Internet DRAFT - draft-jeong-l2nsf-sdn-security-services
draft-jeong-l2nsf-sdn-security-services
Network Working Group J. Jeong
Internet-Draft H. Kim
Intended status: Standards Track Sungkyunkwan University
Expires: April 30, 2015 J. Park
ETRI
October 27, 2014
Requirements for Security Services based on Software-Defined Networking
draft-jeong-l2nsf-sdn-security-services-00
Abstract
This document provides requirements for security services based on
software-defined networking (SDN) with two representative use cases:
(i) centralized firewall system for intra-domain networks and (ii)
centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system between inter-domain
networks. For the centralized firewall system, this document raises
challenging issues in existing firewalls and a use case of
centralized firewall system based on SDN. For the centralized DDoS-
attack mitigation system, this document also raises challenging
issues in existing DDoS-attack mitigation techniques and a use case
of centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system based on SDN.
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
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1. Introduction
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is a set of techniques that enables
users to directly program, orchestrate, control and manage network
resources through software (e.g., SDN applications). It relocates
the control of network resources to a dedicated network element,
namely SDN controller. The SDN controller uses the interface and
arbitrates the control of network resources in a logically
centralized manner. It also manages and configures the distributed
network resources and provides and abstracted view of the network
resources to the SDN applications. The SDN application can customize
and automate the operations (including management) of the abstracted
network resources in a programmable manner via this interface
[RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-SDN-Architecture][ONF-OpenFlow].
Due to the increase of sophisticated network attacks, the legacy
security services become difficult to cope with such network attacks
in an autonomous manner. SDN has been introduced to make networks
more controllable and manageable, and this SDN technology will be
promising to autonomously deal with such network attacks in a prompt
manner.
This document raises requirements to support the protection of
network resources using security services based on SDN. Also, this
document proposes two use cases of the security services, such as
centralized firewall system and centralized DDoS-attack mitigation
system.
For the centralized firewall system, this document raises limitations
in legacy firewalls in terms of flexibility and administration costs.
Since in many cases, access control management for firewall is
manually performed, it is difficult to add the access control policy
rules corresponding to new network attacks in a prompt and autonomous
manner. Thus, this situation requires expensive administration
costs. This document introduces a use case of SDN-based firewall
system to overcome these limitations.
For the centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, this document
raises limitations in legacy DDoS-attack mitigation techniques in
terms of flexibility and administration costs. Since in many cases,
network configuration for the mitigation is manually performed, it is
difficult to dynamically configure network devices to limit and
control suspicious network traffic for DDoS attacks. This document
introduces a use case of SDN-based DDoS-attack mitigation system to
provide an autonomous and prompt configuration for suspicious network
traffic.
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2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Terminology
This document uses the terminology described in [RFC7149],
[ITU-T.Y.3300], [ONF-SDN-Architecture], [ONF-OpenFlow],
[ITU-T.X.1252], and [ITU-T.X.800]. In addition, the following terms
are defined below:
o Software-Defined Networking: A set of techniques that enables to
directly program, orchestrate, control and manage network
resources, which facilitates the design, delivery and operation of
network services in a dynamic and scalable manner [ITU-T.Y.3300].
o Access Control: A procedure used to determine if an entity should
be granted access to resources, facilities, services, or
information based on pre-established rules and specific rights or
authority associated with the requesting party [ITU-T.X.1252].
o Access Control Policy: The set of rules that define the conditions
under which and access may take place [ITU-T.X.800].
o Access Control Policy Rules: Security policy rules concerning the
provision of the access control service [ITU-T.X.800].
o Network Resources: Network devices that can perform packet
forwarding in a network system. The network resources include
network switch, router, gateway, WiFi access points, and similar
devices.
o Firewall: A firewall that is a device or service at the junction
of two network segments that inspects every packet that attempts
to cross the boundary. It also rejects any packet that does not
satisfy certain criteria for disallowed port numbers or IP
addresses.
o Centralized Firewall System: A centralized firewall that can
establish and distribute access control policy rules into network
resources for the efficient firewall management. These rules can
be managed dynamically by a centralized server. SDN can work as a
network-based firewall system through a standard interface between
firewall applications and network resources.
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o Centralized DDoS-attack Mitigation System: A centralized mitigator
that can establish and distribute access control policy rules into
network resources for the efficient DDoS-attack mitigation. These
rules can be managed dynamically by a centralized server. SDN can
work as a network-based mitigation system through a standard
interface between DDoS-attack mitigation applications and network
resources.
4. Overview
This section describes the referenced architecture to support SDN-
based security services, such as centralized firewall system and
centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system.
|
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Security Application | Application
| | (e.g., Firewall, DDoS-attack mitigation) | Layer
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|------------------------------------------------------------
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Application Support |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ SDN
| | Orchestration | Controller
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Layer
| | Abstraction |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|-------------------------------------------------------------
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| | Control Support |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Resource
| | Data Transport and Processing | Layer
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|
Figure 1: High-level Architecture for SDN-based Security Services
As shown in Figure 1, applications for security services (e.g.,
firewall and DDoS-attack mitigation) run on the top of SDN controller
[ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-SDN-Architecture]. When an administrator enforces
security policies for the security services through an application
interface, SDN controller generates the corresponding access control
policy rules to meet such security policies in an autonomous and
prompt manner. According to the generated access control policy
rules, the network resources such as switches take an action to
mitigate network attacks, for example, dropping packets with
suspicious patterns.
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5. Objectives
o Prompt reaction to new network attacks: SDN-based security
services allow private networks to defend themselves against new
sophisticated network attacks.
o Automatic defense from network attacks: SDN-based security
services identify the category of network attack (e.g., worms and
DDoS attacks) and take counteraction for the defense without the
intervention of network administrators.
o Network-load-aware resource allocation: SDN-based security
services measure the overhead of resources for security services
and dynamically select resources considering load balance for the
maximum network performance.
6. Requirements
SDN-based security services provide dynamic and flexible network
resource management to mitigate network attacks, such as malicious
traffic and DDoS attacks. In order to support this capability, the
requirements for SDN-based security services are described as
follows:
o SDN-based security services are required to support the
programmability of network resources to mitigate network attacks.
o SDN-based security services are required to support the
orchestration of network resources and SDN applications to
mitigate network attacks.
o SDN-based security services are required to provide an application
interface allowing the management of access control policies in an
autonomous and prompt manner.
o SDN-based security services are required to provide a resource-
control interface for control of network resources to mitigate
network attacks.
o SDN-based security services are required to provide logically
centralized control of network resources to mitigate network
attacks.
7. Use Cases
This section introduces two use cases for security services based on
SDN: (i) centralized firewall system for intra-domain networks and
(ii) centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system between inter-domain
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networks.
For the centralized firewall system, a centralized network firewall
can manage each network resources and firewall rules can be managed
flexibly by centralized server. The centralized network firewall
manages each switches and firewall rules can be added or deleted.
Legacy firewalls have some challenges such as the expensive cost,
performance, management of access control, establishment of policy,
and packet-based access mechanism. To address these challenges, this
document will investigate the framework of a centralized firewall
system based on SDN. Firewall rules can be managed flexibly by a
centralized server. Existing SDN protocols can be used through
standard interfaces between firewall applications and switches
[RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300][ONF-SDN-Architecture][ONF-OpenFlow].
For the centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system, a DDoS-attack
mitigation system add, delete or modify rules to each switch. The
centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system defends servers against
DDoS attacks outside private network, that is, from public network.
The servers are categorized into stateless servers (e.g., DNS
servers) and stateful servers (e.g., web servers). In a DDoS-attack
mitigation system in a private network, switches are configured in
multi-levels to provide the dynamic defense lines against a variety
of DDoS attacks. The centralized DDoS-attack mitigation system has
some challenges such as the expensive cost, performance, management
of access control, establishment of policy, and packet-based access
mechanism. To address these challenges, this document will
investigate the framework of a centralized DDoS-attack mitigation
system based on SDN. DDoS-attack mitigation rules can be managed
flexibly by a centralized server. Existing SDN protocols can be used
through standard interfaces between DDoS-attack mitigator
applications and switches [RFC7149][ITU-T.Y.3300]
[ONF-SDN-Architecture][ONF-OpenFlow].
8. Security Considerations
This document shares all the security issues of SDN that are
specified in the "Security Considerations" section of [ITU-T.Y.3300].
9. Acknowledgements
This work was partly supported by the ICT R&D program of MSIP/IITP
[10041244, SmartTV 2.0 Software Platform] and ETRI.
This document has greatly benefited from inputs by Geumhwan Cho and
Jihyeok Seo.
10. References
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10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to
Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14,
RFC 2119, March 1997.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC7149] Boucadair, M. and C. Jacquenet, "Software-
Defined Networking: A Perspective from within
a Service Provider Environment", RFC 7149,
March 2014.
[ITU-T.Y.3300] Recommendation ITU-T Y.3300, "Framework of
Software-Defined Networking", June 2014.
[ONF-SDN-Architecture] ONF, "SDN Architecture", June 2014.
[ONF-OpenFlow] ONF, "OpenFlow Switch Specification (Version
1.4.0)", October 2013.
[ITU-T.X.1252] Recommendation ITU-T X.1252, "Baseline
Identity Management Terms and Definitions",
April 2010.
[ITU-T.X.800] Recommendation ITU-T X.800, "Security
Architecture for Open Systems Interconnection
for CCITT Applications", March 1991.
Authors' Addresses
Jaehoon Paul Jeong
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 440-746
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4957
Fax: +82 31 290 5119
EMail: pauljeong@skku.edu
URI: http://cpslab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php
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Hyoungshick Kim
Sungkyunkwan University
2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
Suwon, Gyeonggi-Do 440-746
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 31 299 4324
EMail: hyoung@skku.edu
URI: http://seclab.skku.edu/people/hyoungshick-kim/
Jung-Soo Park
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute
218 Gajeong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
Daejeon, 305-700
Republic of Korea
Phone: +82 42 860 6514
EMail: pjs@etri.re.kr
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