Internet DRAFT - draft-livingood-dont-switch-resolvers

draft-livingood-dont-switch-resolvers







Domain Name System Operations                               J. Livingood
Internet-Draft                                                   Comcast
Intended status: Best Current Practice                September 24, 2014
Expires: March 28, 2015


     In Case of DNSSEC Validation Failures, Do Not Change Resolvers
                draft-livingood-dont-switch-resolvers-02

Abstract

   DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) is beginning widespread deployment.
   However, domain signing tools and processes are not yet as mature and
   reliable as is the case for non-DNSSEC-related domain administration
   tools and processes.  As a result, some DNSSEC validation failures
   may occur.  When these failures do occur, end users SHOULD NOT change
   to a non-validating DNS resolver.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 28, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of




Livingood                Expires March 28, 2015                 [Page 1]

Internet-Draft           Do Not Change Resolvers          September 2014


   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Domain Validation Failures  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   4.  Misunderstanding DNSSEC Validation Failures . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Comparison to Other DNS Misconfigurations . . . . . . . . . .   3
   6.  Switching to a Non-Validating Resolver is NOT Recommended . .   3
   7.  Other Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.1.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.2.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     7.3.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   8.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   9.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Appendix A.  Document Change Log  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Appendix B.  Open Issues  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5

1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2.  Introduction

   The Domain Name System (DNS), DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC), and
   related operational practices are defined extensively [RFC1034]
   [RFC1035] [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035] [RFC4398] [RFC4509] [RFC6781]
   [RFC5155].

   DNSSEC has now entered widespread deployment.  However, domain
   signing tools and processes are not yet as mature and reliable as is
   the case for non-DNSSEC-related domain administration tools and
   processes.  As a result, some DNSSEC validation failures may occur.
   When these failures do occur, end users SHOULD NOT change to a non-
   validating DNS resolver.

3.  Domain Validation Failures

   A domain name can fail validation for two general reasons, a
   legitimate security failure such as due to an attack or compromise of
   some sort, or as a result of misconfiguration (mistake) on the part
   of an domain administrator.  There is no way for end users to discern
   which of these issues has caused a DNSSEC-signed domain to fail



Livingood                Expires March 28, 2015                 [Page 2]

Internet-Draft           Do Not Change Resolvers          September 2014


   validation, and end users should therefore assume that it may be due
   to a legitimate security problem.

4.  Misunderstanding DNSSEC Validation Failures

   End users may incorrectly interpret the failure to reach a domain due
   to DNSSEC-related misconfiguration as their ISP or DNS resolver
   operator purposely blocking access to the domain, or as a
   performance-related failure on the part of their ISP.  In reality,
   these failures may be due to a security issue of which the end user
   is not aware.

5.  Comparison to Other DNS Misconfigurations

   Authoritative DNS-related mistakes and errors typically affect the
   entire Internet, and all DNS recursive resolver operators equally.
   So for example, in an A record is incorrect, an end user would get
   the incorrect record in a DNS response no matter what resolver they
   used.

   In contrast to this, DNSSEC-related mistakes, errors, or validation
   security failures would only affect end users of validating
   resolvers.

6.  Switching to a Non-Validating Resolver is NOT Recommended

   As noted in Section 4 some end users may not understand why a domain
   fails to validate on one network but not another (or with one DNS
   resolver but not another) Section 5.  As a result, they may consider
   switching to an alternative, non-validating resolver themselves.  But
   if a domain fails DNSSEC validation and is inaccessible, this could
   very well be due to a security-related issue.

   As a best practice: In order to be as safe and secure as possible,
   end users SHOULD NOT change to DNS servers that do not perform DNSSEC
   validation as a workaround.

   Even if a website in a domain seems to look "normal" and valid,
   according to the DNSSEC protocol, that domain is not secure.  Domains
   that fail DNSSEC for legitimate reasons may be in control of hackers
   or there could be other significant security issues with the domain.
   Thus, switching to a non-validating resolver to restore access to a
   domain that fails DNSSEC validation is NOT recommended and is
   potentially harmful to end user security.







Livingood                Expires March 28, 2015                 [Page 3]

Internet-Draft           Do Not Change Resolvers          September 2014


7.  Other Considerations

7.1.  Security Considerations

   The use of a non-validating DNS recursive resolver has comparatively
   less security capabilities than a validating resolver, since one
   implements DNS Security Extensions and one does not.

   In the case of a DNSSEC validation failure, if an end user changes to
   a non-validating resolver they may subject themselves to increased
   security risks and threats against which DNS Security Extensions may
   have provided protection.

7.2.  Privacy Considerations

   There are no privacy considerations in this document.

7.3.  IANA Considerations

   There are no IANA considerations in this document.

8.  Acknowledgements

   - William Brown

9.  Normative References

   [RFC1034]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
              STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
              4033, March 2005.

   [RFC4034]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
              RFC 4034, March 2005.

   [RFC4035]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
              Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.




Livingood                Expires March 28, 2015                 [Page 4]

Internet-Draft           Do Not Change Resolvers          September 2014


   [RFC4398]  Josefsson, S., "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name
              System (DNS)", RFC 4398, March 2006.

   [RFC4509]  Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer
              (DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006.

   [RFC5155]  Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS
              Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of
              Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008.

   [RFC5914]  Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor
              Format", RFC 5914, June 2010.

   [RFC6781]  Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC
              Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781, December
              2012.

Appendix A.  Document Change Log

   [RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication]

   -00: First version published as an individual draft.

   -01: Fixed nits identified by William Brown

   -02: Updated prior to IETF-91

Appendix B.  Open Issues

   [RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication]

Author's Address

   Jason Livingood
   Comcast Cable Communications
   One Comcast Center
   1701 John F. Kennedy Boulevard
   Philadelphia, PA  19103
   US

   Email: jason_livingood@cable.comcast.com
   URI:   http://www.comcast.com









Livingood                Expires March 28, 2015                 [Page 5]