Internet DRAFT - draft-mattsson-eap-tls13
draft-mattsson-eap-tls13
Network Working Group J. Mattsson
Internet-Draft M. Sethi
Updates: 5216 (if approved) Ericsson
Intended status: Standards Track March 5, 2018
Expires: September 6, 2018
Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3
draft-mattsson-eap-tls13-02
Abstract
This document specifies the use of EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 while
remaining backwards compatible with existing implementations of EAP-
TLS. TLS 1.3 provides significantly improved security, privacy, and
reduced latency when compared to earlier versions of TLS.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 6, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1.1. Base Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1.2. Resumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.3. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.4. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1.5. Fragmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2. Identity Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3. Key Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4. Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements . . . . 13
3. Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol . . . . . . . . 13
4. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. Security Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2. Peer and Server Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3. Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.4. Certificate Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.5. Packet Modification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Updated references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC3748],
provides a standard mechanism for support of multiple authentication
methods. EAP-Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS) [RFC5216] specifies
an EAP authentication method with certificate-based mutual
authentication and key derivation utilizing the TLS handshake
protocol for cryptographic algorithms and protocol version
negotiation, mutual authentication and establishment of shared secret
keying material. EAP-TLS is widely supported for authentication in
IEEE 802.11 [IEEE-802.11] networks (Wi-Fi) using IEEE 802.1X
[IEEE-802.1X] and it's the default mechanism for certificate based
authentication in MulteFire [MulteFire] and 3GPP 5G [TS.33.501]
networks. EAP-TLS [RFC5216] references TLS 1.0 [RFC2246] and TLS 1.1
[RFC4346], but works perfectly also with TLS 1.2 [RFC5246].
Weaknesses found in previous versions of TLS, as well as new
requirements for security, privacy, and reduced latency has led to
the development of TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], which in large parts
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is a complete remodeling of the TLS handshake protocol including a
different message flow, different handshake messages, different key
schedule, different cipher suites, different resumption, and
different privacy protection. This means that significant parts of
the normative text in the previous EAP-TLS specification [RFC5216]
are not applicable to EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 (or higher). Therefore,
aspects such as resumption, privacy handling, and key derivation need
to be appropriately addressed for EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 (or higher).
This document defines how to use EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 (or higher) and
does not change how EAP-TLS is used with older versions of TLS.
While this document updates EAP-TLS [RFC5216], it remains backwards
compatible with it and existing implementations of EAP-TLS. This
document only describes differences compared to [RFC5216].
In addition to the improved security and privacy offered by TLS 1.3,
there are other significant benefits of using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3.
When EAP-TLS is used with support for privacy, TLS 1.3 requires two
fewer round-trips. TLS 1.3 also introduces more possibilities to
reduce fragmentation when compared to earlier versions of TLS.
1.1. Requirements and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. Readers
are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts used in EAP-
TLS [RFC5216] and TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].
2. Protocol Overview
2.1. Overview of the EAP-TLS Conversation
2.1.1. Base Case
TLS 1.3 changes both the message flow and the handshake messages
compared to earlier versions of TLS. Therefore, much of Section 2.1
of RC5216 [RFC5216] does not apply for TLS 1.3 (or higher).
After receiving an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS as
described in [RFC5216] the conversation will continue with the TLS
handshake protocol encapsulated in the data fields of EAP-Response
and EAP-Request packets. When EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3
or higher, the formatting and processing of the TLS handshake SHALL
be done as specified in that version of TLS. This document only
lists additional and different requirements, restrictions, and
processing compared to [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13] and [RFC5216].
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The EAP server MUST authenticate with a certificate and SHOULD
require the EAP peer to authenticate with a certificate.
Certificates can be of any type supported by TLS including raw public
keys. Pre-Shared Key (PSK) authentication SHALL not be used except
for resumption. SessionID is deprecated in TLS 1.3 and the EAP
server SHALL ignore the legacy_session_id field if TLS 1.3 is
negotiated. Resumption is handled as described in Section 2.1.2.
After the TLS handshake has completed, the EAP server sends EAP-
Success.
As stated in [RFC5216], the TLS cipher suite shall not be used to
protect application data. This applies also for early application
data. When EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3, early application data
SHALL NOT be used.
In the case where EAP-TLS with mutual authentication is successful,
the conversation will appear as shown in Figure 1.
EAP Peer EAP Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
TLS CertificateRequest,
TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
<-------- TLS Finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished) -------->
<-------- EAP-Success
Figure 1: EAP-TLS mutual authentication
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When using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3, the EAP server MUST indicate support
of resumption in the initial authentication. To indicate support of
resumption, the EAP server sends a NewSessionTicket message
(containing a PSK and other parameters) after it has received the
Finished message.
In the case where EAP-TLS with mutual authentication and ticket
establishment is successful, the conversation will appear as shown in
Figure 2.
EAP Peer EAP Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
TLS CertificateRequest,
TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
<-------- TLS Finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS NewSessionTicket)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -------->
<-------- EAP-Success
Figure 2: EAP-TLS ticket establishment
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2.1.2. Resumption
TLS 1.3 replaces the session resumption mechanisms in earlier
versions of TLS with a new PSK exchange. When EAP-TLS is used with
TLS version 1.3 or higher, EAP-TLS SHALL use a resumption mechanism
compatible with that version of TLS.
For TLS 1.3, resumption is described in Section 2.2 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. If the client has received a NewSessionTicket
message from the server, the client can use the PSK identity received
in the ticket to negotiate the use of the associated PSK. If the
server accepts it, then the security context of the new connection is
tied to the original connection and the key derived from the initial
handshake is used to bootstrap the cryptographic state instead of a
full handshake. It is left up to the EAP peer whether to use
resumption, but a EAP peer SHOULD use resumption as long as it has a
valid ticket cached. An EAP server SHOULD accept resumption as long
as the ticket is valid, but MAY require a full authentication.
A subsequent authentication using resumption, where both sides
authenticate successfully is shown in Figure 3.
EAP Peer EAP Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
<-------- TLS Finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Finished) -------->
<-------- EAP-Success
Figure 3: EAP-TLS resumption
As specified in Section 2.2 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13], the EAP peer
SHOULD supply a "key_share" extension when offering resumption, which
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allows the EAP server to decline resumption and continue the
handshake as a full handshake. The message flow in this case is
given by Figure 1 or Figure 2. If the EAP peer did not supply a
"key_share" extension when offering resumption, the EAP server needs
to reject the ClientHello and the EAP peer needs to restart a full
handshake. The message flow in this case is given by Figure 4
followed by Figure 1 or Figure 2.
2.1.3. Termination
TLS 1.3 changes both the message flow and the handshake messages
compared to earlier versions of TLS. Therefore, some normative text
in Section 2.1.3 of RC5216 [RFC5216] does not apply for TLS 1.3 or
higher. The two paragraphs below replaces the corresponding
paragraphs in Section 2.1.3 of RC5216 [RFC5216] when EAP-TLS is used
with TLS 1.3 or higher. The other paragraphs in Section 2.1.3 of
RC5216 [RFC5216] still apply with the exception that SessionID is
deprecated.
If the EAP Server authenticates successfully the EAP Peer MUST
send an EAP-Response message with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS containing TLS
records confirming the processing in the version of TLS used.
If the EAP Peer authenticates successfully the EAP Server MUST
send an EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS containing TLS
records confirming to the processing in the version of TLS used.
The message flow ends with the EAP Server sending a EAP-Success
message.
In the case where the server rejects the ClientHello, the
conversation will appear as follows:
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EAP Peer EAP Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Alert Message)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -------->
<-------- EAP-Failure
Figure 4: EAP-TLS server rejection of ClientHello
In the case where server authentication is unsuccessful, the
conversation will appear as follows:
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EAP Peer EAP Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
TLS CertificateRequest,
TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
<-------- TLS Finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Alert Message)
-------->
<-------- EAP-Failure
Figure 5: EAP-TLS unsuccessful server authentication
In the case where the server authenticates to the peer successfully,
but the peer fails to authenticate to the server, the conversation
will appear as follows:
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EAP Peer EAP Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (MyID) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
TLS CertificateRequest,
TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
<-------- TLS Finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Alert Message)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS -------->
<-------- EAP-Failure
Figure 6: EAP-TLS unsuccessful client authentication
2.1.4. Privacy
TLS 1.3 significantly increases privacy when compared to earlier
version of TLS by forbidding cipher suites without confidentiality
and encrypting large parts of the TLS handshake including the
certificate messages.
EAP-TLS peer and server implementations supporting TLS 1.3 or higher
MUST support anonymous NAIs (Network Access Identifiers) ([RFC7542],
Section 2.4) and MUST confidentiality protect its identity (e.g.
using Anonymous NAIs) when the EAP-TLS server is known to support TLS
1.3 or higher.
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As the certificate messages in TLS 1.3 are encrypted, there is no
need to send an empty certificate_list or perform a second handshake
(as needed by EAP-TLS when with earlier versions of TLS). When EAP-
TLS is used with TLS version 1.3 or higher the EAP-TLS peer and EAP-
TLS server SHALL follow the processing specified by the used version
of TLS. For TLS 1.3 this means that the EAP-TLS peer only sends on
empty certificate_list if it does not have an appropriate certificate
to send and the EAP-TLS server MAY treat an empty certificate_list as
a terminal condition.
When EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3 and privacy, no extra round-trips
are added and the message flow looks just like a normal message flow
with the only difference that an anonymous NAI is used. In the case
where EAP-TLS with mutual authentication and privacy is successful,
the conversation will appear as shown in Figure 7.
EAP Peer EAP Server
EAP-Request/
<-------- Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity (Anonymous NAI) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
<-------- (TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ClientHello) -------->
EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS ServerHello,
TLS EncryptedExtensions,
TLS CertificateRequest,
TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
<-------- TLS Finished)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=EAP-TLS
(TLS Certificate,
TLS CertificateVerify,
TLS Finished) -------->
<-------- EAP-Success
Figure 7: EAP-TLS privacy
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2.1.5. Fragmentation
Including ContentType and ProtocolVersion a single TLS record may be
up to 16387 octets in length. Some EAP implementations and access
networks may limit the number of EAP packet exchanges that can be
handled. To avoid fragmentation, it is RECOMMENDED to keep the sizes
of client, server, and trust anchor certificates small and the length
of the certificate chains short. It addition, it is RECOMMENDED to
use mechanisms that reduce the sizes of Certificate messages.
While Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was optional for earlier
version of TLS, TLS 1.3 mandates support of ECC (see Section 9 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]). To avoid fragmentation, the use of ECC in
certificates, signature algorithms, and groups are RECOMMENDED when
using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 or higher. At a 128-bit security level,
this reduces public key sizes from 384 bytes (RSA and DHE) to 32
bytes (ECDHE) and signatures from 384 bytes (RSA) to 64 bytes (ECDSA
and EdDSA). An EAP-TLS deployment MAY further reduce the certificate
sizes by limiting the number of Subject Alternative Names.
Endpoints SHOULD reduce the sizes of Certificate messages by omitting
certificates that the other endpoint is known to possess. When using
TLS 1.3, all certificates that specifies a trust anchor may be
omitted (see Section 4.4.2 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]). When using TLS
1.2 or earlier, only the self-signed certificate that specifies the
root certificate authority may be omitted (see Section 7.4.2 of
[RFC5246]). EAP-TLS peers and servers SHOULD support and use the
Cached Information Extension as specified in [RFC7924]. EAP-TLS
peers and servers MAY use other extensions for reducing the sizes of
Certificate messages, e.g. certificate compression
[I-D.ietf-tls-certificate-compression].
2.2. Identity Verification
No updates to [RFC5216].
2.3. Key Hierarchy
TLS 1.3 replaces the TLS pseudorandom function (PRF) used in earlier
versions of TLS with HKDF and completely changes the Key Schedule.
The key hierarchies shown in Section 2.3 of [RFC5216] are therefore
not correct when EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3 or higher. For
TLS 1.3 the key schedule is described in Section 7.1 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].
When EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3 or higher the Key_Material,
IV, and Session-Id SHALL be derived from the exporter_master_secret
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using the TLS exporter interface (for TLS 1.3 this is defined in
Section 7.5 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]).
Key_Material = TLS-Exporter("client EAP encryption KM", "", 128)
IV = TLS-Exporter("client EAP encryption IV", "", 64)
Session-Id = TLS-Exporter("client EAP encryption ID", "", 64)
By using the TLS exporter, EAP-TLS can use any TLS 1.3 implementation
without having to extract the Master Secret, ClientHello.random, and
ServerHello.random in a non-standard way.
All other parameters such as MSK and EMSK are derived as specified in
EAP-TLS [RFC5216], Section 2.3. The use of these keys is specific to
the lower layer, as described [RFC5247].
2.4. Parameter Negotiation and Compliance Requirements
TLS 1.3 cipher suites are defined differently than in earlier
versions of TLS (see Section B.4 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]), and the
cipher suites discussed in Section 2.4 of [RFC5216] can therefore not
be used when EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3 or higher. The
requirements on protocol version and compression given in Section 2.4
of [RFC5216] still apply.
When EAP-TLS is used with TLS version 1.3 or higher, the EAP-TLS
peers and servers MUST comply with the requirements for the TLS
version used. For TLS 1.3 the compliance requirements are defined in
Section 9 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].
3. Detailed Description of the EAP-TLS Protocol
No updates to [RFC5216].
4. IANA considerations
There are no IANA impacts in this memo.
5. Security Considerations
5.1. Security Claims
Using EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 does not change the security claims for
EAP-TLS as given in Section 4.1 of [RFC5216]. However, it
strengthens several of the claims as described in the following
updates to the notes given in Section 4.1 of [RFC5216].
[2] Confidentiality: The TLS 1.3 handshake offers much better
confidentiality than earlier versions of TLS by mandating cipher
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suites with confidentiality and encrypting certificates and some of
the extensions, see [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. When using EAP-TLS with
TLS 1.3, the use of privacy does not cause any additional round-
trips.
[3] Key strength: TLS 1.3 forbids all algorithms with known
weaknesses including 3DES, CBC mode, RC4, SHA-1, and MD5. TLS 1.3
only supports cryptographic algorithms offering at least 112-bit
security, see [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].
[4] Cryptographic Negotiation: TLS 1.3 increases the number of
cryptographic parameters that are negotiated in the handshake. When
EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3, EAP-TLS inherits the cryptographic
negotiation of AEAD algorithm, HKDF hash algorithm, key exchange
groups, and signature algorithm, see Section 4.1.1 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13].
5.2. Peer and Server Identities
No updates to [RFC5216].
5.3. Certificate Validation
No updates to [RFC5216].
5.4. Certificate Revocation
The OCSP status handling in TLS 1.3 is different from earlier
versions of TLS, see Section 4.4.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. In TLS
1.3 the OCSP information is carried in the CertificateEntry
containing the associated certificate instead of a separate
CertificateStatus message as in [RFC4366]. This enables sending OCSP
information for all certificates in the certificate chain.
EAP-TLS peers and servers supporting TLS 1.3 SHOULD support
Certificate Status Requests (OCSP stapling) as specified in [RFC6066]
and Section 4.4.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]. The use of Certificate
Status Requests to determine the current status of the EAP server's
certificate is RECOMMENDED.
5.5. Packet Modification Attacks
No updates to [RFC5216].
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6. References
6.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tls-tls13]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", draft-ietf-tls-tls13-24 (work in progress),
February 2018.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
[RFC5216] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
Authentication Protocol", RFC 5216, DOI 10.17487/RFC5216,
March 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5216>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC7542] DeKok, A., "The Network Access Identifier", RFC 7542,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7542, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7542>.
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[RFC7924] Santesson, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Cached Information Extension", RFC 7924,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7924, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7924>.
6.2. Informative references
[I-D.ietf-tls-certificate-compression]
Ghedini, A. and V. Vasiliev, "Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Certificate Compression", draft-ietf-tls-
certificate-compression-02 (work in progress), January
2018.
[IEEE-802.11]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
Standard for Information technology--Telecommunications
and information exchange between systems Local and
metropolitan area networks--Specific requirements - Part
11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical
Layer (PHY) Specifications", IEEE Std 802.11-2016
(Revision of IEEE Std 802.11-2012) , December 2016.
[IEEE-802.1X]
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks -- Port-
Based Network Access Control", IEEE Standard 802.1X-2010 ,
February 2010.
[MulteFire]
MulteFire, "MulteFire Release 1.0.1 specification", 2017.
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2560>.
[RFC3280] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3280, April 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3280>.
[RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4282, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4282>.
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[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4346, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4346>.
[RFC4366] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, J.,
and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions", RFC 4366, DOI 10.17487/RFC4366, April 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4366>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5247] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
RFC 5247, DOI 10.17487/RFC5247, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5247>.
[TS.33.501]
3GPP, "Security architecture and procedures for 5G
System", 3GPP TS 33.501 0.7.1, February 2018.
Appendix A. Updated references
All the following references in [RFC5216] are updated as specified
below when EAP-TLS is used with TLS 1.3 or higher.
All references to [RFC2560] are updated with [RFC6960].
All references to [RFC3280] are updated with [RFC5280].
All references to [RFC4282] are updated with [RFC7542].
Appendix B. Acknowledgements
The authors want to thank Alan DeKok, Ari Keraenen, Bernard Aboba,
Jari Arkko, and Vesa Toivinen for comments and suggestions on the
draft.
Authors' Addresses
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John Mattsson
Ericsson
164 40 Stockholm
Sweden
Email: john.mattsson@ericsson.com
Mohit Sethi
Ericsson
02420 Jorvas
Finland
Email: mohit@piuha.net
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