Internet DRAFT - draft-keyupate-irs-bgp-usecases
draft-keyupate-irs-bgp-usecases
Network Working Group K. Patel
Internet-Draft R. Fernando
Intended status: Informational Cisco Systems
Expires: January 13, 2014 H. Gredler
Juniper Networks
S. Amante
Level 3 Communications, Inc.
July 12, 2013
Use Cases for an Interface to BGP Protocol
draft-keyupate-irs-bgp-usecases-02.txt
Abstract
A network routing protocol like BGP is typically configured and
results of its operation are analyzed through some form of Command
Line Interface (CLI) or NETCONF. These interactions to control BGP
and diagnose its operation encompass: configuration of protocol
parameters, display of protocol data, setting of certain protocol
state and debugging of the protocol.
Interface to the Routing System's (IRS) Programmatic interfaces, as
defined in [I-D.ward-irs-framework], provides an alternate way to
control the configuration and diagnose the operation of the BGP
protocol. IRS may be used for the configuration, manipulation,
polling or analyzing protocol data. This document describes set of
use cases for which IRS can be used for BGP protocol. It is intended
to provide a base for the solution draft describing a set of
interfaces to the BGP protocol.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 13, 2014.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. BGP Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. BGP Protocol Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. BGP Policy Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. BGP Protocol Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. BGP Error Handling for Internal BGP Sessions . . . . . . 7
4. BGP Route Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Customized Best Path Selection Criteria . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Flowspec Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3. Route Filter Routes for Legacy Routers . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4. Optimized Exit Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. BGP Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Notification of Routing Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Tracing Dropped BGP Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.3. BGP Protocol Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
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8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
Typically, a network routing protocol like BGP is configured and
results of its operation are analyzed through some form of Command
Line Interface (CLI) or NETCONF. These interactions to control BGP
and diagnose its operation encompass: configuration of protocol
parameters, display of protocol data, setting of certain protocol
state and debugging of the protocol.
The IRS Framework document [I-D.ward-irs-framework] describes a
mechanism to control network protocols like BGP using a set of
programmatic interfaces. These programmatic interfaces allow one to
control the BGP protocol by analyzing its operational state and
routing protocol data, plus manipulating BGP's configuration to
achieve various goals. The IRS is not intended to replace any
existing configuration mechanisms, (i.e.: Command Line Interface or
NETCONF). Instead, IRS is intended to augment those existing
mechanisms by defining a standardized set of programmatic interfaces
to enable easier configuration, interrogation and analysis of the BGP
protocol.
This document describes set of use cases for which IRS's programmatic
interfaces can be used to control and analyze the operation of BGP.
The use cases described in this document cover the following aspects
of BGP: protocol parameter configuration, configuration of routing
policies, protocol route manipulation and tracking of protocol
events. The goal is to inform the community's understanding of where
the IRS BGP extensions fit within the overall IRS architecture. It
is intended to provide a basis for the solutions draft describing the
set of Interfaces to the BGP protocol.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. BGP Configuration
The configuration of BGP is arduous to establish and maintain,
particularly on networks whose services have a requirement for
complex routing policies. This need is magnified by the need to
routinely perform changes to large numbers of BGP routers to, for
example: add or remove customer's BGP sessions, announce or withdraw
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(customer) IP prefixes in BGP, modify BGP policies to effect changes
in Traffic Engineering, audit BGP routers to ensure they have
consistent and appropriate BGP policies, etc.
There are three categories of BGP configuration:
1. Local BGP routing protocol configuration: local Autonomous System
Number (ASN), BGP path selection properties of the router,
injection of (aggregate) routes into BGP, etc.
2. Local BGP policies: policies designed to filter and then
manipulate BGP attributes associated with BGP routes learned
through BGP sessions. These policies typically live in the
global configuration of a BGP router, but are applied on a per-
BGP neighbor basis (or, group of BGP neighbors); and,
3. BGP neighbor sessions: remote ASN, remote IP address, address
families, BGP policies to applied to routes, max-prefix limits,
etc.
The sum total of BGP configuration on a BGP router is typically the
largest quantify of configuration on Service Provider's BGP routers,
by a fairly large margin. When that is combined with the large set
of routine configuration changes, mentioned above, it should be
fairly clear that systematic reading, configuration and control of
BGP routers through a mechanism like IRS would greatly benefit all
operators of BGP routers.
While it may not be possible to provide programmatic APIs for
esoteric vendor-specific policy configuration, it is possible to
provide such API's for BGP protocol specific configuration and the
more commonly used BGP routing policies.
2.1. BGP Protocol Configuration
Ability to enable and disable new address families within a BGP
protocol for a network of BGP speaking routers is a challenge. The
challenge is mainly in keeping track of BGP speaker's feature
capabilities and then configuration of new address families on a
multiple BGP speakers within a given network. With the necessary
information, IRS controllers allow a network operator to push
configuration information for enabling and disabling of new address
families on a partial or entire set of BGP speakers within a given
network. This would assist in building BGP overlay networks as
needed.
For VPN address families, the main challenge lies in the complex VPN
configuration required to setup the control plane for Customer VPNs.
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The configuration involves creating a Virtual Routing and Forwarding
instance (VRF), a Route Distinguisher (RD) that ensures each customer
prefixes remains unique across VPNs, and Route Targets (RT) that help
ensure that the Customer prefixes are segregated appropriately so
that they do not cross the VPN boundaries. IRS would allow a network
operator to push such configuration from a central location where a
global VPN provisioning information could be stored. This helps
avoid manual configuration of a VPN on multiple routers. Instead the
configuration is controlled and pushed though a central IRS
controller using a programmatic set of APIs on targeted set of BGP
speakers.
Use of IRS controllers to announce protocol configuration information
would simplify and automate configuration of BGP protocol in IBGP
deployments where the protocol based policies are seldom used. To
facilitate such a centralized configuration model, BGP speakers could
be extended to use programmatic APIs to announce their feature
capabilities as part of protocol initialization to the centralize IRS
controllers. This would assist IRS controllers to auto-discover BGP
protocol capabilities of various BGP speakers in a given network.
IRS controllers in turn would use the information towards enabling/
disabling of BGP specific features on BGP speakers.
2.2. BGP Policy Configuration
Filtering of BGP routes is strongly recommended to control the
announcements of BGP prefixes across the internet. Most providers
make extensive use of BGP prefix filtering policies at the edge of
their networks. The reasons for filtering BGP prefixes are:
o Avoid Unwanted Route Announcements. Filter prefixes that MUST not
be routed [RFC5735], [RFC5156]. Filter prefixes that are not
allocated by Internet Routing Registries.
o Facilitate Route Summarization. Filter prefixes beyond certain
agreed prefix mask length between providers. Route Summarization
helps control BGP RIB and FIB table size.
o Defensive Security. Filter prefixes from Stub customer ASes that
are not owned by the customers. Filter customer prefixes
announced by other providers. This helps avoid prefix hijacking.
A set of standards-based schemas to enable configuration of Local BGP
policies and BGP neighbor sessions was realized through the Routing
Policy Specification Language (RSPL) [RFC2622]. The RPSL defined a
standards-based schemas, or 'objects' as it called them, that
defined:
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o binding of IP prefixes to (one or more) Origin AS, (route
objects);
o collections of routes (route-set objects);
o collections of Autonomous Systems (as-set objects); and,
o routing policy of an Autonomous System to/from its adjacent
neighbor AS'es, (aut-num objects)
Each ASN is responsible for creation, modification and deletion of
its RPSL objects in an Internet Routing Registry (IRR). IRR's are
typically operated by Regional Internet Registries (RIR's) and a few
dozen larger ISP's and independent organizations. The IRR's provide
a well-known location for all organizations attached to the Internet
to retrieve or update RPSL objects.
While still widely and actively used by Internet Service Providers,
the prevailing belief is that the data contained in the IRR's is
inaccurate, primarily due to a lack of deployed authorization method
with respect to the creation of modification of RPSL objects. It
should be noted that this criticism is not directed at the previously
defined RPSL schemas, but rather at the data contained in RPSL
schemas by end-users of the IRR system. Please refer to the IRR And
Routing Policy Configuration Considerations
[I-D.mcpherson-irr-routing-policy-considerations] document for a more
thorough discussion of the history and present state of the IRR's.
Currently, RPSL schemas are exchanged between non-routing systems
(servers) used within the IRR system. In addition, open-source and
proprietary applications create or modify RPSL schemas, as necessary,
to signal the announcement (or, withdrawal) of an IP prefix from an
ASN or the creation (or, teardown) of a neighbor relationship between
two adjacent ASN's. Most importantly, these RPSL schemas are
consumed by similar applications to automatically build routing
policies, (i.e.: lists of IP prefixes, corresponding Origin ASN's and
/or AS_PATH's), that then get translated to device-specific syntax
(i.e.: CLI) before being pushed into individual BGP routers to effect
routing policy on the network. It is common for Internet Service
Providers to perform updates to these routing policies across their
entire network on a daily basis.
With IRS it would be desirable to change the last step in the above
process so that BGP policies derived from RPSL schemas, and other
information sources, are translated into standards-based schemas that
are then pushed, or pulled, into individual BGP routers. More
generally, IRS controllers could use API's to gather information
required to build various types of BGP routing policies plus the
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corresponding set of Autonomous System Border Routers (ASBR's) where
such policies need to be applied in the network and, finally, making
those changes to individual network elements so those BGP policies
take effect in the network. In doing so, a network operator now has
a centralized way of building and making these policies take effect
across the network in a coordinated manner.
3. BGP Protocol Operation
It is increasingly common for services facilitated via BGP to be
subject to severe, widespread disruptions (outages), primarily due to
the destructive teardown of BGP sessions as a result of receiving
malformed BGP attributes. The document Operational Requirements for
Enhanced Error Handling Behaviour in BGP-4
[I-D.ietf-grow-ops-reqs-for-bgp-error-handling] outlines requirements
to try to minimize the scope of the impact attributed to such errors.
Unfortunately, more fine-grained BGP error handling solutions, which
would result in little to no impact on the operation of BGP protocol,
remain elusive.
3.1. BGP Error Handling for Internal BGP Sessions
It is possible that IRS could enable enhanced error handling
techniques for Internal BGP sessions. At a minimum, IRS-capable BGP
routers could signal an event such as "Malformed Attribute Received"
toward an IRS controller(s). IRS controller(s) may already have a
real-time view of BGP routes, and corresponding BGP attributes, or
may dynamically interrogate BGP routers in the network to identify
the present propagation scope of the BGP route(s) that are affected.
Finally, the IRS controller(s) could then signal back to BGP routers
to apply a filter that would block propagation of the BGP attribute
or BGP route, as necessary, in order to temporarily aid in
consistency of BGP routing information across the entire network
until a permanent fix can be developed and deployed within BGP
routers.
IRS would enable the global visibility and global control over the
operational state of BGP, within a given Autonomous System, that is
necessary to facilitate the learning of, rapid response to and more
fine-grained isolation/scoping of BGP protocol events that currently
cause a destructive tear-down of BGP sessions that lead to widespread
disruptions of services.
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4. BGP Route Manipulation
Multiprotocol BGP [RFC4760] provides support to carry routing
information for different BGP address families. Route manipulation
is heavily done across these different address families for different
reasons. BGP IPv4 and IPv6 address families use BGP Communities
[RFC1997] and other IBGP and EBGP attributes to manipulate BGP routes
for Traffic Engineering purpose. BGP VPN adddress families use
Extended Communities [RFC4360] to filter unwanted BGP routes. BGP
Flowspec address family [RFC5575] is used to install Flow based
filters to filter unwanted data traffic. The following sub-sections
describe the use of IRS towards BGP Route Manipulation for different
BGP address families.
4.1. Customized Best Path Selection Criteria
The BGP customized Bestpath facilitates custom bestpath computations
within a BGP speaking network. It is usually used within an IBGP
network. Customized bestpaths use special extended communities known
as cost communities. Cost communities carry enough information;
Point of Insertion (POI) and the cost value to signal where in BGP
bestpath the customize checks need to be done. Both, the traffic
engineering as well as backdoor (SHAM) links use customized bestpath
computation.
With IRS, it would be possible for an IRS controller to push routes
with custom cost communities on the BGP routers for Traffic
Engineering purpose. IRS controller now can act as a central entity
keeping track of all Traffic engineering data that get applied to BGP
routes within an IBGP network.
4.2. Flowspec Routes
The BGP flowspec address family is used to disseminate the traffic
flow specification to the BGP Autonomous System Border Routers
(ASBRs) and Provider Edge (PE) routers. Both, the BGP ASBRs and the
PEs would translate the received BGP traffic flow specification into
an Access Control List (ACL) and install it in router's forwarding
path. Using such ACLs routers can now classify, shape, rate limit,
filter, or redirect traffic flows.
With IRS, it would be possible for an IRS controller to push traffic
flow specifications to the BGP ASBRs and the PE routers. IRS
controller can act as a central entity tracking all the traffic flow
specifications that are installed within an IBGP network. IRS
controller could also prioritize and control the announcement of
traffic flow specifications according to various ASRBs and PE
router's capacity. BGP ASBRs and PE routers MAY forward traffic flow
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specifications received from EBGP speakers to IRS Controllers. This
would allow IRS controllers to centrally manage and track any
externally received traffic flow specifications.
4.3. Route Filter Routes for Legacy Routers
The BGP Route Filter address family is used to disseminate the Route
Target filter information between VPN BGP speakers. This information
is then used to build a route distribution graph that helps in
limiting the propagation of VPN NLRI within a VPN network. However,
it requires that all the BGP VPN routers are upgraded to support this
functionality. Otherwise, the graph information is incomplete when a
VPN network consists of legacy routers that participates in VPN but
does not implement the BGP route filter address family.
With IRS, it would be possible for an IRS controller to push router
filter information to BGP RR routers on behalf of all legacy routers
that participates in VPN but does not support or implement the BGP
route filter address family. IRS controller can act as a central
entity tracking all the configured Route Filters for legacy routers
and push them on appropriate RRs who in turn would push it to ASBRs
and PE routers. In this way, IRS controllers help build an optimal
route distribution graph that would assist in filtering of VPN NLRIs
in a VPN network.
4.4. Optimized Exit Control
Optimized Exit Control is used to provide route optimization and load
distribution for multiple network connections between networks.
Network operators can monitor IP traffic flows and then could define
policies and rules based on traffic class performance, link bandwidth
monetary costs, link load distribution, traffic types, link failures,
etc.
With IRS, it would be possible for an IRS controller to manipulate
BGP routes and its parameters that influence BGP bestpath decisions.
IRS controller could act as a central entity that would monitor and
manipulate BGP routes based on central network based policies. Such
routes would then be injected by a IRS controller into the network so
as to get the load distribution for multiple network connections.
5. BGP Events
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Given the extremely large number of BGP Routes in networks, it is
critical to have scalable mechanisms that can be used to monitor for
events affecting routing state and, consequently, reachability. In
addition, similar tools are needed in order to monitor BGP protocol
statistics, which help operators and developers better understand
scalability of software and hardware that BGP utilizes.
IRS could provide a publish-subscribe capability to applications to:
o request monitoring of BGP routes and related events; and,
o subscribe to the IRS controller to receive events related to BGP
routes or other protocol-related events of interest.
5.1. Notification of Routing Events
There are certain IP prefixes, for example those that are arbitrarily
classified by a given network operator as "high visibility" by its
end-users, for which immediate notification of changes in their state
are extremely useful to know about. Upon notification of such
events, a Network Operations Center (NOC) could respond to customer
inquiries in a more timely fashion; alternatively, the NOC may decide
to perform Traffic Engineering to restore service, etc.
Currently, the only way to learn of such events is for a BGP
monitoring system to establish a BGP session with a multitude of BGP
routers in an AS. Then, the BGP monitoring system needs to look
through all BGP UPDATE's in order to identify those events that are
of interest to it. Note, this doesn't account for the fact that
there are several applications that might be simultaneously
interested in learning of events to a given IP prefix nor the fact
that some applications may want to dynamically insert or remove "IP
prefixes of interest", depending on the needs of their constituent
applications.
With IRS, it is conceivable that applications could tell an IRS
controller, through a North-Bound API, their "IP prefixes" (or,
AS_PATH's, BGP communities, etc.) that are of interest. For example,
a NOC application may be interested in changes to high visibility
content or service-provider Web sites; alternatively, a security
application may be interested in events associated with a different
set of IP prefixes. The IRS controller would then consolidate the
list of IP prefixes, and associated characteristics, to be monitored
and program BGP routers in an AS to observe this subset of routes for
changes. Some examples of changes in routing state might include:
o an IP prefix being announced or withdrawn
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o an IP prefix being suppressed, due to route flap dampening
o an alternative best-path being chosen for a given IP prefix
When the requisite events for a BGP Route are observed by a BGP
router, it would notify IRS controllers.
The IRS controllers would have a publish/subscribe mechanism whereby
various sets of applications may subscribe to events of interest.
The IRS controller would then publish these events so applications
would immediately receive them and take the appropriate domain-
specific action necessary.
5.2. Tracing Dropped BGP Routes
It is extremely useful to operators to be able to rapidly identify
instances where a BGP route is not being propagated within an
Autonomous System. At a minimum, this could result in sub-optimal
performance when attempting to reach such destinations.
There are two instances when this scenario will occur. First, when a
Service Provider is using "Soft Reconfiguration Inbound", it allows
their ASBR routers to receive a copy of a BGP route, but show that
route was not permitted into the Adj-RIB-In most likely as a result
of the inbound BGP policy not permitting that IP prefix. Thus, this
BGP route is not even eligible for BGP Path Selection. The second
instance is where the BGP route is permitted by the inbound BGP
policy into the Adj-RIB-In, but due to BGP Path Selection (i.e.:
lower LOCAL_PREF, longer AS_PATH length, etc.) was not chosen as the
best path and, subsequently, this particular BGP route is not
forwarded on to other internal BGP speakers in the AS. In both
instances, the BGP route is only visible within the ASBR on which
that BGP route was first learned. Needless to say, in large Service
Provider networks with a numerous interconnects to a single customer
it can be very time-consuming to discover where such a BGP route is
learned before ultimately determining why the route was blocked or
not preferred.
With IRS, it would be possible for an IRS controller to rapidly
gather information from across a large set of BGP routers in the
network to determine at what ASBR's the BGP route is being learned.
Next, the IRS controller could interrogate those routers BGP policies
to determine the root cause of why the route was either not learned
or not preferred in BGP. Finally, if necessary, the IRS
controller(s) could amend BGP policies and push them out to BGP
routers to permit the BGP route or make it a preferred route
according to the BGP path selection algorithm.
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5.3. BGP Protocol Statistics
There are a variety of statistics related to the operation of BGP
that are invaluable to network operators. These statistics generally
help operators, and developers, understand the present state and
future scalability of BGP.
One statistic that is invaluable to operators is the current number
of BGP routes learned through an eBGP session. Operators then apply
a command against each eBGP session to limit the maximum number of
BGP routes that may be learned through that eBGP session before a
warning message is triggered and/or the eBGP session is torn down
completely. This configuration capability is often referred to as a
"max-prefix limit". This command must be routinely audited and, if
necessary, adjusted in order to not trigger a false warning or
teardown due to the natural organic growth in BGP routes learned from
a given BGP neighbor.
IRS controllers could provide an invaluable capability to help audit
and re-program the "max-prefix limit" on a periodic basis, which is
generally once per day. Specifically, the first task would be for an
IRS controller to validate that there is a "max-prefix limit" applied
to every eBGP session. (If there is not, that should either trigger
a red alarm to the NOC to manually fix this condition or for the IRS
controller to automatically apply a "max-prefix limit" that would
alleviate this hazardous condition). Assuming there is a "max-prefix
limit" already in place, the IRS controller would simultaneously
retrieve, from each BGP router, the current number of BGP routes
learned through a BGP session and value used for the "max-prefix
limit" on that same BGP session. These two values could then be
handed off to an application that determines if adjustments in the
"max-prefix limit" value are required for each BGP session. The
application would then notify the IRS controller of the subset of
eBGP sessions and their associated change in "max-prefix limit"
value, whereby the IRS controller would then adjust the BGP protocol
configuration on each requisite BGP router in the network. Finally,
it should be noted that the above is just one method whereby "max-
prefix limit" values are adjusted. It's similarly possible that the
BGP routers may, through the IRS, pull the "max-prefix limit" values
for each eBGP neighbor they have onboard on a periodic basis and
validate their accuracy.
The above is just one use case related to BGP protocol statistics.
There are wealth of other BGP protocol statistics or state
informatioin that would be invaluable to have programmatic visibility
into that operators do not have today.
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6. Security Considerations
The BGP use cases described in this document assumes use of IRS's
programmatic interfaces described in the IRS framework mentioned in
[I-D.ward-irs-framework]. This document does not change the
underlying security issues inherent in the existing
[I-D.ward-irs-framework].
7. Acknowledgements
TBD.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[I-D.ward-irs-framework]
Atlas, A., Nadeau, T., and D. Ward, "Interface to the
Routing System Framework", draft-ward-irs-framework-00
(work in progress), July 2012.
[RFC1997] Chandrasekeran, R., Traina, P., and T. Li, "BGP
Communities Attribute", RFC 1997, August 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2629] Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
June 1999.
[RFC3392] Chandra, R. and J. Scudder, "Capabilities Advertisement
with BGP-4", RFC 3392, November 2002.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, July
2003.
[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.
[RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended
Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, February 2006.
[RFC4760] Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter,
"Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 4760, January
2007.
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8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-grow-ops-reqs-for-bgp-error-handling]
Shakir, R., "Operational Requirements for Enhanced Error
Handling Behaviour in BGP-4", draft-ietf-grow-ops-reqs-
for-bgp-error-handling-05 (work in progress), July 2012.
[I-D.mcpherson-irr-routing-policy-considerations]
McPherson, D., Amante, S., Osterweil, E., and L. Blunk,
"IRR & Routing Policy Configuration Considerations",
draft-mcpherson-irr-routing-policy-considerations-01 (work
in progress), September 2012.
[RFC2622] Alaettinoglu, C., Villamizar, C., Gerich, E., Kessens, D.,
Meyer, D., Bates, T., Karrenberg, D., and M. Terpstra,
"Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL)", RFC 2622,
June 1999.
[RFC2858] Bates, T., Rekhter, Y., Chandra, R., and D. Katz,
"Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 2858, June 2000.
[RFC5156] Blanchet, M., "Special-Use IPv6 Addresses", RFC 5156,
April 2008.
[RFC5575] Marques, P., Sheth, N., Raszuk, R., Greene, B., Mauch, J.,
and D. McPherson, "Dissemination of Flow Specification
Rules", RFC 5575, August 2009.
[RFC5735] Cotton, M. and L. Vegoda, "Special Use IPv4 Addresses",
RFC 5735, January 2010.
Authors' Addresses
Keyur Patel
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Email: keyupate@cisco.com
Patel, et al. Expires January 13, 2014 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Use Cases for an Interface to BGP July 2013
Rex Fernando
Cisco Systems
170 W. Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Email: rex@cisco.com
Hannes Gredler
Juniper Networks
1194 N. Mathilda Ave
Sunnyvale, CA 94089
USA
Email: hannes@juniper.net
Shane Amante
Level 3 Communications, Inc.
1025 Eldorado Blvd
Broomfield, CO 80021
USA
Email: shane@level3.net
Patel, et al. Expires January 13, 2014 [Page 15]
