Internet DRAFT - draft-kim-i2nsf-security-controller-interface-dm

draft-kim-i2nsf-security-controller-interface-dm







I2NSF Working Group                                               J. Kim
Internet-Draft                                             J. Jeong, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track                               P. Lingga
Expires: 29 September 2023                       Sungkyunkwan University
                                                                S. Hares
                                                                  Huawei
                                                          R. Marin-Lopez
                                                    University of Murcia
                                                           28 March 2023


 I2NSF Security Controller-Facing Interface YANG Data Model for Cross-
                      Domain IPsec Flow Protection
          draft-kim-i2nsf-security-controller-interface-dm-01

Abstract

   This document defines an information model and a YANG data model for
   the Security Controller-Facing Interface between two security
   controllers in an Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF)
   framework located in different Domains.  This interface is used for
   the exchange of IPsec flow protection to protect the IP Communication
   between two Network Security Functions (NSFs) in cross-domain
   environments.  The YANG data model in this document is built on the
   basis of the YANG data model for IPsec flow protection based on
   Software-Defined Networking (SDN).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 29 September 2023.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.



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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  I2NSF Cross Domain IPsec Management Description . . . . . . .   4
   4.  Information Model for Security Controller-Facing Interface  .   5
   5.  Use Cases for the Security Controller-Facing Interface in
           Cross-Domain Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  Peer-to-Peer Use Case for the Security Controller-Facing
           Interface in Cross-Domain Environments  . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.2.  Hierarchical Use Cases for the Security Controller-Facing
           Interface in Cross-Domain Environments  . . . . . . . . .   8
   6.  YANG Data Model for Security Controller-Facing Interface  . .  10
   7.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Appendix A.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix B.  Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   Appendix C.  Changes from
           draft-kim-i2nsf-security-controller-interface-dm-00 . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13

1.  Introduction

   Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) defines a framework
   and its interfaces for the security management and monitoring of
   Network Security Functions (NSFs) for security services.  [RFC8329].













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   To support multiple security services for a traffic flow with
   multiple NSFs, a Service Function Chaining (SFC) [RFC7665] can be
   used.  In SFC, the integrity and confidentiality of security services
   between the NSFs must be guaranteed.  [RFC9061] protects the flow
   between NSFs under the control of the same I2NSF security controller.
   The security controller is in charge of generating, managing and
   distributing the IPsec Security Associations.  This document
   describes the flow protection and key management process (i.e., IKE
   case and IKE-less case) between two NSFs within the coverage of I2NSF
   managed by one security controller, i.e., within one I2NSF domain
   (e.g., an autonomous system (AS)).

   However, recently, as described in [I-D.ietf-bess-bgp-sdwan-usage],
   multiple Software-Defined WANs (SD-WANs) scenarios demand a
   centralized way of flow protection using IPsec between SD-WAN
   peers(NSFs).  In the scenarios, some SD-WAN peers that are located in
   different spaces (virtual or physical) are connected only by
   untrusted public networks.

   Therefore, to ensure secure communication between NSFs located in
   different SD-WANs over untrusted public networks, flow protection is
   required.  Additionally, an interface for exchanging information
   (e.g., security policies and IPsec parameters) between different SD-
   WANs is necessary.

   In response to these requirements, I2NSF needs to extend by using
   [RFC9061].  The I2NSF security controller needs to extend to
   centrally manage multiple I2NSFs that are located in different
   domains, and needs to extend to exchange information between two
   I2NSFs located in two different domains.

   To extend I2NSF, a centralized point that can manage multiple I2NSF
   domains is needed.  It is necessary to introduce a new interface for
   centralized management and exchanging information between NSFs
   located in different I2NSF domains, i.e., a cross-domain environment
   with multiple ASes.

   Therefore, this document proposes an information model and a YANG
   data model for a Security Controller-Facing Interface (SFI) for
   exchanging information (e.g., security policies and IPsec parameters)
   between security controllers.  This interface performs the exchange
   of a security policy and provides flow protection among NSFs located
   in cross-domain environments.  This document suggests two scenarios
   of configuration between peer-to-peer security controller cases (see
   Section 5.1.) and configuration in hierarchical security controller
   cases (see Section 5.2.).





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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   I2NSF Domain: An area that an I2NSF security controller can manage.

   Security Contorller-Facing Interface (SFI): An interface for the
   exchange of information between two security controllers located in
   two different I2NSF domains.

3.  I2NSF Cross Domain IPsec Management Description


          I2NSF Domain A                            I2NSF Domain B
+--------------------------------+         +-------------------------------+
|         +-------------+        |         |         +-------------+       |
|         |   Security  | Security Controller-Facing |   Security  |       |
|         | Controller A|<-------------------------->| Controller B|       |
|         |             |        |Interface|         |             |       |
|         +------+------+        |         |         +------+------+       |
|                ^               |         |                ^              |
|                |               |         |                |              |
|      +---------+------+        |         |       +--------+-------+      |
|      |                |        |         |       |                |      |
|      v                v        |         |       v                v      |
|  +---+---+        +---+---+    |  IPsec  |   +---+---+        +---+---+  |
|  | NSF-1 |        | NSF-2 |==================| NSF-3 |        | NSF-4 |  |
|  +---+---+        +---+---+    |         |   +---+---+        +---+---+  |
+--------------------------------+         +-------------------------------+


   Figure 1: I2NSF Framework for Cross-Domain IPsec Flow Protection

   Figure 1 show the conceptual architecture of I2NSF framework for
   Cross-Domain IPsec flow protection.  As shown in Figure 1, the two
   I2NSF security controllers located in different I2NSF domains, i.e.,
   I2NSF Domains A and B.  In one domain, the security controller only
   can manage NSFs registered by the Developer's Management System
   (DMS).  Therefore, the security controller is not aware of the
   existence of NSFs in other domains.  To enable communication between
   NSFs located in different I2NSF domains, each with its own security
   controller, a security controller can be used as an intermediary.
   The two security controllers in different domains MUST have a secure
   and trusted connection; the setup of this connection is out of the



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   scope of this document.  Through this secure connection, the security
   controllers can exchange the IPsec parameters using SFI and configure
   the NSFs located in different I2NSF domains so that they can
   establish IPsec SAs to protect data traffic between them.

4.  Information Model for Security Controller-Facing Interface

   In [RFC9061], the I2NSF security controller enables the key
   management for flow protection between NSFs in the I2NSF domain that
   it manages.  Therefore, this section introduces the information model
   for exchanging information in different domains using Security
   Controller-Facing Interface (called SFI) between I2NSF Security
   Controllers to provide flow protection between NSFs existing in
   different I2NSF domains.


                              +-----------------+
                              |    Security     |
                              |Controller-Facing|
                              |    Interface    |
                              +--------+--------+
                                       ^
                                       |
                                       |
                              +--------+--------+
                              |                 |
                      +------+------+    +-----+------+
                      |  Low-level  |    |            |
                      |  Security   |    |    IPsec   |
                      |   Policy    |    | Parameters |
                      +-------------+    +------------+



         Figure 2: Diagram for Security Controller-Facing Interface

   Figure 2 shows the high-level concept of SFI to deliver cross-domain
   flow protection for IPsec.  Information that can be delivered through
   SFI is as follows:












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   *  Low-level Security Policy : A low-level security policy to
      configure NSFs located in a cross-domain environment.  The low-
      level security policy means the translated security policy that
      the security administrator wants to configure, such as blocking
      the SNS website, and flow protection between NSFs A and B.  The
      security controller can deliver the low-level security policy to
      the security controllers other I2NSF domains through SFI.  After
      receiving the security policy, the security controller can deliver
      the security policy to the target NSFs via the NSF-Facing
      Interface [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm].

   *  IPsec Parameters: Parameters required to establish IPsec Security
      Associations (SAs) [RFC9061].  To establish IPsec SAs with NSFs
      located in a different domain, the security controller MUST be
      able to securely exchange the necessary parameters for those SAs.

5.  Use Cases for the Security Controller-Facing Interface in Cross-
    Domain Environments

5.1.  Peer-to-Peer Use Case for the Security Controller-Facing Interface
      in Cross-Domain Environments






























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                 1.Security Policy
                         |
+------+          +------V-----+           +------------+        +------+
| NSF1 |          |  Security  |           |  Security  |        | NSF2 |
|      |          |Controller A|           |Controller B|        |      |
+--+---+          +------+-----+           +------+-----+        +-----++
   |                     | 2.Deliver translated   |                     |
   |                     |   Security Policy      |                     |
   |                     |----------------------->|                     |
   |                     |     3. Reply OK        |                     |
   |                     |<-----------------------|4. Deliver Translated|
   |                     |                        |    Security Policy  |
   |5.Deliver translated |                        |-------------------->|
   |   Security Policy   |                        |                     |
   |<--------------------|                        |     6. Reply OK     |
   |     7. Reply OK     |                        |<--------------------|
   |-------------------->|                        |                     |
   |                    8.IPsec Parameter Negotiation                   |
   |<--------------------|<---------------------->|-------------------->|
   |                     |                        |                     |
   |                     |                        |                     |
   |              9.Service Function Chaining with IPsec SAs            |
   |<==================================================================>|



     Figure 3: Use Case of the Peer-to-Peer Security Controllers

   Figure 3 shows the peer-to-peer security controller use case's
   message sequence between entities in multiple domains.  In this use
   case, an I2NSF A's administrator requests a security service that
   cannot address by only the NSFs located in their own I2NSF domain.
   The security controller A can request to cooperate with a trusted
   peer security controller B in a different I2NSF domain for the
   required security service.  In this scenario, it is assumed that the
   secure connection between the two security controllers is already set
   up.  The detailed sequence is as follows:

   1.   I2NSF A's administrator requests a security service that cannot
        be addressed by only the NSFs located in their own I2NSF domain.

   2.   Security Controller A delivers the security policy for NSF2
        through SFI to Security Controller B in a cross-domain
        environment.

   3.   If Security Controller B can handle the received security
        policy, reply OK message to Security Controller A.




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   4.   Security Controller B delivers the security policy to NSF2 for
        checking that NSF2 can be configured by the sent policy.

   5.   Security Controller A deliver the translated security policy for
        NSF1.

   6.   If NSF2 can handle the received security policy, it replies OK
        message to Security Controller B.

   7.   If NSF1 can handle the received security policy, it replies OK
        message to Security Controller A.

   8.   NSF1 and NSF2 negotiate IPsec parameters through Security
        Controller A and Security Controller B.

   9.   NSF1 and NSF2 establish IPsec SAs using the received IPsec
        parameters and provide the requested security service to the
        user through SFC.

5.2.  Hierarchical Use Cases for the Security Controller-Facing
      Interface in Cross-Domain Environments






























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          1.Security Policy
                  |
+------+    +-----V------+   +------------+   +------------+    +------+
|      |    |  Secondary |   |   Primary  |   |  Secondary |    |      |
| NSF1 |    |  Security  |   |  Security  |   |  Security  |    | NSF2 |
|      |    |Controller A|   | Controller |   |Controller B|    |      |
++-----+    +-----+------+   +-----+------+   +-----+------+    +-----++
 |                |  2.Deliver     |                |                 |
 |                |  translated    |                |                 |
 |                | Security Policy|                |                 |
 |                |--------------->|                |                 |
 |                |                |  4.Deliver     |                 |
 |                | 3. Reply OK    |   translated   |                 |
 |  5.Deliver     |<---------------|Security Policy |                 |
 |  translated    |                |--------------->|   6.Deliver     |
 | Security Policy|                |                |   translated    |
 |<---------------|                |                |Security Policy  |
 |                |                |                |---------------->|
 |  8. Reply OK   |                |                |   7. Reply OK   |
 |--------------->|                |                |<----------------|
 |                |                |   9. Reply OK  |                 |
 |                |  10. Reply OK >|<---------------|                 |
 |                |--------------->|                |                 |
 |                |  11.IPsec Parameter Negotiation |                 |
 |<---------------|<------------------------------->|---------------->|
 |                |                |                |                 |
 |                |                |                |                 |
 |<==================================================================>|
               12.Service Function Chaining with IPsec SAs


     Figure 4: Use Case of the Hierarchical Distribution Security
                             Controllers

   Figure 4 shows a message sequence between entities in multiple
   domains with a primary Security Controller.  The primary Security
   Controller can act as a centralized controller.  The primary Security
   Controller between secondary Security Controllers has a secure
   connection in advance.  How to establish this secure connection is
   out of the scope of this document.  Using this secure connection, the
   primary Security Controller collects all of the secondary Security
   Controller's information via SFI.  In this usecase, when the
   administrator of an I2NSF A requests a security service that is not
   available in its own I2NSF domain, then the secondary Security
   Controller A, with the help of the primary Security Controller, can
   collaborate with a trusted peer Security Controller B from a
   different I2NSF domain to obtain the required security service.  The
   detailed sequence is as follows:



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   1.   I2NSF A's administrator requests a security service that cannot
        be addressed only by the NSFs located in its own I2NSF domain.

   2.   The secondary Security Controller A delivers the translated
        security policy through SFI to the primary Security Controller.

   3.   If the primary Security Controller knows which secondary
        Security Controller can handle the delivered security policy,
        the primary Security Controller sends an OK message to Security
        Controller A.

   4.   The primary Security Controller delivers the received security
        policy to the secondary Security Controller that can provide the
        requested security services, i.e., the secondary Security
        Controller B.

   5.   The secondary Security Controller A delivers the translated
        security policy to NSF1 via NFI.

   6.   The secondary Security Controller B delivers the received
        security policy to NSF2 via NFI.

   7.   If NSF2 can handle the received security policy, it replies OK
        message to the secondary Security Controller B.

   8.   If NSF1 can handle the received security policy, it replies OK
        message to the secondary Security Controller A.

   9.   The secondary Security Controller B delivers NSF2's reply OK
        message to the primary Security Controller.

   10.  The secondary Security Controller A delivers NSF1's reply OK
        message to the primary Security Controller.

   11.  Security Controller A and Security Controller B negotiate IPsec
        parameters through the primary Security Controller.

   12.  NSF1 and NSF2 establish IPsec SAs using the received IPsec
        parameters and provide the requested security service to the
        user through SFC.

6.  YANG Data Model for Security Controller-Facing Interface

   TBD







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7.  IANA Considerations

   This document does not require any IANA actions.

8.  Security Considerations

   The same security considerations for the I2NSF framework [RFC8329]
   are applicable to this document.

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7665]  Halpern, J., Ed. and C. Pignataro, Ed., "Service Function
              Chaining (SFC) Architecture", RFC 7665,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7665, October 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7665>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8329]  Lopez, D., Lopez, E., Dunbar, L., Strassner, J., and R.
              Kumar, "Framework for Interface to Network Security
              Functions", RFC 8329, DOI 10.17487/RFC8329, February 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8329>.

   [RFC9061]  Marin-Lopez, R., Lopez-Millan, G., and F. Pereniguez-
              Garcia, "A YANG Data Model for IPsec Flow Protection Based
              on Software-Defined Networking (SDN)", RFC 9061,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9061, July 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9061>.

9.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm]
              Kim, J. T., Jeong, J. P., Jung-Soo, J., Hares, S., and Q.
              Lin, "I2NSF Network Security Function-Facing Interface
              YANG Data Model", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-i2nsf-nsf-facing-interface-dm-29, 1 June 2022,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-i2nsf-
              nsf-facing-interface-dm-29>.




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   [I-D.ietf-idr-sdwan-edge-discovery]
              Dunbar, L., Hares, S., Raszuk, R., Majumdar, K., and G. S.
              Mishra, "BGP UPDATE for SDWAN Edge Discovery", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-idr-sdwan-edge-
              discovery-07, 13 March 2023,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-idr-
              sdwan-edge-discovery-07>.

   [I-D.ietf-bess-bgp-sdwan-usage]
              Dunbar, L., Guichard, J., Sajassi, A., Drake, J., Najem,
              B., and D. Carrel, "BGP Usage for SDWAN Overlay Networks",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-bess-bgp-
              sdwan-usage-08, 26 March 2023,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-bess-
              bgp-sdwan-usage-08>.

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

   This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea
   (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government, Ministry of Science and
   ICT (MSIT) (No. 2023R1A2C2002990).

   This work was supported in part by Institute of Information &
   Communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded
   by the Korea Ministry of Science and ICT (MSIT)(No. 2022-0-01015,
   Development of Candidate Element Technology for Intelligent 6G Mobile
   Core Network).

Appendix B.  Contributors

   The following are coauthors of this document:

   Jung-Soo Park
   Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute
   218 Gajeong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
   Daejeon
   34129
   Republic of Korea
   Email: pjs@etri.re.kr


   Yunchul Choi
   Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute
   218 Gajeong-Ro, Yuseong-Gu
   Daejeon
   34129
   Republic of Korea
   Email: cyc79@etri.re.kr



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   Gabriel Lopez-Millan
   University of Murcia
   Faculty of Computer Science
   Campus de Espinardo S/N
   30100  Murcia
   Spain
   Email: gabilm@um.es


   Fernando Pereniguez-Garcia
   University Defense Center
   Spanish Air Force Academy
   San Javier Murcia
   30720  Murcia
   Spain
   Email: fernando.pereniguez@cud.upct.es


Appendix C.  Changes from draft-kim-i2nsf-security-controller-interface-
             dm-00

   The following changes are made from draft-kim-i2nsf-security-
   controller-interface-dm-00:

   *  This version has been revised with Rafa Marin-Lopez's comments.

Authors' Addresses

   Jeonghyeon Joshua Kim
   Department of Computer Science and Engineering
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon
   Gyeonggi-Do
   16419
   Republic of Korea
   Phone: +82 31 299 4957
   Email: jeonghyeon12@skku.edu


   Jaehoon Paul Jeong (editor)
   Department of Computer Science and Engineering
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon
   Gyeonggi-Do
   16419
   Republic of Korea



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   Phone: +82 31 299 4957
   Email: pauljeong@skku.edu
   URI:   http://iotlab.skku.edu/people-jaehoon-jeong.php


   Patrick Lingga
   Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
   Sungkyunkwan University
   2066 Seobu-Ro, Jangan-Gu
   Suwon
   Gyeonggi-Do
   16419
   Republic of Korea
   Phone: +82 31 299 4957
   Email: patricklink@skku.edu


   Susan Hares
   Huawei
   7453 Hickory Hill
   Saline, MI 48176
   United States of America
   Phone: +1-734-604-0332
   Email: shares@ndzh.com


   Rafa Marin-Lopez
   University of Murcia
   Faculty of Computer Science
   Campus de Espinardo S/N
   30100  Murcia
   Spain
   Phone: +34 868 88 85 01
   Email: rafa@um.es

















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