Internet DRAFT - draft-mauch-bgp-reject
draft-mauch-bgp-reject
Internet Engineering Task Force J. Mauch
Internet-Draft J. Snijders
Intended status: Standards Track NTT
Expires: May 4, 2016 November 1, 2015
By default reject propagation when no policy is associated with a BGP
peering session.
draft-mauch-bgp-reject-01.txt
Abstract
This document defines the default behaviour of a BGP speaker when no
explicit policy is associated with a BGP peering session.
Foreword
A placeholder to list general observations about this document.
Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 4, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Definitions and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Solution Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Introduction
BGP speakers have many default settings which need to be revisited as
part of improving the routing ecosystem. There is a need to provide
guidace to BGP implementors for the default behaviors of a well
functioning internet ecosystem. Routing leaks [3] are part of the
problem, but software defects and operator misconfigurations are just
a few of the attacks on internet stability we aim to address.
Usually BGP speakers accept all routes from a configured peer or
neighbor. This practice dates back to the early days of internet
protocols in being very permissive in offering routing information to
allow all networks to reach each other. With the core of the
internet becoming more densely interconnected the risk of a
misbehaving edge device or BGP speaking customer poses signficiant
risks to the reachability of critical services.
This proposal intends to solve this situation with the requiring the
explicity configuration of BGP policy for any non-iBGP speaking
session such as customers, peers or confederation boundaries. When
this solution is implemented, devices will no longer pass routes
without explicit policy.
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2. Definitions and Acronyms
o BGP: Border Gateway Protocol [2]
3. Solution Requirements
The following requirements apply to the solution described in this
document:
o Software MUST mark any routes from an eBGP peer as 'invalid' in
the Adj-RIB-In, if no explicit policy was configured.
o Software MUST NOT advertise any routes to an eBGP peer without an
operator configuring a policy
o Software MUST NOT require a configuration directive to operate in
this mode.
o Software MUST provide protection from internal failures preventing
the advertisement and acceptance of routes
o Software MAY provide a configuration option to disable this
security capability.
4. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the following people for their
comments and support: Shane Amante, Christopher Morrow, Robert
Raszuk.
5. Security Considerations
This document addresses the basic security posture of a BGP speaking
device within a network. Operators have a need for implementors to
address the problem through a behavior change to mitigate against
possible attacks from a permissive security posture. Attacks and
inadvertent advertisements cause business impact necessitating this
default behavior.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[2] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.
6.2. Informative References
[3] "Methods for Detection and Mitigation of BGP Route Leaks",
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sriram-idr-route-leak-
detection-mitigation>.
Authors' Addresses
Jared Mauch
NTT Communications, Inc.
8285 Reese Lane
Ann Arbor Michigan 48103
US
Email: jmauch@us.ntt.net
Job Snijders
NTT Communications, Inc.
Amsterdam
NL
Email: job@ntt.net
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