Internet DRAFT - draft-lou-rtgwg-sinc
draft-lou-rtgwg-sinc
Network Working Group D. Lou
Internet-Draft L. Iannone
Intended status: Experimental Y. Li
Expires: 18 March 2024 C. Zhang
Huawei
K. Yao
China Mobile
15 September 2023
Signaling In-Network Computing operations (SINC)
draft-lou-rtgwg-sinc-01
Abstract
This memo introduces "Signaling In-Network Computing operations"
(SINC), a mechanism to enable signaling in-network computing
operations on data packets in specific scenarios like NetReduce,
NetDistributedLock, NetSequencer, etc. In particular, this solution
allows to flexibly communicate computational parameters, to be used
in conjunction with the payload, to in-network SINC-enabled devices
in order to perform computing operations.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 18 March 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. SINC Relevant Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. NetReduce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.2. NetDistributedLock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. NetSequencer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. In-Network Generic Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. SINC Framework Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Data Operation Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. Individual Computing Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. Batch Computing Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. SINC Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Control Plane Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
According to the original design, the Internet performs just "store
and forward" of packets, and leaves more complex operations at the
end-points. However, new emerging applications could benefit from
in-network computing to improve the overall system efficiency
([GOBATTO], [ZENG]). It is different from what the IETF Computing-
Aware Traffic Steering (CATS) working group is chartered for service
instance selection based on network and compute metrics between
clients of a service and sites offering the service. The in-network
computing is more about "light" data calculation/operation performed
in the network to reduce the computation work load for the end hosts.
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The formation of the COmputing In-Network (COIN) Research Group
[COIN], in the IRTF, encourages people to explore this emerging
technology and its impact on the Internet architecture. The "Use
Cases for In-Network Computing" document [I-D.irtf-coinrg-use-cases]
introduces some use cases to demonstrate how real applications can
benefit from COIN and show essential requirements demanded by COIN
applications.
Recent research has shown that network devices undertaking some
computing tasks can greatly improve the network and application
performance in some scenarios, like for instance aggregating path-
computing [NetReduce], key-value(K-V) cache [NetLock], and strong
consistency [GTM]. Their implementations mainly rely on programmable
network devices, by using P4 [P4] or other languages. In the context
of such heterogeneity of scenarios, it is desirable to have a generic
and flexible framework, able to explicitly signaling the computing
operation to be performed by network devices, which should be
applicable to many use cases, enabling easier deployment.
This document specifies such a Signaling In-Network Computing (SINC)
framework for, as the name states, in-network computing operation.
The computing functions are hosted on network devices, which, in this
memo, are generally named as SINC switches/routers.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] and [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. SINC Relevant Use Cases
Hereafter a few relevant use cases are described, namely NetReduce,
NetDistributedLock, and NetSequencer, in order to help understanding
the requirements for a framework. Such a framework, should be
generic enough to accommodate a large variety of use cases, besides
the ones described in this document.
3.1. NetReduce
Over the last decade, the rapid development of Deep Neural Networks
(DNN) has greatly improved the performance of many applications like
computer vision and natural language processing. However, DNN
training is a computation intensive and time consuming task, which
has been increasing exponentially in the past 10 years. Scale-up
techniques concentrating on the computing capability of a single
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device cannot meet the expectation. Distributed DNN training
approaches with synchronous data parallelism like Parameter Server
[PARAHUB] and All-Reduce [MGWFBP] are commonly employed in practice,
which on the other hand, become increasingly a network-bound workload
since communication becomes a bottleneck at scale.
Comparing to host-oriented solutions, in-network aggregation
approaches like SwitchML [SwitchML], SHArP [SHArP], and NetReduce
[NetReduce] can potentially reduce to nearly half the bandwidth
needed for data aggregation, by offloading gradients aggregation from
the host to network switches. However, they are limited to one
single specific operation, namely aggregation.
SwitchML is designed to implement in-network workers performing data
aggregation relying on Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) [ROCEv2]
and the application layer logic. In principle this allows to
repurpose relatively easily the system at the cost of deploying new
workers since there is no in-network operation signaling.
NetReduce [NetReduce] does tackle the same problem like SwitchML,
including the use of RDMA, but introduces an In-Network Aggregation
(INA) header, allowing easy identification of data fragments. Yet,
the only possible operation remains the aggregation, there is no
mechanism to signal a different operation.
SHArP [SHArP], uses as well RDMA and introduces as well a custom
header to simplify in-network handling of the packets. Similarly to
NetReduce, SHArP remains a solution targeting only the aggregation
function, relying on a rigid tree topology and proposing a header
that allows only aggregation function and no other operation, hence,
like NetReduce, hard to be converted for other purposes.
3.2. NetDistributedLock
In the majority of distributed system, the lock primitive is a widely
used concurrency control mechanism. For large distributed systems,
there is usually a dedicated lock manager that nodes contact to gain
read and/or write permissions of a resource. The lock manager is
often abstracted as Compare And Swap (CAS) or Fetch Add (FA)
operations.
The lock manager is typically running on a server, causing a
limitation on the performance by the speed of disk I/O transaction.
When the load increases, for instance in the case of database
transactions processed on a single node, the lock manager becomes a
major performance bottleneck, consuming nearly 75% of transaction
time [OLTP]. The multi-node distributed lock processing superimposes
the communication latency between nodes, which makes the performance
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even worse. Therefore offloading the lock manager function from the
server to the network switch might be a better choice, since the
switch is capable of managing lock function efficiently. Meanwhile
it liberate the server for other computation tasks.
The test results in NetLock [NetLock] show that the lock manager
running on a switch is able to answer 100 million requests per
second, nearly 10 times more than what a lock server can do.
3.3. NetSequencer
Transaction managers are centralized solutions to guarantee
consistency for distributed transactions, such as GTM in Postgre-XL
([GTM], [CALVIN]). However, as a centralized module, transaction
managers have become a bottleneck in large scale high-performance
distributed systems. The work by Kalia et al. [HPRDMA] introduces a
server based networked sequencer, which is a kind of task manager
assigning monotonically increasing sequence number for transactions.
In [HPRDMA], the authors shows that the maximum throughput is 122
Million requests per second (Mrps), at the cost of an increased
average latency. This bounded throughput will impact the scalability
of distributed systems. The authors also test the bottleneck for
varies optimization methods, including CPU, DMA bandwidth and PCIe
RTT, which is introduced by the CPU centric architecture.
For a programmable switch, a sequencer is a rather simple operation,
while the pipeline architecture can avoid bottlenecks. It is worth
implementing a switch-based sequencer, which sets the performance
goal as hundreds of Mrps and latency in the order of microseconds.
4. In-Network Generic Operations
The COIN use case draft [I-D.irtf-coinrg-use-cases] illustrates some
general requirements for scenarios where the aforementioned use cases
belong to. One of the requirements is that any in-network computing
system must provide means to specify the constraints for placing
execution logic in certain logical execution points (and their
associated physical locations). In case of NetReduce,
NetDistributedLock, and NetSequencer, data aggregation, lock
management and sequence number generation functions can be offloaded
onto the in-network device. It can be observed that those functions
are based on "simple" and "generic" operators, as shown in Table 1.
Programmable switches are capable of performing basic operations by
executing one or more operators, without impacting the forwarding
performance ([NetChain], [ERIS]).
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+==============+===============+=================================+
| Use Case | Operation | Description |
+==============+===============+=================================+
| NetReduce | Sum value | The in-network device sums the |
| | (SUM) | data together and outputs the |
| | | resulting value. |
+--------------+---------------+---------------------------------+
| NetLock | Compare And | By comparing the request with |
| | Swap or | the status of its own lock, the |
| | Fetch-and-Add | in-network device sends out |
| | (CAS or FA) | whether the host has the |
| | | acquired the lock. Through the |
| | | CAS and FA, host can implement |
| | | shared and exclusive locks. |
+--------------+---------------+---------------------------------+
| NetSequencer | Fetch-and-Add | The in-network device provides |
| | (FA) | a monotonically increasing |
| | | counter number for the host. |
+--------------+---------------+---------------------------------+
Table 1: Example of in-network operations.
5. SINC Framework Overview
This section describes the various elements of the SINC framework and
explains how they work together.
The SINC protocol and extensions are designed for deployment in
limited domains, such as a data center network, rather than
deployment across the open Internet. The requirements and semantics
are specifically limited, as defined in the previous sections.
Figure 1 shows the overall SINC framework, consisting of Hosts, the
SINC Ingress Proxy, SINC switch/router (SW/R), the SINC Egress Proxy
and normal switches/routers(if any).
+---------+ +---------+
| Host A | | Host B |
+---------+ +---------+
| |
| |
+------------+ +------+ +-----------+ +------+ +-----------+
|SINC Ingress| | | | | | | |SINC Egress|
|Proxy |-->| SW/R |-->| SINC SW/R |-->| SW/R |-->|Proxy |
+------------+ +----- + +-----------+ +------+ +-----------+
Figure 1: General SINC deployment.
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In the SINC domain, a host MUST be SINC-aware. It defines the data
operation to be executed. However, it does not need to be aware of
where the operation will be executed and how the traffic will be
steered in the network. The host sends out packets with a SINC
header containing the definition and parameters of data operations.
The SINC header could be placed directly after the transport layer,
before the computing data as part of the payload. However, the SINC
header can also potentially be positioned at layer 4, layer 3, or
even layer 2, depending on the network context of the applications
and the deployment consideration. This will be discussed in further
details in [I-D.zhou-rtgwg-sinc-deployment-considerations].
The SINC proxies are responsible for encapsulating/decapsulating
packets in order to steer them through the right network path and
nodes. The SINC proxies may or may not be collocated with hosts.
The SINC Ingress Proxy encapsulates and forwards packets containing a
SINC header, to the right node(s) with SINC operation capabilities.
Such an operation may involve the use of protocols like Service
Function Chaining (SFC [RFC7665]), LISP [RFC9300], Geneve [RFC8926],
or even MPLS [RFC3031]. Based on the definition of the required data
processing and the network capabilities, the SINC ingress proxy can
determine whether the data processing defined in the SINC header
could be executed in a single node or in multiple nodes. The SINC
Egress Proxy is responsible for decapsulating packets before
forwarding them to the destination host.
The SINC switch/router is the node equipped with in-network computing
capabilities. It MUST look for the SINC header and perform the
required operations if any. It could be done from the encapsulation
protocols that contain a field of "next protocols". Otherwise, the
SINC switch/router should be able to perform a deep packet inspection
to identify the location of the SINC header. The detection of the
location of the SINC header will be further depicted in
[I-D.zhou-rtgwg-sinc-deployment-considerations]. Upon receiving a
SINC packet, the SINC switch/router data-plane processes the SINC
header, executes required operations, updates the payload with
results (if necessary) and forwards the packet to the destination.
The SINC workflow is as follows:
1. Host A transmits a packet with the SINC header and data to the
SINC Ingress proxy.
2. The SINC Ingress proxy encapsulates and forwards the original
packet to a SINC switch/router(s).
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3. The SINC switches/routers verifies the source, checks the
integrity of the data and performs the required data processing
defined in the SINC header. When the computing is done, if
necessary, the payload is updated with the result and then
forwarded to the SINC Egress proxy.
4. When the packet reaches the SINC Egress Proxy, the encapsulation
will be removed and the inner packet will be forwarded to the
final destination (Host B).
6. Data Operation Mode
According to the SINC scenarios, the SINC processing can be divided
into two modes: individual computing mode and batch computing mode.
Individual operations include all operations that can be performed on
data coming from a single packet (e.g., Netlock). Conversely, batch
operations include all operations that require to collect data from
multiple packets (e.g., NetReduce data aggregation).
6.1. Individual Computing Mode
The NetLock is a typical scenario involving individual operations,
where the SINC switch/router acts as a lock server, generating a lock
for a packet coming from one host.
This kind of operation has some general aspects to be considered:
* Initialization of the context on the computing device. The
context is the information necessary to perform operations on the
packets. For instance, the context for a lock operation includes
selected keys, lock states (values) for granting locks.
* Error conditions. Operations may fail and, as a consequence,
sometimes actions needs to be taken, e.g. sending a message to the
source host. However, error handling is not necessarily handled
by the SINC switch/router, which could simply roll back the
operation and forward the packet unchanged to the destination
host. The destination host will in this case perform the
operation. If the operation fails again, the destination host
will handle the error condition and may send a message back to the
source host. In this way SINC switches/router operation remains
relatively simple.
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6.2. Batch Computing Mode
The batch operations require to collect data from multiple sources
before actually being able to perform the required operations. For
instance, in the NetReduce scenario, the gradient aggregation
requires packets carrying gradient arrays from each host to generate
the desired result array.
In this mode, the data operation is collective. The data coming from
multiple sources may be aggregated in multiple aggregation nodes in a
hierarchy. Hence a tree topology should be created from the control
plane for each batch computing request, which will be dismissed once
the batch computing is done. A message is required to signal the
start and the end of the operation.
Each aggregation node should collect all input before executing the
calculation. If some packets do not arrive or arrive too late, the
batch computing may fail. The time the packets are temporarily
cached on the SINC switch/router should be carefully configured. On
the one hand, it has to be sufficiently long so that there is enough
time to receive all required packets. On the other hand, it has to
be sufficiently short so that no retransmissions are triggered at the
transport or application layers on the end hosts. Similarly to the
error condition for the individual operations, if the SINC switch/
router does not receive all required packets in the configured time
interval, it can simply forward the packets to the end host so that
they deal with packet losses and retransmissions if necessary.
7. SINC Header
The SINC header carries the data operation information and it has a
fixed length of 16 octets, as shown in Figure 2.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved |D|L| Group ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| No. of Data Sources | Data Source ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| SeqNum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Data Operation | Data Offset |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: SINC Header.
* Reserved: Flags field reserved for future use. MUST be set to
zero on transmission and MUST be ignored on reception.
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* Done flag (D): Zero (0) indicates that the request operation is
not yet performed. One (1) indicates the operation has been done.
The source host MUST set this bit to 0. The in-network switch/
router performing the operation MUST set this flag to 1 after the
operation is executed.
* Loopback flag (L): Zero (0) indicates that the packet SHOULD be
sent to the destination after the data operation. One (1)
indicates that the packet SHOULD be sent back to the source node
after the data operation.
* Group ID: The group ID identifies different groups. Each group is
associated with one task.
* Number of Data Sources: Total number of data source nodes that are
part of the group.
* Data Source ID: Unique identifier of the data source node of the
packet.
* Sequence Number (SeqNum): The SeqNum is used to identify different
requests within one group.
* Data Operation: The operation to be executed by the SINC switch/
router.
* Data Offset: The in-packet offset from the SINC header to the data
required by the operation. This field is useful in cases where
the data is not right after the SINC header, the offset indicates
directly where, in the packet, the data is located.
8. Control Plane Considerations
The SINC control plane is responsible for the creation and
configuration of the computing network topology with SINC capable
network elements, as well as the monitoring and management of the
system, to ensure the proper execution of the computing task. The
SINC framework can work with either centralized (e.g. SDN like),
distributed (by utilizing dynamic signaling protocols), or hybrid
control planes. However, this document does not assume any specific
control plane design.
A computing network topology needs to be created in advance to
support the required in network computing tasks. The topology could
be as simple as a explicit path with SINC capable nodes for
individual computing mode (e.g. NetLock and NetSequencer), as well
as a tree topology supporting more complex batch computing mode (e.g.
NetReduce). After the completion of the computing task, the control
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plane needs to delete the topology and release relevant resources
accordingly. The following features are necessary in control plane
for the topology creation/deletion in the SINC network:
* Topology computation: When receiving the computing request from
the Host, the SINC control plane needs to compute a set of
feasible paths with SINC capable nodes to support individual or
batch computations.
* Topology establishment: The topology has to be sent/configured/
signaled to the network device, so SINC packets could pass through
the right SINC capable nodes to perform the required data
computing in the network. Once done, the control plane will
signal the application to kick off the packet transmission.
* Topology deletion: Once the application finishes the action, it
will inform the control plane to delete the topology and release
the reserved resources for other applications and purposes.
SINC packets are supposed to pass SINC capable nodes without traffic
and computing congestion, which demands sufficient resource
reservation. There are multiple types of resources (e.g., computing
resource, buffer resource, and bandwidth resource) in the network
that should be reserved to ensure the smooth execution of the
computing tasks.
The performance monitoring (PM) is required to detect any potential
issues during the data operation. It could be done actively or
passively. By injecting OAM packets into the network to estimate the
performance of the network, the active PM might affect the overall
performance of the network. SINC does not introduces any constrains
and pre-existing monitoring infrastructures can continue to be used.
The service protection contains two parts: the computing service
protection and network service protection.
* The in-network computing service must be protected. If a SINC
node of an in-network operation fails, the impact should be
minimized by guaranteeing as much as possible that the packets are
at least delivered to the end node, which will perform the
requested operation (cf. Section 6). The control plane will take
care to recover the failure, possibly using a different SINC node
and re-routing the traffic.
* The network service must be able to deliver packet to the
designated SINC nodes even in case of partial network failures
(e.g. link failures). To this end existing protection and re-
route solution may be applied.
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From the above discussion about the control plane, the following
basic requirements can be identified:
* The ability to exchange computing requirements (e.g. computing
tasks, performance, bandwidth, etc.) and execution status with the
application (e.g., via a User Network Interface). SINC tasks
should be carefully coordinated with (other) host tasks.
* The ability to gather the resources available on SINC-capable
devices, which demands regular advertisement of node capabilities
and link resources to other network nodes or to network
controller(s).
* The ability to dynamically create, modify and delete computing
network topologies based on application requests and according to
defined constraints. It includes, but it is not limited to,
topology creation/update, explicit path determination, link
bandwidth reservation and node computing resource reservation.
The created topology should be able to execute computing task
requested by the application with no (ot low) impact on the packet
transmission.
* The ability to monitor the performance of SINC nodes and link
status to ensure that they meet the requirements.
* The ability to provide failover mechanism in order to handle
errors and failures, and improves the resilience of the system. A
fallback mechanism is required in case that in-network resources
are not sufficient for processing SINC tasks, in which case, end
host might provide some complementary computing capabilities.
9. Security Considerations
In-network computing exposes computing data to network devices, which
inevitably raises security and privacy considerations. The security
problems faced by in-network computing include, but are not limited
to:
* Trustworthiness of participating devices
* Data hijacking and tampering
* Private data exposure
This documents assume that the deployment is done in a trusted
environment. For example, in a data center network or a private
network.
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A fine security analysis will be provided in future revisions of this
memo.
10. IANA Considerations
This document makes no requests to IANA.
Acknowledgements
This document received contribution from Yujing Zhou as well as
valuable feedback from Dirk Trossen, which was of great help in
improving the content. The authors would like to thank all of them.
References
Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
Informative References
[CALVIN] Thomson, A., Diamond, T., Weng, S., Ren, K., Shao, P., and
D. Abadi, "Calvin: fast distributed transactions for
partitioned database systems", ACM, Proceedings of the
2012 ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management
of Data, DOI 10.1145/2213836.2213838, May 2012,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/2213836.2213838>.
[COIN] "Computing in the Network, COIN, proposed IRTF group",
n.d., <https://datatracker.ietf.org/rg/coinrg/about/>.
[ERIS] Li, J., Michael, E., and D. R. K. Ports, "Eris:/
Coordination-Free Consistent Transactions Using In-Network
Concurrency Control", SOSP '17:/ Proceedings of the 26th
Symposium on Operating Systems Principles , 2017.
[GOBATTO] Reinehr Gobatto, L., Rodrigues, P., Tirone, M., Cordeiro,
W., and J. Azambuja, "Programmable Data Planes meets In-
Network Computing: A Review of the State of the Art and
Prospective Directions", Journal of Integrated Circuits
and Systems, Journal of Integrated Circuits and
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Systems vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 1-8,
DOI 10.29292/jics.v16i2.497, August 2021,
<https://doi.org/10.29292/jics.v16i2.497>.
[GTM] "GTM and Global Transaction Management", n.d.,
<https://www.postgres-xl.org/documentation/xc-overview-
gtm.html>.
[HPRDMA] Kalia, A., Kaminsky, M., and D. G. Andersen, "Design
Guidelines for High Performance RDMA Systems", 2016 USENIX
Annual Technical Conference (USENIX ATC 16) , 2016,
<https://www.usenix.org/conference/atc16/technical-
sessions/presentation/kalia>.
[I-D.irtf-coinrg-use-cases]
Kunze, I., Wehrle, K., Trossen, D., Montpetit, M., de Foy,
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Computing", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-
coinrg-use-cases-04, 30 June 2023,
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use-cases-04>.
[I-D.zhou-rtgwg-sinc-deployment-considerations]
Lou, Z., Iannone, L., Zhou, Y., Yang, J., and Zhangcuimin,
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Contributors
Jinze Yang
China
Email: jz.yang@live.com
Authors' Addresses
Zhe Lou
Huawei Technologies
Riesstrasse 25
80992 Munich
Germany
Email: zhe.lou@huawei.com
Lou, et al. Expires 18 March 2024 [Page 16]
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Luigi Iannone
Huawei Technologies France S.A.S.U.
18, Quai du Point du Jour
92100 Boulogne-Billancourt
France
Email: luigi.iannone@huawei.com
Yizhou Li
Huawei Technologies
Nanjing
China
Email: liyizhou@huawei.com
Cuimin Zhang
Huawei Technologies
Huawei base in Bantian, Longgang District
Shenzhen
China
Email: zhangcuimin@huawei.com
Kehan Yao
China Mobile
China
Email: yaokehan@chinamobile.com
Lou, et al. Expires 18 March 2024 [Page 17]
