Internet DRAFT - draft-levine-dkim-conditional
draft-levine-dkim-conditional
Network Working Group J. Levine
Internet-Draft Taughannock Networks
Intended status: Standards Track 30 August 2020
Expires: 3 March 2021
Mandatory Tags for DKIM Signatures
draft-levine-dkim-conditional-04
Abstract
The DKIM protocol applies a cryptographic signature to an e-mail
message. This specification extends DKIM to allow new signature tags
that validators are required to evaluate. The first such tag
specifies a second signature that must be present for a signature to
be valid.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 March 2021.
Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. Mandatory DKIM header tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Signature verification features . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. Processing mandatory tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Forward signature (!fs) tag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Typical application scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Sender use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. Forwarder use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. Recipient use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.1. -03 to -04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.2. -02 to -03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.3. -01 to -02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction
DKIM [RFC6376] defines a cryptographic header field consisting of a
series of tags and values. The values include signed hashes of some
of the header fields and part or all of the body of a message. The
signature contains a domain name that is responsible for the
signature. The signature is valid if the hashes in the signature
match the corresponding hashes of the message at validation time, the
signature is validated by a public key retrieved from that
responsible domain's DNS, and it is before the expiration time in the
signature header field.
This specification defines the syntax for new tags in a signature
header field that specify additional conditions that must be
satisfied for a signature to be valid. The first such condition
requires the presence of an additional signature from a specified
different domain. It also changes the DKIM version tag to a
verification features tag to allow the new semantics of conditional
signatures.
2. Definitions
The upper case key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL",
"SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
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Syntax descriptions use Augmented BNF (ABNF)[RFC5234].
The ABNF "ALPHA", "FWS", "tag-list" and "domain-name" are defined as
in [RFC6376].
3. Mandatory DKIM header tags
The current DKIM specification defines a set of header tags, some of
which are required to appear in every signature and some of which are
optional. It also allows a signer to include private tags that don't
conflict with the registered ones. Since verifiers ignore tags that
they don't understand, new tags can only provide new information
about the message, or enable new verification schemes for signatures
that would otherwise be considered invalid.
A Mandatory Tag is a new kind of tag prefixed with an exclamation
point. Its syntax is otherwise identical to an ordinary tag.
ABNF:
tag-spec =/ [FWS] "!" tag-name [FWS] "=" [FWS] tag-value [FWS]
3.1. Signature verification features
The v= tag defined in section [RFC6376] section 3.5 is renamed to the
Verification Features tag. Its value is a comma-separated sequence
of alphanumeric feature names.
ABNF:
sig-v-tag = %x76 [FWS] "=" [FWS] 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT)
0*(, 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT))
Feature name "1" includes all of the features described in [RFC6376].
Feature name "man" includes the Mandatory Tag.
When a signer creates a signature, the v= tag MUST include feature
names for all features used in the signature. The v= tag SHOULD NOT
include feature names for features not used in the signature. For
example, signatures that use only RFC 6376 features have a "v=1" tag.
When a verifier encounters a feature name in the v= tag that it does
not support, it MUST return PERMFAIL for that signature.
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3.2. Processing mandatory tags
When a verifier encounters a mandatory tag in a signature, it MUST
process the tag according to the tag's definition. If the verifier
is unable to process the tag the verifier MUST return PERMFAIL for
that signature. If there are multiple signatures on a message, the
verifier continues to verify other signatures as usual. It is valid
to have a signatures using different features on a single message.
3.3. Forward signature (!fs) tag
The "!fs" mandatory tag means that the signature is only valid if an
additional signature is present in the message. The value of the !fs
tag is a domain name that is the value of the d= tag of the
additional signature. The condition is satisfied if the message
includes at least one valid DKIM signature header field with
responsible domain (the d= tag) being one specified by the !fs tag.
Chained !fs tags are valid and may be useful in scenarios with
multiple levels of forwarders. DKIM verifiers SHOULD handle at least
three levels of !fs chaining.
4. Typical application scenarios
A sender that expects a message to be forwarded might put both a
conventional DKIM signature and a signature with a !fs tag that
refers to the domain name of the expected forwarder, most likely the
domain of the recipient in the To header. That signature would be a
"weak" signature that covers the From, To, Date, and Message-ID
headers but does not cover the Subject header or the message body, so
that it would remain valid even if a forwarder made changes that
forwarders such as mailing lists often make. Subsequent recipients
observe both the forwarder's signature and the signature with the !fs
tag that matches the other signature, and use either or both to
assess the message.
4.1. Sender use
A small sender that doesn't know which of its mail recipients are
likely to be forwarders might put a weak signature on all outgoing
mail, in the expectation that few of its users correspondents are
likely to be malicious. A sender that had some idea which recipients
are forwarders could apply weak signnatures only to mail to those
recipients. Or a sender might apply weak signatures to all mail
except that sent to recipients with poor reputations.
For the second or third possibilities, the sender might keep its own
reputation data, or might query shared reputation services.
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4.2. Forwarder use
At the time the message is forwarded, the forwarder uses the
conventional signature to assess the message, edits the message, and
then signs the outgoing message with its own signature. This process
is the same as what forwarders typically do now. The forwarder must
not strip the weak signature from the outgoing message.
The forwarder's signature d= domain has to match the one in the
original !fs= tag. The simplest way to arrange this is for that
domain to be the one in the To header, normally one that the
forwarder controls.
[[ Possibly allow some flexibility about superdomain or subdomain
matching? ]]
4.3. Recipient use
A sample set of weak and forwarder signatures might be:
DKIM-Signature: v=man,1; a=rsa-sha256; d=example.net; s=abc;
c=simple; t=1518456670; h=from:to:date:message-id; l=0;
!fs=lists.example.com; bh=MT34908vdk3l24kedfkpI=;
b=dzdfAKCdLXdJOc9G2q8LoXSlEniSbav+yuU4zGeeruD00lszZVoG4ZHRNiYzR;
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=brisbane; d=lists.example.com;
h=From : To : Subject : Date : Message-ID;
bh=2jUSOH9NhtVGCQWNr9BrIAPreKQjO6Sn7XIkfJVOzv8=;
b=AuUoFEfDxTDkHlLXSZEpZj79LICEps6eda7W3deTVFOk4yAUoqOB=;
A message with a weak signature and a forwarder's signature is signed
by both, and the recipient would typically use either or both to
assess the message. In particular, if the original sender asserts a
DMARC policy, the weak signature would be adequate to satisfy that
policy.
If a message arrives with signature containing a !fs but no
forwarding signature, the recipient would ignore that signature. If
the message contains other signatures, the recipient can use them to
assess the message.
5. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to add this entry to the "DKIM-Signature Tag
Specifications" registry.
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+======+=================+========+
| TYPE | REFERENCE | STATUS |
+======+=================+========+
| !fs | (this document) | active |
+------+-----------------+--------+
Table 1: DKIM-Signature Tag
Specifications additions
IANA is requested to create the "DKIM-Signature Feature Name"
registry, with the following initial contents.
+======+=================+========+
| NAME | REFERENCE | STATUS |
+======+=================+========+
| 1 | (this document) | active |
+------+-----------------+--------+
| man | (this document) | active |
+------+-----------------+--------+
Table 2: DKIM-Signature Feature
Name contents
6. Security Considerations
DKIM was designed to provide assurances that a message with a valid
signature was received in essentially the same form that it was sent.
The forwarding signature condition deliberately creates a loophole
for messages intended to be forwarded by entities that edit the
message. It opens up a variety of obvious replay attacks that may or
may not be important depending on both the selection of target
domains for messages to be forwarded, and the behavior of forwarders
that receive messages with conditional signatures.
A sender can limit the conceptual size of the loophole by being
selective about what other domains it allows in its !fs tags, and by
using the x= tag to limit the time during which forwarded signatures
are valid.
7. Change Log
Please remove this section before publication.
7.1. -03 to -04
Add hints to use To domain as the chain link
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7.2. -02 to -03
Add feature names.
Expand usage scenarios.
7.3. -01 to -02
Change tag character from @ to ! per Murray.
Add suggestions about limiting the forwarding loophole.
8. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234>.
[RFC6376] Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed.,
"DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76,
RFC 6376, DOI 10.17487/RFC6376, September 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6376>.
Author's Address
John Levine
Taughannock Networks
PO Box 727
Trumansburg
Email: standards@taugh.com
URI: http://jl.ly
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