Internet DRAFT - draft-linkova-v6ops-nd-cache-init
draft-linkova-v6ops-nd-cache-init
v6ops J. Linkova
Internet-Draft Google
Intended status: Informational July 5, 2019
Expires: January 6, 2020
Neighbor Cache Entries on First-Hop Routers: Operational Considerations
draft-linkova-v6ops-nd-cache-init-01
Abstract
Neighbor Discovery (RFC4861) is used by IPv6 nodes to determine the
link-layer addresses of neighboring nodes as well as to discover and
maintain reachability information. This document discusses how the
neighbor discovery state machine on a first-hop router is causing
user-visible connectivity issues when a new (not being seen on the
network before) IPv6 address is being used.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 6, 2020.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Potential Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Do Nothing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1. Pros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.2. Cons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Change to the Registration-Based Neighbor Discovery . . . 5
2.3. Hosts Explicitly Advertizing Their GUAs Using Existing ND
Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.1. Host Sending Unsolicited NA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.1.1. Pros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.1.2. Cons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.2. Host Sending NS to the Router Address from Its GUA . 7
2.3.2.1. Pros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.2.2. Cons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.3. Host Sending Router Solicitation from its GUA . . . . 8
2.3.3.1. Pros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.3.2. Cons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4. Initiating Hosts2Routers Communication . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4.1. Pros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.2. Cons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5. Tweaking Probing Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6. Routers Buffering More Packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.6.1. Pros . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.6.2. Cons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1. Avoiding Disruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
The section 7.2.5 of [RFC4861] states: "When a valid Neighbor
Advertisement is received (either solicited or unsolicited), the
Neighbor Cache is searched for the target's entry. If no entry
exists, the advertisement SHOULD be silently discarded. There is no
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need to create an entry if none exists, since the recipient has
apparently not initiated any communication with the target."
This approach is perfectly suitable for host2host communications
which are in most cases bi-directional and it could be expected that
if a host A has an ND cache entry for the host B IPv6 address, the
host B also has the corresponding ND entry for the host A address in
its cache. However when a host communicates to off-link destinations
via its first-hop router that logic does not apply. Here is the most
typical scenario when the problem may arise:
1. When a host joins the network it receives an RA packet from the
first-hop router (either a periodic unsolicited RA or a response
to an RS sent by the host). The RA contains information the host
needs to perform SLAAC and to configure its network stack. Among
other things the host populates its ND cache with the router
link-local address and potentially link-layer address (if
included in the RA Source Link-Layer Address option).
2. The host starts opening connections to off-link destinations.
Very common use case is a mobile device sending probes to detect
the Internet connectivity and/or the captive portals presence on
the network. To speed up that process many implementations are
using the Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection ([RFC4429])
which allows them to send probes from their GUA before the DAD
process is completed. Imprortant point here is that at that
moment the device ND cache contains all information required to
send those probes (such as the default gateway LLA and the link-
layer address). The router ND cache, however, might contain an
entry for the device link-local address (if the device has been
performing the ND process for the roiter LLA) but there are no
entries for the device GUA.
3. Response packets for the probes (or any other traffic sent by the
host) are received by the first-hop router. As the router does
not have any ND cache entry for the host GUA, the router starts
the neighbor discovery process by creating an INCOMPLETE cache
entry and then sending an NS to the Solicited Node Multicast
Address. Apparently most of the router implementations buffer
only one data packet while performing the ND process for its
destination. Therefore all packets for the host GUA, except for
the very first one are dropped until the address resolution
process is completed.
4. As many implementations send multiple probes in parallel it's
very likely that all probes ex. the first one would be considered
failed. If the host implements an exponential backoff for
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probing it leads to user-noticeable delay in detecting network
connectivity/reporting the network as usable.
The above-mentioned scenario illustrates the problem happening when
the device connects to the network for the first time/after a long
timeout. However the same sequence of events happen when the host
starts using the new (previously unseen by the router or ) GUA (e.g.
a new privacy address [RFC4941]) or if the router Neighbor Cache has
been flushed.
While in dual-stack networks this problem might hidden by Happy
Eyeballs ([RFC8305]) it manifests itself quite clearly in IPv6-only
networks, especially wireless ones, leading to poor user experience
and contributing to negative perception of IPv6-only solutions as
unstable and non-deployable.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
1.2. Terminology
ND: Neighbor Discovery, [RFC4861].
SLAAC: IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration, [RFC4862].
NS: Neighbor Solicitation, [RFC4861].
NA: Neighbor Advertisement, [RFC4861].
RS: Router Solicitation, [RFC4861].
RA: Router Advertisement, [RFC4861].
SLLA: Source link-layer Address, an option in the ND packets
containing the link-layer address of the sender of the packet
([RFC4861]).
TLLA: Target link-layer Address, an option in the ND packets
containing the link-layer address of the target ([RFC4861]).
GUA: Global Unicast Address ([RFC4291]).
DAD: Duplicate Address Detection, [RFC4862].
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Optimistic DAD: a modification of DAD, [RFC4429].
2. Potential Solutions
The problem could be addressed from different angles. Possible
approaches are:
o Just do nothing.
o Migrate from the "reactive" Neighbor Discovery ([RFC4861]) to the
registration-based mechanisms ([RFC8505]).
o The host explicitly advertizes its GUAs using Neighbor Discovery
mechanisms.
o The host initiates bidirectional communication to the router using
the host GUA.
o Making the probing logic on hosts more robust.
o Increasing the buffer size on routers.
The following sections discuss those approaches in more detail.
2.1. Do Nothing
One of the possible approaches might be to declare that everything is
working as intended.
2.1.1. Pros
o No work required.
2.1.2. Cons
o Unhappy users.
o Many support tickets.
o More resistance to deploy IPv6 and IPv6-Only networks.
2.2. Change to the Registration-Based Neighbor Discovery
The most radical approach would be to move away from the reactive ND
as defined in [RFC4861] and expand the registration-based ND
([RFC6775], [RFC8505]) used in Low-Power Wireless Personal Area
Networks (6LoWPANs) to the rest of IPv6 deployments.
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This option required some investigation and discussions. More text
will be added here in the following revision of the draft.
2.3. Hosts Explicitly Advertizing Their GUAs Using Existing ND
Mechanisms
The Neighbor Discovery is designed to allow IPv6 nodes to discover
neighboring nodes reachability and learn IPv6 to link-layer addresses
mapping. Therefore ND seems to be the most appropriate tool to
inform the first-hop routers about addresses the host is going to
use. The following sections discuss potential apptoaches in more
detail.
2.3.1. Host Sending Unsolicited NA
Section 4.4 of [RFC4861] says:
"A node sends Neighbor Advertisements in response to Neighbor
Solicitations and sends unsolicited Neighbor Advertisements in order
to (unreliably) propagate new information quickly."
Propagating information about new GUA as quickly as possible is
exactly what is required to solve the problem outlined in this
document. Therefore the host might send an unsolicited NA to
advertize its GUA as soon as the said address enters Optimistic or
Preferred state. The NA should include the target link-layer address
option. To ensure that all first-hop routers receive the
advertisement it could be sent to all-routers multicast address
(ff02::2).
As it's been mentioned, [RFC4861] explicitly states that receiving a
NA should not create a new NC entry. However the justification for
that requirement ("There is no need to create an entry if none
exists, since the recipient has apparently not initiated any
communication with the target.") clearly does not apply for the case
discussed. As per [RFC2119] "there may exist valid reasons in
particular circumstances to ignore a particular item, but the full
implications must be understood and carefully weighed before choosing
a different course.". Therefore routers creating a new NC entry upon
receiving an unsolicited NA would still be compliant with [RFC4861].
It should be noted that some routing and switching platforms have
implemented such behaviour already. Administrators could enable
creating neighbor discovery cache entries based on unsolicited NA
packets sent from the previously unknown neighbors on that interface.
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2.3.1.1. Pros
o Already implemented on some platforms.
o In accordance with [RFC4861].
2.3.1.2. Cons
o Allows a malicious host to execute an ND cache exhaustion attack.
It's recommended that this functionality is configurable and
recommendations from [RFC6583] are taken into account.
o Requires hosts to send unsolicited NA (changes to the hosts).
o Some wireless devices are known to fiddle with ND packets and
perform various non-obvious forms of ND proxy actions. In some
cases unsolicited NAs might not even reach the routers.
2.3.2. Host Sending NS to the Router Address from Its GUA
The host could force creating a STALE entry for its GUA in the router
ND cache by sending the following Neighbor Solicitation message:
o The NS source address is the host GUA.
o The Source Link-Layer Address option contains the host link-layer
address.
o The target address is the host default gateway address (the
default router address the host received in the RA).
The main disadvantage of this approach is that it would not work if
the GUA the host needs to advertise is still in the Optimistic state.
The section 2.2 of [RFC4429] explicitly prohibits sending Neighbor
Solicitations from an Optimistic Address.
2.3.2.1. Pros
o Router implementations which follow recommendations made in
[RFC6583] might prioritize responding to NS packets to own
addresses.
2.3.2.2. Cons
o Does not work for Optimistic addresses (see section 2.2 of
[RFC4429]).
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o If first-hop redundancy is deployed in the network, the NS would
reach the active router only, so all backup routers (or all active
routers ex. one) would not get their neighbor cache updated.
o Some wireless devices are known to fiddle with ND packets and
perform various non-obvious forms of ND proxy actions. In some
cases unsolicited NAs might not even reach the routers.
2.3.3. Host Sending Router Solicitation from its GUA
The host could send a router solicitation message to 'all routers'
multicast address, using its GUA as a source. If the host link-layer
address is included in the Source Link-Layer Address option, the
router would create a STALE entry for the host GUA (see the section
6.2.6 of [RFC4861]). However this approach can not be used if the
GUA is in optimistic state: the section 2.2 of [RFC4429] explicitly
prohibits using an Optimistic Address as the source address of a
Router Solicitation with a SLLAO as it might disrupt the rightful
owner of the address in the case of a collision. So for the
optimistic addresses the host can send an RS without SLLAO included.
In that case the router may respond with either a multicast or a
unicast RA (only the latter would create a cache entry).
2.3.3.1. Pros
o Unlike NS packets, RS packets would reach all routers on link,
allowing all routers to update their neighbor caches and
preventing packet loss in case of asymmetric routing.
2.3.3.2. Cons
o As for the Optimistic addresses SLLAO can not be included into RS
packets, the cache entry for the optimistic address would be
created only if the router sends solicited RAs as unicast. In
addition, there might be a random delay between receiving an RS
and sending a unicast RA back (and creating a cache entry) which
might undermine the idea of creating the cache entry proactively.
o Some wireless devices are known to fiddle with ND packets and
perform various non-obvious forms of ND proxy actions. In some
cases RSes might not even reach the routers.
2.4. Initiating Hosts2Routers Communication
Every time the host configures a new GUA (when the address enters the
Optimistic state or, if the optimistic DAD is not used, as soon as it
changes the state from tentative to preferred) the host can a ping or
traceroute packet to the default gateway LLA. As the RTT to the
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default gateway is lower than RTT to any off-link destinations it's
quite likely that the router would start the neighbor discovery
process for the host GUA before the first packet of the returning
traffic arrives. There are pretty good chances that the process
would be completed before the actual data traffic reaches the router.
2.4.1. Pros
o As data packets are involved, there is no potential impact caused
by smart wireless infrastructure performing ND proxy.
o Full compliance with existing standards.
2.4.2. Cons
o Data packets to the router LLA could be blocked by security policy
or control plane protection mechanism.
o Maximum overhead for routers control plane (in addition to
processing ND packets, the data packet needs to be processed as
well).
o If the first hop redundancy is implemented in the network the host
ping/traceroute packet would reach the active router only. All
backup routers would not receive it and therefore would not start
populating the cache. So in the case of asymmetric traffic flow
(packets leave the network via one router while the return flow is
going via another) the backup router(s) still would not have the
cache entry. (A hacky way to overcome this limitation would be
sending ping/traceroute packet to 'all routers' ff02::2 multicast
address).
2.5. Tweaking Probing Algorithms
While tweaking the probing logic on devices might make the problem
less visible it would be still desirable to avoid packet loss
everytime the new GUA is used by a host. It would be quite tricky to
adjust every probing algorithm to find the right balance between
prompt detection of network connectivity and false positives in
IPv6-only mode.
2.6. Routers Buffering More Packets
Another way to mitigate the issue, at least partially, would be
increasing the number of packets the router could buffer while
performing the neighbor discovery process for the INCOMPLETE cache
entry. However it would be against recommendations made in the
section 7.2.2 of [RFC4861] and [RFC6583].
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2.6.1. Pros
o Does not require changes on hosts.
2.6.2. Cons
o This approach makes the routers even more vulnerable to attack
vectors described in [RFC6583]. In particular, it would amplify
the impact of any scanning attack.
o Against the recommendations from the section 7 of [RFC6583].
o Requires router vendors support.
3. Recommendations
o Hosts SHOULD send at least one unsolicited NA packet to all-
routers multicast address (ff02::2) as soon as one of the
following events happens:
* (if Optimistic DAD is used): a new Optimistic GUA is assigned
to the host interface.
* (if Optimistic DAD is not used): a GUA changes the state from
tentative to preferred.
o Routers SHOULD have a configuration knob to enable creating ND
cache entry upon receiving unsolicited NAs on a specific
interface. This document does not change the behavior if the ND
cache entry already exists when receiving an unsolicited NA.
3.1. Avoiding Disruption
If hosts following the recommendations in this document are using the
DAD mechanism defined in [RFC4862], they would send unsolicited NA as
soon as the address changes the state from tentative to preferred
(after its uniqueness has been verified). However hosts willing to
minimize network stack configuration delays might be using optimistic
addresses, which means there is possibility of the address not being
unique on the link. The section 2.2 of [RFC4429] discusses measures
to ensure that ND packets from the optimistic address do not override
any existing neighbor cache entries as it would cause traffic
interruption of the rightful address owner in case of address
conflict.
As hosts willing to speed up their network stack configuration are
most likely to be affected by the problem outlined in this document
it seems reasonable for such hosts to advertise their optimistic GUAs
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by sending unsolicited NAs. The main question to consider is the
potential risk of overriding the cache entry for the rightful address
owner if the optimistic address happens to be duplicated.
As per section 7.2.5 of [RFC4861] if the Neighbor Cache entry for the
target address already exists and is in in any state other than
INCOMPLETE then the only change the unsolicited NA could cause is to
change the entry from REACHABLE to STALE. It would not cause any
traffic interruption for the rightful address owner.
If there is no entry then it would be created/updated with the
supplied LLA and its state set to STALE. In that case as soon as the
entry is used for sending traffic to the host, the entry state will
be changed to DELAY and the Neighbor Unreachability Detection would
be started and the rightful owner LLA will be entered in the cache.
So in the scenario when the rightful owner does not use the address
for communication then it might be a short (a few seconds) period of
time when the data packets sent from the outside could reach the host
with the optimistic address. However it seems likely that hosts
using Optimistic DAD would start sending/receiving traffic right
away, so the first return packet would trigger the NUD process and
rewrite the cache.
Another corner case is the INCOMPLETE cache entry for the address.
If the host sends an unsolicited NA from the Optimistic address it
would update the entry with the host LLA and set the entry to the
STALE state. As the INCOMPLETE entry means that the router has
started the ND process for the address and the multicast NS has been
sent, the rightful owner is expected to reply with solicited NA which
would recover the cache entry and set the LLA to the rightful owner's
one. The risk here:
o The data packet arrives after the unsolicited NA from the host but
before the rightful owner responded with the solicited NA. Those
packets would be sent to the host with the optimistic address
instead of its rightful owner. However without the unsolicited NA
those packets would have been dropped anyway (as the entry was in
INCOMPLETE state).
4. IANA Considerations
This memo asks the IANA for no new parameters.
5. Security Considerations
One of the potential attack vector to consider is a cache spoofing
when the attacker might try to install a cache entry for the victim's
IPv6 address and the attacker's Link-Layer address. However it
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should be noted that this document does not propose any changes for
the scenario when the ND cache for the given IPv6 address already
exists. Therefore it is not possible for the attacker to override
any existing cache entry.
A malicious host could attempt to exhaust the neighbor cache on the
router by creating a large number of STALE entries. However this
attack vector is not new and this document does not increase the risk
of such attack: the attacker could do it, for example, by sending a
NS or RS packet with SLLAO included. All recommendations from
[RFC6583] still apply.
6. Acknowledgements
Thanks to the following people (in alphabetical order) for their
review and feedback: Lorenzo Colitti, Tatuya Jinmei, Erik Kline,
Warren Kumari, Michael Richardson, Pascal Thubert, Loganaden
Velvindron, Eric Vyncke.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.
[RFC4429] Moore, N., "Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (DAD)
for IPv6", RFC 4429, DOI 10.17487/RFC4429, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4429>.
[RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
[RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>.
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[RFC6775] Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C.
Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over
Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)",
RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6775>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8305] Schinazi, D. and T. Pauly, "Happy Eyeballs Version 2:
Better Connectivity Using Concurrency", RFC 8305,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8305, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8305>.
[RFC8505] Thubert, P., Ed., Nordmark, E., Chakrabarti, S., and C.
Perkins, "Registration Extensions for IPv6 over Low-Power
Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) Neighbor
Discovery", RFC 8505, DOI 10.17487/RFC8505, November 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8505>.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.
[RFC6583] Gashinsky, I., Jaeggli, J., and W. Kumari, "Operational
Neighbor Discovery Problems", RFC 6583,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6583, March 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6583>.
Author's Address
Jen Linkova
Google
1 Darling Island Rd
Pyrmont, NSW 2009
AU
Email: furry@google.com
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