Internet DRAFT - draft-liusvaara-jose-cfrg-curves
draft-liusvaara-jose-cfrg-curves
Network Working Group I. Liusvaara
Internet-Draft Independent
Intended status: Standards Track December 9, 2015
Expires: June 11, 2016
CFRG curves and signatures in JOSE
draft-liusvaara-jose-cfrg-curves-00
Abstract
This document defines how to use curves and algorithms from IRTF CFRG
elliptic curves work (Diffie-Hellman and signatures) in JOSE.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 11, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Key type 'OKP' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Signatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.1. Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1.2. Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1.3. Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. ECDH-ES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2.1. Performing the ECDH operation . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A.1. Ed25519 private key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.2. Ed25519 public key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.3. JWK thumbprint canonicalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.4. Ed25519 Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.5. Ed25519 Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.6. ECDH-ES with X25519 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.7. ECDH-ES with X448 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) Crypto Forum Research Group
(CFRG) selected new elliptic curves and signature algorithms for
asymmetric key cryptography. This document defines how those curves
and algorithms are to be used in JOSE in interoperable manner.
This extends [RFC7517] and [RFC7518]
1.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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1.2. Notation
All inputs to and outputs from the the ECDH and signature functions
are defined to be octet strings, with the exception of output of
verfication function, which is a boolean.
2. Key type 'OKP'
A new key type (kty) value "OKP" (Octet Key Pair) is defined for
public key algorithms that use octet strings as private and public
keys. It has the following parameters:
o The parameter "kty" MUST be "OKP".
o The parameter "crv" MUST be present, and contain the subtype of
the key (from "JSON Web Elliptic curve" registry).
o The parameter "x" MUST be present, and contain the public key
encoded using base64url [RFC4648] encoding.
o The parameter "d" MUST be present for private keys, and contain
the private key encoded using base64url encoding. This parameter
MUST NOT be present for public keys.
Note: Do not assume that there is an underlying elliptic curve,
despite the existence of the "crv" and "x" parameters.
When calculating thumbprints [RFC7638], the three public key fields
are included in the hash. That is, in lexographic order: "crv",
"kty" and "x".
3. Algorithms
3.1. Signatures
3.1.1. Algorithms
The following signature algorithms are defined here (to be applied as
values of "alg" parameter). All these have keys with subtype of the
same name:
alg value: subtype: The algorithm:
Ed25519 Ed25519 Ed25519
Ed25519ph Ed25519ph Ed25519ph
Ed448 Ed448 Ed448
Ed448ph Ed448ph Ed448ph
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The key type for these keys is "OKP" and key subtype for these
algorithms MUST be the same as the algorithm name.
The keys of these subtypes MUST NOT be used for ECDH-ES.
[TBD: Merge the alg values into a single one that can perform signing
with any signature-capable OKP subtype? That would remove a source
of possible errors, since then the message and key could not mismatch
in algorithm.]
3.1.2. Signing
Signing for these is preformed by applying the signing algorithm
defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa] to the private key (as private key),
public key (as public key) and the JWS Signing Input (as message).
The resulting signature is the JWS Signature value. All inputs and
outputs are octet strings.
3.1.3. Verification
Verification is performed by applying the verification algorithm
defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa] to the public key (as public key),
the JWS Signing Input (as message) and the JWS Signature value (as
signature). All inputs are octet strings. If the algorithm accepts,
the signature is valid, otherwise it is invalid.
3.2. ECDH-ES
The following key subtypes defined here for purpose of ECDH-ES:
subtype: ECDH Function:
X25519 X25519
X448 X448
The key type used with these keys is "OKP". These subtypes MUST NOT
be used for signing.
3.2.1. Performing the ECDH operation
The "x" parameter of "epk" field is set as follows:
Apply the appropriate ECDH function to the ephemeral private key (as
scalar input) and the standard basepoint (as u-coordinate input).
The output is the value for "x" parameter of "epk" field. All inputs
and outputs are octet strings.
The Z value (raw key agreement output) for key agreement is
determined as follows:
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Apply the appropriate ECDH function to the ephemeral private key (as
scalar input) and receiver public key (as u-coordinate input). The
output is the Z value. All inputs and outputs are octet strings.
4. Security considerations
Security considerations from [I-D.irtf-cfrg-curves] and
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa] apply here.
Some algorithms interact in bad ways (e.g. "Ed25519" and
"Ed25519ph"). For this reason, those algorithms have different
subtypes, so keys for each are not mixed up.
Do not separate key material from information what key algorithm
group it is for. When using keys, check that the algorithm is
compatible with the key algorithm group for the key. To do otherwise
opens system up to attacks via mixing up algorithms. It is
practicularly dangerous to mix up signature and MAC algorithms.
Do not assume that signature also binds the key used for signing, it
does not (there are also other widespread signature algorithms where
this binding fails, as such binding is not part of the definition of
secure signature primitive). As an example of such failure, the
Ed25519ph signature of X under key (Ed25519ph,Y) is identical to
Ed25519 signature of SHA512(X) under key (Ed25519,Y). And often it
takes only setting a few bits of message (easy to do by brute force)
to make the message valid enough to be processed in some very
surprising way.
If key generation or batch signature verification is performed, a
well-seed cryptographical random number generator is REQUIRED.
Signing and non-batch signature verification are deterministic
operations and do not need random numbers of any kind.
5. Acknowledgements
Mike Jones for comments on initial pre-draft.
6. IANA considerations
The following is added to JSON Web Key Types Registry:
o "kty" Parameter Value: "OKP"
o Key Type Description: Octet string key pairs
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [RFC-THIS]
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The following is added to JSON Web Key Parameters Registry:
o Parameter Name: "crv"
o Parameter Description: The algorithm group of keypair
o Parameter Information Class: Public
o Used with "kty" Value(s): "OKP"
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [RFC-THIS]
o Parameter Name: "d"
o Parameter Description: The private key
o Parameter Information Class: Private
o Used with "kty" Value(s): "OKP"
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [RFC-THIS]
o Parameter Name: "x"
o Parameter Description: The public key
o Parameter Information Class: Public
o Used with "kty" Value(s): "OKP"
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2 of [RFC-THIS]
The following is added to JSON Web Signature and Encryption
Algorithms Registry:
o Algorithm Name: "Ed25519"
o Algorithm Description: Ed25519 signature algorithm
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [RFC-THIS]
o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa]
o Algorithm Name: "Ed25519ph"
o Algorithm Description: Ed25519 signature algorithm with prehash
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [RFC-THIS]
o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa]
o Algorithm Name: "Ed448"
o Algorithm Description: Ed448 signature algorithm
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
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o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [RFC-THIS]
o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa]
o Algorithm Name: "Ed448ph"
o Algorithm Description: Ed448 signature algorithm with prehash
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [RFC-THIS]
o Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa]
The following is added to JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve Registry:
o Curve Name: "Ed25519"
o Curve Description: Ed25519 signature algorithm keypairs
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [RFC-THIS]
o Curve Name: "Ed25519ph"
o Curve Description: Ed25519 signature algorithm with prehash
keypairs
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [RFC-THIS]
o Curve Name: "Ed448"
o Curve Description: Ed448 signature algorithm keypairs
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [RFC-THIS]
o Curve Name: "Ed448ph"
o Curve Description: Ed448 signature algorithm with prehash keypairs
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [RFC-THIS]
o Curve name: "X25519"
o Curve Description: X25519 function keypairs
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of [RFC-THIS]
o Analysis Documents(s): [I-D.irtf-cfrg-curves]
o Curve Name: "X448"
o Curve Description: X448 function keypairs
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o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of [RFC-THIS]
o Analysis Documents(s): [I-D.irtf-cfrg-curves]
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-curves]
Langley, A. and M. Hamburg, "Elliptic Curves for
Security", draft-irtf-cfrg-curves-11 (work in progress),
October 2015.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", draft-irtf-cfrg-eddsa-01
(work in progress), December 2015.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC7517] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7517>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
[RFC7638] Jones, M. and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Key (JWK)
Thumbprint", RFC 7638, DOI 10.17487/RFC7638, September
2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7638>.
Appendix A. Examples
To the extent possible, the examples use material lifted from test
vectors of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-curves] and [I-D.irtf-cfrg-eddsa]
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A.1. Ed25519 private key
{"kty":"OKP","crv":"Ed25519",
"d":"nWGxne_9WmC6hEr0kuwsxERJxWl7MmkZcDusAxyuf2A"
"x":"11qYAYKxCrfVS_7TyWQHOg7hcvPapiMlrwIaaPcHURo"}
The hexadecimal dump of private key is:
9d 61 b1 9d ef fd 5a 60 ba 84 4a f4 92 ec 2c c4
44 49 c5 69 7b 32 69 19 70 3b ac 03 1c ae 7f 60
And of the public key:
d7 5a 98 01 82 b1 0a b7 d5 4b fe d3 c9 64 07 3a
0e e1 72 f3 da a6 23 25 af 02 1a 68 f7 07 51 1a
A.2. Ed25519 public key
This is the public parts of the previous private key (just omits
"d"):
{"kty":"OKP","crv":"Ed25519",
"x":"11qYAYKxCrfVS_7TyWQHOg7hcvPapiMlrwIaaPcHURo"}
A.3. JWK thumbprint canonicalization
The JWK thumbprint canonicalization of the two above examples is
(linebreak inserted for formatting reasons)
{"crv":"Ed25519","kty":"OKP","x":"11qYAYKxCrfVS_7TyWQHOg7hcvPapiMlrwI
aaPcHURo"}
Which has the SHA-256 hash of:
90facafea9b1556698540f70c0117a22ea37bd5cf3ed3c47093c1707282b4b89
A.4. Ed25519 Signing
The JWS protected header is:
{"alg":"Ed25519"}
This has base64url encoding of:
eyJhbGciOiJFZDI1NTE5In0
The payload is (text):
Example of Ed25519 signing
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This has base64url encoding of:
RXhhbXBsZSBvZiBFZDI1NTE5IHNpZ25pbmc
The JWS signing input is (concatenation of base64url encoding of the
(protected) header, a dot and base64url encoding of the payload) is:
eyJhbGciOiJFZDI1NTE5In0.RXhhbXBsZSBvZiBFZDI1NTE5IHNpZ25pbmc
Applying Ed25519 signing algorithm to the private key, public key and
the JWS signing input yields signature (hex):
53 18 48 60 b1 c6 83 7f 4d 54 22 e9 40 05 43 fd
47 1f 3a 69 c6 48 2c cb 15 9a 17 62 42 e2 21 b1
5c 72 63 9b fe a3 9b b2 08 f3 2c ab 1f 27 0f b8
36 57 1c 52 0b d8 ac 41 eb 45 b3 55 d0 77 19 01
Converting this to base64url yields:
UxhIYLHGg39NVCLpQAVD_UcfOmnGSCzLFZoXYkLiIbFccmOb_qObsgjzLKsfJw-4NlccU
gvYrEHrRbNV0HcZAQ
So the compact serialization of JWS is (concatenation of signing
input, a dot and base64url encoding of the signature:
eyJhbGciOiJFZDI1NTE5In0.RXhhbXBsZSBvZiBFZDI1NTE5IHNpZ25pbmc.UxhIYLHGg
39NVCLpQAVD_UcfOmnGSCzLFZoXYkLiIbFccmOb_qObsgjzLKsfJw-4NlccUgvYrEHrRb
NV0HcZAQ
A.5. Ed25519 Validation
The JWS from above example is:
eyJhbGciOiJFZDI1NTE5In0.RXhhbXBsZSBvZiBFZDI1NTE5IHNpZ25pbmc.UxhIYLHGg
39NVCLpQAVD_UcfOmnGSCzLFZoXYkLiIbFccmOb_qObsgjzLKsfJw-4NlccUgvYrEHrRb
NV0HcZAQ
This has 2 dots in it, so it might be valid JWS. Base64url decoding
the protected header yields:
{"alg":"Ed25519"}
So this is Ed25519 signature. Now the key has: "kty":"OKP" and
"crv":"Ed25519", so the key is valid for the algorithm (if it had
other values, the validation would have failed).
The signing input is the part before second dot:
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eyJhbGciOiJFZDI1NTE5In0.RXhhbXBsZSBvZiBFZDI1NTE5IHNpZ25pbmc
Applying Ed25519 verification algorithm to the public key, JWS
signing input and the signature yields true. So the signature is
valid. The message is base64 decoding of the part between the dots:
Example of Ed25519 signing
A.6. ECDH-ES with X25519
The public key to encrypt to is:
{"kty":"OKP","crv":"X25519","kid":"Bob"
"x":"3p7bfXt9wbTTW2HC7OQ1Nz-DQ8hbeGdNrfx-FG-IK08"}
The public key from target key is (hex):
de 9e db 7d 7b 7d c1 b4 d3 5b 61 c2 ec e4 35 37
3f 83 43 c8 5b 78 67 4d ad fc 7e 14 6f 88 2b 4f
The ephemeral secret happens to be (hex):
77 07 6d 0a 73 18 a5 7d 3c 16 c1 72 51 b2 66 45
df 4c 2f 87 eb c0 99 2a b1 77 fb a5 1d b9 2c 2a
So the ephemeral public key is X25519(ephkey,G) (hex):
85 20 f0 09 89 30 a7 54 74 8b 7d dc b4 3e f7 5a
0d bf 3a 0d 26 38 1a f4 eb a4 a9 8e aa 9b 4e 6a
This is packed into ephemeral public key value:
{"kty":"OKP","crv":"X25519",
"x":"hSDwCYkwp1R0i33ctD73Wg2_Og0mOBr066SpjqqbTmo"}
So the protected header could for example be:
{"alg":"ECDH-ES+A128KW","epk":{"kty":"OKP","crv":"X25519",
"x":"hSDwCYkwp1R0i33ctD73Wg2_Og0mOBr066SpjqqbTmo"},
"enc":"A128GCM","kid":"Bob"}
And sender computes as the DH Z value as X25519(ephkey,recv_pub)
(hex):
4a 5d 9d 5b a4 ce 2d e1 72 8e 3b f4 80 35 0f 25
e0 7e 21 c9 47 d1 9e 33 76 f0 9b 3c 1e 16 17 42
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The receiver computes as the DH Z value as X25519(seckey,ephkey_pub)
(hex):
4a 5d 9d 5b a4 ce 2d e1 72 8e 3b f4 80 35 0f 25
e0 7e 21 c9 47 d1 9e 33 76 f0 9b 3c 1e 16 17 42
Which is the same as sender's value (the both sides run this through
KDF before using as AES128-KW key).
A.7. ECDH-ES with X448
The public key to encrypt to is (linebreak inserted for formatting
reasons):
{"kty":"OKP","crv":"X448","kid":"Dave"
"x":"PreoKbDNIPW8_AtZm2_sz22kYnEHvbDU80W0MCfYuXL8PjT7QjKhPKcG3LV67D2
uB73BxnvzNgk"}
The public key from target key is (hex):
3e b7 a8 29 b0 cd 20 f5 bc fc 0b 59 9b 6f ec cf
6d a4 62 71 07 bd b0 d4 f3 45 b4 30 27 d8 b9 72
fc 3e 34 fb 42 32 a1 3c a7 06 dc b5 7a ec 3d ae
07 bd c1 c6 7b f3 36 09
The ephemeral secret happens to be (hex):
9a 8f 49 25 d1 51 9f 57 75 cf 46 b0 4b 58 00 d4
ee 9e e8 ba e8 bc 55 65 d4 98 c2 8d d9 c9 ba f5
74 a9 41 97 44 89 73 91 00 63 82 a6 f1 27 ab 1d
9a c2 d8 c0 a5 98 72 6b
So the ephemeral public key is X448(ephkey,G) (hex):
9b 08 f7 cc 31 b7 e3 e6 7d 22 d5 ae a1 21 07 4a
27 3b d2 b8 3d e0 9c 63 fa a7 3d 2c 22 c5 d9 bb
c8 36 64 72 41 d9 53 d4 0c 5b 12 da 88 12 0d 53
17 7f 80 e5 32 c4 1f a0
This is packed into ephemeral public key value (linebreak inserted
for formatting purposes):
{"kty":"OKP","crv":"X448",
"x":"mwj3zDG34-Z9ItWuoSEHSic70rg94Jxj-qc9LCLF2bvINmRyQdlT1AxbEtqIEg1
TF3-A5TLEH6A"}
So the protected header could for example be (linebreak inserted for
formatting purposes):
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{"alg":"ECDH-ES+A256KW","epk":{"kty":"OKP","crv":"X448",
"x":"mwj3zDG34-Z9ItWuoSEHSic70rg94Jxj-qc9LCLF2bvINmRyQdlT1AxbEtqIEg1
TF3-A5TLEH6A"},"enc":"A256GCM","kid":"Dave"}
And sender computes as the DH Z value as X448(ephkey,recv_pub) (hex):
07 ff f4 18 1a c6 cc 95 ec 1c 16 a9 4a 0f 74 d1
2d a2 32 ce 40 a7 75 52 28 1d 28 2b b6 0c 0b 56
fd 24 64 c3 35 54 39 36 52 1c 24 40 30 85 d5 9a
44 9a 50 37 51 4a 87 9d
The receiver computes as the DH Z value as X448(seckey,ephkey_pub)
(hex):
07 ff f4 18 1a c6 cc 95 ec 1c 16 a9 4a 0f 74 d1
2d a2 32 ce 40 a7 75 52 28 1d 28 2b b6 0c 0b 56
fd 24 64 c3 35 54 39 36 52 1c 24 40 30 85 d5 9a
44 9a 50 37 51 4a 87 9d
Which is the same as sender's value (the both sides run this through
KDF before using as AES256-KW key).
Author's Address
Ilari Liusvaara
Independent
Email: ilariliusvaara@welho.com
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