Internet DRAFT - draft-martinsen-tram-stuntrace
draft-martinsen-tram-stuntrace
TRAM P. Martinsen
Internet-Draft D. Wing
Intended status: Standards Track Cisco
Expires: December 3, 2015 June 1, 2015
STUN Traceroute
draft-martinsen-tram-stuntrace-01
Abstract
After a UDP protocol such as RTP determines a network path is
experiencing problems, a traceroute is often useful to determine
which router or which link is contributing to the problem. However,
operating system traceroute commands follow a different path than the
actual UDP flow which complicates troubleshooting. A superior method
is shown which is absolutely path-congruent with the UDP protocol
itself, works on IPv4 and IPv6, and does not require administrative
privileges on most operating systems.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on December 3, 2015.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Overview of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. New STUN Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. PATH-NODE-PROBE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Base Protocol Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.1. Forming STUN Packet Probes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5.2. Receiving a STUN Packet Probe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.3. Receiving ICMP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. IPv4 and IPv6 Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Platform Implementation Details . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.1. Setting TTL or HOP_LIMIT on Probes . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.2. Receiving ICMP Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.2.1. OS-X and iOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A.2.2. Linux and Android . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
A.2.3. Windows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
Traceroute [RFC1393] is a simple tool available on most operating
systems and is popular to debug the network by simply getting round-
trip time along each hop to a remote IP address. More advanced
tools, such as MTR, provide more metrics such as packet loss and
round trip time to each hop over several seconds or minutes.
To simplify network debugging when dealing with bi-directional real
time media it is often useful to get as much information as possible
regarding the network path. In this specification probe packets are
sent using the same 5-tuple where (S)RTP media is flowing. This will
provide the most accurate results, as probe packets sent on a
different 5-tuple may take another path due to Equal-Cost Multipath
(ECMP, [RFC2992]), policy-based routing, and similar techniques.
To avoid those problems, the probe packets need to be sent from the
same socket and with the same DiffServ code point the normal (S)RTP
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media packets. As shown in Appendix A, most operating systems can
pass the ICMP "Time to Live Exceeded" error to the application, so
the application can perform the diagnostics over that network path.
This specifications uses STUN [RFC5389] packets as probes. STUN
packets are designed to be multiplexed together with RTP [RFC3550]
(and SRTP [RFC3711]) and are unlikely to cause any "problems" for the
(S)RTP receiver. To differentiate each hop count, classic traceroute
uses different UDP port numbers (e.g., TTL=1 uses UDP port 55001,
TTL=2 uses UDP port 55002, etc.). The mechanism described here uses
the same UDP port number (so that the trace is path-congruent with
the (S)RTP packets), and uses different length UDP packets to
differentiate each hop count (e.g., TTL=1 uses length 501, TTL=2 uses
length 502, etc.).
Using a technique based on ICMP replies avoids a forklift upgrade of
the network to provide host applications with useful information.
ICMP is already supported in most network and application stacks.
Additional network characteristics like MTU and bandwidth
availability can be discovered by using
[I-D.petithuguenin-behave-stun-pmtud] and
[I-D.martinsen-tram-turnbandwidthprobe].
2. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. Overview of Operation
An application using (S)RTP to send and receive media like audio and
video following the guidelines in [RFC4961] uses symmetric send and
receive ports. The application opens one socket that it uses to both
send and receive media on.
It is important to note that the functionality described here can be
done on most OSes without any administrative privileges.
Figure 1 depicts the various components needed for this to work. The
application opens up its media socket as it would in normal cases
where media is to be sent and received. It also opens up a ICMP
socket or installs an error listener on the media socket.
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POLL/ Network Node Network Node
SELECT
+-----+ | | |
| A |* ICMP +++ /+\++++++++++++|++++ <ICMP Reply> |
| L | SOCKET | | | ++++++++++++ |
| I | | | | + |
| C |* MEDIA ==|===|===========|=================+|====<(S)RTP>
| E | SOCKET --\-/------------|------------------X <STUN Probe>
+-----+ | | |(TTL expired)
====== Media Path
------ STUN Probes (on same 5 tuple as Media)
++++++ ICMP reply
Figure 1
The application also need to listen on the sockets for any incoming
ICMP packets or socket error messages. This is usually done with the
socket calls select() or poll(). How to actually receive the ICMP
messages will vary from OS to OS. See Appendix A for implementation
details on various OSes.
Once the application have media running and is listening for ICMP
replies it can start sending probes to detect networks nodes in the
media path. This is done by sending STUN messages and setting the
TTL/MAX_HOP limit in the IPv4/IPv6 header. Appendix A.1 explains how
to set this on various platforms.
The STUN packet is sent on the same socket as the media packet are
sent and received on. Mixing (S)RTP and STUN is well known behavior
and should not cause any problems.
Along the path, every layer 3 network node (a.k.a. router) decreases
the IPv4 TTL or IPv6 HOP_LIMIT field. If the field becomes 0 the
network node responds with a ICMP error "Time to Live Exceeded" (TTL
Exceeded) or "Hop Limit Exceeded in Transit" (Time Exceeded Message).
The application will receive a ICMP error in response to the
offending probe packet. The source IP address of the ICMP packet
will be the sending network node. This enables the application to
trace the path towards the destination. The ICMP reply contains at
least 8 bytes of the offending packet. The IP fragment of the
offending packet in the ICMP reply can be used to determining if this
ICMP reply actually was a reply to an offending packet the
application did send out.
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4. New STUN Attributes
This STUN extension defines the following new attribute:
0xXXX0: PATH-NODE-PROBE
4.1. PATH-NODE-PROBE
This attribute have a length of 8. Padding is needed to hit the
required STUN 32 bit STUN attribute boundary.
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| HOP |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 2: PATH-NODE-PROBE Attribute
The HOP field indicates what hop in the network path (relative to the
application) the application is trying to learn the IP address of.
This field should be set to the same value as the TTL/HOP_LIMIT field
in the IPv4/IPv6 header of the probe packet leaving the application.
Note that the TTL/HOP_LIMIT field in the IPv4/IPv6 header will
decrease as the packet traverses the path. The HOP field in the
attribute will remain unchanged.
This attribute is useful for clients when receiving the whole
offending IP packet in the ICMP reply. The attribute will be
reflected back in a STUN response if the remote application supports
is. This makes it easier to correlate sent probe packets and ICMP
responses.
5. Base Protocol Procedures
The procedures are simple; send a probe packet that may or may not
trigger a reply from one of the nodes in the network path and then
listen and parse any incoming replies. The reply might be an ICMP
Time To Live Exceeded (from an intermediate hop), a STUN response
(from the (S)RTP peer), or any other ICMP error message.
5.1. Forming STUN Packet Probes
To reduce chances of a STUN traceroute probe being stopped by various
middle-boxes it is RECOMMENDED to use a STUN binding request as
described in ICE [RFC5245].
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Since the STUN packet can traverse the whole media-path and reach the
remote peer it is RECOMMENDED the agent follows the guidelines for
sending connectivity checks defined in ICE [RFC5245]. Adding a
USERNAME attribute and integrity protecting the STUN message enables
the remote peer to authenticate the STUN message and create an
appropriate response. If the remote peer is unable to authenticate
the STUN request it will not send any response. Getting a response
from the remote peer is useful as it is an indication the probe have
traveled the whole network path.
When forming the STUN packet probe the agent SHOULD add the PATH-
NODE-PROBE attribute and MAY add a PADDING attribute as described in
[RFC5780] Section 7.6. The PATH-NODE-PROBE attribute is useful for
STUN servers receiving the STUN probe and it can be used to correlate
any ICMP replies if the reply contains the complete offending packet.
Adding the PADDING attribute is useful for clients that needs to have
several outstanding probe packets on the same 5-tuple. The length of
the offending packet reported back in any ICMP reply will make it
possible to correlate this to the correct probe.
The agent sending the STUN packet probe MUST store the length of the
UDP packet (as reported in the IP header) containing the STUN probe.
Before sending the probe on the wire it is important to set the
appropriate TTL or HOP_LIMIT field in the IPv4 or IPv6 header before
the packet is sent. How to do this on various OSes are described in
Appendix A.1.
The probe MUST also be sent with the same DSCP value as the (S)RTP
packets. This is normally not a problem as the STUN probes and
(S)RTP packets are sent on the same socket.
5.2. Receiving a STUN Packet Probe
An agent that listens for STUN requests (a.k.a STUN server) that
receives a STUN request with a PATH-NODE-PROBE attribute, MUST
include a PATH-NODE-PROBE attribute with the same value in the
generated response.
Any PADDING attributes as defined in [RFC5780] SHOULD be ignored by
the STUN server.
5.3. Receiving ICMP Messages
After an agent sends a STUN probe it must be ready to receive a ICMP
reply or a STUN reply. Details on how to do this on various OSes are
described in Appendix A.2.
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To prevent ICMP spoofing attacks [RFC5927] , the received ICMP packet
MUST be validated by port number and length in the IP fragment of the
offending packet contained in the ICMP payload. Port number
validation checks that the port number in the offending IP fragment
of the probe packet contained in the ICMP payload corresponds to the
(S)RTP media (and STUN probe) 5-tuple. The length validation checks
IP packet length field in the IP fragment of the offending packet
received in the ICMP reply. This value MUST correspond to any length
stored when the agent sent the STUN probe. If the agent uses the
PADDING (Defined in [RFC5780]) attribute to generate different length
on the STUN probes it is possible to have several outstanding probes,
thus speeding up the trace.
6. IPv4 and IPv6 Differences
Core functionality is the same. In IPv6 the IPv4 TTL field is
renamed to HOP_LIMIT to better reflect what it actually represent.
7. IANA Considerations
The code-point for the new STUN attribute defined in this
specification is described in Section 4.
8. Security Considerations
ICMP messages does leak network topology, which is a well-known
threat to networks and mitigations have long existed in routers and
firewalls so that networks can be configured to not leak this
topology information beyond their borders.
ICMP spoofing and DOS attack prevention exist in routers deployed on
the Internet today.
No new threats have been added in this specification.
9. Acknowledgements
Trond Andersen for actually implementing this and Wilson Chen for
helping out with different OS behavior testing.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
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[RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
Applications", STD 64, RFC 3550, July 2003.
[RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
RFC 3711, March 2004.
[RFC4961] Wing, D., "Symmetric RTP / RTP Control Protocol (RTCP)",
BCP 131, RFC 4961, July 2007.
[RFC5245] Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
(ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT)
Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245, April
2010.
[RFC5389] Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing,
"Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389,
October 2008.
[RFC5780] MacDonald, D. and B. Lowekamp, "NAT Behavior Discovery
Using Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC
5780, May 2010.
10.2. Informative References
[I-D.martinsen-tram-turnbandwidthprobe]
Martinsen, P., Andersen, T., Salgueiro, G., and M. Petit-
Huguenin, "Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN)
Bandwidth Probe", draft-martinsen-tram-
turnbandwidthprobe-00 (work in progress), May 2015.
[I-D.petithuguenin-behave-stun-pmtud]
Petit-Huguenin, M., "Path MTU Discovery Using Session
Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", draft-petithuguenin-
behave-stun-pmtud-03 (work in progress), March 2009.
[ICMPTest]
"ICMP test github repo", <https://github.com/palerikm/
ICMPTest/>.
[RFC1393] Malkin, G., "Traceroute Using an IP Option", RFC 1393,
January 1993.
[RFC2992] Hopps, C., "Analysis of an Equal-Cost Multi-Path
Algorithm", RFC 2992, November 2000.
[RFC5927] Gont, F., "ICMP Attacks against TCP", RFC 5927, July 2010.
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Appendix A. Platform Implementation Details
This section provides examples and hint on how probe packets can be
sent and ICMP messages received on various OSes. For a complete
example please refer to [ICMPTest].
A.1. Setting TTL or HOP_LIMIT on Probes
Setting the appropriate value in the IPv4 or IPv6 header is the same
for most platforms. Use
setsockopt(sockHandle, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TTL, &sock_ttl,
sizeof(sock_ttl));
for IPv4 or
setsockopt(sockHandle,
IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS, &sock_ttl,
sizeof(sock_ttl));
for IPv6.
Sending the probes on the same socket as media is flowing requires
the implementations to only set this when sending the probe packet.
Remember to set it back to initial value when sending media. Most
OSes seems to handle the setsockopt call correctly and not set the
value in the IP header of any buffered packets.
A.2. Receiving ICMP Messages
A.2.1. OS-X and iOS
Creating a socket to listen for incoming ICMP messages can be done
as:
icmpSocket=socket(config.remoteAddr.ss_family, SOCK_DGRAM,
IPPROTO_ICMP); <<<
This is done in addition to the normal socket used to send media on
(RTP) and probes. (Yes, even if the probe are sent on the media
socket the ICMP reply will be on the ICMP sockets..)
Code in the while(1) loop of poll would look something like:
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for(i=0;i<numSockets;i++){
if (ufds[i].revents & POLLIN) {
if(i == rtpSock){
//Handle "normal" data here.
}
if(i == icmpSock){//This is the ICMP socket
//Handle ICMP packets here.
}
}
}
A.2.2. Linux and Android
For unprivileged recipient of the ICMP messages an error handler must
be installed. This can be done like:
setsockopt (config.sockfd, SOL_IP,
IP_RECVERR, &val, sizeof(val)) < 0);
In the poll() section of the code something like this needs to be
there:
struct msghdr msg;
if (ufds[dataSock].revents & POLLERR) {
if (recvmsg(sockfd, &msg, MSG_ERRQUEUE ) == -1) {
//Ignore for now. Will get it later..
continue;
}
//possible ICMP message
//use cmsg to read the structures in msg
}
Failing to call rcvmsg seems to let the msg fall through to the
kernel. Looks like it will close down the socket because of the
received error. So be careful!
For application with the right administrative privileges it is
possible create a separate ICMP listen socket as described in the
previous section. The socket() call would then look like:
icmpSocket=socket(config.remoteAddr.ss_family, SOCK_RAW,
IPPROTO_ICMP);
The poll() loop will be as described for OS-X and iOS. No need for a
error handler.
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A.2.3. Windows
The following code in select() or poll() will read and detect any
incoming ICMP messages on the send socket.
if (FD_ISSET(sendsocket, &read_flags)) {
cc = recvfrom(sendsocket, receivepacket,
sizeof(receivepacket), 0,
(struct sockaddr *)&receiveaddr, (int*)&fromlen);
if (cc < 0 && GETERRORCODE == WSAENETRESET) {
//ICMP packet handling here
//Do:
//inet_ntoa(receiveaddr.sin_addr));
//to get the address of the router sending the
//ICMP reply
}
}
Authors' Addresses
Paal-Erik Martinsen
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Philip Pedersens Vei 22
Lysaker, Akershus 1325
Norway
Email: palmarti@cisco.com
Dan Wing
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, California 95134
USA
Email: dwing@cisco.com
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