Internet DRAFT - draft-lazanski-consolidation
draft-lazanski-consolidation
Independent Submission D. Lazanski
Internet Draft Last Press Label
M. McFadden
Internet policy advisors, ltd
Intended status: Informational Oct 24, 2022
Expires: April 24, 2023
Protocol and Engineering Effects of Consolidation
draft-lazanski-consolidation-05.txt
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Abstract
This document contributes to the continuing discussion on Internet
consolidation. Over the last several years there have been many
types of discussions around consolidation at a technical level, a
economic or market level and also at an engineering level. This
document aims to discuss recent areas of Internet consolidation and
provide some suggestions for advancing the discussion.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction...................................................3
2. Background to Consolidation Issues and the Role of Standards...3
2.1. Process...................................................4
3. Overarching Issues Related to Consolidation....................5
3.1. Economic..................................................5
3.2. Security..................................................6
4. <Implications of Consolidation on Internet Architecture........7
4.1. Changing Internet architecture............................7
4.2. End to end principle redux................................8
5. Implications of Consolidation on Protocol Design..............10
5.1. Does Protocol Design Really Affect Consolidation.........10
5.2. Case Studies in Consolidation and Protocol Design........10
5.2.1. DNS over HTTPS (DOH)................................10
5.2.2. Encrypted Server Name Indication (eSNI).............11
5.2.3. Privacy Pass........................................12
6. Potential Technical Risks.....................................12
7. Security Considerations.......................................13
8. IANA Considerations...........................................13
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9. Conclusions...................................................13
10. References...................................................13
10.1. Normative References....................................13
11. Acknowledgments..............................................15
1. Introduction
The Internet itself is a decentralised network of networks.
Resilience, security and best effort delivery of data and
information on all layers of the Internet works best in a
decentralised manner. But over the last several years there have
been discussions on how the Internet is becoming "centralised" and
"consolidated".
Internet consolidation is "the process of increasing control over
internet infrastructure and services by a small set of
organizations." [2] Let us consider two general categories of
concentration: "player" and "layer". By player concentration, we
mean the aggregating of a market to a small number of providers for
a particular service. Layer concentration means the combining of
functions within a given layer. An example of "player" concentration
would be a relatively small number of email service providers who
offer billions of users email service. Or the number of web search
providers or even web browser offerings. [3]
As defined in draft-nottingham-avoiding-Internet-centralization-05
"centralization" as the ability of a single entity or a small group
of them to exclusively observe, capture, control, or extract rent
from the operation or use of an Internet function. Furthermore,
"centralisation" as noted in the Internet of three Protocols is that
one or two or three single protocols are being used for everything
rather than one protocol for one operation as is a guiding principle
of protocol design until now.
The Internet is being centralised and, thus, consolidated on all
layers of the Internet and it is essential to recognise the
technical, political and economic reasons for this happening. The
rest of this draft will focus on different aspects of the issue of
consolidation.
2. Background to Consolidation Issues and the Role of Standards
The Internet is being consolidated at all layers, from the
application layer to the network layer. Today's traffic over the
Internet is primarily derived from search and content companies. The
current set of Internet protocol standards, often originating from
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work at one of these companies, has facilitated the push to a more
consolidated Internet.
In years past, standards have been viewed as a means to prevent
barriers to entry. During the 1980s, AT&T was required to abide by
standards as part of the consent decree that resolved antitrust
litigation, leading to the ability of anyone to connect a telephone
to its network. By 1994 standards were recognized as a means to
prevent technical barriers to trade (TBT) during the Uruguay Round
of the World Trade Organization.
Since 2019 a number of organisations and individuals published on
the subject of consolidation. Most notably the Internet Society
focused on consolidation as a key topic for their 2019 Global
Internet Report [4] Additionally, the Journal of Cyber Policy
published a special edition on Consolidation. Topics in this special
issue included market concentration and security, DNS consolidation,
supply chains, interoperability and Internet architecture. [5]
Discussion of consolidation primarily focuses on Internet services
and data. However, there is more to consolidation than just
applications and services. The application layer is directly user
facing and, as a result, is what users experience. But the
underlying infrastructure and protocols are also going through
consolidation as they develop. The transport layer protocol
development is focused on the end-to-end encryption model which,
when implemented, forces data to the end points. Thus, the data is
managed at the endpoints only and not managed throughout its entire
transit. This results in a limited number of available options for
the use of the data.
The QUIC protocol is an example of the consolidation between layers
of the Internet. Designed and deployed as a transport layer
protocol, it effectively replaces TCP at the network layer while
also adding improved security. The result is the merging or
consolidation of layers. QUIC should improve efficiency and delivery
of applications, but also forces all data to be managed at the
endpoint, which in this case is a browser or application, making it
more difficult or impossible to manage traffic at the network layer.
2.1. Process
Another key point to make is that the process of standards
development impacts the outcome and adoption of the standard. This
is key for consolidation. Though Internet protocol development
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should be multistakeholder, standards development is subject to
vested interests, personal approaches and commercial realities. [6]
Developing protocols, and standards more generally, takes time, much
discussion and a bottom-up approach. However, commercial
organisations have different goals in the process of trying to
standardize protocols. Larger organisations have more resources
dedicated to protocol and standards development. Larger
organisations with staff specifically dedicated to standards tend to
have the ability to push for their proposals and their protocols.
There is no coincidence that these companies are the ones that have
facilitated consolidation on a commercial level and are facilitating
consolidation on a protocol level.
3. Overarching Issues Related to Consolidation
In A Taxonomy of Internet Consolidation, a new draft by Mark
McFadden, a set of typologies for Internet consolidation is clearly
and concisely outlined. Four main areas, namely economic, traffic
and infrastructure, architectural and service and application
consolidation create a taxonomy that can be used to articulate the
different issues and challenge of consolidation.
Consolidation has led to the use of a few, large online platforms
which is facilitated by choice and market consolidation. But
consolidation also has led to the development of a protocols manage
traffic flow and capture data. The over-reliance on one or two
entities for delivery of that use a small handful of protocols has
led to technical dependencies on these protocols.
"Did the IETF create a better internet when it approved DoH? There's
a lot of disagreement about that, but what has upset many is that
DoH was a surprise - the IETF standardised it without consulting
some who it was likely to affect," it says in RFC 8890 [7] However,
there was little multistakeholder consultation and discussion prior
to the adoption of DoH. This was more of a rapid development and
deployment process, without the market driving the use cases and
uptake. By forcing the concentration of the data at the endpoint,
the data is consolidated into the service provider at that endpoint.
3.1. Economic
According to the Internet Society's 2019 report, consolidation is
broadly defined as, "economic activities that either support the
Internet or are fundamentally dependent on the Internet's
existence."[8]
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One focus of consolidation is around the concentration of power -
consumer, technical and financial - into a handful of large Internet
companies. The first point of engagement with any of these
companies, including Facebook and Google, is through consumer
applications. The ability to easily understand consolidation at an
application layer, because of the widespread and common use of
Facebook and Google, has caused the focus of consolidation and anti-
competitive issues from policy makers and politicians to be at the
application layer.
However, consolidation also has upsides. Consolidation allows for
economies of scale, investment in infrastructure and the ability for
small and medium enterprises to buy and use services, like cloud
storage, content distribution networks and security technology,
without having to build them from the ground up every time. However,
the lack of market diversity means a lack of competition which, in
turn means a lack of innovation and a lack of consumer choice.
New entrants and competition in a market creates options for
consumers that potentially pulls them away from popular websites and
applications. When a market is not competitive or viable, regulation
and anti-trust measures can intervene to remedy a consolidated
market which is tending towards or has achieved monopoly status.
Legal and regulatory intervention, however, tends to create its own
set of issues as seen through several decades of EU intervention in
big tech starting with Microsoft in 2004. Unintended consequences
with regulatory or legal intervention may skew the market even
further.
3.2. Security
Consolidation of protocol development has facilitated the secure,
end to end encryption of information going over networks in recent
years. New technologies such as DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH), Oblivious DNS
over HTTPs (ODOH)and DNS-over-TLS (DoT) standardised through the
IETF allow for confidential look up of DNS queries. However, it has
required updates onto many DNS servers and operating systems. The
implementation of these protocols enable circumvention of DNS
filtering which ISPs offer for protection from malicious websites
and software on the network.
This is a form of market consolidation based on development choices
by several large companies. These development choices are often
technically opaque without transparency of what happens when updates
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take place, resulting in more difficulty when trying to troubleshoot
security issues.
The development of these protocols, while providing increased
privacy and addressing issues concerning government surveillance,
have forced other unintended consequences which is promoting
consolidation.
Consequences of the security of the global Internet are evident. On
June 8, 2021, a global outage of Fastly, a content delivery network
(CDN), was caused by a software update which included an
undiscovered bug. [10] While this was resolved within a working day,
one of the main causes of the outage was a consequence of the
limited number of CDNs running services in the cloud. Other CDNs,
which resolved traffic via Fastly for redundancy, were also taken
down as a result of the Fastly outage. This dependency is caused by
consolidation and a concentration of infrastructure. A highly
consolidated CDN network facilitates a less secure environment
because of the weakening of resilience [11]
On 22 June 2022 Cloudflare suffered an outage that lasted just over
an hour and impacted 19 data centers. Though the outage was due to a
misconfiguration that was quickly resolved, the impact of the outage
renewed calls for a critical look at decentralising the Internet. A
handful of cloud and infrastructure providers are responsible for
global connections. This outage was a reminder of the need to think
about resilience and security in global Internet connectivity. [12]
4. Implications of Consolidation on Internet Architecture
4.1. Changing Internet architecture
The phenomenon of consolidation may be in the eyes of the beholder.
A government may see market failure or a need for regulation. [13] A
civil society advocate may see it from the point of view of privacy
or free speech. For the purposes of this draft we view it from the
perspective of the underlying architecture of the public Internet
Consolidation in the Internet's architecture is not a new
development. The approach of providing intermediaries to deliver
service or content rather than the more traditional end-to-end
approach has been in place for more than a decade. However, it is
possible to argue that the architecture of the Internet has changed
dramatically in the last decade.
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The architecture of the Internet is always changing. New services,
applications and content mean that the market creates new ways to
deliver them. Consolidation clearly has economic, social and policy
issues, but it is important to understand how consolidation affects
the underlying architecture of the Internet. The impact of
intermediaries on architecture is often not obvious
The use of intermediaries in the Internet's architecture may include
the use of third parties to provide services, applications or
content. In the early days of the Web, this was evident when
rendering a web page that included content from multiple sources. In
today's Internet the intermediaries are not so obvious.
Authentication servers, content distribution networks, certificate
authorities, malicious content protection and DNS resolution
services are all examples of tools provided to the Internet by
intermediaries - often without the knowledge or approval of both
endpoints.
Having intermediaries embedded in the architecture is a different
effect from having them embedded in the service infrastructure. The
domination by a few companies of the content and application layer
is largely an economic effect of scale. On the other hand, there is
a prevalent belief that the Internet puts intelligence at the edge.
While that may have been true in the past, it is hard to argue that
this is a feature of the contemporary Internet.
There is a suggestion that the network simply provides for the
transport of data. There are almost no network connections like that
in today's Internet. A consumer's view of the Internet is limited
by unseen intermediaries of many types. A consumer on the Internet
seldom makes choices about those intermediaries: they are simply
part of the fabric that makes up the Internet.
Almost all important parts of the architecture have been affected by
consolidation: DNS resolution, access service, transit provision,
content distribution and authorization. Consolidation in these areas
has a direct effect on engineering and protocol design.
4.2. End to end principle redux
The end-to-end principle is the idea that reliability and
trustworthiness reside at the end nodes of networks rather than in
the network itself. In other words, the idea was that the network
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itself was dumb and intelligence was at the edge or end. However,
Internet architecture is evolving in such a way that this principle
is changing.
Networks and the devices on the networks act as access
consolidators. While, in the past, the network was a simple
transporter of bits, today's networks see intermediaries
consolidating both access and the delivery of information (e.g.
streaming media). For example, 5G will allow for different services,
systems and use cases at a very specific level. Network slicing in
5G will concentrate services like video on demand into concentrated
- and consolidation - areas on a network. [14] In other words, as
specific types of services are relegated to a segregated part of a
network, the availability and access of that service is limited to
accessing a specific network. Depending on the type of device or
maturity of the network infrastructure available at the point of the
attempted access, options for access might be limited. If a network
slice on 5G is where a specific service is located, for example, but
it is only possible to use a 3G mobile network, then the service is
unavailable. Thus, the service is only available on a consolidated
part of the mobile network.
Another change is how the layers of the Internet, as discussed in
the QUIC example, are consolidating. Differentiation among layers is
fading fast with the development of applications which require
network access and control.
Rapidly, the end-to-end principle is becoming the edge-to-edge
principle. The layers of the internet are morphing into several
consolidated layers and it is becoming difficult to differentiate
between the end or edge, and also nearly impossible to ensure the
reliability of the internet because of it. But the important part of
this is the network is not dumb. Data processing, storage and highly
evolved services (including custom data and metadata processing at
the edge) means that the 'dumb' network is no longer dumb.
If the number of organizations that provide those "network services"
that we rely upon is small, our dependence is higher. In extreme
cases of engineering, we put ourselves at risk of engineering a
single point of failure. But also if organisations can't and won't
enter the market, the market is left with very few options and
choices. In other words, if a handful of organisations enable end to
end encryption and those same organisations also offers services at
the edge, then only a handful of organisations provide the entire
value chain. This is consolidation.
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The trend toward highly specific and concentrated processing, as
well as the drive for highly customised applications and services
will drive the Internet away from an end-to-end principle. This will
create not a network of networks, but a mesh. If the mesh is
dependent on a small number of very large providers through
consolidation, we will have engineered a single source of failure
into the Internet.
5. Implications of Consolidation on Protocol Design
5.1. Does Protocol Design Really Affect Consolidation
As noted in "Internet of Three Protocols" draft, "One of the guiding
principles of designing a protocol in the original Internet
community was the protocol is not complete when everything possible
has been added, but rather when everything possible has been
removed." This is so that security, scalability, resilience and
observability can be ensured. However, the recent trend has been
towards having a few protocols, but having those protocols do all
things.
So, in effect, the protocols themselves are becoming consolidated.
The point of protocol design is not to develop all things on one
protocol, but to have a protocol that improves the sustainability of
the Internet.
5.2. Case Studies in Consolidation and Protocol Design
5.2.1. DNS over HTTPS (DOH)
The development of encrypted DNS, specifically DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH),
has been driven by a desire to show full end-to-end encryption of
network connections. The protocol was completed and the DoH working
group wound up in March 2020 despite the absence of both resolver
discovery and selection mechanisms. This may be addressed in the
future.[15] Client software is developing with interim discovery
solutions which almost always favour the large, cloud-based resolver
operators. This is leading to a situation where users are being
presented with a very small number of pre-configured resolver
options irrespective of their location - in some client software as
few as three or four options may be presented. [16] Currently, there
are many thousands of DNS servers operating without DoH.
It is likely that most of the DNS traffic will be consolidated onto
a handful of global operators, if multiple options for discovery
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mechanisms are not developed. The impact that such a loss of
diversity of providers may have on the long-term resilience of DNS
should not be underestimated. [17] Nor should the attractiveness of
these potential network chokepoints to attack be overlooked either
to access consolidated data or launch an attack from. One danger is
that if DNS traffic is concentrated onto a small handful of global
operators and is 'automatically-on' the result would be default
adoption by the vast majority of the Internet's clients. The
suggestion that there were mechanisms for users to opt-out would not
matter in the face of statistics that regularly show that users
almost never change default settings. Currently, the deployment
approach for DoH is opt-in . For CDNs, DoH default-on would disrupt
and render CDN geolocation designed to manage traffic flows more
efficient closer to the desired delivery location. Thus, protocol
design decisions that are enshrined in default settings will become
the norm. In this case, default on, which facilitates consolidation,
will become standard.
By routing the DNS over HTTPS, it becomes much easier to track user
activity through the use of cookies. Therefore a protocol that was
developed to enhance user privacy and security could actually
undermine both: privacy through the use of cookies and security by
consolidating DNS traffic onto far fewer resolver operators that are
far more attractive targets for malicious actors of various types.
5.2.2. Encrypted Server Name Indication (eSNI)
Options to encrypt the Server Name Indication (SNI) have been
explored in the TLS working group but to date it has not been
possible to develop a solution without shortcomings. This flaw in
the encrypted SNI (eSNI) options under evaluation required a rethink
in the approach being taken. The solution now proposed, Encrypted
Client Hello (ECH, previously called ECHO) assumes that private
origins will co-locate with or hide behind a provider (CDN,
application server etc.) which can protect SNIs for all of the
domains that it hosts.[18] Whilst there is logic in this approach,
the consequence is that the would-be standard encourages further
consolidation of data to aid privacy. What it does not appear to
consider is the attractiveness of this larger data pool to an
attacker, compared with more dispersed solutions.
eSNI can be implemented by a "fronting" service which protects a
hidden service behind it. Because the client will not verify the
identity of this fronting service, server spoofing attacks are
possible. Indeed, the fronting service could be pressured by
attackers. The fronting service then becomes a rich source of
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information about client connections and an attractive attack
surface for adversaries.
5.2.3. Privacy Pass
The Privacy Pass protocol provides a set of cross-domain
authorization tokens that protect the client's anonymity in message
exchanges with a server. This allows clients to communicate an
attestation of a previously authenticated server action, without
having to reauthenticate manually. The tokens retain anonymity in
the sense that the act of revealing them cannot be linked back to
the session where they were initially issued.
For Privacy Pass to succeed clients must be able to acquire tokens
that they can later redeem with greater privacy and anonymity. This
document does not discuss the goals of privacy or anonymity.
Instead, it identifies a problem related to the upper bound in
number of servers that affects the Privacy Pass ecosystem.
"Server centralization" is the strict limit or upper bound in the
number of servers available from which a client can acquire a token
for later redemption. The current architecture of privacy pass
strictly limits the number of participants (so-called Attesters or
Issuers). The current architecture suggests a non-protocol approach
to addressing the centralization problem (through a multi-
stakeholder governance model) and also suggests a different approach
where a quorum of parties acted in a way where clients would have
more opportunities to switch between attestation participants.
However, neither of these approaches is required by the Privacy Pass
architecture document and the centralization problem created by the
specification of the protocol is left to implementations to solve.
6. Potential Technical Risks
There are a number of potential risks to the security, stability and
performance of the Internet and many of them are well articulated in
DoH Implementation Risks [19], but some notable ones are:
1. Significant operational shift of the global Internet from a
highly distributed to a centralised system. This would impact both
security and resilience.
2. Decreased stability due to the fact that a centralised system
will have higher fragility, fewer points of failure and greater
impact on the system when it does fail.
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3. Increased security issues caused by the reduction of number of
recursive DNS operators. [20] Lack of distributed and recursive DNS
creates a lack of redundancy for when security attacks hit parts of
the Internet.
4. Loss of security threat visibility due to degraded ability to use
DNS blocklists and overall network management for malware, phishing,
spam, DDoS and etc if DNS management is consolidated into a few
operators.
5. Reduced diversity in the Internet ecosystem. Diversity creates
greater redundancy, resilience and agility to respond to attacks,
outages and network issues.
7. Security Considerations
While this document does not describe a specific protocol, it does
discuss the evolving architecture of the Internet. Changes to the
Internet's architecture have direct and indirect implications for
the Internet's threat model.
Specifically, the changes to the end-to-end model (see section 4.2
above) have inserted new interfaces which must be reflected in
security considerations for new protocols.
8. IANA Considerations
This memo contains no instructions or requests for IANA.
9. Conclusions
This document seeks to further continue the discussion on
consolidation. As argued above, Internet consolidation is happening
at different places and different layers of the Internet and ongoing
discussions, particularly in DINRG group.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[1] Considerations on Internet Consolidation and the Internet
Architecture [draft-arkko-iab-internet-consolidation-02].
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[2] IBID
[3] Google has over at least 80% worldwide market share.
https://www.statista.com/statistics/216573/worldwide-
market-
share-of-search-engines/
[4] https://www.internetsociety.org/tag/consolidation
[5] Centralised Architecture in Internet Infrastructure [draft-
arkko-arch-infrastructure-centralisation-00]page 5.
[6] Dominique Lazanski, Governance in international technical
standards-making: a tripartite model, Journal of Cyber
Policy, 4:3, 362-379, 2019.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23738871.2019.169
6851
[7] RFC 8890, The Internet is for End Users. Nottingham, Mark.
August 2020. https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8890
[8] Consolidation In the Internet Economy, Internet Society,
2019.
https://future.internetsociety.org/2019/consolidation-in-
the-internet-economy
[9] https://seekingalpha.com/article/4544613-cloudflare-on-the-
right-trajectory
[10] Fastly Blog, June 8, 2021.
https://www.fastly.com/blog/summary-of-june-8-outage
[11] The Deeper Root Cause of the Fastly and Akamai Outages,
CircleID, June 28, 2021
https://www.circleid.com/posts/20210628-the-deeper-root-
cause-of-the-fastly-and-akamai-outages/
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[12] https://www.site24x7.com/blog/6-lessons-from-cloudflares-
june-2022-outage
[13] See Google, antitrust and how to best regulate big tech,
The
Economist, 7 October 2020
https://www.economist.com/business/2020/10/07/google-
antitrust-and-how-best-to-regulate-big-tech
[14] What is Network Slicing? https://5g.co.uk/guides/what-is-
network-slicing/
[15] DNS over HTTPS (doh)
https://datatracker.ietf.org/group/doh/about/
[16] At the time of writing, the Firefox browser presents a list
of
three pre-configured resolver options to North American
users:
Cloudflare, NextDNS and Comcast.
[17] Cloudflare DNS goes down taking a large piece of the
Internet
with it, 17 July 2020.
https://techcrunch.com/2020/07/17/cloudflare-dns-goes-down-
taking-a-large-piece-of-the-internet-with-it/
[18] TLS Encrypted Client Hello draft-ietf-tls-esni-07
https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni-07
[19] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-livingood-doh-
implementation-risks-issues/
[20] https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/evidence-of-decreasing-internet-
entropy-the-lack-of-redundancy-in-dns-resolutionbymajor-
websites-and-services
11. Acknowledgments
Many thanks to all who discussed this with us, especially Jason
Livingood and Eliot Lear.
This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.
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Authors' Addresses
Dominique Lazanski
Last Press Label
London, UK
Email: dml@lastpresslabel.com
Mark McFadden
Internet policy advisors ltd
Chepstow, Wales, UK
Email: mark@internetpolicyadvisors.com
Lazanski Expires April 24, 2023 [Page 16]
