Internet DRAFT - draft-li-opsec-sav-gap-analysis
draft-li-opsec-sav-gap-analysis
Network Working Group D. Li
Internet-Draft J. Wu
Intended status: Informational Tsinghua
Expires: January 6, 2022 Y. Gu
Huawei
L. Qin
Tsinghua
T. Lin
H3C
July 5, 2021
Soure Address Validation: Gap Analysis
draft-li-opsec-sav-gap-analysis-02
Abstract
This document identifies scenarios where existing IP spoofing
approaches for detection and mitigation don't perform perfectly.
Exsiting SAV (source address validation) approaches, either Ingress
ACL filtering [RFC2827], unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF)
[RFC3704], Feasible Path uRPF [RFC 3704], or Enhanced Feasible-Path
uRPF [RFC8704] has limitations regarding eihter automated
implemetation objective or detection accuracy objective (0% false
positive and 0% false negative). This document provides the gap
analysis of the exsting SAV approaches, and also provides solution
discussions.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Source Address Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Existing SAV Techniques Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Use Case 1: Inter-AS Multi-homing . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Use Case 2: Intra-AS Multi-homing . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Solution Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
1.1. Source Address Validation
The Internet is open to traffic, which means that a sender can
generate traffic and send to any receiver in the Internet as long as
the address is reachable. Although this openness design improves the
scalability of the Internet, it also leaves security risks, e.g., a
sender can forge the source address when sending the packets, which
is also known as IP spoofing. IP spoofing is constantly used in
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which seriously compromise network
security. DOS attacks using IP spoofing makes it difficult for
operators to locate the attacker's actual source address. [RFC6959]
identifies different types of DOS attacks with IP spoofing, i.e.,
single-packet attack, flood-based DoS, poisoning attack, spoof-based
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worm/malware propagation, reflective attack, accounting subversion,
man-in-the-middle attack, third-party recon, etc.
1.2. Existing SAV Techniques Overview
Source address validation (SAV) verifies the authenticity of the
packet's source address to detect and mitigate IP spoofing [RFC2827].
Existing methods, such as Source Address Validation Improvement
(SAVI) [RFC7039], unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) (i.e.,
Strict uRPF, Feasible uRPF and Loose uRPF) [RFC3704], as well as
Enhanced Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (EFP-uRPF)
methods [RFC8704] are deployed at different network levels to prevent
IP spoofing.
Overall, when evaluating a SAV technique, one should consider the
following two perspectives.
1) Precise filtering: Two important indicators for precise filtering.
1) 0% false positive (FP) rate. If legitimate packets are
dropped, it can seriously affect the user experience. 2) 0% false
negative (FN) rate. If some packets with a forged source address
passes, it poses potential security risks.
2) Automatic implementation: In practice, the address space may grow,
and routing policies may be dynamically adjusted. SAV solutions
that rely entirely on manual configuration are either non-scalable
or error-prone.
SAVI, typically performed at the access network, is enforced in
switches, where the mapping relationship between an IP address and
other "trust anchor" is maintained. A "trust anchor" can be link-
layer information (such as MAC address), physical port of a switch to
connect a host, etc. It enforces hosts to use legitimate IP source
addresses. However, given numerous access networks managed by
different operators, it is far from practice for all the access
networks to simultaneously deploy SAVI. Therefore, in order to
mitigate the security risks raised by source address spoofing, SAV
performed in network border routers is also necessary. Although it
does not provide the same filtering granualarity as SAVI does, it
still helps the tracing of spoofing to a minimized network range.
Ingress ACLs [RFC2827], typically performed at the network border
routers, is performed by manually maintaining a traffic filtering
access list which contains acceptable source address for each
interface. Only packets with a source address encompassed in the
access list can be accepted. It strictly specifies the source
address space of incoming packets. However, manual-based filtering
method is error-prone and face scalability issues.
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Strict uRPF, typically performed at the network (IGP areas or ASes)
border routers, requires that a data packet can be only accepted when
the FIB contains a prefix that encompasses the source address and the
corresponding out-interface matches the data incoming interface. It
has the advantages of simple operation, easy deployment, and
automatic update. However, in case of multihoming, when the data
imcoming interface is different from the out-interface, which is also
refered to as asymmetric routing of data packets, Strict uRPF exibits
FP.
Loose uRPF, sacrificing the directionality of Strict uRPF, only
requires that the packet's source IP exists as a FIB entry.
Intuitively, Loose uRPF cannot prevent the attacker from forging a
source address that already exists in the FIB, which incurs FN
detection.
Feasible uRPF (FP-uRPF), typically performed at the network border
routers, helps mitigate FP of Strict uRPF in the multihoming
scenarios. Instead of installing only the best route into FIB as
Strict uRPF does, Feasible uRPF installs all alternative paths into
the FIB. It helps reduce FP filtering compared with the Strict uRPF,
in the case when multiple paths are learnt from different interfaces.
However, it should be noted that Feasible uRPF only works when
multiple paths are learnt. There are cases when a device only learns
one path but still has packets coming from other valid interfaces.
Thus, FP-uRPF performs better than Loose uRPF regarding FP detection,
but still doesn't not guarantee 0% FP.
EFP-uRPF, specifically performed at the AS border routers, further
improves FP-uRPF in the inter-AS scenario. An ASBR, performing EFP-
uRPF, maintains an RPF filtering list on each customer/peer
interface. It introduces two algorihtms (i.e., Algorithm A and
Algorithm B) regarding different application scenarios. In the case
that a customer interface fails to learn any route from a directly
connected customer AS, enabling Algorithm A at this customer
interface may exibit false postive detection. In this case,
Algorithm B can mitigate the FP. However, in case of two customer
ASes spoofing each other, Algorithm B exibits FN.
This document specifically identifies two scenarios, where the above
mentioned SAV techniques, i.e., Strict uRPF, Loose uRPF, FP-uRPF, and
EFP-uRPF, fail to guarantee 0% FP and 0% FN detection.
2. Terminology
IGP: Interior Gateway Protocol
IS-IS: Intermediate System to Intermediate System
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BGP: Boarder Gateway Protocol
RIB: Routing Information Base
FIB: Forwarding Information Base
SAV: Source Address Validation
AD: Administrative Domain
3. Problem Statement
3.1. Use Case 1: Inter-AS Multi-homing
Figure 1 illustrates an inter-AS multihoming case.
AS2 is multi-homed to AS1 and AS4. AS2 announces P1/P2 to AS1
through BGP. AS2 doesn't announce any of its routes to AS4 due to
policy control. P1/P2 are propagated from AS1 to AS4 through BGP.
AS3 is single-homed to AS4. AS3 announces P3 to AS4 through BGP.
AS4 propagates P3 to AS1 through BGP.
Now suppose two data flows coming from AS2 to AS4: Flow 1 with source
IP as P1, and Flow 2 with source IP as P3 (IP spoofing). Using
existing SAV methods at AS4, Flow 1 is supposed to be passed, while
Flow 2 is supposed to be dropped.
o Loose uRPF: works for Flow 1, but fails for Flow 2.
o Strict uRPF: works for Flow 2, but fails for Flow 1 (the incoming
interface does not match P1/P2's out-interface).
o FP-uRFP: works for Flow 2, but fails for Flow 1 (no feasible path
for P1/P2 other than the best route exists).
o EFP-uRPF: works for Flow 1, but fails for Flow 2 using Algorithm
B. Works for Flow 2, but fails for Flow 1 when using Algorithm A.
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P1[AS1 AS2]
P2[AS1 AS2]
+---------------+ (C2P) +---------------+
| +------------------> |
| AS1 | | AS4 |
| <------------------+ |
+----+/\+-------+ P3[AS4 AS3] ++/\+-----+/\+--+
\ (P2C) / \
\ / \
P1[AS2] [no prefix adv] P3[AS3]
P2[AS2] / \
(C2P) \ / (C2P) \ (C2P)
\ / \
\ / \
+---------------------+ +---------------+
| | | |
| AS2(customer) | | AS3(customer) |
| | | |
+---------------------+ +---------------+
P1,P2(prefixes originated) P3(prefix originated)
Figure 1: Asymmetric data flow in the Inter-AS scenario
3.2. Use Case 2: Intra-AS Multi-homing
Figure 2 illustrates an intra-AS multihoming case. To facilitate
management, one AS can be divided into several administrative domains
(ADs) and managed by different inner groups. In Figure 2, AD1 is the
upper level compared to AD2 and AD3, meaning that AD2 or AD3 needs to
connect through AD1 for external reachability (i.e., networks outside
AD1). For example, AD1 is the backbone of one national education
network, while AD2 and AD3 are the campus networks of the two
universities.
Router 1 is multi-homed to Router 2 and Router 3. No dynamic routing
protocol set up between Router 1 and Router 2, as well as between
Router 1 and Router 3. In AD2, static routes to outside AD2 are
configured on Router 1 with Router 3 as the next hop. In AD1, static
route to P1 is configured on Router 2 and static route to P2 is
configured on Router 3, due to traffic control purpose. Router 2 and
Router 3 are connected with each other using ISIS or OSPF.
Router 5 is single-homed to Router 3. In AD3, static routes to
outside AD3 are configured on Router 5 with Router 3 as the next hop.
In AD1,static route to P3 is configured on Router 3 with Router 5 as
the next hop.
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Now suppose two data flows coming from Router 1 to Router 3: Flow 1
with source IP as P1, and Flow 2 with source IP as P3 (IP spoofing).
Using existing SAV methods at Router 3, Flow 1 is supposed to be
passed, while Flow 2 is supposed to be dropped.
o Loose uRPF: works for Flow 1, but fails for Flow 2.
o Strict uRPF: works for Flow 2, but fails for Flow 1 (the incoming
interface does not match P1's out-interface).
o FP-uRFP: works for Flow 2, but fails for Flow 1 (no feasible path
for P1 other than the best route exists).
o EFP-uRPF: does not apply at the intra-AS case.
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AS |
| +--------------------------------+ |
| | AD1 +------------+ | |
| | | Router 4 | | |
| | +-/\------/\-+ | |
| Router 2 | / \ | Router 3 |
| Static RIB: | / \ | Static RIB: |
| Prefix: P1 | +--------+ [P1] +--------+ | Prefix: P2 |
| NH: Router 1 | | +----------> | | NH: Router 1 |
| | |Router 2| |Router 3| | Prefix: P3 |
| IGP RIB: | | <----------+ | | NH: Router 5 |
| Prefix: P2 | +--------+ [P2,P3] +--------+ | |
| NH: Router 3 +---/\-----------------/\----/\--+ IGP RIB: |
| Prefix: P3 \ / \ Prefix: P1 |
| NH: Router 3 \ / \ NH: Router 2 |
| \ / \ |
| [no prefix adv] [no prefix adv] [no prefix adv] |
| \ / \ |
| +-------\-------/----+ +------\---------+ |
| |AD2 +----------+ | |AD3 +--------+ | |
| | | Router 1 | | | |Router 5| | |
| | +----------+ | | +--------+ | |
| | P1,P2 | | P3 | |
| +--------------------+ +----------------+ |
| P1,P2(prefixes originated) P3(prefix originated) |
| |
+----------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 2: Asymmetric data flow in the Intra-AS scenario
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4. Solution Discussions
Both EFP-uRPF and FP-uRPF try to achieve a balance between
flexibility (Loose uRPF) and directionality (Strict uRPF).
In the inter-AS multi-homing scenario, EFP-uRPF further improves FR-
uRPF's directionality. The key improvement of EFP-uRPF is that it
synchronizes certain information between interfaces that share the
same RPF filtering list, so as to construct an RPF list as
comprehensive as possible, although [RFC8704] does not explicitly
specify how the information is synchronized, e.g., what information,
in which format and in which way. In addition, the construction of
RPF lists can be further augmented with data from Route Origin
Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482], as well as Internet Routing Registry
(IRR) data. In fact, the global availability of ROA and IRR
databeses provides a secondary information synchronization approach.
However, EFP-uRPF still fails to achieve 0% FN and 0% FP in case of
Figure 1. Further infomration synchronization between interfaces
might provide further improvement.
The above description works similarly for the intra-AS scenario.
Information synchronization is also required in order to achieve
higher filtering accuracy.
5. Security Considerations
TBD
6. Contributors
TBD
7. Acknowledgments
TBD
8. Normative References
[I-D.brockners-inband-oam-requirements]
Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., Dara, S., Pignataro, C.,
Gredler, H., Leddy, J., Youell, S., Mozes, D., Mizrahi,
T., <>, P. L., and R. Chang, "Requirements for In-situ
OAM", draft-brockners-inband-oam-requirements-03 (work in
progress), March 2017.
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[I-D.ietf-grow-bmp-adj-rib-out]
Evens, T., Bayraktar, S., Lucente, P., Mi, P., and S.
Zhuang, "Support for Adj-RIB-Out in the BGP Monitoring
Protocol (BMP)", draft-ietf-grow-bmp-adj-rib-out-07 (work
in progress), August 2019.
[I-D.ietf-grow-bmp-local-rib]
Evens, T., Bayraktar, S., Bhardwaj, M., and P. Lucente,
"Support for Local RIB in BGP Monitoring Protocol (BMP)",
draft-ietf-grow-bmp-local-rib-11 (work in progress), April
2021.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-yang-push]
Clemm, A. and E. Voit, "Subscription to YANG Notifications
for Datastore Updates", draft-ietf-netconf-yang-push-25
(work in progress), May 2019.
[I-D.openconfig-rtgwg-gnmi-spec]
Shakir, R., Shaikh, A., Borman, P., Hines, M., Lebsack,
C., and C. Morrow, "gRPC Network Management Interface
(gNMI)", draft-openconfig-rtgwg-gnmi-spec-01 (work in
progress), March 2018.
[I-D.song-ntf]
Song, H., Zhou, T., Li, Z., Fioccola, G., Li, Z.,
Martinez-Julia, P., Ciavaglia, L., and A. Wang, "Toward a
Network Telemetry Framework", draft-song-ntf-02 (work in
progress), July 2018.
[RFC1157] Case, J., Fedor, M., Schoffstall, M., and J. Davin,
"Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", RFC 1157,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1157, May 1990,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1157>.
[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[RFC1195] Callon, R., "Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and
dual environments", RFC 1195, DOI 10.17487/RFC1195,
December 1990, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1195>.
[RFC1213] McCloghrie, K. and M. Rose, "Management Information Base
for Network Management of TCP/IP-based internets: MIB-II",
STD 17, RFC 1213, DOI 10.17487/RFC1213, March 1991,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1213>.
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[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827,
May 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827>.
[RFC3209] Awduche, D., Berger, L., Gan, D., Li, T., Srinivasan, V.,
and G. Swallow, "RSVP-TE: Extensions to RSVP for LSP
Tunnels", RFC 3209, DOI 10.17487/RFC3209, December 2001,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3209>.
[RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, DOI 10.17487/RFC3704, March
2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3704>.
[RFC3719] Parker, J., Ed., "Recommendations for Interoperable
Networks using Intermediate System to Intermediate System
(IS-IS)", RFC 3719, DOI 10.17487/RFC3719, February 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3719>.
[RFC3988] Black, B. and K. Kompella, "Maximum Transmission Unit
Signalling Extensions for the Label Distribution
Protocol", RFC 3988, DOI 10.17487/RFC3988, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3988>.
[RFC6232] Wei, F., Qin, Y., Li, Z., Li, T., and J. Dong, "Purge
Originator Identification TLV for IS-IS", RFC 6232,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6232, May 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6232>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed.,
and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol
(NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6959] McPherson, D., Baker, F., and J. Halpern, "Source Address
Validation Improvement (SAVI) Threat Scope", RFC 6959,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6959, May 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6959>.
[RFC7039] Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt, Ed.,
"Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Framework",
RFC 7039, DOI 10.17487/RFC7039, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7039>.
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[RFC7752] Gredler, H., Ed., Medved, J., Previdi, S., Farrel, A., and
S. Ray, "North-Bound Distribution of Link-State and
Traffic Engineering (TE) Information Using BGP", RFC 7752,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7752, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7752>.
[RFC7854] Scudder, J., Ed., Fernando, R., and S. Stuart, "BGP
Monitoring Protocol (BMP)", RFC 7854,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7854, June 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7854>.
[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.
[RFC8231] Crabbe, E., Minei, I., Medved, J., and R. Varga, "Path
Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)
Extensions for Stateful PCE", RFC 8231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8231, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8231>.
[RFC8704] Sriram, K., Montgomery, D., and J. Haas, "Enhanced
Feasible-Path Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding", BCP 84,
RFC 8704, DOI 10.17487/RFC8704, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8704>.
Authors' Addresses
Dan Li
Tsinghua
Beijing
China
Email: tolidan@tsinghua.edu.cn
Jianping Wu
Tsinghua
Beijing
China
Email: jianping@cernet.edu.cn
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Yunan Gu
Huawei
Beijing
China
Email: guyunan@huawei.com
Lancheng Qin
Tsinghua
Beijing
China
Email: qlc19@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Tao Lin
H3C
Beijing
China
Email: lintao@h3c.com
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