Internet DRAFT - draft-jones-oauth-dyn-reg-management
draft-jones-oauth-dyn-reg-management
OAuth Working Group J. Richer
Internet-Draft The MITRE Corporation
Intended status: Standards Track M. Jones
Expires: August 1, 2014 Microsoft
J. Bradley
Ping Identity
M. Machulak
Newcastle University
January 28, 2014
OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Management Protocol
draft-jones-oauth-dyn-reg-management-00
Abstract
This specification defines methods for management of dynamic OAuth
2.0 client registrations.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 1, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Registration Tokens and Client Credentials . . . . . . . . 5
1.4.1. Credential Rotation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Client Configuration Endpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL . . . . . . 7
2.2. Client Read Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. Client Update Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4. Client Delete Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.1. Client Information Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix B. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix C. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
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1. Introduction
In order for an OAuth 2.0 client to utilize an OAuth 2.0
authorization server, the client needs specific information to
interact with the server, including an OAuth 2.0 Client ID to use at
that server. The OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Core Protocol
[OAuth.Registration] specification describes how an OAuth 2.0 client
can be dynamically registered with an authorization server to obtain
this information and how metadata about the client can be registered
with the server.
This specification extends the core registration specification by
defining a set of methods for management of dynamic OAuth 2.0 client
registrations beyond those defined in the core registration
specification.
1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
are case sensitive.
1.2. Terminology
This specification uses the terms "Access Token", "Refresh Token",
"Authorization Code", "Authorization Grant", "Authorization Server",
"Authorization Endpoint", "Client", "Client Identifier", "Client
Secret", "Protected Resource", "Resource Owner", "Resource Server",
"Response Type", and "Token Endpoint" defined by OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749]
and the terms defined by the OAuth 2.0 Client Dynamic Registration
Core Protocol [OAuth.Registration].
This specification defines the following terms:
Client Configuration Endpoint OAuth 2.0 endpoint through which
registration information for a registered client can be managed.
This URL for this endpoint is returned by the authorization server
in the client information response.
Registration Access Token OAuth 2.0 bearer token issued by the
authorization server through the client registration endpoint that
is used to authenticate the caller when accessing the client's
registration information at the client configuration endpoint.
This access token is associated with a particular registered
client.
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1.3. Protocol Flow
This extends the flow in the OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration
Core Protocol [OAuth.Registration] specification as follows:
+--------(A)- Initial Access Token (OPTIONAL)
|
| +----(B)- Software Statement (OPTIONAL)
| |
v v
+-----------+ +---------------+
| |--(C)- Client Registration Request -->| Client |
| | | Registration |
| |<-(D)- Client Information Response ---| Endpoint |
| | +---------------+
| |
| | +---------------+
| Client or |--(E)- Read or Update Request ------->| |
| Developer | | |
| |<-(F)- Client Information Response ---| Client |
| | | Configuration |
| | | Endpoint |
| | | |
| |--(G)- Delete Request --------------->| |
| | | |
| |<-(H)- Delete Confirmation -----------| |
+-----------+ +---------------+
Figure 1: Abstract Extended Dynamic Client Registration Flow
The abstract OAuth 2.0 client dynamic registration flow illustrated
in Figure 1 describes the interaction between the client or developer
and the endpoints defined in this specification and its parent. This
figure does not demonstrate error conditions. This flow includes the
following steps:
(A) Optionally, the client or developer is issued an initial access
token for use with the client registration endpoint. The method
by which the initial access token is issued to the client or
developer is out of scope for this specification.
(B) Optionally, the client or developer is issued a software
statement for use with the client registration endpoint. The
method by which the software statement is issued to the client or
developer is out of scope for this specification.
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(C) The client or developer calls the client registration endpoint
with its desired registration metadata, optionally including the
initial access token from (A) if one is required by the
authorization server.
(D) The authorization server registers the client and returns the
client's registered metadata, a client identifier that is unique
at the server, a set of client credentials such as a client secret
if applicable for this client, a URI pointing to the client
configuration endpoint, and a registration access token to be used
when calling the client configuration endpoint.
(E) The client or developer optionally calls the client
configuration endpoint with a read or update request using the
registration access token issued in (D). An update request
contains all of the client's registered metadata.
(F) The authorization server responds with the client's current
configuration, potentially including a new registration access
token and a new set of client credentials such as a client secret
if applicable for this client. If a new registration access token
is issued, it replaces the token issued in (D) for all subsequent
calls to the client configuration endpoint.
(G) The client or developer optionally calls the client
configuration endpoint with a delete request using the
registration access token issued in (D).
(H) The authorization server deprovisions the client and responds
with a confirmation that the deletion has taken place.
1.4. Registration Tokens and Client Credentials
Throughout the course of the dynamic registration protocol, there are
three different classes of credentials in play, each with different
properties and targets.
o The initial access token is optionally used by the client or
developer at the registration endpoint. This is an OAuth 2.0
token that is used to authorize the initial client registration
request. The content, structure, generation, and validation of
this token are out of scope for this specification. The
authorization server can use this token to verify that the
presenter is allowed to dynamically register new clients. This
token may be shared between multiple instances of a client to
allow them to each register separately, thereby letting the
authorization server use this token to tie multiple instances of
registered clients (each with their own distinct client
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identifier) back to the party to whom the initial access token was
issued, usually an application developer. This token should be
used only at the client registration endpoint.
o The registration access token is used by the client or developer
at the client configuration endpoint and represents the holder's
authorization to manage the registration of a client. This is an
OAuth 2.0 bearer token that is issued from the client registration
endpoint in response to a client registration request and is
returned in a client information response. The registration
access token is uniquely bound to the client identifier and is
required to be presented with all calls to the client
configuration endpoint. The registration access token should be
protected and should not be shared between instances of a client
(otherwise, one instance could change or delete registration
values for all instances of the client). The registration access
token can be rotated through the use of the client update method
on the client configuration endpoint. The registration access
token should be used only at the client configuration endpoint.
o The client credentials (such as "client_secret") are optional
depending on the type of client and are used to retrieve OAuth
tokens. Client credentials are most often bound to particular
instances of a client and should not be shared between instances.
Note that since not all types of clients have client credentials,
they cannot be used to manage client registrations at the client
configuration endpoint. The client credentials can be rotated
through the use of the client update method on the client
configuration endpoint. The client credentials cannot be used for
authentication at the client registration endpoint or at the
client configuration endpoint.
1.4.1. Credential Rotation
The Authorization Server MAY rotate the client's registration access
token and/or client credentials (such as a "client_secret")
throughout the lifetime of the client. The client can discovery that
these values have changed by reading the client information response
returned from either a read or update request to the client
configuration endpoint. The client's current registration access
token and client credentials (if applicable) MUST be included in this
response.
The registration access token SHOULD be rotated only in response to
an update request to the client configuration endpoint, at which
point the new registration access token is returned to the client and
the old registration access token SHOULD be discarded by both
parties. If the registration access token were to expire or be
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rotated outside of such requests, the client or developer might be
locked out of managing the client's configuration.
2. Client Configuration Endpoint
The client configuration endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 protected resource
that is provisioned by the server to facilitate viewing, updating,
and deleting a client's registered information. The location of this
endpoint is communicated to the client through the
"registration_client_uri" member of the Client Information Response,
as specified in Section 3.1. The client MUST use its registration
access token in all calls to this endpoint as an OAuth 2.0 Bearer
Token [RFC6750].
Operations on this endpoint are switched through the use of different
HTTP methods [RFC2616]. If an authorization server does not support
a particular method on the client configuration endpoint, it MUST
respond with the appropriate error code.
2.1. Forming the Client Configuration Endpoint URL
The authorization server MUST provide the client with the fully
qualified URL in the "registration_client_uri" element of the Client
Information Response, as specified in Section 3.1. The authorization
server MUST NOT expect the client to construct or discover this URL
on its own. The client MUST use the URL as given by the server and
MUST NOT construct this URL from component pieces.
Depending on deployment characteristics, the client configuration
endpoint URL may take any number of forms. It is RECOMMENDED that
this endpoint URL be formed through the use of a server-constructed
URL string which combines the client registration endpoint's URL and
the issued "client_id" for this client, with the latter as either a
path parameter or a query parameter. For example, a client with the
client identifier "s6BhdRkqt3" could be given a client configuration
endpoint URL of "https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3"
(path parameter) or of
"https://server.example.com/register?client_id=s6BhdRkqt3" (query
parameter). In both of these cases, the client simply uses the URL
as given by the authorization server.
These common patterns can help the server to more easily determine
the client to which the request pertains, which MUST be matched
against the client to which the registration access token was issued.
If desired, the server MAY simply return the client registration
endpoint URL as the client configuration endpoint URL and change
behavior based on the authentication context provided by the
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registration access token.
2.2. Client Read Request
To read the current configuration of the client on the authorization
server, the client makes an HTTP GET request to the client
configuration endpoint, authenticating with its registration access
token. This operation SHOULD be idempotent -- not causing changes to
the client configuration.
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
GET /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
Upon successful read of the information for a currently active
client, the authorization server responds with an HTTP 200 OK with
content type of "application/json" and a payload, as described in
Section 3.1. Some values in the response, including the
"client_secret" and "registration_access_token", MAY be different
from those in the initial registration response. However, since read
operations are intended to be idempotent, the read request itself
SHOULD NOT cause changes to the client's registered metadata values.
If the authorization server includes a new client secret and/or
registration access token in its response, the client MUST
immediately discard its previous client secret and/or registration
access token. The value of the "client_id" MUST NOT change from the
initial registration response.
If the registration access token used to make this request is not
valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in OAuth
Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].
If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond
with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the registration access token used to
make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.
If the client does not have permission to read its record, the server
MUST return an HTTP 403 Forbidden.
2.3. Client Update Request
This operation updates a previously-registered client with new
metadata at the authorization server. This request is authenticated
by the registration access token issued to the client.
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The client sends an HTTP PUT to the client configuration endpoint
with a content type of "application/json". The HTTP entity payload
is a JSON [RFC4627] document consisting of a JSON object and all
parameters as top- level members of that JSON object.
This request MUST include all client metadata fields as returned to
the client from a previous registration, read, or update operation.
The client MUST NOT include the "registration_access_token",
"registration_client_uri", "client_secret_expires_at", or
"client_id_issued_at" fields described in Section 3.1.
Valid values of client metadata fields in this request MUST replace,
not augment, the values previously associated with this client.
Omitted fields MUST be treated as null or empty values by the server.
The client MUST include its "client_id" field in the request, and it
MUST be the same as its currently-issued client identifier. If the
client includes the "client_secret" field in the request, the value
of this field MUST match the currently-issued client secret for that
client. The client MUST NOT be allowed to overwrite its existing
client secret with its own chosen value.
For all metadata fields, the authorization server MAY replace any
invalid values with suitable default values, and it MUST return any
such fields to the client in the response.
For example, a client could send the following request to the client
registration endpoint to update the client registration in the above
example with new information:
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Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
PUT /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/json
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
{
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
"redirect_uris":[
"https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/alt"],
"scope": "read write dolphin",
"grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks",
"client_name":"My New Example",
"client_name#fr":"Mon Nouvel Exemple",
"logo_uri":"https://client.example.org/newlogo.png",
"logo_uri#fr":"https://client.example.org/fr/newlogo.png"
}
This example uses client metadata values defined both in
[OAuth.Registration] and [OAuth.Registration.Metadata].
Upon successful update, the authorization server responds with an
HTTP 200 OK Message with content type "application/json" and a
payload, as described in Section 3.1. Some values in the response,
including the "client_secret" and r"egistration_access_token", MAY be
different from those in the initial registration response. If the
authorization server includes a new client secret and/or registration
access token in its response, the client MUST immediately discard its
previous client secret and/or registration access token. The value
of the "client_id" MUST NOT change from the initial registration
response.
If the registration access token used to make this request is not
valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in OAuth
Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].
If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond
with HTTP 401 Unauthorized, and the registration access token used to
make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.
If the client is not allowed to update its records, the server MUST
respond with HTTP 403 Forbidden.
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If the client attempts to set an invalid metadata field and the
authorization server does not set a default value, the authorization
server responds with an error as described in [OAuth.Registration].
2.4. Client Delete Request
To deprovision itself on the authorization server, the client makes
an HTTP DELETE request to the client configuration endpoint. This
request is authenticated by the registration access token issued to
the client.
Following is a non-normative example request (with line wraps for
display purposes only):
DELETE /register/s6BhdRkqt3 HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer reg-23410913-abewfq.123483
A successful delete action will invalidate the "client_id",
"client_secret", and "registration_access_token" for this client,
thereby preventing the "client_id" from being used at either the
authorization endpoint or token endpoint of the authorization server.
The authorization server SHOULD immediately invalidate all existing
authorization grants and currently-active tokens associated with this
client.
If a client has been successfully deprovisioned, the authorization
server responds with an HTTP 204 No Content message.
If the server does not support the delete method, the server MUST
respond with an HTTP 405 Not Supported.
If the registration access token used to make this request is not
valid, the server MUST respond with an error as described in OAuth
Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].
If the client does not exist on this server, the server MUST respond
with HTTP 401 Unauthorized and the registration access token used to
make this request SHOULD be immediately revoked.
If the client is not allowed to delete itself, the server MUST
respond with HTTP 403 Forbidden.
Following is a non-normative example response:
HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
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3. Responses
In response to certain requests from the client to either the client
registration endpoint or the client configuration endpoint as
described in this specification, the authorization server sends the
following response bodies.
3.1. Client Information Response
This specification extends the client information response defined in
OAuth 2.0 Core Client Dynamic Registration. The response contains
the client identifier as well as the client secret, if the client is
a confidential client. The response also contains the fully
qualified URL of the client configuration endpoint for this specific
client that the client may use to obtain and update information about
itself. The response also contains a registration access token that
is to be used by the client to perform subsequent operations at the
client configuration endpoint.
client_id REQUIRED. The unique client identifier, MUST NOT be
currently valid for any other registered client.
client_secret OPTIONAL. The client secret. If issued, this MUST be
unique for each "client_id". This value is used by confidential
clients to authenticate to the token endpoint as described in
OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] Section 2.3.1.
client_id_issued_at OPTIONAL. Time at which the Client Identifier
was issued. The time is represented as the number of seconds from
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
client_secret_expires_at REQUIRED if "client_secret" is issued.
Time at which the "client_secret" will expire or 0 if it will not
expire. The time is represented as the number of seconds from
1970-01-01T0:0:0Z as measured in UTC until the date/time.
registration_access_token REQUIRED. Access token that is used at
the client configuration endpoint to perform subsequent operations
upon the client registration.
registration_client_uri
REQUIRED. The fully qualified URL of the client configuration
endpoint for this client. The client MUST use this URL as given
when communicating with the client configuration endpoint.
Additionally, the Authorization Server MUST return all registered
metadata about this client, including any fields provisioned by the
authorization server itself. The authorization server MAY reject or
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replace any of the client's requested metadata values submitted
during the registration or update requests and substitute them with
suitable values.
The response is an "application/json" document with all parameters as
top-level members of a JSON object [RFC4627].
Following is a non-normative example response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
{
"registration_access_token": "reg-23410913-abewfq.123483",
"registration_client_uri":
"https://server.example.com/register/s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_id":"s6BhdRkqt3",
"client_secret": "cf136dc3c1fc93f31185e5885805d",
"client_id_issued_at":2893256800,
"client_secret_expires_at":2893276800,
"client_name":"My Example Client",
"client_name#ja-Jpan-JP":
"\u30AF\u30E9\u30A4\u30A2\u30F3\u30C8\u540D",
"redirect_uris":[
"https://client.example.org/callback",
"https://client.example.org/callback2"],
"scope": "read write dolphin",
"grant_types": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
"token_endpoint_auth_method": "client_secret_basic",
"logo_uri": "https://client.example.org/logo.png",
"jwks_uri": "https://client.example.org/my_public_keys.jwks"
}
4. IANA Considerations
This specification makes no requests of IANA.
5. Security Considerations
While the client secret can expire, the registration access token
should not expire while a client is still actively registered. If
this token were to expire, a developer or client could be left in a
situation where they have no means of retrieving or updating the
client's registration information. Were that the case, a new
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registration would be required, thereby generating a new client
identifier. However, to limit the exposure surface of the
registration access token, the registration access token MAY be
rotated when the developer or client does an update operation on the
client's client configuration endpoint. As the registration access
tokens are relatively long-term credentials, and since the
registration access token is a Bearer token and acts as the sole
authentication for use at the client configuration endpoint, it MUST
be protected by the developer or client as described in OAuth 2.0
Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].
Since the client configuration endpoint is an OAuth 2.0 protected
resource, it SHOULD have some rate limiting on failures to prevent
the registration access token from being disclosed though repeated
access attempts.
If a client is deprovisioned from a server, any outstanding
registration access token for that client MUST be invalidated at the
same time. Otherwise, this can lead to an inconsistent state wherein
a client could make requests to the client configuration endpoint
where the authentication would succeed but the action would fail
because the client is no longer valid. To prevent accidental
disclosure from such an erroneous situation, the authorization server
MUST treat all such requests as if the registration access token was
invalid (by returning an HTTP 401 Unauthorized error, as described).
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[OAuth.Registration]
Richer, J., Jones, M., Bradley, J., and M. Machulak,
"OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Core Protocol",
draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg (work in progress), January 2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, October 2012.
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[RFC6750] Jones, M. and D. Hardt, "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization
Framework: Bearer Token Usage", RFC 6750, October 2012.
6.2. Informative References
[OAuth.Registration.Metadata]
Richer, J., Jones, M., Bradley, J., and M. Machulak,
"OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Metadata",
draft-jones-oauth-dyn-reg-metadata (work in progress),
January 2014.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The authors thank the OAuth Working Group, the User-Managed Access
Working Group, and the OpenID Connect Working Group participants for
their input to this document. In particular, the following
individuals have been instrumental in their review and contribution
to various versions of this document: Amanda Anganes, Derek Atkins,
Tim Bray, Domenico Catalano, Donald Coffin, Vladimir Dzhuvinov,
George Fletcher, Thomas Hardjono, Phil Hunt, William Kim, Torsten
Lodderstedt, Eve Maler, Josh Mandel, Nov Matake, Tony Nadalin, Nat
Sakimura, Christian Scholz, and Hannes Tschofenig.
Appendix B. Open Issues
o Should this specification become a working group document so that
the functionality defined in this document that was previously
defined in draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-14 is retained in working
group drafts?
Appendix C. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-00
o Partitioned the Dynamic Client Registration specification into
core, metadata, and management specifications. This built on work
first published as draft-richer-oauth-dyn-reg-core-00 and
draft-richer-oauth-dyn-reg-management-00.
o Clarified that read operations are intended to be idempotent.
o Rewrote the introduction.
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Authors' Addresses
Justin Richer
The MITRE Corporation
Email: jricher@mitre.org
Michael B. Jones
Microsoft
Email: mbj@microsoft.com
URI: http://self-issued.info/
John Bradley
Ping Identity
Email: ve7jtb@ve7jtb.com
Maciej Machulak
Newcastle University
Email: m.p.machulak@ncl.ac.uk
URI: http://ncl.ac.uk/
Richer, et al. Expires August 1, 2014 [Page 16]
