Internet DRAFT - draft-maditimbru-rfc8416-bis
draft-maditimbru-rfc8416-bis
Network Working Group D. Ma
Internet-Draft ZDNS
Obsoletes: 8416 (if approved) T. Bruijnzeels
Intended status: Standards Track NLnet Labs
Expires: 8 January 2024 7 July 2023
Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI
(SLURM)
draft-maditimbru-rfc8416-bis-01
Abstract
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. Network operators, e.g., Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), can use the RPKI to validate BGP route origin assertions.
ISPs can also use the RPKI to validate the path of a BGP route.
However, ISPs may want to establish a local view of exceptions to the
RPKI data in the form of local filters and additions. The mechanisms
described in this document provide a simple way to enable INR holders
to establish a local, customized view of the RPKI, overriding global
RPKI repository data as needed.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 January 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. RP with SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. SLURM Files and Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. Use of JSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. SLURM File Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.3. Validation Output Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.3. ASPA Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Locally Added Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4.1. ROA Prefix Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4.2. BGPsec Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4.3. ASPA Assertions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.5. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions . . . 14
5. SLURM File Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1. SLURM File Atomicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2. Multiple SLURM Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
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2. Introduction
The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a global
authorization infrastructure that allows the holder of Internet
Number Resources (INRs) to make verifiable statements about those
resources. For example, the holder of a block of IP(v4 or v6)
addresses can issue a Route Origin Authorization (ROA) [RFC6482] to
authorize an Autonomous System (AS) to originate routes for that
block. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can then use the RPKI to
validate BGP routes. (Validation of the origin of a route is
described in [RFC6811], BGPSec validation of the path of a route is
described in [RFC8205], and ASPA based verification of the path is
decsribed in [I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification].
However, an RPKI Relying Party (RP) may want to override some of the
information expressed via configured Trust Anchors (TAs) and the
certificates downloaded from the RPKI repository system. For
instance, [RFC6491] recommends the creation of ROAs that would
invalidate public routes for reserved and unallocated address space,
yet some ISPs might like to use BGP and the RPKI with private address
space (see [RFC1918], [RFC4193], and [RFC6598]) or private AS numbers
(see [RFC1930] and [RFC6996]). Local use of private address space
and/or AS numbers is consistent with the RFCs cited above, but such
use cannot be verified by the global RPKI. This motivates creation
of mechanisms that enable a network operator to publish, at its
discretion, an exception to the RPKI in the form of filters and
additions (for its own use and that of its customers). Additionally,
a network operator might wish to make use of a local override
capability to protect routes from adverse actions [RFC8211], until
the results of such actions have been addressed. The mechanisms
developed to provide this capability to network operators are hereby
called "Simplified Local Internet Number Resource Management with the
RPKI (SLURM)".
3. RP with SLURM
SLURM provides a simple way to enable an RP to establish a local,
customized view of the RPKI, overriding RPKI repository data if
needed. To that end, an RP with SLURM can filter out (i.e., removes
from consideration for routing decisions) ROA Prefix, ASPA and BGPSec
assertions in the RPKI, and can add local assertions instead or in
addition to the ones found in the RPKI.
In general, the primary output of an RP is the data it sends to
routers over the RPKI-Router protocol [RFC8210]. The RPKI-Router
protocol enables routers to query an RP for all assertions it knows
about (Reset Query) or for an update of only the changes in
assertions (Serial Query). The mechanisms specified in this document
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are to be applied to the result set for a Reset Query and to both the
old and new sets that are compared for a Serial Query. RP software
may modify other forms of output in comparable ways, but that is
outside the scope of this document.
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +------------+
| | | | | |
| Repositories +--->Local cache of RPKI objects+---> Validation |
| | | | | |
+--------------+ +---------------------------+ +-----+------+
|
+-------------------------------------------------+
|
+------v-------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +-------------+
| | | | | | | |
| SLURM +---> SLURM +--->RPKI-Router+---> BGP Speakers|
| Filters | | Assertions | | Protocol | | |
+--------------+ +------------+ +-----------+ +-------------+
Figure 1: SLURM's Position in the RP Stack
4. SLURM Files and Mechanisms
4.1. Use of JSON
SLURM filters and assertions are specified in JSON format [RFC8259].
JSON members that are not defined here MUST NOT be used in SLURM
files. An RP MUST consider any deviations from the specifications to
be errors. Future additions to the specifications in this document
MUST use an incremented value for the "slurmVersion" member.
4.2. SLURM File Overview
A SLURM file consists of a single JSON object containing following
members:
* A "slurmVersion" member that MUST be set to 2, encoded as a number
* A "validationOutputFilters" member (Section 4.3), whose value is
an object. The object MUST contain exactly three members:
- A "prefixFilters" member, whose value is described in
Section 4.3.1.
- A "bgpsecFilters" member, whose value is described in
Section 4.3.2.
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- A "aspaFilters" member, whose value is described in
Section 4.3.3.
* A "locallyAddedAssertions" member (Section 3.4), whose value is an
object. The object MUST contain exactly three members:
- A "prefixAssertions" member, whose value is described in
Section 4.4.1.
- A "bgpsecAssertions" member, whose value is described in
Section 4.4.2.
- A "aspaAssertions" member, whose value is described in
Section 4.4.3.
In the envisioned typical use case, an RP uses both Validation Output
Filters and Locally Added Assertions. In this case, the resulting
assertions MUST be the same as if output filtering were performed
before locally adding assertions; that is, Locally Added Assertions
MUST NOT be removed by output filtering.
The following JSON structure with JSON members represents a SLURM
file that has no filters or assertions:
{
"slurmVersion": 2,
"validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [],
"bgpsecFilters": [],
"aspaFilters": []
},
"locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [],
"bgpsecAssertions": [],
"aspaAssertions": []
}
}
Figure 2: Empty SLURM File
4.3. Validation Output Filters
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4.3.1. Validated ROA Prefix Filters
The RP can configure zero or more Validated ROA Prefix Filters
("Prefix Filters" for short). Each Prefix Filter can contain either
an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and/or an ASN. It is RECOMMENDED that an
explanatory comment is included with each Prefix Filter so that it
can be shown to users of the RP software.
The above is expressed as a value of the "prefixFilters" member, as
an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain either 1)
one of the following members or 2) one of each of the following
members.
* A "prefix" member, whose value is a string representing either an
IPv4 prefix [RFC4632] or an IPv6 prefix ([RFC5952]).
* An "asn" member, whose value is a number.
In addition, each object MAY contain one optional "comment" member,
whose value is a string.
The following example JSON structure represents a "prefixFilters"
member with an array of example objects for each use case listed
above:
"prefixFilters": [
{
"prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
},
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
},
{
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"asn": 64497,
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
}
]
Figure 3: "prefixFilters" Examples
Any Validated ROA Payload (VRP) [RFC6811] that matches any configured
Prefix Filter MUST be removed from the RP's output.
A VRP is considered to match with a Prefix Filter if one of the
following cases applies:
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1. If the Prefix Filter only contains an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix, the
VRP is considered to match the filter if the VRP prefix is equal
to or covered by the Prefix Filter prefix.
2. If the Prefix Filter only contains an ASN, the VRP is considered
to match the filter if the VRP ASN matches the Prefix Filter ASN.
3. If the Prefix Filter contains both an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and an
ASN, the VRP is considered to match if the VRP prefix is equal to
or covered by the Prefix Filter prefix and the VRP ASN matches
the Prefix Filter ASN.
4.3.2. BGPsec Assertion Filters
The RP can configure zero or more BGPsec Assertion Filters ("BGPsec
Filters" for short). Each BGPsec Filter can contain an ASN and/or
the Base64 [RFC4648] encoding of a Router Subject Key Identifier
(SKI), as described in [RFC8209] and [RFC6487]. It is RECOMMENDED
that an explanatory comment is also included with each BGPsec Filter,
so that it can be shown to users of the RP software.
The above is expressed as a value of the "bgpsecFilters" member, as
an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one of
either, or one each of both following members:
* An "asn" member, whose value is a number
* An "SKI" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding without
trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the certificate's Subject
Key Identifier as described in Section 4.8.2 of [RFC6487]. (This
is the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or
length fields.)
In addition, each object MAY contain one optional "comment" member,
whose value is a string.
The following example JSON structure represents a "bgpsecFilters"
member with an array of example objects for each use case listed
above:
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"bgpsecFilters": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "All keys for ASN"
},
{
"SKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
"comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
},
{
"asn": 64497,
"SKI": "<Base 64 of some SKI>",
"comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
}
]
Figure 4: "bgpsecFilters" Examples
Any BGPsec Assertion that matches any configured BGPsec Filter MUST
be removed from the RP's output. A BGPsec Assertion is considered to
match with a BGPsec Filter if one of the following cases applies:
1. If the BGPsec Filter only contains an ASN, a BGPsec Assertion is
considered to match if the Assertion ASN matches the Filter ASN.
2. If the BGPsec Filter only contains an SKI, a BGPsec Assertion is
considered to match if the Assertion Router SKI matches the
Filter SKI.
3. If the BGPsec Filter contains both an ASN and a Router SKI, then
a BGPsec Assertion is considered to match if both the Assertion
ASN matches the Filter ASN and the Assertion Router SKI matches
the Filter SKI.
4.3.3. ASPA Filters
The RP can configure zero or more ASPA Filters. Each ASPA Filter can
contain a customer ASN and/or a list of providers ASNs. It is
RECOMMENDED that an explanatory comment is included with each ASPA
Filter so that it can be shown to users of the RP software.
The above is expressed as a value of the "aspaFilters" member, as an
array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain at least one
of the following members:
* A "customerAsid" member, whose value is a number representing an
ASPA Customer Autonomous System as described in section 3.2 of
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile].
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* A "providers" member, whose value is an array of 1 or more numbers
representing ASPA provider ASes as described in section 3.3 of
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile].
In addition, each object MAY contain one optional "comment" member,
whose value is a string.
The following example JSON structure represents a "aspaFilters"
member with an array of example objects for each use case listed
above:
{
"aspaFilters": [
{
"customerAsid": 64496,
"comment": "Filter out all VAPs that have 64496 as Customer ASID"
},
{
"customerAsid": 64497,
"providers": [ 64498, 64499],
"comment": "Filter some providers with 64497 as Customer ASID"
},
{
"providers": [ 65003 ],
"comment": "Never accept 65003 as a valid provider."
}
]
}
Figure 5: "aspaFilters" Examples
4.3.3.1. ASPA Unions and Filters
Before applying any ASPA filter an RP MUST first obtain a set of
validated ASPA objects, extract the Validated ASPA Payload (VAP) for
each object, and then make unions of all VAPs pertaining to the same
customer ASN. A unified VAP for a customer ASN will contain the
union of all provider ASes that are contained in any of the source
VAPs.
Example using human readable ASPA notation
[I-D.timbru-sidrops-aspa-notation]:
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Given VAPs from ASPA Objects:
AS65000 => AS65001, AS65002, AS65003,
AS65000 => AS65002, AS65003, AS65004
Unified VAP:
AS65000 => AS65001, AS65002, AS65003, AS65004
Figure 6: VAP Customer Only Filter Example
4.3.3.1.1. Customer AS Only Filter
If an ASPA filter specifies a "customerAsid" only, then the unified
VAP matching the Customer Autonomous System MUST be removed entirely.
Example using human readable ASPA notation:
Given VAP:
AS65000 => AS65001, AS65002
Filter:
"customerAsid": AS65000
Result:
VAP is removed completely
Figure 7: VAP Customer Only Filter Example
4.3.3.1.2. Providers Only Filter
If an ASPA filter specifies a "providers" array only, then matching
provider AS statements MUST be removed from any unified VAP, i.e.
regardless of the "customerAsid" used.
Example using human readable ASPA notation:
Given VAPs:
AS65000 => AS65001, AS65002, AS65003, AS65004
AS65005 => AS65001, AS65002, AS65003, AS65004
Filter:
"providers": [ 65001, 65002, 65003]
Result:
AS65000 => AS65001, AS65004
AS65005 => AS65001, AS65004
Figure 8: VAP Provider Only Filter Example
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4.3.3.1.3. Customer AS and Providers Filter
If a filter specifies both "customerAsid" and "providers", then the
provider filter is applied only to the unified VAP that matches the
Customer Autonomous System.
Example using human readable ASPA notation:
Given VAPs:
AS65000 => AS65001, AS65002, AS65003, AS65004
AS65005 => AS65001, AS65002, AS65003, AS65004
Filter:
"customerAsid": 65000,
"providers": [ 65002, 65003, 65004 ]
Result:
AS65000 => AS65001
AS65005 => AS65001, AS65002, AS65003, AS65004
Figure 9: VAP Customer and Provider Filter Example
4.3.3.1.4. ASPA Filter Considerations
It should be noted that while this standard allows for fine-grained
ASPA filters to be specified, no specific way to filter is
recommended here. In other words, this document aims to give
operators set logic oriented tools to manipulate the VAPs that would
be communicated to their routers, but it does not make any
assumptions about use cases and best practices.
This design choice is based on the conviction that not all possible
use cases can be known at this time, and that more deployment
experience is needed before best practices can be formulated. It is
however encouraged that this discussion takes place, and that, if
needed, a follow-up document that describes use cases and best
practices is made in future.
4.4. Locally Added Assertions
4.4.1. ROA Prefix Assertions
Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of ROA
Prefix Assertions ("Prefix Assertions" for short). Each ROA Prefix
Assertion MUST contain an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix and an ASN. It MAY
include a value for the maximum length. It is RECOMMENDED that an
explanatory comment is also included with each so that it can be
shown to users of the RP software.
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The above is expressed as a value of the "prefixAssertions" member,
as an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one of
each of the following members:
* A "prefix" member, whose value is a string representing either an
IPv4 prefix (see Section 3.1 of [RFC4632]) or an IPv6 prefix (see
[RFC5952]).
* An "asn" member, whose value is a number.
In addition, each object MAY contain one of each of the following
members:
* A "maxPrefixLength" member, whose value is a number.
* A "comment" member, whose value is a string.
The following example JSON structure represents a "prefixAssertions"
member with an array of example objects for each use case listed
above:
"prefixAssertions": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"comment": "My other important route"
},
{
"asn": 64496,
"prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
"maxPrefixLength": 48,
"comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
}
]
Figure 10: "prefixAssertions" Examples
Note that the combination of the prefix, ASN, and optional maximum
length describes a VRP as described in [RFC6811]. The RP MUST add
all Prefix Assertions found this way to the VRP found through RPKI
validation and ensure that it sends the complete set of Protocol Data
Units (PDUs), excluding duplicates when using the RPKI-Router
protocol (see Sections 5.6 and 5.7 of [RFC8210]).
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4.4.2. BGPsec Assertions
Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of BGPsec
Assertions. Each BGPsec Assertion MUST contain an AS number, a
Router SKI, and the router public key. It is RECOMMENDED that an
explanatory comment is also included so that it can be shown to users
of the RP software.
The above is expressed as a value of the "bgpsecAssertions" member,
as an array of zero or more objects. Each object MUST contain one
each of all of the following members:
* An "asn" member, whose value is a number.
* An "SKI" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding without
trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the certificate's Subject
Key Identifier as described in Section 4.8.2 of [RFC6487] (This is
the value of the ASN.1 OCTET STRING without the ASN.1 tag or
length fields.)
* A "routerPublicKey" member, whose value is the Base64 encoding
without trailing '=' (Section 5 of [RFC4648]) of the equivalent to
the subjectPublicKeyInfo value of the router certificate's public
key, as described in [RFC8208]. This is the full ASN.1 DER
encoding of the subjectPublicKeyInfo, including the ASN.1 tag and
length values of the subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
* An optional "comment" member, whose value is a string.
The following example JSON structure represents a "bgpsecAssertions"
member with one object as described above:
"bgpsecAssertions": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
"routerPublicKey": "<some base64 public key>",
"comment": "My known key for my important ASN"
}
]
Figure 11: "bgpsecAssertions" Examples
Note that a "bgpsecAssertions" member matches the syntax of the
Router Key PDU described in Section 5.10 of [RFC8210]. Relying
Parties MUST add any "bgpsecAssertions" member thus found to the set
of Router Key PDUs, excluding duplicates, when using the RPKI-Router
protocol [RFC8210].
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4.4.3. ASPA Assertions
Each RP is locally configured with a (possibly empty) array of ASPA
assertions. It is RECOMMENDED that an explanatory comment is also
included so that it can be shown to users of the RP software.
The above is expressed as a value of the "aspaAssertions" member, as
an array of zero or more objects. The object structure is similar to
the ASPA filter structure, except that in this case both a
"customerAsid" member and a "providers" member containing at at least
one provider ASN MUST be specified.
"aspaAssertions": [
{
"customerAsid": 64496,
"providers": [ 64498, 64499, 64500 ],
"comment": "Authorize additional providers for customer AS 64496"
}
]
Figure 12: "aspaAssertions" Example
Assertions are applied after the RP obtained unified VAPs and applied
any configured filters. If there is an existing unified and
potentially partially filtered VAP for the assertion customer ASN,
then the additional authorizations are merged into this in the same
way as VAPs are merged (see section 4.3.3.1).
Note that the presence of an ASPA assertion does not imply any
filtering. If the intent is to replace all existing authorized
providers then an ASPA filter for the customer ASN only (i.e. without
listing providers) should be used in addition as this would ensure
that the original unified VAP is removed before the assertion is
applied.
4.5. Example of a SLURM File with Filters and Assertions
The following JSON structure represents an example of a SLURM file
that uses all the elements described in the previous sections:
{
"slurmVersion": 2,
"validationOutputFilters": {
"prefixFilters": [
{
"prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
},
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{
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
},
{
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"asn": 64497,
"comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
}
],
"bgpsecFilters": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment": "All keys for ASN"
},
{
"SKI": "Zm9v",
"comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
},
{
"asn": 64497,
"SKI": "YmFy",
"comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
}
],
"aspaFilters": [
{
"customerAsid": 64496,
"comment": "Filter out all VAPs for customer AS 64496"
},
{
"customerAsid": 64497,
"providers": [ 64498, 64499, 64500 ],
"comment": "Filter some providers for customer AS 64497"
},
{
"providers": [ 65001 ],
"comment": "Never accept 65001 as a valid provider."
}
]
},
"locallyAddedAssertions": {
"prefixAssertions": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
"comment": "My other important route"
},
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{
"asn": 64496,
"prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
"maxPrefixLength": 48,
"comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
}
],
"bgpsecAssertions": [
{
"asn": 64496,
"comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
"SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
"routerPublicKey": "<some base64 public key>"
}
],
"aspaAssertions": [
{
"customerAsid": 64496,
"providers": [ 64498, 64499, 64500 ],
"comment": "Authorize additional providers for AS 64496"
}
]
}
}
Figure 13: Example of Full SLURM File
5. SLURM File Configuration
5.1. SLURM File Atomicity
To ensure local consistency, the effect of SLURM MUST be atomic.
That is, the output of the RP either MUST be the same as if a SLURM
file were not used or MUST reflect the entire SLURM configuration.
For an example of why this is required, consider the case of two
local routes for the same prefix but different origin ASNs. Both
routes are configured with Locally Added Assertions. If neither
addition occurs, then both routes could be in the NotFound state
[RFC6811]. If both additions occur, then both routes would be in the
Valid state. However, if one addition occurs and the other does not,
then one could be Invalid while the other is Valid.
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5.2. Multiple SLURM Files
An implementation MAY support the concurrent use of multiple SLURM
files. In this case, the resulting inputs to Validation Output
Filters and Locally Added Assertions are the respective unions of the
inputs from each file. The envisioned typical use case for multiple
files is when the files have distinct scopes. For instance,
operators of two distinct networks may resort to one RP system to
frame routing decisions. As such, they probably deliver SLURM files
to this RP independently. Before an RP configures SLURM files from
different sources, it MUST make sure there is no internal conflict
among the INR assertions in these SLURM files. To do so, the RP
SHOULD check the entries of each SLURM file with regard to overlaps
of the INR assertions and report errors to the sources that created
the SLURM files in question. The RP gets multiple SLURM files as a
set, and the whole set MUST be rejected in case of any overlaps among
the SLURM files.
If a problem is detected with the INR assertions in these SLURM
files, the RP MUST NOT use them and SHOULD issue a warning as error
report in the following cases:
1. There may be conflicting changes to ROA Prefix Assertions if an
IP address X and distinct SLURM files Y and Z exist such that X
is contained by any prefix in any "prefixAssertions" or
"prefixFilters" in file Y and X is contained by any prefix in any
"prefixAssertions" or "prefixFilters" in file Z.
2. There may be conflicting changes to BGPsec Assertions if an ASN X
and distinct SLURM files Y and Z exist such that X is used in any
"bgpsecAssertions" or "bgpsecFilters" in file Y and X is used in
any "bgpsecAssertions" or "bgpsecFilters" in file Z.
6. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
7. Security Considerations
The mechanisms described in this document provide a network operator
with additional ways to control use of RPKI data while preserving
autonomy in address space and ASN management. These mechanisms are
only applied locally; they do not influence how other network
operators interpret RPKI data. Nonetheless, care should be taken in
how these mechanisms are employed. Note that it also is possible to
use SLURM to (locally) manipulate assertions about non-private INRs,
e.g., allocated address space that is globally routed. For example,
a SLURM file may be used to override RPKI data that a network
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operator believes has been corrupted by an adverse action. Network
operators who elect to use SLURM in this fashion should use extreme
caution.
The goal of the mechanisms described in this document is to enable an
RP to create its own view of the RPKI, which is intrinsically a
security function. An RP using a SLURM file is trusting the
assertions made in that file. Errors in the SLURM file used by an RP
can undermine the security offered to that RP by the RPKI. A SLURM
file could declare as invalid ROAs that would otherwise be valid, and
vice versa. As a result, an RP MUST carefully consider the security
implications of the SLURM file being used, especially if the file is
provided by a third party.
Additionally, each RP using SLURM MUST ensure the authenticity and
integrity of any SLURM file that it uses. Initially, the SLURM file
may be preconfigured out of band, but if the RP updates its SLURM
file over the network, it MUST verify the authenticity and integrity
of the updated SLURM file. The mechanism to update the SLURM file to
guarantee authenticity and integrity is out of the scope of this
document.
8. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank David Mandelberg for co-authoring
[RFC8416] which this document replaces. The authors would also like
to thank Stephen Kent, Richard Hansen, Hui Zou and Chunlin An for
their contributions to [RFC8416].
9. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile]
Azimov, A., Uskov, E., Bush, R., Snijders, J., Housley,
R., and B. Maddison, "A Profile for Autonomous System
Provider Authorization", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-15, 8 June 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
aspa-profile-15>.
[I-D.ietf-sidrops-aspa-verification]
Azimov, A., Bogomazov, E., Bush, R., Patel, K., Snijders,
J., and K. Sriram, "BGP AS_PATH Verification Based on
Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA) Objects",
Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-
verification-14, 19 April 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-sidrops-
aspa-verification-14>.
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[I-D.timbru-sidrops-aspa-notation]
Bruijnzeels, T., Borchert, O., Ma, D., and T. de Kock,
"Human Readable ASPA Notation", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-timbru-sidrops-aspa-notation-01, 6
July 2023, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-
timbru-sidrops-aspa-notation-01>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4632] Fuller, V. and T. Li, "Classless Inter-domain Routing
(CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation
Plan", BCP 122, RFC 4632, DOI 10.17487/RFC4632, August
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5952] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
Address Text Representation", RFC 5952,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5952, August 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5952>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R.
Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6811>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8205] Lepinski, M., Ed. and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.
[RFC8208] Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8208>.
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[RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>.
[RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8416] Ma, D., Mandelberg, D., and T. Bruijnzeels, "Simplified
Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI
(SLURM)", RFC 8416, DOI 10.17487/RFC8416, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8416>.
10. Informative References
[RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.
J., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private
Internets", BCP 5, RFC 1918, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918,
February 1996, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918>.
[RFC1930] Hawkinson, J. and T. Bates, "Guidelines for creation,
selection, and registration of an Autonomous System (AS)",
BCP 6, RFC 1930, DOI 10.17487/RFC1930, March 1996,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1930>.
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public
Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA",
RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6491>.
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[RFC6598] Weil, J., Kuarsingh, V., Donley, C., Liljenstolpe, C., and
M. Azinger, "IANA-Reserved IPv4 Prefix for Shared Address
Space", BCP 153, RFC 6598, DOI 10.17487/RFC6598, April
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6598>.
[RFC6996] Mitchell, J., "Autonomous System (AS) Reservation for
Private Use", BCP 6, RFC 6996, DOI 10.17487/RFC6996, July
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6996>.
[RFC8211] Kent, S. and D. Ma, "Adverse Actions by a Certification
Authority (CA) or Repository Manager in the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 8211,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8211, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8211>.
Authors' Addresses
Di Ma
ZDNS
Email: madi@zdns.cn
Tim Bruijnzeels
NLnet Labs
Email: tim@nlnetlabs.nl
URI: https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/
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