, if the packet belongs to a
matched flow's packet related to SIP (called matched SIP packet),
Switch forwards the packet to Switch Controller so that the
packet can be checked by an NSF for VoIP (i.e., VoIP IPS) via
Switch Controller, which monitors the behavior of its SIP call.
2. Switch Controller forwards the unknown flow's packet or the
matched SIP packet to an appropriate security service function,
such as VoIP IPS.
3. VoIP IPS analyzes the headers and contents of the signal packet,
such as IP address, calling number, and session description
[RFC4566].
4. If VoIP IPS regards the packet as a spoofed packet by hackers or
a scanning packet searching for VoIP/VoLTE devices, it requests
the Switch Controller to block that packet and the subsequent
packets that have the same call-id.
5. Switch Controller installs new rules (e.g., drop packets) into
switches.
6. The illegal packets are dropped by switches.
For the above centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system, the existing
SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces between the
VoIP IPS application and switches [RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300]
[ONF-OpenFlow][ONF-SDN-Architecture].
Legacy hardware based VoIP IPSes have some challenges, such as
provisioning time, the granularity of security, expensive cost, and
the establishment of policy. The proposed framework can resolve the
challenges through the above centralized VoIP/VoLTE security system
based on SDN as follows:
o Provisioning: The provisioning time of setting up a legacy VoIP
IPS to network is substantial because it takes from some hours to
some days. By managing the network resources centrally, VoIP IPS
can provide more agility in provisioning both virtual and physical
network resources from a central location.
o The granularity of security: The security rules of a legacy VoIP
IPS are compounded considering the granularity of security. The
proposed framework can provide more granular security by
centralizing security control into a switch controller. The VoIP
IPS can effectively manage security rules throughout the network.
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o Cost: The cost of adding VoIP IPS to network resources, such as
routers, gateways, and switches is substantial due to the reason
that we need to add VoIP IPS on each network resource. To solve
this, each network resource can be managed centrally such that a
single VoIP IPS is manipulated by a centralized server.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for VoIP IPS within a specific
organization network under management. Thus, a centralized view
is helpful to determine security policies for such a network.
5.3. Attack Mitigation: Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System
For the centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, a centralized
DDoS-attack mitigation can manage each network resource and
manipulate rules to each switch through a centralized server for
DDoS-attack mitigation (called DDoS-attack Mitigator). The
centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system defends servers against
DDoS attacks outside private network, that is, from public network.
Servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS servers)
and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). For DDoS-attack
mitigation, traffic flows in switches are dynamically configured by
traffic flow forwarding path management according to the category of
servers [AVANT-GUARD]. Such a managenent should consider the load
balance among the switches for the defense against DDoS attacks.
The procedure of DDoS-attack mitigation operations in the centralized
DDoS-attack mitigation system is as follows:
1. Switch periodically reports an inter-arrival pattern of a flow's
packets to Switch Controller.
2. Switch Controller forwards the flow's inter-arrival pattern to an
appropriate security service application, such as DDoS-attack
Mitigator.
3. DDoS-attack Mitigator analyzes the reported pattern for the flow.
4. If DDoS-attack Mitigator regards the pattern as a DDoS attack, it
computes a packet dropping probability corresponding to
suspiciousness level and reports this DDoS-attack flow to Switch
Controller.
5. Switch Controller installs new rules into switches (e.g., forward
packets with the suspicious inter-arrival pattern with a dropping
probability).
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6. The suspicious flow's packets are randomly dropped by switches
with the dropping probability.
For the above centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, the existing
SDN protocols can be used through standard interfaces between the
DDoS-attack mitigator application and switches [RFC7149]
[ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-OpenFlow][ONF-SDN-Architecture].
The centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system has challenges similar
to the centralized firewall system. The proposed framework can
resolve the challenges through the above centralized DDoS-attack
mitigation system based on SDN as follows:
o Cost: The cost of adding DDoS-attack mitigators to network
resources such as routers, gateways, and switches is substantial
due to the reason that we need to add DDoS-attack mitigator on
each network resource. To solve this, each network resource can
be managed centrally such that a single DDoS-attack mitigator is
manipulated by a centralized server.
o Performance: The performance of DDoS-attack mitigators is often
slower than the link speed of network interfaces. The checking of
DDoS attacks may reduce the performance of the network interfaces.
DDoS-attack mitigators can be adaptively deployed among network
switches, depending on network conditions in the framework.
o The management of network resources: Since there may be hundreds
of network resources in an administered network, the dynamic
management of network resources for performance (e.g., load
balancing) is a challenge for DDoS-attack mitigation. In the
framework, as dynamic network resource management, traffic flow
forwarding path management can handle the load balancing of
network switches [AVANT-GUARD]. With this management, the current
and near-future workload can be spread among the network switches
for DDoS-attack mitigation. In addition, DDoS-attack mitigation
rules can be dynamically added for new DDoS attacks.
o The establishment of policy: Policy should be established for each
network resource. However, it is difficult to describe what flows
are permitted or denied for new DDoS-attacks (e.g., DNS reflection
attack) within a specific organization network under management.
Thus, a centralized view is helpful to determine security policies
for such a network.
So far this document has described the procedure and impact of the
three use cases for networked security services using the I2NSF
framework with SDN networks. To support these use cases in the
proposed data-driven security service framework, YANG data models
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described in [consumer-facing-inf-dm], [nsf-facing-inf-dm], and
[registration-inf-dm] can be used as Consumer-Facing Interface, NSF-
Facing Interface, and Registration Interface, respectively, along
with RESTCONF [RFC8040] and NETCONF [RFC6241].
6. Security Considerations
The I2NSF framework with SDN networks in this document is derived
from the I2NSF framework [i2nsf-framework], so the security
considerations of the I2NSF framework should be included in this
document. Therefore, proper secure communication channels should be
used the delivery of control or management messages among the
components in the proposed framework.
This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are
specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300].
7. Acknowledgements
This work was supported by Institute for Information & communications
Technology Promotion (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government
(MSIP) (No.R-20160222-002755, Cloud based Security Intelligence
Technology Development for the Customized Security Service
Provisioning).
This document has greatly benefited from inputs by Hyoungshick Kim,
Jung-Soo Park, Se-Hui Lee, Jinyong Kim, Daeyoung Hyun, and Dongjin
Hong.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to
Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
RFC 2119, March 1997.
[i2nsf-framework] Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L.,
Strassner, J., and R. Kumar, "Framework for
Interface to Network Security Functions",
draft-ietf-i2nsf-framework-05 (work in
progress), May 2017.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., "YANG - A Data Modeling
Language for the Network Configuration
Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020,
October 2010.
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[RFC6241] Enns, R., Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J.,
and A. Bierman, "Network Configuration
Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, June 2011.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen,
"RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040,
January 2017.
8.2. Informative References
[consumer-facing-inf-im] Kumar, R., Lohiya, A., Qi, D., Bitar, N.,
Palislamovic, S., and L. Xia, "Information
model for Client-Facing Interface to
Security Controller", draft-kumar-i2nsf-
client-facing-interface-im-02 (work in
progress), April 2017.
[consumer-facing-inf-dm] Jeong, J., Kim, E., Ahn, T., Kumar, R., and
S. Hares, "I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface
YANG Data Model", draft-jeong-i2nsf-
consumer-facing-interface-dm-02 (work in
progress), July 2017.
[i2nsf-nsf-cap-im] Xia, L., Strassner, J., Basile, C., and D.
Lopez, "Information Model of NSFs
Capabilities",
draft-xibassnez-i2nsf-capability-01 (work
in progress), March 2017.
[nsf-facing-inf-dm] Kim, J., Jeong, J., Park, J., Hares, S.,
and L. Xia, "I2NSF Network Security
Functions-Facing Interface YANG Data
Model", draft-kim-i2nsf-nsf-facing-
interface-data-model-02 , July 2017.
[registration-inf-im] Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Woo, S., Yeo, Y., and
J. Park, "I2NSF Registration Interface
Information Model", draft-hyun-i2nsf-
registration-interface-im-02 (work in
progress), July 2017.
[registration-inf-dm] Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Yeo, Y., Woo, S., and
J. Park, "I2NSF Registration Interface YANG
Data Model",
draft-hyun-i2nsf-registration-dm-01 (work
in progress), July 2017.
[nsf-triggered-steering] Hyun, S., Jeong, J., Park, J., and S.
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Hares, "NSF-triggered Traffic Steering
Framework",
draft-hyun-i2nsf-nsf-triggered-steering-03
(work in progress), July 2017.
[RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-
Defined Networking: A Perspective from
within a Service Provider Environment",
RFC 7149, March 2014.
[ITU-T.Y.3300] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300, "Framework of
Software-Defined Networking", June 2014.
[ONF-OpenFlow] ONF, "OpenFlow Switch Specification
(Version 1.4.0)", October 2013.
[ONF-SDN-Architecture] ONF, "SDN Architecture", June 2014.
[ITU-T.X.1252] Recommendation ITU-T X.1252, "Baseline
Identity Management Terms and Definitions",
April 2010.
[ITU-T.X.800] Recommendation ITU-T X.800, "Security
Architecture for Open Systems
Interconnection for CCITT Applications",
March 1991.
[AVANT-GUARD] Shin, S., Yegneswaran, V., Porras, P., and
G. Gu, "AVANT-GUARD: Scalable and Vigilant
Switch Flow Management in Software-Defined
Networks", ACM CCS, November 2013.
[ETSI-NFV] ETSI GS NFV 002 V1.1.1, "Network Functions
Virtualisation (NFV); Architectural
Framework", October 2013.
[RFC4566] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins,
"SDP: Session Description Protocol",
RFC 4566, July 2006.
Appendix A. Changes from draft-jeong-i2nsf-applicability-00
The following changes have been made from
draft-jeong-i2nsf-applicability-00:
o Figure 1 is modified such that Security Controller and Switch
Controller are directly connected with each other via NSF-Facing
Interface for the security policy configuration.
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Authors' Addresses
Jaehoon Paul Jeong
Department of Software
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4957
Fax: +82 31 290 7996
EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu
URI: http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
Sangwon Hyun
Department of Software
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 16419
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 290 7222
Fax: +82 31 299 6673
EMail: swhyun77@skku.edu
URI: http://imtl.skku.ac.kr/
Tae-Jin Ahn
Korea Telecom
70 Yuseong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon 305-811
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 42 870 8409
EMail: taejin.ahn@kt.com
Susan Hares
Huawei
7453 Hickory Hill
Saline, MI 48176
USA
Phone: +1-734-604-0332
EMail: shares@ndzh.com
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Diego R. Lopez
Telefonica I+D
Jose Manuel Lara, 9
Seville, 41013
Spain
Phone: +34 682 051 091
EMail: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com
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