Internet DRAFT - draft-klensin-iaoc-member
draft-klensin-iaoc-member
Network Working Group J. Klensin
Internet-Draft February 11, 2016
Updates: 4071 (if approved)
Intended status: Best Current Practice
Expires: August 14, 2016
Revised IAOC Membership
draft-klensin-iaoc-member-01.txt
Abstract
The original specification of the membership of the IAOC included the
IETF and IAB Chairs as voting members. While probably desirable
initially, this has turned out to have unfortunate side effects.
This document discusses those side effects and replaces those
specific individuals with liaisons from the IAB and IESG.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 14, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The IAB and IETF Chairs and the IAOC . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Reasons for IAB and IETF Chair Membership in the IAOC and
IETF Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. BCP 101 Modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Other Obvious Questions About Choices . . . . . . . 7
A.1. How About the ISOC President/CEO? . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
A.2. The Trust-IAOC Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.3. Changing the appointment mechanism for IAOC members
selected from the community by the IAB and IAOC . . . . . 8
Appendix B. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
B.1. History and Changes from version -00 to -01 . . . . . . . 8
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
The original specification of the membership of the IAOC in BCP 101
[1] included the IETF and IAB Chairs as voting members. While
probably desirable initially, this has turned out to have unfortunate
side effects. This document discusses those side effects and
replaces those specific individuals with liaisons from the IAB and
IESG.
Note in Draft: This working draft contains a considerable amount of
explanatory material about the various choices, both to make the
intent more clear and to facilitate community discussion of those and
other options. If the draft is approved in principle, those
materials should probably either be moved to appendices or deleted
entirely. Also, in response to several comments made on the IETF
list, it is worth noting that this document is about IASA and the
IAOC (and, peripherally, the IETF Trust) and only incidentally about
how the IAB and IESG organize themselves and determine their
representation on other bodies.
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2. History
[[CREF1: RFC Editor: please remove this section if the document
reaches you. ]]
The original version of this document was posted in July 2009 and got
absolutely no traction, indeed one or two key members of the IESG
made it clear informally that they had no interest in it and that
there was no point even trying to discuss it. In February 2016, a
draft [3] was posted by some IAB members that seems to have
[re]started the discussion. After repeated requests that a draft be
posted, this one has been updated to reflect changed context and list
discussion. It is posted as a contribution to the discussion.
The concept of "liaisons" is from the original version of this draft
and is a third alternative to recent suggestions of "observers" or
ex-officio IAB and IESG members who are not necessarily the chair.
While the author prefers a liaison model for reasons discussed below,
the distinction may be minor and there would be little objection to
one or the other substitution if the community favored it.
As noted above, the author has produced this draft in the hope that
it will provide a useful starting point and alternative for the
community. If it is useful enough in that role to justify revision,
a co-author, or an effort to merge parts of it with the Hardie et al
draft [3], would be welcomed.
3. The IAB and IETF Chairs and the IAOC
While BCP 101 specified that the IAB and IETF Chairs should serve on
the IAOC (and now as Trustees of the Internet Trust [2]), there does
not appear to be a strong motivation for having those particular
Chair roles expanded to include the considerable additional workload
that comes with the IAOC and Trustee roles. There were some good
reasons associated with transition at the time the IASA (and IAOC)
were established, but the transition to the IASA (and Trust)
arrangements are now in the distant past and at least the original
set of reasons no longer apply. It is clearly important that the
IAOC and Trustees have direct and ongoing input from the IAB and
IESG, but that responsibility need not be performed by the two
Chairs. There are disadvantages associated with having the Chairs in
the Trustee and IAOC roles, which include:
Workload and full-time positions
To a considerable extent, each additional task we permanently
assign to the IAB or IETF Chair positions narrows the number of
people who will have the bandwidth and support needed to take on
those roles. It also assumes a wider range of skills. Those
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requirements make the positions harder to fill, reduce the number
of volunteers, and increase the risk that the IAB or Nomcom,
respectively, will be placed into the position of selecting
someone "least bad" among a small range of candidates. Absent
really compelling arguments to the contrary (see Section 4), it
also puts us in a position in which the two Chairs are personally
essential rather than leaders who are responsible to consensus
within their bodies and the community. As others have pointed
out, that is inconsistent with our claimed "no kings" model.
A different way to look at almost the same issue is that
circumstances change. The IAB should be able to determine its
priorities, and how the time of the Chair should be allocated, and
to do so dynamically rather than assuming that the IAOC is always
a high and inescapable priority.
Skill set
Section 4 of BCP 101 [1] provides guidance about the IAB and IESG
(non-ex-officio) appointments to the IAOC and indicates
"people with some knowledge of contracts and financial
procedures, who are familiar with the administrative support
needs of the IAB, the IESG, or the IETF standards process."
The "Principles" described in Section 2.2 of RFC 4071 make it
entirely clear that the IAOC (and the IASA structure in general)
are intended to provide for and support the administrative needs
of the IETF and related organizations (including the IAB and, now,
the IETF Trust). At least according to that document and the
other documents that make up BCP 101, the IAOC is not a policy
body. The strongest arguments that have been advanced for
requiring in-person participation by the IAB and IETF Chairs all
appear to be related to IAOC policy-making of to the IETF Trust
(see below and Appendix A.2. If the community does not intend
such policy-making to occur in the IAOC, it may be better to have
the IAOC membership selected for a higher degree of skill and
interest in its actual role.
Similar issues apply to the IETF Trust role (unless the IAOC and
Trustee roles are ultimately separated): doing the job well
requires an ability and willingness to understand the realities of
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) law and regulations and to work
effectively with lawyers and other advisers who are IPR
specialists.
The appeals chain
RFC 4071 also defines an appeals model for IAOC actions that takes
appeals to the IAB. Specifically for that IAB role, it would
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probably be better to not require that the IAB Chair be personally
involved in the IAOC as a voting member.
In addition, it is useful to clarify the role of the IAB and IESG
representatives by making them non-voting liaisons. This reduces the
requirement that IAB and/or IESG members be selected for the specific
types of expertise needed on the IAOC and Trustees. If they cannot
explain IESG and IAB requirements and perspectives to the voting IAOC
and Trustee members and persuade them as needed or cannot explain
IAOC and Truetee matters to the IAB (or IESG) as needed, we have far
more serious problems than whether or not those two people vote. It
may be worth noting that reporting on and explaining portions between
the two bodies is exactly consistent with our expectations for IAB/
IETF liaisons to completely external bodies.
4. Reasons for IAB and IETF Chair Membership in the IAOC and IETF Trust
As discussed above, when the community approved BCP 101, it was
approving a fundamentally administrative activity. That was
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to replace earlier
arrangements if which administrative activities for the IETF were run
entirely by an external body. However, it was equally important to
be sure that those detailed administrative functions did not fall on
the IESG or IAB in order that those bodies could continue to do their
primary jobs. At the beginning, there were strong arguments for
including the IAB and IETF Chairs in the IAOC in order to facilitate
the transition and because they had been, de facto, the primary
liaisons and contact points for the earlier arrangements. RFC 4071
is now well into its tenth year, we have a stable environment that is
working at least moderately well (modulo some issues about
responsiveness to the community and conformance with the transparency
requirements of the RFC with which the presence of the two Chairs as
voting members does not appear to be helping), and those transitional
requirements no longer apply.
The issues with the IETF Trust [2] are a bit different. It is much
more a policy body than the IAOC. The reasons for making the IAOC
members the Trustees of the IETF Trust were, again, dictated by some
transition concerns in which the appearance of the Chairs of the IAB
and IETF being directly involved was important. But, again, the IETF
Trust has entered its second decade, is stable, and appears to be
working relatively well. If Trust considerations argue against
making the changes outlined in this document, that may be a stronger
reason for the community to review the composition of the Trustees
than to preserve the status quo in the IAOC. (See further discussion
on this topic in Appendix A.2.
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Nothing in this document should be construed as prohibiting either
the IETF or IAB Chairs from serving in the liaison roles. The IAB
Chair, who is chosen for that role by an IAB selected largely or
entirely for skills not related to the IAOC or the IETF Trust (and
who serves at the pleasure of that body), will often not be the
optimal liaison. By contrast, the IETF Chair, who is selected by the
Nomcom for skills that will often be more relevant, may more often be
the best choice for liaison. However, it seems more reasonable to
leave those decisions to the IAB and IESG and the individuals
involved rather than building them rigidly into a BCP, if only to
better allow for changing circumstances.
5. BCP 101 Modifications
BCP 101 is hereby modified by changing "eight" to "six" in the first
sentence of Section 4 of RFC 4071, deleting the bullet items from
that section that read "The IETF Chair (ex officio);" and "The IAB
Chair (ex officio);", and adding, after the bullet list, "The IAB and
IESG shall appoint liaisons from their own membership to the IAOC.
Those liaisons shall function as full members but without vote.
6. Acknowledgments
The original (2009) version of this draft emerged from a number of
community discussions and discussions about variations in the match
between the skills and interests of various IAB and IETF Chairs over
the years, noting that the skills and interest needed to effectively
serve on the IAOC had rarely been identified as primary, or even
high, on the list of IAB or Nomcom criteria for people selected to
those leadership posts.
The current, 2016, version was stimulated by a draft being circulated
for IAB comment [3] and IETF list discussion of it. One of the
authors of that draft challenged those in the community who had
different views or proposals to produce a draft that specified a
practical alternative. This draft is a response to that request; the
author thanks the IAB member authors of the other draft and many
contributors to the on-list conversation for the new ideas and
rationale that appear here, while understanding that some of them may
not agree with the way in which this draft utilizes their views and
insights. Comments from Brian Carpenter, Dave Crocker, Ted Hardie,
Mike St. Johns, and Andrew Sullivan were particularly helpful in that
regard.
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7. IANA Considerations
[[CREF2: RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication.]]
This memo includes no requests to or actions for IANA.
8. Security Considerations
This document makes an adjustment to an IETF and IASA procedural
document. It has no Internet security implications beyond those
described in the relevant base documents.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[1] Austein, R., Ed. and B. Wijnen, Ed., "Structure of the
IETF Administrative Support Activity (IASA)", BCP 101,
RFC 4071, DOI 10.17487/RFC4071, April 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4071>.
[2] Carpenter, B., Ed. and L. Lynch, Ed., "BCP 101 Update for
IPR Trust", BCP 101, RFC 4371, DOI 10.17487/RFC4371,
January 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4371>.
9.2. Informative References
[3] Hardie, T., Sullivan, A., and R. Housley, "Updating the
ex-officio member of the IAB in the IAOC", February 2016,
<draft-hardie-iaoc-iab-update-00>.
Appendix A. Other Obvious Questions About Choices
A.1. How About the ISOC President/CEO?
As specified in RFC 4071, there are three ex-officio voting positions
on the IAOC. This document eliminates two of those positions,
replacing them with non-voting liaisons appointed by the relevant
body. The preference remains to have the IETF Chair actually serve
on the IAOC unless there are reasons to not do so while the
preference about the IAB Chair is much less strong (and the reasons
less compelling). That leads to an obvious question as to why the
requirement that the ISOC President and CEO serve directly, ex-
officio, on the IAOC (and the IETF Trust, see below) should be
retained. The reason is that RFC 4071 makes it quite clear that IASA
is an ISOC function, carried out for the IETF community, that the IAD
is an ISOC employee, that ISOC is expected to be the actual signatory
to relevant contracts, and so on. That combination of factors gives
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ISOC line responsibility (as well as ultimate budgetary
responsibility) and having the ISOC President and CEO serve directly
on the IAOC is important to those relationships and accountability
for them.
A.2. The Trust-IAOC Relationship
When the IETF Trust was established, it was critically important, as
an initialization and transition matter, that the Trustees and the
IAOC have the same membership. At this point, a decade on, the
importance of having the IAOC serve the administrative oversight
function (for which it was named) remains clear. The IETF Trust and
its Trustees have, by contrast, assumed more of a policy function.
At this point, the reasons for keeping the two memberships the same
(including an early, now-expired, constraint about not being able to
make changes without external approval) have largely disappeared.
This document does not specify separating the two, but such an action
would be compatible with it, noting that there is almost certainly a
much stronger argument for keeping the IETF and IAB Chairs as
Trustees than there is for keeping them as IAOC members.
A.3. Changing the appointment mechanism for IAOC members selected from
the community by the IAB and IAOC
Several suggestions have been made lately for shifting the IAB and
IESG appointment responsibilities for community members to serve as
voting IAOC members to the Nomcom, allowing the Nomcom to appoint all
such members other than the one appointed by ISOC. This document
does not address that possibility, but it would be compatible with
what is proposed here. As with the role of the IAB and IETF Chairs
(see above), there is probably a stronger case to me made for the IAB
and IESG appointing Trustees than for their appointing IAOC members.
Appendix B. Change Log
[[CREF3: RFC Editor: Please remove this section before publication.]]
B.1. History and Changes from version -00 to -01
As discussed above, version -01 of this document is a 2016 rewrite of
the 2009 version -00. There are few if any changes to the
substantive proposal but a good deal of discussion has been added to
reflect more recent considerations.
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Author's Address
John C Klensin
1770 Massachusetts Ave, Ste 322
Cambridge, MA 02140
USA
Phone: +1 617 245 1457
Email: john+ietf@jck.com
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