Internet DRAFT - draft-looker-cfrg-bbs-signatures
draft-looker-cfrg-bbs-signatures
CFRG T. Looker
Internet-Draft V. Kalos
Intended status: Informational MATTR
Expires: 9 January 2023 A. Whitehead
Portage
M. Lodder
CryptID
8 July 2022
The BBS Signature Scheme
draft-looker-cfrg-bbs-signatures-01
Abstract
BBS is a digital signature scheme categorized as a form of short
group signature that supports several unique properties. Notably,
the scheme supports signing multiple messages whilst producing a
single output digital signature. Through this capability, the
possessor of a signature is able to generate proofs that selectively
disclose subsets of the originally signed set of messages, whilst
preserving the verifiable authenticity and integrity of the messages.
Furthermore, these proofs are said to be zero-knowledge in nature as
they do not reveal the underlying signature; instead, what they
reveal is a proof of knowledge of the undisclosed signature.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/decentralized-identity/bbs-signature.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
This Internet-Draft will expire on 9 January 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. Organization of this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Scheme Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.1. Subgroup Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2.2. Messages and generators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Key Generation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3.1. KeyGen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3.2. SkToPk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4. Core Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4.1. Sign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.4.2. Verify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.4.3. ProofGen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4.4. ProofVerify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4. Utility Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.1. Generator point computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2. MapMessageToScalar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.1. MapMessageToScalarAsHash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3. Hash to Scalar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.4. Serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4.1. OctetsToSignature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4.2. SignatureToOctets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4.3. OctetsToProof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.4.4. ProofToOctets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.4.5. OctetsToPublicKey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.4.6. EncodeForHash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.1. Validating public keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5.2. Point de-serialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.3. Skipping membership checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.4. Side channel attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.5. Randomness considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5.6. Presentation header selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.7. Implementing hash_to_curve_g1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.8. Choice of underlying curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.9. Security of proofs generated by ProofGen . . . . . . . . 33
6. Ciphersuites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.1. Ciphersuite Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.1.1. Ciphersuite ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.1.2. Additional Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2. BLS12-381 Ciphersuite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.2.1. Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
10. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix A. BLS12-381 hash_to_curve definition using
SHAKE-256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A.1. BLS12-381 G1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix B. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
B.1. Non-correlating Security Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
B.2. Improved Bearer Security Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
B.3. Selectively Disclosure Enabled Identity Credentials . . . 44
Appendix C. Additional BLS12-381 Ciphersuite Test Vectors . . . 44
C.1. Modified Message Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
C.2. Extra Unsigned Message Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
C.3. Missing Message Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
C.4. Reordered Message Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
C.5. Wrong Public Key Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Appendix D. Proof Generation and Verification Algorithmic
Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Appendix E. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1. Introduction
A digital signature scheme is a fundamental cryptographic primitive
that is used to provide data integrity and verifiable authenticity in
various protocols. The core premise of digital signature technology
is built upon asymmetric cryptography where-by the possessor of a
private key is able to sign a message, where anyone in possession of
the corresponding public key matching that of the private key is able
to verify the signature.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
The name BBS is derived from the authors of the original academic
work of Dan Boneh, Xavier Boyen, and Hovav Shacham, where the scheme
was first described.
Beyond the core properties of a digital signature scheme, BBS
signatures provide multiple additional unique properties, three key
ones are:
*Selective Disclosure* - The scheme allows a signer to sign multiple
messages and produce a single -constant size- output signature. A
holder/prover then possessing the messages and the signature can
generate a proof whereby they can choose which messages to disclose,
while revealing no-information about the undisclosed messages. The
proof itself guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the
disclosed messages (e.g. that they were originally signed by the
signer).
*Unlinkable Proofs* - The proofs generated by the scheme are known as
zero-knowledge, proofs-of-knowledge of the signature, meaning a
verifying party in receipt of a proof is unable to determine which
signature was used to generate the proof, removing a common source of
correlation. In general, each proof generated is indistinguishable
from random even for two proofs generated from the same signature.
*Proof of Possession* - The proofs generated by the scheme prove to a
verifier that the party who generated the proof (holder/prover) was
in possession of a signature without revealing it. The scheme also
supports binding a presentation header to the generated proof. The
presentation header can include arbitrary information such as a
cryptographic nonce, an audience/domain identifier and or time based
validity information.
Refer to the Appendix B for an elaboration on situations where these
properties are useful
Below is a basic diagram describing the main entities involved in the
scheme
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
(1) sign (3) ProofGen
+----- +-----
| | | |
| | | |
| \ / | \ /
+----------+ +-----------+
| | | |
| | | |
| | | |
| Signer |---(2)* Send signature + msgs----->| Holder/ |
| | | Prover |
| | | |
| | | |
+----------+ +-----------+
|
|
|
(4)* Send proof + disclosed msgs
|
|
\ /
+-----------+
| |
| |
| |
| Verifier |
| |
| |
| |
+-----------+
| / \
| |
| |
+-----
(5) ProofVerify
Figure 1: Basic diagram capturing the main entities involved in
using the scheme
*Note* The protocols implied by the items annotated by an asterisk
are out of scope for this specification
1.1. Terminology
The following terminology is used throughout this document:
SK The secret key for the signature scheme.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
PK The public key for the signature scheme.
L The total number of signed messages.
R The number of message indexes that are disclosed (revealed) in a
proof-of-knowledge of a signature.
U The number of message indexes that are undisclosed in a proof-of-
knowledge of a signature.
msg An input message to be signed by the signature scheme.
generator A valid point on the selected subgroup of the curve being
used that is employed to commit a value.
signature The digital signature output.
nonce A cryptographic nonce
presentation_header (ph) A payload generated and bound to the
context of a specific spk.
nizk A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof from fiat-shamir
heuristic.
dst The domain separation tag.
I2OSP As defined by Section 4 of [RFC8017]
OS2IP As defined by Section 4 of [RFC8017].
1.2. Notation
The following notation and primitives are used:
a || b Denotes the concatenation of octet strings a and b.
I \ J For sets I and J, denotes the difference of the two sets i.e.,
all the elements of I that do not appear in J, in the same order
as they were in I.
X[a..b] Denotes a slice of the array X containing all elements from
and including the value at index a until and including the value
at index b. Note when this syntax is applied to an octet string,
each element in the array X is assumed to be a single byte.
range(a, b) For integers a and b, with a <= b, denotes the ascending
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
ordered list of all integers between a and b inclusive (i.e., the
integers "i" such that a <= i <= b).
utf8(ascii_string) Encoding the inputted ASCII string to an octet
string using UTF-8 character encoding.
length(input) Takes as input either an array or an octet string. If
the input is an array, returns the number of elements of the
array. If the input is an octet string, returns the number of
bytes of the inputted octet string.
Terms specific to pairing-friendly elliptic curves that are relevant
to this document are restated below, originally defined in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves]
E1, E2 elliptic curve groups defined over finite fields. This
document assumes that E1 has a more compact representation than
E2, i.e., because E1 is defined over a smaller field than E2.
G1, G2 subgroups of E1 and E2 (respectively) having prime order r.
GT a subgroup, of prime order r, of the multiplicative group of a
field extension.
e G1 x G2 -> GT: a non-degenerate bilinear map.
r The prime order of the G1 and G2 subgroups.
P1, P2 points on G1 and G2 respectively. For a pairing-friendly
curve, this document denotes operations in E1 and E2 in additive
notation, i.e., P + Q denotes point addition and x * P denotes
scalar multiplication. Operations in GT are written in
multiplicative notation, i.e., a * b is field multiplication.
Identity_G1, Identity_G2, Identity_GT The identity element for the
G1, G2, and GT subgroups respectively.
hash_to_curve_g1(ostr, dst) -> P A cryptographic hash function that
takes an arbitrary octet string as input and returns a point in
G1, using the hash_to_curve operation defined in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] and the inputted dst as the domain
separation tag for that operation (more specifically, the inputted
dst will become the DST parameter for the hash_to_field operation,
called by hash_to_curve).
point_to_octets_g1(P) -> ostr, point_to_octets_g2(P) -> ostr returns
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
the canonical representation of the point P for the respective
subgroup as an octet string. This operation is also known as
serialization.
octets_to_point_g1(ostr) -> P, octets_to_point_g2(ostr) -> P returns
the point P for the respective subgroup corresponding to the
canonical representation ostr, or INVALID if ostr is not a valid
output of the respective point_to_octets_g* function. This
operation is also known as deserialization.
subgroup_check(P) -> VALID or INVALID returns VALID when the point P
is an element of the subgroup of order r, and INVALID otherwise.
This function can always be implemented by checking that r * P is
equal to the identity element. In some cases, faster checks may
also exist, e.g., [Bowe19].
1.3. Organization of this document
This document is organized as follows:
* Scheme Definition (#scheme-definition) defines the core operations
and parameters for the BBS signature scheme.
* Utility Operations (#utility-operations) defines utilities used by
the BBS signature scheme.
* Security Considerations (#security-considerations) describes a set
of security considerations associated to the signature scheme.
* Ciphersuites (#ciphersuites) defines the format of a ciphersuite,
alongside a concrete ciphersuite based on the BLS12-381 curve.
2. Conventions
The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this
document, are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Scheme Definition
This section defines the BBS signature scheme, including the
parameters required to define a concrete ciphersuite.
3.1. Parameters
The schemes operations defined in this section depend on the
following parameters:
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
* A pairing-friendly elliptic curve, plus associated functionality
given in Section 1.2 (#notation).
* A hash-to-curve suite as defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve],
using the aforementioned pairing-friendly curve. This defines the
hash_to_curve and expand_message operations, used by this
document.
* PRF(n): a pseudo-random function similar to [RFC4868]. Returns n
pseudo randomly generated bytes.
3.2. Considerations
3.2.1. Subgroup Selection
In definition of this signature scheme there are two possible
variations based upon the sub-group selection, namely where public
keys are defined in G2 and signatures in G1 OR the opposite where
public keys are defined in G1 and signatures in G2. Some pairing
cryptography based digital signature schemes such as
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-bls-signature] elect to allow for both variations,
because they optimize for different things. However, in the case of
this scheme, due to the operations involved in both signature and
proof generation being computational in-efficient when performed in
G2 and in the pursuit of simplicity, the scheme is limited to a
construction where public keys are in G2 and signatures in G1.
3.2.2. Messages and generators
Throughout the operations of this signature scheme, each message that
is signed is paired with a specific generator (point in G1).
Specifically, if a generator H_1 is multiplied with msg_1 during
signing, then H_1 MUST be multiplied with msg_1 in all other
operations (signature verification, proof generation and proof
verification).
Aside from the message generators, the scheme uses two additional
generators: Q_1 and Q_2. The first (Q_1), is used for the blinding
value (s) of the signature. The second generator (Q_2), is used to
sign the signature's domain, which binds both the signature and
generated proofs to a specific context and cryptographically protects
any potential application-specific information (for example, messages
that must always be disclosed etc.).
3.3. Key Generation Operations
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
3.3.1. KeyGen
This operation generates a secret key (SK) deterministically from a
secret octet string (IKM).
KeyGen uses an HKDF [RFC5869] instantiated with the hash function
hash.
For security, IKM MUST be infeasible to guess, e.g. generated by a
trusted source of randomness.
IKM MUST be at least 32 bytes long, but it MAY be longer.
Because KeyGen is deterministic, implementations MAY choose either to
store the resulting SK or to store IKM and call KeyGen to derive SK
when necessary.
KeyGen takes an optional parameter, key_info. This parameter MAY be
used to derive multiple independent keys from the same IKM. By
default, key_info is the empty string.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
SK = KeyGen(IKM, key_info)
Inputs:
- IKM (REQUIRED), a secret octet string. See requirements above.
- key_info (OPTIONAL), an octet string. if this is not supplied, it
MUST default to an empty string.
Definitions:
- HKDF-Extract is as defined in [@!RFC5869], instantiated with hash function hash.
- HKDF-Expand is as defined in [@!RFC5869], instantiated with hash function hash.
- I2OSP and OS2IP are as defined in [@!RFC8017], Section 4.
- L is the integer given by ceil((3 * ceil(log2(r))) / 16).
- INITSALT is the ASCII string "BBS-SIG-KEYGEN-SALT-".
Outputs:
- SK, a uniformly random integer such that 0 < SK < r.
Procedure:
1. salt = INITSALT
2. SK = 0
3. while SK == 0:
4. salt = hash(salt)
5. PRK = HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM || I2OSP(0, 1))
6. OKM = HKDF-Expand(PRK, key_info || I2OSP(L, 2), L)
7. SK = OS2IP(OKM) mod r
8. return SK
*Note* This operation is the RECOMMENDED way of generating a secret
key, but its use is not required for compatibility, and
implementations MAY use a different KeyGen procedure. For security,
such an alternative MUST output a secret key that is statistically
close to uniformly random in the range 0 < SK < r.
3.3.2. SkToPk
This operation takes a secret key (SK) and outputs a corresponding
public key (PK).
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
PK = SkToPk(SK)
Inputs:
- SK (REQUIRED), a secret integer such that 0 < SK < r.
Outputs:
- PK, a public key encoded as an octet string.
Procedure:
1. W = SK * P2
2. return point_to_octets_g2(W)
3.4. Core Operations
The operations in this section make use of a "Precomputations" set of
steps. The "Precomputations" steps must be executed before the steps
in the "Procedure" of each operation and include computations that
can be cached and re-used multiple times (like creating the
generators etc.) or procedural steps like de-structuring inputted
arrays.
3.4.1. Sign
This operation computes a deterministic signature from a secret key
(SK) and optionally over a header and or a vector of messages.
signature = Sign(SK, PK, header, messages)
Inputs:
- SK (REQUIRED), a non negative integer mod r outputted by the KeyGen
operation.
- PK (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the SkToPk
operation provided the above SK as input.
- header (OPTIONAL), an octet string containing context and application
specific information. If not supplied, it defaults
to an empty string.
- messages (OPTIONAL), a vector of scalars. If not supplied, it defaults
to the empty array "()".
Parameters:
- ciphersuite_id, ASCII string. The unique ID of the ciphersuite.
- generator_seed, ASCII string. The generators seed defined by the
ciphersuite
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
Definitions:
- L, is the non-negative integer representing the number of messages to
be signed e.g length(messages). If no messages are supplied as an
input, the value of L MUST evaluate to zero (0).
Outputs:
- signature, a signature encoded as an octet string.
Precomputations:
1. msg_1, ..., msg_L = messages[1], ..., messages[L]
2. (Q_1, Q_2, H_1, ..., H_L) = create_generators(generator_seed, L+2)
Procedure:
1. dom_array = (PK, L, Q_1, Q_2, H_1, ..., H_L, ciphersuite_id, header)
2. dom_for_hash = encode_for_hash(dom_array)
3. if dom_for_hash is INVALID, return INVALID
4. domain = hash_to_scalar(dom_for_hash, 1)
5. e_s_for_hash = encode_for_hash((SK, domain, msg_1, ..., msg_L))
6. if e_s_for_hash is INVALID, return INVALID
7. (e, s) = hash_to_scalar(e_s_for_hash, 2)
8. B = P1 + Q_1 * s + Q_2 * domain + H_1 * msg_1 + ... + H_L * msg_L
9. A = B * (1 / (SK + e))
10. signature_octets = signature_to_octets(A, e, s)
11. return signature_octets
*Note* When computing step 9 of the above procedure there is an
extremely small probability (around 2^(-r)) that the condition (SK +
e) = 0 mod r will be met. How implementations evaluate the inverse
of the scalar value 0 may vary, with some returning an error and
others returning 0 as a result. If the returned value from the
inverse operation 1/(SK + e) does evaluate to 0 the value of A will
equal Identity_G1 thus an invalid signature. Implementations MAY
elect to check (SK + e) = 0 mod r prior to step 9, and or A !=
Identity_G1 after step 9 to prevent the production of invalid
signatures.
3.4.2. Verify
This operation checks that a signature is valid for a given header
and vector of messages against a supplied public key (PK). The
messages MUST be supplied in this operation in the same order they
were supplied to Sign (#sign) when creating the signature.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
result = Verify(PK, signature, header, messages)
Inputs:
- PK (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the SkToPk
operation.
- signature (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the
Sign operation.
- header (OPTIONAL), an octet string containing context and application
specific information. If not supplied, it defaults
to an empty string.
- messages (OPTIONAL), a vector of scalars. If not supplied, it defaults
to the empty array "()".
Parameters:
- ciphersuite_id, ASCII string. The unique ID of the ciphersuite.
- generator_seed, ASCII string. The generators seed defined by the
ciphersuite.
Definitions:
- L, is the non-negative integer representing the number of messages to
be signed e.g length(messages). If no messages are supplied as an
input, the value of L MUST evaluate to zero (0).
Outputs:
- result, either VALID or INVALID.
Precomputations:
1. (msg_1, ..., msg_L) = messages
2. (Q_1, Q_2, H_1, ..., H_L) = create_generators(generator_seed, L+2)
Procedure:
1. signature_result = octets_to_signature(signature)
2. if signature_result is INVALID, return INVALID
3. (A, e, s) = signature_result
4. W = octets_to_pubkey(PK)
5. if W is INVALID, return INVALID
6. dom_array = (PK, L, Q_1, Q_2, H_1, ..., H_L, ciphersuite_id, header)
7. dom_for_hash = encode_for_hash(dom_array)
8. if dom_for_hash is INVALID, return INVALID
9. domain = hash_to_scalar(dom_for_hash, 1)
10. B = P1 + Q_1 * s + Q_2 * domain + H_1 * msg_1 + ... + H_L * msg_L
11. if e(A, W + P2 * e) * e(B, -P2) != Identity_GT, return INVALID
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
12. return VALID
3.4.3. ProofGen
This operation computes a zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge of a
signature, while optionally selectively disclosing from the original
set of signed messages. The "prover" may also supply a presentation
header, see Presentation header selection (#presentation-header-
selection) for more details.
The messages supplied in this operation MUST be in the same order as
when supplied to Sign (#sign). To specify which of those messages
will be disclosed, the prover can supply the list of indexes
(disclosed_indexes) that the disclosed messages have in the array of
signed messages. Each element in disclosed_indexes MUST be a non-
negative integer, in the range from 1 to length(messages).
proof = ProofGen(PK, signature, header, ph, messages, disclosed_indexes)
Inputs:
- PK (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the SkToPk
operation.
- signature (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the
Sign operation.
- header (OPTIONAL), an octet string containing context and application
specific information. If not supplied, it defaults
to an empty string.
- ph (OPTIONAL), octet string containing the presentation header. If not
supplied, it defaults to an empty string.
- messages (OPTIONAL), a vector of scalars. If not supplied, it defaults
to the empty array "()".
- disclosed_indexes (OPTIONAL), vector of unsigned integers in ascending
order. Indexes of disclosed messages. If
not supplied, it defaults to the empty
array "()".
Parameters:
- ciphersuite_id, ASCII string. The unique ID of the ciphersuite.
- generator_seed, ASCII string. The generators seed defined by the
ciphersuite.
Definitions:
- L, is the non-negative integer representing the number of messages,
i.e., L = length(messages). If no messages are supplied, the
value of L MUST evaluate to zero (0).
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
- R, is the non-negative integer representing the number of disclosed
(revealed) messages, i.e., R = length(disclosed_indexes). If no
messages are disclosed, R MUST evaluate to zero (0).
- U, is the non-negative integer representing the number of undisclosed
messages, i.e., U = L - R.
- prf_len = ceil(ceil(log2(r))/8), where r defined by the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- proof, octet string; or INVALID.
Precomputations:
1. (i1, ..., iR) = disclosed_indexes
2. (j1, ..., jU) = range(1, L) \ disclosed_indexes
3. (msg_1, ..., msg_L) = messages
4. (msg_i1, ..., msg_iR) = (messages[i1], ..., messages[iR])
5. (msg_j1, ..., msg_jU) = (messages[j1], ..., messages[jU])
6. (Q_1, Q_2, MsgGenerators) = create_generators(generator_seed, L+2)
7. (H_1, ..., H_L) = MsgGenerators
8. (H_j1, ..., H_jU) = (MsgGenerators[j1], ..., MsgGenerators[jU])
Procedure:
1. signature_result = octets_to_signature(signature)
2. if signature_result is INVALID, return INVALID
3. (A, e, s) = signature_result
4. dom_array = (PK, L, Q_1, Q_2, H_1, ..., H_L, ciphersuite_id, header)
5. dom_for_hash = encode_for_hash(dom_array)
6. if dom_for_hash is INVALID, return INVALID
7. domain = hash_to_scalar(dom_for_hash, 1)
8. (r1, r2, e~, r2~, r3~, s~) = hash_to_scalar(PRF(prf_len), 6)
9. (m~_j1, ..., m~_jU) = hash_to_scalar(PRF(prf_len), U)
10. B = P1 + Q_1 * s + Q_2 * domain + H_1 * msg_1 + ... + H_L * msg_L
11. r3 = r1 ^ -1 mod r
12. A' = A * r1
13. Abar = A' * (-e) + B * r1
14. D = B * r1 + Q_1 * r2
15. s' = r2 * r3 + s mod r
16. C1 = A' * e~ + Q_1 * r2~
17. C2 = D * (-r3~) + Q_1 * s~ + H_j1 * m~_j1 + ... + H_jU * m~_jU
18. c_array = (A', Abar, D, C1, C2, R, i1, ..., iR,
msg_i1, ..., msg_iR, domain, ph)
19. c_for_hash = encode_for_hash(c_array)
20. if c_for_hash is INVALID, return INVALID
21. c = hash_to_scalar(c_for_hash, 1)
22. e^ = c * e + e~ mod r
23. r2^ = c * r2 + r2~ mod r
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
24. r3^ = c * r3 + r3~ mod r
25. s^ = c * s' + s~ mod r
26. for j in (j1, ..., jU): m^_j = c * msg_j + m~_j mod r
27. proof = (A', Abar, D, c, e^, r2^, r3^, s^, (m^_j1, ..., m^_jU))
28. return proof_to_octets(proof)
3.4.4. ProofVerify
This operation checks that a proof is valid for a header, vector of
disclosed messages (along side their index corresponding to their
original position when signed) and presentation header against a
public key (PK).
The operation accepts the list of messages the prover indicated to be
disclosed. Those messages MUST be in the same order as when supplied
to Sign (#sign) (as a subset of the signed messages list). The
operation also requires the total number of signed messages (L).
Lastly, it also accepts the indexes that the disclosed messages had
in the original array of messages supplied to Sign (#sign) (i.e., the
disclosed_indexes list supplied to ProofGen (#proofgen)). Every
element in this list MUST be a non-negative integer in the range from
1 to L, in ascending order.
result = ProofVerify(PK, proof, L, header, ph,
disclosed_messages,
disclosed_indexes)
Inputs:
- PK (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the SkToPk
operation.
- proof (REQUIRED), an octet string of the form outputted by the
ProofGen operation.
- L (REQUIRED), non-negative integer. The number of signed messages.
- header (OPTIONAL), an optional octet string containing context and
application specific information. If not supplied,
it defaults to an empty string.
- ph (OPTIONAL), octet string containing the presentation header. If not
supplied, it defaults to an empty string.
- disclosed_messages (OPTIONAL), a vector of scalars. If not supplied,
it defaults to the empty array "()".
- disclosed_indexes (OPTIONAL), vector of unsigned integers in ascending
order. Indexes of disclosed messages. If
not supplied, it defaults to the empty
array "()".
Parameters:
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
- ciphersuite_id, ASCII string. The unique ID of the ciphersuite.
- generator_seed, ASCII string. The generators seed defined by the
ciphersuite.
Definitions:
- R, is the non-negative integer representing the number of disclosed
(revealed) messages, i.e., R = length(disclosed_indexes). If no
messages are disclosed, the value of R MUST evaluate to zero (0).
- U, is the non-negative integer representing the number of undisclosed
messages, i.e., U = L - R.
Outputs:
- result, either VALID or INVALID.
Precomputations:
1. (i1, ..., iR) = disclosed_indexes
2. (j1, ..., jU) = range(1, L) \ disclosed_indexes
3. (msg_i1, ..., msg_iR) = disclosed_messages
4. (Q_1, Q_2, MsgGenerators) = create_generators(generator_seed, L+2)
5. (H_1, ..., H_L) = MsgGenerators
6. (H_i1, ..., H_iR) = (MsgGenerators[i1], ..., MsgGenerators[iR])
7. (H_j1, ..., H_jU) = (MsgGenerators[j1], ..., MsgGenerators[jU])
Preconditions:
1. for i in (i1, ..., iR), if i < 1 or i > L, return INVALID
2. if length(disclosed_messages) != R, return INVALID
Procedure:
1. proof_result = octets_to_proof(proof)
2. if proof_result is INVALID, return INVALID
3. (A', Abar, D, c, e^, r2^, r3^, s^, (m^_j1,...,m^_jU)) = proof_result
4. W = octets_to_pubkey(PK)
5. if W is INVALID, return INVALID
6. dom_array = (PK, L, Q_1, Q_2, H_1, ..., H_L, ciphersuite_id, header)
7. dom_for_hash = encode_for_hash(dom_array)
8. if dom_for_hash is INVALID, return INVALID
9. domain = hash_to_scalar(dom_for_hash, 1)
10. C1 = (Abar - D) * c + A' * e^ + Q_1 * r2^
11. T = P1 + Q_2 * domain + H_i1 * msg_i1 + ... H_iR * msg_iR
12. C2 = T * c - D * r3^ + Q_1 * s^ + H_j1 * m^_j1 + ... + H_jU * m^_jU
13. cv_array = (A', Abar, D, C1, C2, R, i1, ..., iR,
msg_i1, ..., msg_iR, domain, ph)
14. cv_for_hash = encode_for_hash(cv_array)
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
15. if cv_for_hash is INVALID, return INVALID
16. cv = hash_to_scalar(cv_for_hash, 1)
17. if c != cv, return INVALID
18. if A' == Identity_G1, return INVALID
19. if e(A', W) * e(Abar, -P2) != Identity_GT, return INVALID
20. return VALID
4. Utility Operations
4.1. Generator point computation
This operation defines how to create a set of generators that form a
part of the public parameters used by the BBS Signature scheme to
accomplish operations such as Sign (#sign), Verify (#verify),
ProofGen (#proofgen) and ProofVerify (#proofverify). It takes one
input, the number of generator points to create, which is determined
in part by the number of signed messages.
As an optimization, implementations MAY cache the result of
create_generators for a specific generator_seed (determined by the
ciphersuite) and count. The values n and v MAY also be cached in
order to efficiently extend a existing list of generator points.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
generators = create_generators(count)
Inputs:
- count (REQUIRED), unsigned integer. Number of generators to create.
Parameters:
- hash_to_curve_suite, the hash to curve suite id defined by the
ciphersuite.
- hash_to_curve_g1, the hash_to_curve operation for the G1 subgroup,
defined by the suite specified by the
hash_to_curve_suite parameter.
- expand_message, the expand_message operation defined by the suite
specified by the hash_to_curve_suite parameter.
- generator_seed, octet string. A seed value selected by the
ciphersuite.
Definitions:
- seed_dst, the octet string representing the ASCII encoded characters:
"BBS_" || hash_to_curve_suite || "SIG_GENERATOR_SEED_".
- generator_dst, the octet string representing:
"BBS_" || hash_to_curve_suite || "SIG_GENERATOR_DST_",
in the ASCII characters encoding.
- seed_len = ceil((ceil(log2(r)) + k)/8), where r and k are defined by
the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- generators, an array of generators.
Procedure:
1. v = expand_message(generator_seed, seed_dst, seed_len)
2. n = 1
3. for i in range(1, count):
4. v = expand_message(v || I2OSP(n, 4), seed_dst, seed_len)
5. n = n + 1
6. generator_i = Identity_G1
7. candidate = hash_to_curve_g1(v, generator_dst)
8. if candidate in (P1, generator_1, ..., generator_i):
9. go back to step 4
10. generator_i = candidate
11. return (generator_1, ..., generator_count)
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
4.2. MapMessageToScalar
There are multiple ways in which messages can be mapped to their
respective scalar values, which is their required form to be used
with the Sign (#sign), Verify (#verify), ProofGen (#proofgen) and
ProofVerify (#proofverify) operations.
4.2.1. MapMessageToScalarAsHash
This operation takes an input message and maps it to a scalar value
via a cryptographic hash function for the given curve.
result = MapMessageToScalarAsHash(msg, dst)
Inputs:
- msg (REQUIRED), octet string.
- dst (REQUIRED), octet string. Domain separation tag; note this is not
defined as a function argument as per
[@!I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] but as a parameter.
Outputs:
- result, a scalar value.
Procedure:
1. If length(dst) > 2^8 - 1 or length(msg) > 2^64 - 1, return INVALID
2. dst_prime = I2OSP(length(dst), 1) || dst
3. msg_prime = I2OSP(length(msg), 8) || msg
4. result = hash_to_scalar(msg_prime || dst_prime, 1)
5. return result
4.3. Hash to Scalar
This operation describes how to hash an arbitrary octet string to n
scalar values in the multiplicative group of integers mod r (i.e.,
values in the range [1, r-1]). This procedure acts as a helper
function, used internally in various places within the operations
described in the spec. To map a message to a scalar that would be
passed as input to the Sign (#sign), Verify (#verify), ProofGen
(#proofgen) and ProofVerify (#proofverify) functions, one must use
MapMessageToScalarAsHash (#mapmessagetoscalar) instead.
This operation makes use of expand_message defined in
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve], in a similar way used by the
hash_to_field operation of Section 5 from the same document (with the
additional checks for getting a scalar that is 0). Note that, if an
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
implementer wants to use hash_to_field instead, they MUST use the
multiplicative group of integers mod r (Fr), as the target group (F).
However, the hash_to_curve ciphersuites used by this document, make
use of hash_to_field with the target group being the multiplicative
group of integers mod p (Fp). For completeness, we define here the
operation making use of the expand_message function, that will be
defined by the hash-to-curve suite used. If someone also has a
hash_to_field implementation available, with the target group been
Fr, they can use this instead (adding the check for a scalar been 0).
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
scalars = hash_to_scalar(msg_octets, count)
Inputs:
- msg_octets (REQUIRED), octet string. The message to be hashed.
- count (REQUIRED), an integer greater or equal to 1. The number of
scalars to output.
Parameters:
- hash_to_curve_suite, the hash to curve suite id defined by the
ciphersuite.
- expand_message, the expand_message operation defined by the suite
specified by the hash_to_curve_suite parameter.
Definitions:
- h2s_dst, the octet string representing the ASCII encoded characters:
"BBS_" || hash_to_curve_suite || "HASH_TO_SCALAR_".
- expand_len = ceil((ceil(log2(r))+k)/8), where r and k are defined by
the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- scalars, an array of non-zero scalars mod r.
Procedure:
1. len_in_bytes = count * expand_len
2. t = 0
3. msg_prime = msg_octets || I2OSP(t, 1) || I2OSP(count, 4)
4. uniform_bytes = expand_message(msg_prime, h2s_dst, len_in_bytes)
5. for i in (1, ..., count):
6. tv = uniform_bytes[(i-1)*expand_len..i*expand_len-1]
7. scalar_i = OS2IP(tv) mod r
8. if 0 in (scalar_1, ..., scalar_count):
9. t = t + 1
10. go back to step 3
11. return (scalar_1, ..., scalar_count)
4.4. Serialization
4.4.1. OctetsToSignature
This operation describes how to decode an octet string, validate it
and return the underlying components that make up the signature.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
signature = octets_to_signature(signature_octets)
Inputs:
- signature_octets (REQUIRED), octet string of the form output from
signature_to_octets operation.
Outputs:
signature, a signature in the form (A, e, s), where A is a point in G1
and e and s are non-zero scalars mod r.
Procedure:
1. expected_len = octet_point_length + 2 * octet_scalar_length
2. if length(signature_octets) != expected_len, return INVALID
3. A_octets = signature_octets[0..(octet_point_length - 1)]
4. A = octets_to_point_g1(A_octets)
5. if A is INVALID, return INVALID
6. if A == Identity_G1, return INVALID
7. index = octet_point_length
8. end_index = index + octet_scalar_length - 1
9. e = OS2IP(signature_octets[index..end_index])
10. if e = 0 OR e >= r, return INVALID
11. index += octet_scalar_length
12. end_index = index + octet_scalar_length - 1
13. s = OS2IP(signature_octets[index..end_index])
14. if s = 0 OR s >= r, return INVALID
15. return (A, e, s)
4.4.2. SignatureToOctets
This operation describes how to encode a signature to an octet
string.
_Note_ this operation deliberately does not perform the relevant
checks on the inputs A, e and s because its assumed these are done
prior to its invocation, e.g as is the case with the Sign (#sign)
operation.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
signature_octets = signature_to_octets(signature)
Inputs:
- signature (REQUIRED), a valid signature, in the form (A, e, s), where
A a point in G1 and e, s non-zero scalars mod r.
Outputs:
- signature_octets, octet string.
Procedure:
1. (A, e, s) = signature
2. A_octets = point_to_octets_g1(A)
3. e_octets = I2OSP(e, octet_scalar_length)
4. s_octets = I2OSP(s, octet_scalar_length)
5. return (A_octets || e_octets || s_octets)
4.4.3. OctetsToProof
This operation describes how to decode an octet string representing a
proof, validate it and return the underlying components that make up
the proof value.
The proof value outputted by this operation consists of the following
components, in that order:
1. Three (3) valid points of the G1 subgroup, each of which must not
equal the identity point.
2. Five (5) integers representing scalars in the range of 1 to r-1
inclusive.
3. A set of integers representing scalars in the range of 1 to r-1
inclusive, corresponding to the undisclosed from the proof
message commitments. This set can be empty (i.e., "()").
proof = octets_to_proof(proof_octets)
Inputs:
- proof_octets (REQUIRED), octet string of the form outputted from the
proof_to_octets operation.
Parameters:
- r (REQUIRED), non-negative integer. The prime order of the G1 and
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
G2 groups, defined by the ciphersuite.
- octet_scalar_length (REQUIRED), non-negative integer. The length of
a scalar octet representation, defined
by the ciphersuite.
- octet_point_length (REQUIRED), non-negative integer. The length of
a point in G1 octet representation,
defined by the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- proof, a proof value in the form described above or INVALID
Procedure:
1. proof_len_floor = 3 * octet_point_length + 5 * octet_scalar_length
2. if length(proof_octets) < proof_len_floor, return INVALID
// Points (i.e., (A', Abar, D) in ProofGen) de-serialization.
3. index = 0
4. for i in range(0, 2):
5. end_index = index + octet_point_length - 1
6. A_i = octets_to_point_g1(proof_octets[index..end_index])
7. if A_i is INVALID or Identity_G1, return INVALID
8. index += octet_point_length
// Scalars (i.e., (c, e^, r2^, r3^, s^, (m^_j1, ..., m^_jU)) in
// ProofGen) de-serialization.
9. j = 0
10. while index < length(proof_octets):
11. end_index = index + octet_scalar_length - 1
12. s_j = OS2IP(proof_octets[index..end_index])
13. if s_j = 0 or if s_j >= r, return INVALID
14. index += octet_scalar_length
15. j += 1
16. if index != length(proof_octets), return INVALID
17. msg_commitments = ()
18. If j > 5, set msg_commitments = (s_5, ..., s_(j-1))
19. return (A_0, A_1, A_2, s_0, s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4, msg_commitments)
4.4.4. ProofToOctets
This operation describes how to encode a proof, as computed at step
25 in ProofGen (#proofgen), to an octet string. The input to the
operation MUST be a valid proof.
The inputed proof value must consist of the following components, in
that order:
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
1. Three (3) valid compressed points of the G1 subgroup, different
from the identity point of G1 (i.e., A', Abar, D, in ProofGen)
2. Five (5) integers representing scalars in the range of 1 to r-1
inclusive (i.e., c, e^, r2^, r3^, s^, in ProofGen).
3. A number of integers representing scalars in the range of 1 to
r-1 inclusive, corresponding to the undisclosed from the proof
messages (i.e., m^_j1, ..., m^_jU, in ProofGen, where U the
number of undisclosed messages).
proof_octets = proof_to_octets(proof)
Inputs:
- proof (REQUIRED), a BBS proof in the form calculated by ProofGen in
step 25 (see above).
Parameters:
- octet_scalar_length (REQUIRED), non-negative integer. The length of
a scalar octet representation, defined
by the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- proof_octets, octet string.
Procedure:
1. (A', Abar, D, c, e^, r2^, r3^, s^, (m^_1, ..., m^_U)) = proof
2. Let proof_octets be an empty octet string.
// Points Serialization.
3. for point in (A', Abar, D):
4. point_octets = point_to_octets_g1(point)
5. proof_octets = proof_octets || point_octets
// Scalar Serialization.
6. for scalar in (c, e^, r2^, r3^, s^, m^_1, ..., m^_U):
7. scalar_octets = I2OSP(scalar, octet_scalar_length)
8. proof_octets = proof_octets || scalar_octets
9. return proof_octets
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
4.4.5. OctetsToPublicKey
This operation describes how to decode an octet string representing a
public key, validates it and returns the corresponding point in G2.
Steps 2 to 5 check if the public key is valid. As an optimization,
implementations MAY cache the result of those steps, to avoid
unnecessarily repeating validation for known public keys.
W = octets_to_pubkey(PK)
Inputs:
- PK, octet string. A public key in the form ouputted by the SkToPK
operation
Outputs:
- W, a valid point in G2 or INVALID
Procedure:
1. W = octets_to_point_g2(PK)
2. If W is INVALID, return INVALID
3. if subgroup_check(W) is INVALID, return INVALID
4. If W == Identity_G2, return INVALID
5. return W
4.4.6. EncodeForHash
This document uses the hash_to_scalar function to hash elements to
scalars in the multiplicative group mod r (see Section 5.3 (#hash-to-
scalar)). To avoid ambiguity, elements passed to that operation,
must first be encoded appropriately using encode_for_hash. The
following procedure describes how to encode each element accordingly
by serializing it to an appropriate format depending on its type and
concatenating the results. Specifically,
* Points in G1 or G2 will be encoded using the point_to_octets_g*
implementation for a particular ciphersuite.
* Non-negative integers will be encoded using I2OSP with an output
length of 8 bytes.
* Scalars will be zero-extended to a fixed length, defined by a
particular ciphersuite.
* Octet strings will be zero-extended to a length that is a multiple
of 8 bits. Then, the extended value is encoded directly.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 28]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
* ASCII strings will be transformed into octet strings using UTF-8
encoding.
After encoding, octet strings will be prepended with a value
representing the length of their binary representation in the form of
the number of bytes. This length must be encoded to octets using
I2OSP with output length of 8 bytes. The combined value (encoded
value + length prefix) binary representation is then encoded as a
single octet string. For example, the string 0x14d will be encoded
as 0x0000000000000002014d. If the length of the octet string is
larger than 2^64 - 1, the octet string must be rejected. Similarly,
ASCII strings, after encoded to octets (using utf8), will also be
appended with the length of their octet-string representation.
Optional input/parameters to operations that feature in a call to
hash_to_scalar, that are not supplied to the operation should default
to an empty octet string. For example, if X is an optional input/
parameter that is not supplied, whilst A and B are required, then the
procedural step of hash(A || X || B) MUST be evaluated to hash(A ||
"" || B).
The above is further described in the following procedure.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 29]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
result = encode_for_hash(input_array)
Inputs:
- input_array, an array of elements to be hashed. All elements of this
array that are octet strings MUST be multiples of 8 bits.
Parameters:
- octet_scalar_length, non-negative integer. The length of a scalar
octet representation, defined by the ciphersuite.
Outputs:
- result, an octet string or INVALID.
Procedure:
1. let octets_to_hash be an empty octet string.
2. for el in input_array:
3. if el is an ASCII string: el = utf8(el)
4. if el is an octet string representing a public key: el_octs = el
5. else if el is an octet string:
6. if length(el) > 2^64 - 1, return INVALID
7. el_octs = I2OSP(length(el), 8) || el
8. else if el is a Point in G1: el_octs = point_to_octets_g1(el)
9. else if el is a Point in G2: el_octs = point_to_octets_g2(el)
10. else if el is a Scalar: el_octs = I2OSP(el, octet_scalar_length)
11. else if el is a non-negative integer: el_octs = I2OSP(el, 8)
12. else: return INVALID
13. octets_to_hash = octets_to_hash || el_octs
14. return octets_to_hash
5. Security Considerations
5.1. Validating public keys
It is RECOMENDED for any operation in Core Operations (#core-
operations) involving public keys, that they deserialize the public
key first using the OctetsToPublicKey (#octetstopublickey) operation,
even if they only require the octet-string representation of the
public key. If the octets_to_pubkey procedure (see the
OctetsToPublicKey (#octetstopublickey) section) returns INVALID, the
calling operation should also return INVALID and abort. An example
of where this recommendation applies is the Sign (#sign) operation.
An example of where an explicit invocation to the octets_to_pubkey
operation is already defined and therefore required is the Verify
(#verify) operation.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 30]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
5.2. Point de-serialization
This document makes use of octet_to_point_g* to parse octet strings
to elliptic curve points (either in G1 or G2). It is assumed (even
if not explicitly described) that the result of this operation will
not be INVALID. If octet_to_point_g* returns INVALID, then the
calling operation should immediately return INVALID as well and abort
the operation. Note that the only place where the output is assumed
to be VALID implicitly is in the EncodingForHash (#encodingforhash)
section.
5.3. Skipping membership checks
Some existing implementations skip the subgroup_check invocation in
Verify (#verify), whose purpose is ensuring that the signature is an
element of a prime-order subgroup. This check is REQUIRED of
conforming implementations, for two reasons.
1. For most pairing-friendly elliptic curves used in practice, the
pairing operation e Section 1.2 is undefined when its input
points are not in the prime-order subgroups of E1 and E2. The
resulting behavior is unpredictable, and may enable forgeries.
2. Even if the pairing operation behaves properly on inputs that are
outside the correct subgroups, skipping the subgroup check breaks
the strong unforgeability property [ADR02].
5.4. Side channel attacks
Implementations of the signing algorithm SHOULD protect the secret
key from side-channel attacks. One method for protecting against
certain side-channel attacks is ensuring that the implementation
executes exactly the same sequence of instructions and performs
exactly the same memory accesses, for any value of the secret key.
In other words, implementations on the underlying pairing-friendly
elliptic curve SHOULD run in constant time.
5.5. Randomness considerations
The IKM input to KeyGen MUST be infeasible to guess and MUST be kept
secret. One possibility is to generate IKM from a trusted source of
randomness. Guidelines on constructing such a source are outside the
scope of this document.
Secret keys MAY be generated using other methods; in this case they
MUST be infeasible to guess and MUST be indistinguishable from
uniformly random modulo r.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 31]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
BBS proofs are nondeterministic, meaning care must be taken against
attacks arising from using bad randomness, for example, the nonce
reuse attack on ECDSA [HDWH12]. It is RECOMMENDED that the
presentation header used in this specification contain a nonce chosen
at random from a trusted source of randomness, see the Section 5.6
for additional considerations.
When a trusted source of randomness is used, signatures and proofs
are much harder to forge or break due to the use of multiple nonces.
5.6. Presentation header selection
The signature proofs of knowledge generated in this specification are
created using a specified presentation header. A verifier-specified
cryptographically random value (e.g., a nonce) featuring in the
presentation header provides strong protections against replay
attacks, and is RECOMMENDED in most use cases. In some settings,
proofs can be generated in a non-interactive fashion, in which case
verifiers MUST be able to verify the uniqueness of the presentation
header values.
5.7. Implementing hash_to_curve_g1
The security analysis models hash_to_curve_g1 as random oracles. It
is crucial that these functions are implemented using a
cryptographically secure hash function. For this purpose,
implementations MUST meet the requirements of
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
In addition, ciphersuites MUST specify unique domain separation tags
for hash_to_curve. Some guidance around defining this can be found
in Section 6.
5.8. Choice of underlying curve
BBS signatures can be implemented on any pairing-friendly curve.
However care MUST be taken when selecting one that is appropriate,
this specification defines a ciphersuite for using the BLS12-381
curve in Section 6 which as a curve achieves around 117 bits of
security according to a recent NCC ZCash cryptography review
[ZCASH-REVIEW].
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 32]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
5.9. Security of proofs generated by ProofGen
The proof, as returned by ProofGen, is a zero-knowledge proof-of-
knowledge [CDL16]. This guarantees that no information will be
revealed about the signature itself or the undisclosed messages, from
the output of ProofGen. Note that the security proofs in [CDL16]
work on type 3 pairing setting. This means that G1 should be
different from G2 and with no efficient isomorphism between them.
6. Ciphersuites
This section defines the format for a BBS ciphersuite. It also gives
concrete ciphersuites based on the BLS12-381 pairing-friendly
elliptic curve [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves].
6.1. Ciphersuite Format
6.1.1. Ciphersuite ID
The following section defines the format of the unique identifier for
the ciphersuite denoted ciphersuite_id. The REQUIRED format for this
string is
"BBS_" || H2C_SUITE_ID || ADD_INFO
* Strings in double quotes are ASCII-encoded literals.
* H2C_SUITE_ID is the suite ID of the hash-to-curve suite used to
define the hash_to_curve function.
* ADD_INFO is an optional string indicating any additional
information used to uniquely qualify the ciphersuite. When
present this value MUST only contain ASCII characters between 0x21
and 0x7e (inclusive), and MUST end with an underscore (0x5f),
other than the last character the string MUST not contain any
other underscores (0x5f).
6.1.2. Additional Parameters
The parameters that each ciphersuite needs to define are generally
divided into three main categories; the basic parameters (a hash
function etc.,), the serialization operations (point_to_octets_g1
etc.,) and the generator parameters. See below for more details.
*Basic parameters*:
* hash: a cryptographic hash function.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 33]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
* octet_scalar_length: Number of bytes to represent a scalar value,
in the multiplicative group of integers mod r, encoded as an octet
string. It is RECOMMENDED this value be set to ceil(log2(r)/8).
* octet_point_length: Number of bytes to represent a point encoded
as an octet string outputted by the point_to_octets_g* function.
It is RECOMMENDED that this value is set to ceil(log2(p)/8).
* hash_to_curve_suite: The hash-to-curve ciphersuite id, in the form
defined in [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]. This defines the
hash_to_curve_g1 (the hash_to_curve operation for the G1 subgroup,
see the Notation (#notation) section) and the expand_message
(either expand_message_xmd or expand_message_xof) operations used
in this document.
*Serialization functions*:
* point_to_octets_g1: a function that returns the canonical
representation of the point P for the G1 subgroup as an octet
string.
* point_to_octets_g2: a function that returns the canonical
representation of the point P for the G2 subgroup as an octet
string.
* octets_to_point_g1: a function that returns the point P in the
subgroup G1 corresponding to the canonical representation ostr, or
INVALID if ostr is not a valid output of point_to_octets_g1.
* octets_to_point_g2: a function that returns the point P in the
subgroup G2 corresponding to the canonical representation ostr, or
INVALID if ostr is not a valid output of point_to_octets_g2.
*Generator parameters*:
* generator_seed: The seed used to determine the generator points
which form part of the public parameters used by the BBS signature
scheme. Note there are multiple possible scopes for this seed,
including: a globally shared seed (where the resulting message
generators are common across all BBS signatures); a signer
specific seed (where the message generators are specific to a
signer); and a signature specific seed (where the message
generators are specific per signature). The ciphersuite MUST
define this seed OR how to compute it as a pre-cursor operation to
any others.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 34]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
6.2. BLS12-381 Ciphersuite
The following ciphersuite is based on the BLS12-381 elliptic curve
defined in Section 4.2.1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves].
The targeted security level of the suite in bits is k = 128. The
ciphersuite makes use of an extendable output function, and most
specifically of SHAKE-256, as defined in Section 6.2 of [SHA3]. It
also uses the hash-to-curve suite defined by this document in
Appendix A.1 (#bls12-381-hash_to_curve-def), which also makes use of
the SHAKE-256 function.
*Basic parameters*:
* Ciphersuite_ID: "BBS_BLS12381G1_XOF:SHAKE-256_SSWU_RO_"
* hash: SHAKE-256 as defined in [SHA3].
* octet_scalar_length: 32, based on the RECOMMENDED approach of
ceil(log2(r)/8).
* octet_point_length: 48, based on the RECOMMENDED approach of
ceil(log2(p)/8).
* hash_to_curve_suite: "BLS12381G1_XOF:SHAKE-256_SSWU_R0_" as
defined in Appendix A.1 (#bls12-381-hash-to-curve-definition-
using-shake-256) for the G1 subgroup.
*Serialization functions*:
* point_to_octets_g1: follows the format documented in Appendix C
section 1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves] for the G1
subgroup, using compression (i.e., setting C_bit = 1).
* point_to_octets_g2: follows the format documented in Appendix C
section 1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves] for the G2
subgroup, using compression (i.e., setting C_bit = 1).
* octets_to_point_g1: follows the format documented in Appendix C
section 2 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves] for the G1
subgroup.
* octets_to_point_g2: follows the format documented in Appendix C
section 2 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves] for the G2
subgroup.
*Generator parameters*:
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 35]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
* generator_seed: A global seed value of "BBS_BLS12381G1_XOF:SHAKE-
256_SSWU_RO_MESSAGE_GENERATOR_SEED" which is used by the
create_generators (#generator-point-computation) operation to
compute the required set of message generators.
6.2.1. Test Vectors
The following section details a basic set of test vectors that can be
used to confirm an implementations correctness
*NOTE* All binary data below is represented as octet strings encoded
in hexadecimal format
*NOTE* These fixtures are a work in progress and subject to change
Further fixtures are available in Appendix C
6.2.1.1. Message Generators
Following the procedure defined in Section 4.1 with an input seed
value of
BBS_BLS12381G1_XOF:SHAKE-256_SSWU_RO_MESSAGE_GENERATOR_SEED
a dst of
BBS_BLS12381G1_XOF:SHAKE-256_SSWU_RO_
and a length value of 10
Outputs the following values
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 36]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
{{ $generators[0] }}
{{ $generators[1] }}
{{ $generators[2] }}
{{ $generators[3] }}
{{ $generators[4] }}
{{ $generators[5] }}
{{ $generators[6] }}
{{ $generators[7] }}
{{ $generators[8] }}
{{ $generators[9] }}
6.2.1.2. Key Pair
Following the procedure defined in Section 3.3.1 with an input IKM
value as follows
{{ $keyPair.seed }}
Outputs the following SK value
{{ $keyPair.keyPair.secretKey }}
Following the procedure defined in Section 3.3.2 with an input SK
value as above produces the following PK value
{{ $keyPair.keyPair.publicKey }}
6.2.1.3. Valid Single Message Signature
Using the following message
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature001.messages[0] }}
Along with the SK value as defined in Section 6.2.1.2 as inputs into
the Sign operations, yields the following output signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature001.signature }}
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 37]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
6.2.1.4. Valid Multi-Message Signature
Using the following messages (*Note* the ordering of the messages
MUST be preserved)
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature004.messages[0] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature004.messages[1] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature004.messages[2] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature004.messages[3] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature004.messages[4] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature004.messages[5] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature004.messages[6] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature004.messages[7] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature004.messages[8] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature004.messages[9] }}
Along with the SK value as defined in Section 6.2.1.2 as inputs into
the Sign operations, yields the following output signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature004.signature }}
7. IANA Considerations
This document does not make any requests of IANA.
8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the significant amount of
academic work that preceeded the development of this document. In
particular the original work of [BBS04] which was subsequently
developed in [ASM06] and in [CDL16]. This last academic work is the
one mostly used by this document.
The current state of this document is the product of the work of the
Decentralized Identity Foundation Applied Cryptography Working group,
which includes numerous active participants. In particular, the
following individuals contributed ideas, feedback and wording that
influenced this specification:
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 38]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
Orie Steele, Christian Paquin, Alessandro Guggino and Tomislav
Markovski
9. Normative References
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]
Faz-Hernandez, A., Scott, S., Sullivan, N., Wahby, R. S.,
and C. A. Wood, "Hashing to Elliptic Curves", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-
16, 15 June 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
draft-irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve-16>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves]
Sakemi, Y., Kobayashi, T., Saito, T., and R. S. Wahby,
"Pairing-Friendly Curves", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-10, 30 July
2021, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-
cfrg-pairing-friendly-curves-10>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC8017] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
RFC 8017, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017>.
[SHA3] NIST, "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and
Extendable-Output Functions",
<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.202.pdf>.
10. Informative References
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 39]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
[ADR02] An, J. H., Dodis, Y., and T. Rabin, "On the Security of
Joint Signature and Encryption", pages 83-107, April 2002,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46035-7_6>.
[ASM06] Au, M. H., Susilo, W., and Y. Mu, "Constant-Size Dynamic
k-TAA", Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006,
<https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/11832072_8>.
[BBS04] Boneh, D., Boyen, X., and H. Shacham, "Short Group
Signatures", pages 41-55, 2004,
<https://link.springer.com/
chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-28628-8_3>.
[Bowe19] Bowe, S., "Faster subgroup checks for BLS12-381", July
2019, <https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/814>.
[CDL16] Camenisch, J., Drijvers, M., and A. Lehmann, "Anonymous
Attestation Using the Strong Diffie Hellman Assumption
Revisited", Springer, Cham, 2016,
<https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/663.pdf>.
[HDWH12] Heninger, N., Durumeric, Z., Wustrow, E., and J.A.
Halderman, "Mining your Ps and Qs: Detection of widespread
weak keys in network devices", pages 205-220, August 2012,
<https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/
usenixsecurity12/sec12-final228.pdf>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-bls-signature]
Boneh, D., Gorbunov, S., Wahby, R. S., Wee, H., Wood, C.
A., and Z. Zhang, "BLS Signatures", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-cfrg-bls-signature-05, 16 June
2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-
cfrg-bls-signature-05>.
[ZCASH-REVIEW]
NCC Group, "Zcash Overwinter Consensus and Sapling
Cryptography Review", <https://research.nccgroup.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/07/
NCC_Group_Zcash2018_Public_Report_2019-01-30_v1.3.pdf>.
Appendix A. BLS12-381 hash_to_curve definition using SHAKE-256
The following defines a hash_to_curve suite
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve] for the BLS12-381 curve for both the G1
and G2 subgroups using the extendable output function (xof) of
SHAKE-256 as per the guidance defined in section 8.9 of
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 40]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
Note the notation used in the below definitions is sourced from
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
A.1. BLS12-381 G1
The suite of BLS12381G1_XOF:SHAKE-256_SSWU_R0_ is defined as follows:
* encoding type: hash_to_curve (Section 3 of
[@!I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve])
* E: y^2 = x^3 + 4
* p: 0x1a0111ea397fe69a4b1ba7b6434bacd764774b84f38512bf6730d2a0f6b0f624
1eabfffeb153ffffb9feffffffffaaab
* r: 0x73eda753299d7d483339d80809a1d80553bda402fffe5bfeffffffff00000001
* m: 1
* k: 128
* expand_message: expand_message_xof (Section 5.3.2 of
[@!I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve])
* hash: SHAKE-256
* L: 64
* f: Simplified SWU for AB == 0 (Section 6.6.3 of
[@!I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve])
* Z: 11
* E': y'^2 = x'^3 + A' * x' + B', where
- A' = 0x144698a3b8e9433d693a02c96d4982b0ea985383ee66a8d8e8981aef
d881ac98936f8da0e0f97f5cf428082d584c1d
- B' = 0x12e2908d11688030018b12e8753eee3b2016c1f0f24f4070a0b9c14f
cef35ef55a23215a316ceaa5d1cc48e98e172be0
* iso_map: the 11-isogeny map from E' to E given in Appendix E.2 of
[@!I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve]
* h_eff: 0xd201000000010001
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 41]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
Note that the h_eff values for this suite are copied from that
defined for the BLS12381G1_XMD:SHA-256_SSWU_RO_ suite defined in
section 8.8.1 of [I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
An optimized example implementation of the Simplified SWU mapping to
the curve E' isogenous to BLS12-381 G1 is given in Appendix F.2
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-hash-to-curve].
Appendix B. Use Cases
B.1. Non-correlating Security Token
In the most general sense BBS signatures can be used in any
application where a cryptographically secured token is required but
correlation caused by usage of the token is un-desirable.
For example in protocols like OAuth2.0 the most commonly used form of
the access token leverages the JWT format alongside conventional
cryptographic primitives such as traditional digital signatures or
HMACs. These access tokens are then used by a relying party to prove
authority to a resource server during a request. However, because
the access token is most commonly sent by value as it was issued by
the authorization server (e.g in a bearer style scheme), the access
token can act as a source of strong correlation for the relying
party. Relevant prior art can be found here
(https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-private-access-tokens-
01.html).
BBS Signatures due to their unique properties removes this source of
correlation but maintains the same set of guarantees required by a
resource server to validate an access token back to its relevant
authority (note that an approach to signing JSON tokens with BBS that
may be of relevance is the JWP (https://json-web-proofs.github.io/
json-web-proofs/draft-jmiller-json-web-proof.html) format and
serialization). In the context of a protocol like OAuth2.0 the
access token issued by the authorization server would feature a BBS
Signature, however instead of the relying party providing this access
token as issued, in their request to a resource server, they generate
a unique proof from the original access token and include that in the
request instead, thus removing this vector of correlation.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 42]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
B.2. Improved Bearer Security Token
Bearer based security tokens such as JWT based access tokens used in
the OAuth2.0 protocol are a highly popular format for expressing
authorization grants. However their usage has several security
limitations. Notably a bearer based authorization scheme often has
to rely on a secure transport between the authorized party (client)
and the resource server to mitigate the potential for a MITM attack
or a malicious interception of the access token. The scheme also has
to assume a degree of trust in the resource server it is presenting
an access token to, particularly when the access token grants more
than just access to the target resource server, because in a bearer
based authorization scheme, anyone who possesses the access token has
authority to what it grants. Bearer based access tokens also suffer
from the threat of replay attacks.
Improved schemes around authorization protocols often involve adding
a layer of proof of cryptographic key possession to the presentation
of an access token, which mitigates the deficiencies highlighted
above as well as providing a way to detect a replay attack. However,
approaches that involve proof of cryptographic key possession such as
DPoP (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04
(https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-dpop-04))
suffer from an increase in protocol complexity. A party requesting
authorization must pre-generate appropriate key material, share the
public portion of this with the authorization server alongside
proving possession of the private portion of the key material. The
authorization server must also be-able to accommodate receiving this
information and validating it.
BBS Signatures ofter an alternative model that solves the same
problems that proof of cryptographic key possession schemes do for
bearer based schemes, but in a way that doesn't introduce new up-
front protocol complexity. In the context of a protocol like
OAuth2.0 the access token issued by the authorization server would
feature a BBS Signature, however instead of the client providing this
access token as issued, in their request to a resource server, they
generate a unique proof from the original access token and include
that in the request instead. Because the access token is not shared
in a request to a resource server, attacks such as MITM are
mitigated. A resource server also obtains the ability to detect a
replay attack by ensuring the proof presented is unique.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 43]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
B.3. Selectively Disclosure Enabled Identity Credentials
BBS signatures when applied to the problem space of identity
credentials can help to enhance user privacy. For example a digital
drivers license that is cryptographically signed with a BBS
signature, allows the holder or subject of the license to disclose
different claims from their drivers license to different parties.
Furthermore, the unlinkable presentations property of proofs
generated by the scheme remove an important possible source of
correlation for the holder across multiple presentations.
Appendix C. Additional BLS12-381 Ciphersuite Test Vectors
*NOTE* These fixtures are a work in progress and subject to change
C.1. Modified Message Signature
Using the following message
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature002.messages[0] }}
And the following signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature002.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 6.2.1.2 as inputs into
the Verify operation should fail signature validation due to the
message value being different from what was signed
C.2. Extra Unsigned Message Signature
Using the following messages
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature003.messages[0] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature003.messages[1] }}
And the following signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature002.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 6.2.1.2 as inputs into
the Verify operation should fail signature validation due to an
additional message being supplied that was not signed
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 44]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
C.3. Missing Message Signature
Using the following messages
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature005.messages[0] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature005.messages[1] }}
And the following signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature005.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 6.2.1.2 as inputs into
the Verify operation should fail signature validation due to missing
messages that were originally present during the signing
C.4. Reordered Message Signature
Using the following messages
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature006.messages[0] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature006.messages[1] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature006.messages[2] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature006.messages[3] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature006.messages[4] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature006.messages[5] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature006.messages[6] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature006.messages[7] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature006.messages[8] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature006.messages[9] }}
And the following signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature006.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 6.2.1.2 as inputs into
the Verify operation should fail signature validation due to messages
being re-ordered from the order in which they were signed
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 45]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
C.5. Wrong Public Key Signature
Using the following messages
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature007.messages[0] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature007.messages[1] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature007.messages[2] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature007.messages[3] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature007.messages[4] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature007.messages[5] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature007.messages[6] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature007.messages[7] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature007.messages[8] }}
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature007.messages[9] }}
And the following signature
{{ $signatureFixtures.signature007.signature }}
Along with the PK value as defined in Section 6.2.1.2 as inputs into
the Verify operation should fail signature validation due to public
key used to verify is in-correct
Appendix D. Proof Generation and Verification Algorithmic Explanation
The following section provides an explanation of how the ProofGen and
ProofVerify operations work.
Let the prover be in possession of a BBS signature (A, e, s) on
messages msg_1, ..., msg_L and a domain value (see Sign (#sign)).
Let A = B * (1/(e + SK)) where SK the signer's secret key and,
B = P1 + Q_1 * s + Q_2 * domain + H_1 * msg_1 + ... + H_L * msg_L
Let (i1, ..., iR) be the indexes of generators corresponding to
messages the prover wants to disclose and (j1, ..., jU) be the
indexes corresponding to undisclosed messages (i.e., (j1, ..., jU) =
range(1, L) \ (i1, ..., iR)). To prove knowledge of a signature on
the disclosed messages, work as follows,
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 46]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
* Hide the signature by randomizing it. To randomize the signature
(A, e, s), take uniformly random r1, r2 in [1, r-1], and
calculate,
1. A' = A * r1,
2. Abar = A' * (-e) + B * r1
3. D = B * r1 + H0 * r2.
Also set,
4. r3 = r1 ^ -1 mod r
5. s' = r2 * r3 + s mod r.
The values (A', Abar, D) will be part of the proof and are used to
prove possession of a BBS signature, without revealing the
signature itself. Note that; e(A', PK) = e(Abar, P2) where PK the
signer's public key and P2 the base element in G2 (used to create
the signer's PK, see SkToPk (#sktopk)). This also serves to bind
the proof to the signer's PK.
* Set the following,
1. C1 = Abar - D
2. C2 = P1 + Q_2 * domain + H_i1 * msg_i1 + ... + H_iR * msg_iR
Create a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge (nizk)
of the values e, r2, r3, s' and msg_j1, ..., msg_jU (the
undisclosed messages) so that both of the following equalities
hold,
EQ1. C1 = A' * (-e) - H0 * r2
EQ2. C2 = H0 * s' - D * r3 + H_j1 * msg_j1 + ... + H_jU * msg_jU.
Note that the verifier will know the elements in the left side of the
above equations (i.e., C1 and C2) but not in the right side (i.e.,
s', r3 and the undisclosed messages: msg_j1, ..., msg_jU). However,
using the nizk, the prover can convince the verifier that they (the
prover) know the elements that satisfy those equations, without
disclosing them. Then, if both EQ1 and EQ2 hold, and e(A', PK) =
e(Abar, P2), an extractor can return a valid BBS signature from the
signer's SK, on the disclosed messages. The proof returned is (A',
Abar, D, nizk). To validate the proof, a verifier checks that e(A',
PK) = e(Abar, P2) and verifies the nizk. Validating the proof, will
guarantee the authenticity and integrity of the disclosed messages,
as well as ownership of the undisclosed messages and of the
signature.
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 47]
Internet-Draft The BBS Signature Scheme July 2022
Appendix E. Document History
-00
* Initial version
-01
* Populated fixtures
Authors' Addresses
Tobias Looker
MATTR
Email: tobias.looker@mattr.global
Vasilis Kalos
MATTR
Email: vasilis.kalos@mattr.global
Andrew Whitehead
Portage
Email: andrew.whitehead@portagecybertech.com
Mike Lodder
CryptID
Email: redmike7@gmail.com
Looker, et al. Expires 9 January 2023 [Page 48]
