Internet DRAFT - draft-mavrogiannopoulos-tls-server-key-exchage
draft-mavrogiannopoulos-tls-server-key-exchage
Network Working Group N. Mavrogiannopoulos
Internet-Draft KU Leuven - IBBT
Intended status: Standards Track May 15, 2012
Expires: November 16, 2012
Preventing cross-protocol attacks in TLS protocol
draft-mavrogiannopoulos-tls-server-key-exchage-00
Abstract
This memo proposes a fix in the TLS ServerKeyExchange message
signature, to prevent cross-protocol attacks.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 16, 2012.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. The Wagner and Schneier attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. The new ServerKeyExchange signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. The extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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1. Introduction
The TLS protocol [RFC5246] suffers from an issue in the
ServerKeyExchange message signature discovered by Wagner and Schneier
in [WS-ATTACK]. They describe a cross-protocol attack on the SSL 3.0
[RFC6101] protocol, that re-uses a signed ServerKeyExchange packet in
another session with a different key exchange algorithm. In effect
the attack uses a server as an oracle that transmits signed
ServerKeyExchange messages that can be relayed to another, unrelated,
session. The described attack turned to be impossible to implement
in practice, but the underlying idea is applicable to all TLS
protocol versions, and as the supported key exchange algorithms
increase, it provides a tool for new attacks on the protocol [ref
needed].
In this document we propose a fix for the TLS protocol that does not
require a protocol version upgrade.
2. Terminology
This document uses the same notation and terminology used in the TLS
Protocol specification [RFC5246].
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. The Wagner and Schneier attack
Wagner and Schneier in [WS-ATTACK] describe a cross-protocol attack
(The authors refer to it as "key exchange algorithm rollback attack")
based on the observation that the digital signature in a Diffie-
Hellman key exchange does not cover any identifier of the negotiated
ciphersuite. According to the SSL 3.0 protocol [RFC6101] when a
Diffie-Hellman key exchange has been negotiated, the group parameters
are sent by the server in the ServerKeyExchange message as shown
below.
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struct {
select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
case diffie_hellman:
opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
Signature signed_params;
case rsa:
opaque rsa_modulus<1..2^16-1>;
opaque rsa_exponent<1..2^16-1>;
Signature signed_params;
};
} ServerKeyExchange;
The signature on that message is calculated on the algorithm
parameters, and the nonces exchanged by both peers. The crucial
observation is that the negotiated key exchange algorithm is not part
of this signature.
This omission allows an adversary to re-use a signed
ServerKeyExchange packet in another session, with another key
exchange algorithm, by initiating a parallel connection to the
server. In particular, the described in [WS-ATTACK] attack deceives
a client who advertises a TLS_RSA_EXPORT ciphersuite and expects
temporary RSA parameters in the ServerKeyExchange message, into
receiving Diffie-Hellman parameters from a TLS_DHE_RSA ciphersuite.
The attack is based on a wrong assumption in the TLS packet parsing,
which prevents it from being practical. It demonstrates, however,
the idea of a cross-protocol attack utilizing two of the SSL 3.0 key
exchange methods, the Diffie-Hellman and the RSA-EXPORT key
exchanges.
4. The new ServerKeyExchange signature
The goal of this memo is to restrict the applicability of the server
provided signed ServerKeyExchange to the current session. A simple
fix may be to include the negotiated ciphersuite into the signature.
However, the TLS protocol is complex and a key exchange method does
not always imply a single format of the ServerKeyExchange signature.
For example, the elliptic curves key exchange method may be used with
an arbitrary elliptic curve [RFC4492] which requires different data
in the ServerKeyExchange than when used with a named curve. Such key
exchange suboptions are negotiated using TLS extensions and such
extensions should be covered by the signature, to prevent any attack
that takes advantage of the different signature format.
For that we propose that the signature of the ServerKeyExchange
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message to be modified to include in addition to explicit identifiers
of the algorithms, all the previously exchanged messages. The
proposed signature for a ServerKeyExchange message is shown below.
enum { server (0), client (1) } ConnectionEnd;
enum { dhe_dss (0), dhe_rsa (1),
ec_diffie_hellman (2)
} KeyExchangeAlgorithm;
struct {
digitally-signed struct {
ConnectionEnd entity;
KeyExchangeAlgorithm kx_algorithm;
select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
case dhe_dss:
case dhe_rsa:
ServerDHParams params;
case ec_diffie_hellman:
ServerECDHParams;
}
opaque handshake_messages<0..2^24-1>;
}
} ServerKeyExchange;
The new format includes explicit indicators of the entity (server),
the key exchange algorithm used, the handshake messages exchanged,
and the parameters of the key exchange. This modification will be
negotiated by using a new TLS extension to allow backwards
compatibility.
5. The extension
In order for a client to advertise its support for the new
ServerKeyExchange foramt we add a new extension
"new_server_key_exchange", with value TBD-BY-IANA, to the enumerated
ExtensionType defined in [RFC5246]. Clients MAY include the
extension of type "new_server_key_exchange" in the (extended) client
hello. The "extension_data" field of this extension MUST be empty.
Servers that receive an extended client hello containing a
"new_server_key_exchange" extension, MAY accept the request for the
new ServerKeyExchange format by including an extension of type
"new_server_key_exchange" in the (extended) server hello. The
"extension_data" field of this extension MUST be empty.
Note that this extension is valid for all versions of the TLS
protocol including TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and SSL 3.0 [RFC6101].
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6. Security considerations
This extension modifies the ServerKeyExchange message in order to
prevent attacks to the protocol similar in nature with the Wagner and
Schneier attack. In order for the protection to be applicable, both
the client and the server must support this extension. In the case
where either or none support this extension, the old vulnerable
format is being used.
7. IANA Considerations
This document defines the TLS extension "new_server_key_exchange"
(value TBD-BY-IANA) whose value should be assigned from the TLS
ExtensionType Registry defined in [RFC5246].
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[WS-ATTACK] Wagner, D. and B. Schneier, "WS-ATTACK of the SSL 3.0
protocol", The Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic
Commerce Proceedings, USENIX Press , November 1996.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
August 2008.
8.2. Informative References
[RFC6101] Freier, A., Karlton, P., and P. Kocher, "The Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0", RFC 6101,
August 2011.
[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and
B. Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher
Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492,
May 2006.
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Author's Address
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
KU Leuven ESAT/SCD/COSIC - IBBT
Kasteelpark Arenberg 10, bus 2446
Leuven-Heverlee, B-3001
Belgium
EMail: nikos.mavrogiannopoulos@esat.kuleuven.be
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