Internet DRAFT - draft-jones-oauth-discovery
draft-jones-oauth-discovery
OAuth Working Group M. Jones
Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track N. Sakimura
Expires: July 31, 2016 NRI
J. Bradley
Ping Identity
January 28, 2016
OAuth 2.0 Discovery
draft-jones-oauth-discovery-01
Abstract
This specification defines a mechanism for an OAuth 2.0 client to
discover the resource owner's OAuth 2.0 authorization server and
obtain information needed to interact with it, including its OAuth
2.0 endpoint locations and authorization server capabilities.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 31, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Authorization Server WebFinger Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Authorization Server Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Obtaining Authorization Server Configuration Information . . . 10
4.1. Authorization Server Configuration Information Request . . 10
4.2. Authorization Server Configuration Information Response . 11
4.3. Authorization Server Configuration Information
Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. String Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Compatibility Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. TLS Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.2. Impersonation Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. OAuth Discovery Metadata Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8.2. Updated Registration Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Appendix B. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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1. Introduction
This specification generalizes the discovery mechanisms defined by
"OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0" [OpenID.Discovery] in a way that is
compatible with OpenID Connect Discovery, while being applicable to a
wider set of OAuth 2.0 use cases. This is intentionally parallel to
the way that the "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol"
[RFC7591] specification generalized the dynamic client registration
mechanisms defined by "OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration
1.0" [OpenID.Registration] in a way that was compatible with it.
In order for an OAuth client to utilize OAuth 2.0 services for a
resource owner, the client needs to know where the OAuth 2.0
authorization server is. This specification uses WebFinger [RFC7033]
to locate the authorization server for an resource owner. This
process is described in Section 2.
Once the authorization server has been identified, the configuration
information for that authorization server is retrieved from a well-
known location as a JSON [RFC7159] document, including its OAuth 2.0
endpoint locations and authorization server capabilities. This
process is described in Section 4.
1.1. Requirements Notation and Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119].
All uses of JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] and JSON Web Encryption
(JWE) [JWE] data structures in this specification utilize the JWS
Compact Serialization or the JWE Compact Serialization; the JWS JSON
Serialization and the JWE JSON Serialization are not used.
1.2. Terminology
This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Authorization
Code", "Authorization Endpoint", "Authorization Grant",
"Authorization Server", "Client", "Client Authentication", "Client
Identifier", "Client Secret", "Grant Type", "Protected Resource",
"Redirection URI", "Refresh Token", "Resource Owner", "Resource
Server", "Response Type", and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749], the terms "Claim Name", "Claim Value", and "JSON Web Token
(JWT)" defined by JSON Web Token (JWT) [JWT], and the term "Response
Mode" defined by OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices
[OAuth.Responses].
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This specification also defines the following terms:
Resource
Entity that is the target of a request in WebFinger.
Host
Server where a WebFinger service is hosted.
2. Authorization Server WebFinger Discovery
Authorization server WebFinger discovery is a means of determining
the location of the authorization server's configuration information.
WebFinger discovery is OPTIONAL; if a client knows the authorization
server's configuration information location through an out-of-band
mechanism, it can skip this step and proceed to Section 4.
WebFinger discovery requires the following information to make a
discovery request:
resource
Identifier for the target resource owner that is the subject of
the discovery request.
host
Server where the WebFinger service is hosted.
rel
URI identifying the type of service whose location is being
requested.
OAuth discovery uses the following "rel" value in WebFinger
[RFC7033]:
+----------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| Rel Type | URI |
+----------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| OAuth 2.0 | http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer |
| Configuration | |
| Information Location | |
| URL | |
+----------------------+--------------------------------------------+
To start discovery of OAuth 2.0 configuration information, the
resource owner supplies a URI to the client that can be used to
discover the corresponding authorization server. In some cases, the
client may know this URI without involvement of the resource owner.
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This URI might, for instance, be an e-mail address, an account
identifier, a profile URL, or a service or tenant URL.
The host to which the WebFinger request will be made is obtained from
the URI. The client then makes an HTTP "GET" request to the host's
WebFinger [RFC7033] endpoint using the URI as the "resource"
parameter value and the "rel" value
"http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer" to obtain the
authorization server's configuration information location.
The configuration information location MUST be returned in the
WebFinger response as the value of the "href" member of a "links"
array element with "rel" member value
"http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer". As described in
Section 6, despite the identifier
"http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer" appearing to be OpenID-
specific, its usage in this specification is actually referring to a
general OAuth 2.0 feature that is not specific to OpenID Connect.
(Per Section 7 of WebFinger [RFC7033], obtaining the WebFinger
response may first involve following some redirects.)
The returned configuration information location MUST be a URI RFC
3986 [RFC3986] with a scheme component that MUST be "https", a host
component, and optionally, port and path components and no query or
fragment components. Note that the WebFinger response can return a
configuration information location value using a completely different
scheme, host, port, and path from any contained in the input URI, and
no relationship can be assumed between the input URI and the
resulting configuration information location.
An example WebFinger discovery request follows. To find the
authorization server's configuration information location for the
account identified using the e-mail address syntax "joe@example.com"
and corresponding account URI "acct:joe@example.com", the WebFinger
parameters are as follows:
+---------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| WebFinger Parameter | Value |
+---------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| resource | acct:joe@example.com |
| host | example.com |
| rel | http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer |
+---------------------+--------------------------------------------+
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The client would make the following WebFinger request to discover the
authorization server's configuration information location (with line
wraps within lines for display purposes only):
GET /.well-known/webfinger
?resource=acct%3Ajoe%40example.com
&rel=http%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fspecs%2Fconnect%2F1.0%2Fissuer
HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/jrd+json
{
"subject": "acct:joe@example.com",
"links":
[
{
"rel": "http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer",
"href": "https://server.example.com"
}
]
}
The discovered authorization server configuration information
location is "https://server.example.com".
3. Authorization Server Metadata
Authorization servers can have metadata describing their
configuration. These authorization server metadata values are used
by this specification:
issuer
REQUIRED. URL of the authorization server's configuration
information location, which uses the "https" scheme and has no
query or fragment components. This is the location where
".well-known" RFC 5785 [RFC5785] resources containing information
about the authorization server are published, and in particular,
the "/.well-known/openid-configuration" resource defined in
Section 4. If WebFinger discovery is supported (see Section 2),
this value MUST be identical to the configuration information
location value returned by WebFinger.
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authorization_endpoint
REQUIRED. URL of the authorization server's authorization
endpoint [RFC6749].
token_endpoint
URL of the authorization server's token endpoint [RFC6749]. This
is REQUIRED unless only the implicit grant type is used.
jwks_uri
REQUIRED. URL of the authorization server's JWK Set [JWK]
document. This contains the signing key(s) the client uses to
validate signatures from the authorization server. The JWK Set
MAY also contain the Server's encryption key(s), which are used by
RPs to encrypt requests to the Server. When both signing and
encryption keys are made available, a "use" (public key use)
parameter value is REQUIRED for all keys in the referenced JWK Set
to indicate each key's intended usage. Although some algorithms
allow the same key to be used for both signatures and encryption,
doing so is NOT RECOMMENDED, as it is less secure. The JWK "x5c"
parameter MAY be used to provide X.509 representations of keys
provided. When used, the bare key values MUST still be present
and MUST match those in the certificate.
registration_endpoint
RECOMMENDED. URL of the authorization server's OAuth 2.0 Dynamic
Client Registration endpoint [RFC7591].
scopes_supported
RECOMMENDED. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
[RFC6749] "scope" values that this authorization server supports.
Servers MAY choose not to advertise some supported scope values
even when this parameter is used.
response_types_supported
REQUIRED. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
"response_type" values that this authorization server supports.
response_modes_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0
"response_mode" values that this authorization server supports, as
specified in OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding Practices
[OAuth.Responses]. If omitted, the default is "["query",
"fragment"]". The response mode value "form_post" is also defined
in OAuth 2.0 Form Post Response Mode [OAuth.Post].
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grant_types_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0 grant
type values that this authorization server supports. If omitted,
the default value is "["authorization_code", "implicit"]".
token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of client authentication
methods supported by this token endpoint. Client authentication
method values are used in the "token_endpoint_auth_method"
parameter defined in Section 2 of [RFC7591]. If omitted, the
default is "client_secret_basic" -- the HTTP Basic Authentication
Scheme specified in Section 2.3.1 of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749].
token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing
algorithms ("alg" values) supported by the token endpoint for the
signature on the JWT [JWT] used to authenticate the client at the
token endpoint for the "private_key_jwt" and "client_secret_jwt"
authentication methods. Servers SHOULD support "RS256". The
value "none" MUST NOT be used.
service_documentation
OPTIONAL. URL of a page containing human-readable information
that developers might want or need to know when using the
authorization server. In particular, if the authorization server
does not support Dynamic Client Registration, then information on
how to register clients needs to be provided in this
documentation.
ui_locales_supported
OPTIONAL. Languages and scripts supported for the user interface,
represented as a JSON array of BCP47 [RFC5646] language tag
values.
op_policy_uri
OPTIONAL. URL that the authorization server provides to the
person registering the client to read about the authorization
server's requirements on how the client can use the data provided
by the authorization server. The registration process SHOULD
display this URL to the person registering the client if it is
given. As described in Section 6, despite the identifier
"op_policy_uri", appearing to be OpenID-specific, its usage in
this specification is actually referring to a general OAuth 2.0
feature that is not specific to OpenID Connect.
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op_tos_uri
OPTIONAL. URL that the authorization server provides to the
person registering the client to read about authorization server's
terms of service. The registration process SHOULD display this
URL to the person registering the client if it is given. As
described in Section 6, despite the identifier "op_tos_uri",
appearing to be OpenID-specific, its usage in this specification
is actually referring to a general OAuth 2.0 feature that is not
specific to OpenID Connect.
revocation_endpoint
OPTIONAL. URL of the authorization server's OAuth 2.0 revocation
endpoint [RFC7009].
revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of client authentication
methods supported by this revocation endpoint. The valid client
authentication method values are those registered in the IANA
"OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters].
revocation_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing
algorithms ("alg" values) supported by the revocation endpoint for
the signature on the JWT [JWT] used to authenticate the client at
the revocation endpoint for the "private_key_jwt" and
"client_secret_jwt" authentication methods. The value "none" MUST
NOT be used.
introspection_endpoint
OPTIONAL. URL of the authorization server's OAuth 2.0
introspection endpoint [RFC7662].
introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of client authentication
methods supported by this introspection endpoint. The valid
client authentication method values are those registered in the
IANA "OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods" registry
[IANA.OAuth.Parameters] or those registered in the IANA "OAuth
Access Token Types" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]. (These
values are and will remain distinct, due to Section 8.2.)
introspection_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the JWS signing
algorithms ("alg" values) supported by the introspection endpoint
for the signature on the JWT [JWT] used to authenticate the client
at the introspection endpoint for the "private_key_jwt" and
"client_secret_jwt" authentication methods. The value "none" MUST
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NOT be used.
code_challenge_methods_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of PKCE [RFC7636] code
challenge methods supported by this authorization server. Code
challenge method values are used in the "code_challenge_method"
parameter defined in Section 4.3 of [RFC7636]. The valid code
challenge method values are those registered in the IANA "PKCE
Code Challenge Methods" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters].
Additional authorization server metadata parameters MAY also be used.
Some are defined by other specifications, such as OpenID Connect
Discovery 1.0 [OpenID.Discovery].
4. Obtaining Authorization Server Configuration Information
Using the configuration information location discovered as described
in Section 2 or by other means, the authorization server's
configuration information can be retrieved.
Authorization servers supporting discovery MUST make a JSON document
available at the path formed by concatenating the string
"/.well-known/openid-configuration" to the configuration information
location. The syntax and semantics of ".well-known" are defined in
RFC 5785 [RFC5785] and apply to the configuration information
location value when it contains no path component.
"openid-configuration" MUST point to a JSON document compliant with
this specification and MUST be returned using the "application/json"
content type. As described in Section 6, despite the identifier
"/.well-known/openid-configuration", appearing to be OpenID-specific,
its usage in this specification is actually referring to a general
OAuth 2.0 feature that is not specific to OpenID Connect.
4.1. Authorization Server Configuration Information Request
An authorization server configuration information document MUST be
queried using an HTTP "GET" request at the previously specified path.
The client would make the following request to the configuration
information location "https://example.com" to obtain its
configuration information, since the configuration information
location contains no path component:
GET /.well-known/openid-configuration HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
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If the configuration information location value contains a path
component, any terminating "/" MUST be removed before appending
"/.well-known/openid-configuration". The client would make the
following request to the configuration information location
"https://example.com/issuer1" to obtain its configuration
information, since the configuration information location contains a
path component:
GET /issuer1/.well-known/openid-configuration HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Using path components enables supporting multiple issuers per host.
This is required in some multi-tenant hosting configurations. This
use of ".well-known" is for supporting multiple issuers per host;
unlike its use in RFC 5785 [RFC5785], it does not provide general
information about the host.
4.2. Authorization Server Configuration Information Response
The response is a set of claims about the authorization server's
configuration, including all necessary endpoints and public key
location information. A successful response MUST use the 200 OK HTTP
status code and return a JSON object using the "application/json"
content type that contains a set of claims as its members that are a
subset of the metadata values defined in Section 3. Other claims MAY
also be returned.
Claims that return multiple values are represented as JSON arrays.
Claims with zero elements MUST be omitted from the response.
An error response uses the applicable HTTP status code value.
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The following is a non-normative example response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
{
"issuer":
"https://server.example.com",
"authorization_endpoint":
"https://server.example.com/connect/authorize",
"token_endpoint":
"https://server.example.com/connect/token",
"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported":
["client_secret_basic", "private_key_jwt"],
"token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported":
["RS256", "ES256"],
"userinfo_endpoint":
"https://server.example.com/connect/userinfo",
"jwks_uri":
"https://server.example.com/jwks.json",
"registration_endpoint":
"https://server.example.com/connect/register",
"scopes_supported":
["openid", "profile", "email", "address",
"phone", "offline_access"],
"response_types_supported":
["code", "code token"],
"service_documentation":
"http://server.example.com/connect/service_documentation.html",
"ui_locales_supported":
["en-US", "en-GB", "en-CA", "fr-FR", "fr-CA"]
}
4.3. Authorization Server Configuration Information Validation
If any of the validation procedures defined in this specification
fail, any operations requiring the information that failed to
correctly validate MUST be aborted and the information that failed to
validate MUST NOT be used.
The "issuer" value returned MUST be identical to the configuration
information location URL that was directly used to retrieve the
configuration information.
5. String Operations
Processing some OAuth 2.0 messages requires comparing values in the
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messages to known values. For example, the member names in the
configuration information response might be compared to specific
member names such as "issuer". Comparing Unicode [UNICODE] strings,
however, has significant security implications.
Therefore, comparisons between JSON strings and other Unicode strings
MUST be performed as specified below:
1. Remove any JSON applied escaping to produce an array of Unicode
code points.
2. Unicode Normalization [USA15] MUST NOT be applied at any point to
either the JSON string or to the string it is to be compared
against.
3. Comparisons between the two strings MUST be performed as a
Unicode code point to code point equality comparison.
6. Compatibility Notes
The identifiers "/.well-known/openid-configuration",
"http://openid.net/specs/connect/1.0/issuer", "op_policy_uri", and
"op_tos_uri" contain strings referring to the OpenID Connect
[OpenID.Core] family of specifications that were originally defined
by "OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0" [OpenID.Discovery]. Despite the
reuse of these identifiers that appear to be OpenID-specific, their
usage in this specification is actually referring to general OAuth
2.0 features that are not specific to OpenID Connect.
7. Security Considerations
7.1. TLS Requirements
Implementations MUST support TLS. Which version(s) ought to be
implemented will vary over time, and depend on the widespread
deployment and known security vulnerabilities at the time of
implementation. The authorization server MUST support TLS version
1.2 [RFC5246] and MAY support additional transport-layer security
mechanisms meeting its security requirements. When using TLS, the
client MUST perform a TLS/SSL server certificate check, per RFC 6125
[RFC6125]. Implementation security considerations can be found in
Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS [BCP195].
To protect against information disclosure and tampering,
confidentiality protection MUST be applied using TLS with a
ciphersuite that provides confidentiality and integrity protection.
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7.2. Impersonation Attacks
TLS certificate checking MUST be performed by the client, as
described in Section 7.1, when making an authorization server
configuration information request. Checking that the server
certificate is valid for the configuration information location URL
prevents man-in-middle and DNS-based attacks. These attacks could
cause a client to be tricked into using an attacker's keys and
endpoints, which would enable impersonation of the legitimate
authorization server. If an attacker can accomplish this, they can
access the resources that the affected client has access to using the
authorization server that they are impersonating.
An attacker may also attempt to impersonate an authorization server
by publishing a discovery document that contains an "issuer" claim
using the configuration information location URL of the authorization
server being impersonated, but with its own endpoints and signing
keys. This would enable it to impersonate that authorization server,
if accepted by the client. To prevent this, RPs MUST ensure that the
configuration information location URL they are using for the
configuration information request exactly matches the value of the
"issuer" metadata value in the authorization server configuration
information document received by the client.
8. IANA Considerations
The following registration procedure is used for the registry
established by this specification.
Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis
after a two-week review period on the oauth-ext-review@ietf.org
mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts.
However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication,
the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are
satisfied that such a specification will be published.
Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use
an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to register OAuth Discovery
Metadata: example").
Within the review period, the Designated Experts will either approve
or deny the registration request, communicating this decision to the
review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation and, if
applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request successful.
Registration requests that are undetermined for a period longer than
21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the
iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
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Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general
applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application,
and whether the registration makes sense.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Experts
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list.
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other
Experts.
8.1. OAuth Discovery Metadata Registry
This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Discovery Metadata"
registry for OAuth 2.0 authorization server metadata names. The
registry records the authorization server metadata member and a
reference to the specification that defines it.
8.1.1. Registration Template
Discovery Metadata Name:
The name requested (e.g., "issuer"). This name is case-sensitive.
Names may not match other registered names in a case-insensitive
manner unless the Designated Experts state that there is a
compelling reason to allow an exception.
Discovery Metadata Description:
Brief description of the discovery metadata (e.g., "Issuer URL").
Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the
name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal
address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter,
preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of
the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be
included but is not required.
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8.1.2. Initial Registry Contents
o Discovery Metadata Name: "issuer"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
configuration information location
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "authorization_endpoint"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
authorization endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "token_endpoint"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
token endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "jwks_uri"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
JWK Set document
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "registration_endpoint"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "scopes_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the OAuth 2.0 "scope" values that this authorization server
supports
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "response_types_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the OAuth 2.0 "response_type" values that this authorization
server supports
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
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o Discovery Metadata Name: "response_modes_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the OAuth 2.0 "response_mode" values that this authorization
server supports
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "grant_types_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the OAuth 2.0 grant type values that this authorization server
supports
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
client authentication methods supported by this token endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name:
"token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the JWS signing algorithms supported by the token endpoint for the
signature on the JWT used to authenticate the client at the token
endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "service_documentation"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of a page containing human-
readable information that developers might want or need to know
when using the authorization server
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "ui_locales_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: Languages and scripts supported
for the user interface, represented as a JSON array of BCP47
language tag values
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "op_policy_uri"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL that the authorization server
provides to the person registering the client to read about the
authorization server's requirements on how the client can use the
data provided by the authorization server
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o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "op_tos_uri"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL that the authorization server
provides to the person registering the client to read about
authorization server's terms of service
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "revocation_endpoint"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
OAuth 2.0 revocation endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name:
"revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
client authentication methods supported by this revocation
endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name:
"revocation_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the JWS signing algorithms supported by the revocation endpoint
for the signature on the JWT used to authenticate the client at
the revocation endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "introspection_endpoint"
o Discovery Metadata Description: URL of the authorization server's
OAuth 2.0 introspection endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name:
"introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
client authentication methods supported by this introspection
endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
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o Discovery Metadata Name:
"introspection_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: JSON array containing a list of
the JWS signing algorithms supported by the introspection endpoint
for the signature on the JWT used to authenticate the client at
the introspection endpoint
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
o Discovery Metadata Name: "code_challenge_methods_supported"
o Discovery Metadata Description: PKCE code challenge methods
supported by this authorization server
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3 of [[ this specification ]]
8.2. Updated Registration Instructions
This specification adds to the instructions for the Designated
Experts of the following IANA registries, both of which are in the
"OAuth Parameters" registry [IANA.OAuth.Parameters]:
o OAuth Access Token Types
o OAuth Token Endpoint Authentication Methods
IANA has added a link to this specification in the Reference sections
of these registries. [[ RFC Editor: The above sentence is written in
the past tense as it would appear in the final specification, even
though these links won't actually be created until after the IESG has
requested publication of the specification. Please delete this note
after the links are in place. ]]
For these registries, the designated experts must reject registration
requests in one registry for values already occurring in the other
registry. This is necessary because the
"introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" parameter allows for
the use of values from either registry. That way, because the values
in the two registries will continue to be mutually exclusive, no
ambiguities will arise.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[BCP195] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525,
May 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp195>.
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[IANA.OAuth.Parameters]
IANA, "OAuth Parameters",
<http://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters>.
[JWA] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7518>.
[JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7516>.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, DOI 10.17487/
RFC7517, May 2015, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517>.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515,
May 2015, <http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515>.
[JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519>.
[OAuth.Post]
Jones, M. and B. Campbell, "OAuth 2.0 Form Post Response
Mode", April 2015, <http://openid.net/specs/
oauth-v2-form-post-response-mode-1_0.html>.
[OAuth.Responses]
de Medeiros, B., Ed., Scurtescu, M., Tarjan, P., and M.
Jones, "OAuth 2.0 Multiple Response Type Encoding
Practices", February 2014, <http://openid.net/specs/
oauth-v2-multiple-response-types-1_0.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
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[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/
RFC5246, August 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying
Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646,
September 2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>.
[RFC5785] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-Known
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)", RFC 5785,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5785, April 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5785>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125,
March 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7009] Lodderstedt, T., Ed., Dronia, S., and M. Scurtescu, "OAuth
2.0 Token Revocation", RFC 7009, DOI 10.17487/RFC7009,
August 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009>.
[RFC7033] Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., Jones, M., and J. Smarr,
"WebFinger", RFC 7033, DOI 10.17487/RFC7033,
September 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7033>.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159,
March 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7159>.
[RFC7565] Saint-Andre, P., "The 'acct' URI Scheme", RFC 7565,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7565, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7565>.
[RFC7591] Richer, J., Ed., Jones, M., Bradley, J., Machulak, M., and
P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol",
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RFC 7591, DOI 10.17487/RFC7591, July 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591>.
[RFC7636] Sakimura, N., Ed., Bradley, J., and N. Agarwal, "Proof Key
for Code Exchange by OAuth Public Clients", RFC 7636,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7636, September 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7636>.
[RFC7662] Richer, J., Ed., "OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection",
RFC 7662, DOI 10.17487/RFC7662, October 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662>.
[UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard",
<http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>.
[USA15] Davis, M. and K. Whistler, "Unicode Normalization Forms",
Unicode Standard Annex 15, June 2015,
<http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr15/>.
9.2. Informative References
[OpenID.Core]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", November 2014,
<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
[OpenID.Discovery]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., and E. Jay, "OpenID
Connect Discovery 1.0", November 2014, <http://openid.net/
specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html>.
[OpenID.Registration]
Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect
Dynamic Client Registration 1.0", November 2014, <http://
openid.net/specs/openid-connect-registration-1_0.html>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgements
This specification is based on the OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0
specification, which was produced by the OpenID Connect working group
of the OpenID Foundation.
Appendix B. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
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-01
o Added "revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" and
"revocation_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported" for the
revocation endpoint.
o Added "introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported" and
"introspection_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported" for the
introspection endpoint.
o Added "code_challenge_methods_supported" for PKCE.
-00
o Created the initial version based on OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0
draft 26.
Authors' Addresses
Michael B. Jones
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/
Nat Sakimura
Nomura Research Institute, Ltd.
Email: n-sakimura@nri.co.jp
URI: http://nat.sakimura.org/
John Bradley
Ping Identity
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
URI: http://www.thread-safe.com/
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