Internet DRAFT - draft-mcd-identifier-access-security
draft-mcd-identifier-access-security
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) C. Ma
Internet Draft J. Chen
Intended status: Informational X. Fan
Expires: June 21, 2024 M. Chen
Z. Li
China Academy of Information and Communications Technology
December 21, 2023
Security Services for the Industrial Internet Identifier Data Access
Protocol (IIIDAP)
draft-mcd-identifier-access-security-08
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Abstract
The Industrial Internet Identifier Data Access Protocol (IIIDAP)
provides "RESTful" web services to retrieve identifier metadata from
Second-Level Node (SLN). This document describes information
security services, including access control, authentication,
authorization, availability, data confidentiality, and data
integrity for IIIDAP.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction ................................................ 2
2. Conventions used in this document............................ 3
2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations.............................. 3
3. Information Security Services and IIIDAP..................... 3
3.1. Access Control ......................................... 3
3.2. Authentication ......................................... 3
3.3. Authorization .......................................... 4
3.4. Availability ........................................... 5
3.5. Data Confidentiality.................................... 5
3.6. Data Integrity ......................................... 6
4. Privacy Threats Associated with Industrial Internet Identifier
Data ........................................................... 7
5. Security Considerations...................................... 7
6. IANA Considerations ......................................... 8
7. References .................................................. 8
7.1. Normative References.................................... 8
7.2. Informative References.................................. 9
1. Introduction
One goal of IIIDAP is to provide security services, including access
control, authentication, authorization, availability, data
confidentiality, and data integrity. This document describes how
each of these services is achieved by IIIDAP using features that are
available in other protocol layers. Additional or alternative
mechanisms can be added in the future.
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2. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations
HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol
JSON: JavaScript Object Notation
IIIDAP: Industrial Internet Identifier Data Access Protocol
SLN: Second-Level Nodes
ELN: Enterprise-Level Nodes
TLS: Transport Layer Security
3. Information Security Services and IIIDAP
IIIDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead,
IIIDAP relies on features that are available in other protocol
layers to provide needed security services, including access
control, authentication, authorization, availability, data
confidentiality, and data integrity. A description of each of these
security services can be found in "Internet Security Glossary,
Version 2" [RFC4949]. No requirements have been identified for other
security services.
3.1. Access Control
As described in the following sections, IIIDAP includes features to
identify, authenticate, and authorize clients, allowing server
operators to control access to information based on a client's
identity and associated authorizations. Information returned to a
client can be clearly marked with a status value (see Section 13 of
[IDENTIFIER-RESPONSES]) that identifies the access granted to the
client.
3.2. Authentication
This section describes security authentication mechanisms and the
need for authorization policies to include them. It describes
requirements for the implementations of clients and servers but does
not dictate the policies of server operators. For example, a server
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operator with no policy regarding differentiated or tiered access to
data will have no authorization mechanisms and will have no need for
any type of authentication. A server operator with policies on
differentiated access will have to construct an authorization scheme
and will need to follow the specified authentication requirements.
IIIDAP's authentication framework needs to accommodate anonymous
access as well as verification of identities using a range of
authentication methods and credential services. To that end, IIIDAP
clients and servers MUST implement the authentication framework
[RFC9110]. The "basic" scheme can be used to send a client's user
name and password to a server in plaintext, base64-encoded form. The
"digest" scheme can be used to authenticate a client without
exposing the client's plaintext password. If the "basic" scheme is
used, HTTP over TLS [RFC9110] MUST be used to protect the client's
credentials from disclosure while in transit (see Section 3.5).
Servers MUST support either Basic or Digest authentication; they are
not required to support both. Clients MUST support both to
interoperate with servers that support one or the other. Servers may
provide a login page that triggers HTTP authentication. Clients
should continue sending the HTTP authentication header once they
receive an initial 401 (Unauthorized) response from the HTTP server
as long as the scheme portion of the URL doesn't change.
The Transport Layer Security protocol [RFC8446] includes an optional
feature to identify and authenticate clients who possess and present
a valid X.509 digital certificate [RFC5280]. Support for this
feature is OPTIONAL.
IIIDAP does not impose any unique server authentication
requirements. The server authentication provided by TLS fully
addresses the needs of IIIDAP. In general, transports for IIIDAP
must either provide a TLS-protected transport (e.g., HTTPS) or a
mechanism that provides an equivalent level of server
authentication.
Work on HTTP authentication methods continues. IIIDAP is designed to
be agile enough to support additional methods as they are defined.
3.3. Authorization
Server operators MAY offer varying degrees of access depending on
policy and need in conjunction with the authentication methods
described in Section 3.2. If such varying degrees of access are
supported, an IIIDAP server MUST provide granular access controls
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(that is, per identifier metadata) in order to implement
authorization policies. Some examples:
- Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a
relationship.
- Unauthenticated or anonymous access status may not yield any
contact information.
- Full access may be granted to a special group of authenticated
clients.
The type of access allowed by a server will most likely vary from
one operator to the next. A description of the response privacy
considerations associated with different levels of authorization can
be found in Section 13 of [IDENTIFIER-RESPONSES].
3.4. Availability
An IIIDAP service has to be available to be useful. There are no
IIIDAP-unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general
security consideration, a service operator needs to be aware of the
issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of
"Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations" [RFC4732] is advised.
An IIIDAP service MAY use an HTTP throttling mechanism to limit the
number of queries that a single client can send in a given period of
time. If used, the server SHOULD return an HTTP 429 (Too Many
Requests) response code as described in "Additional HTTP Status
Codes" [RFC6585]. A client that receives a 429 response SHOULD
decrease its query rate and honor the Retry-After header field if
one is present. Note that this is not a defense against denial-of-
service attacks, since a malicious client could ignore the code and
continue to send queries at a high rate. A server might use another
response code if it did not wish to reveal to a client that rate
limiting is the reason for the denial of a reply.
3.5. Data Confidentiality
IIIDAP uses HTTP over TLS [RFC9110] to provide that protection by
encrypting all traffic sent on the connection between client and
server. HTTP over TLS MUST be used to protect all client-server
exchanges unless operational constraints make it impossible to meet
this requirement. It is also possible to encrypt discrete objects
(such as command path segments and JSON- encoded response objects)
at one endpoint, send them to the other endpoint via an unprotected
transport protocol, and decrypt the object on receipt. Encryption
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algorithms as described in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2"
[RFC4949] are commonly used to provide data confidentiality at the
object level.
There are no current requirements for object-level data
confidentiality using encryption. Support for this feature could be
added to IIIDAP in the future.
As noted in Section 3.2, the HTTP "basic" authentication scheme can
be used to authenticate a client. When this scheme is used, HTTP
over TLS MUST be used to protect the client's credentials from
disclosure while in transit. If the policy of the server operator
requires encryption to protect client-server data exchanges (such as
to protect non-public data that cannot be accessed without client
identification and authentication), HTTP over TLS MUST be used to
protect those exchanges.
A description of privacy threats that can be addressed with
confidentiality services can be found in Section 4. Section 13 of
[IDENTIFIER-RESPONSES] describes status values that can be used to
describe operator actions used to protect response data from
disclosure to unauthorized clients.
3.6. Data Integrity
Web services such as IIIDAP commonly use HTTP over TLS [RFC9110] to
provide that protection by using a keyed Message Authentication Code
(MAC) to detect modifications. It is also possible to sign discrete
objects (such as command path segments and JSON-encoded response
objects) at one endpoint, send them to the other endpoint via a
transport protocol, and validate the signature of the object on
receipt. Digital signature algorithms as described in "Internet
Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly used to provide
data integrity at the object level.
There are no current requirements for object-level data integrity
using digital signatures. Support for this feature could be added to
IIIDAP in the future.
The most specific need for this service is to provide assurance that
HTTP 30x redirection hints [RFC9110] and response elements returned
from the server are not modified while in transit. If the policy of
the server operator requires message integrity for client-server
data exchanges, HTTP over TLS MUST be used to protect those
exchanges.
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4. Privacy Threats Associated with Industrial Internet Identifier Data
The identifiers' information of ELN SHOULD be uploaded to SLN. The
standardization of IIIDAP does not change or impact the data that
operators of SLN may require to be collected from ELN, but it
provides support for a number of mechanisms that may be used to
mitigate privacy threats to ELN should SLN choose to use them.
IIIDAP includes mechanisms that can be used to authenticate clients,
allowing servers to support tiered access based on local policy.
This means that all identifier data need no longer be public, and
personal data or data that may be considered more sensitive can have
its access restricted to specifically privileged clients.
IIIDAP data structures allow servers to indicate via status values
when data returned to clients has been made private, redacted,
obscured, by a proxy. "Private" means that the data is not
designated for public consumption. "Redacted" means that some
identifier data fields are not being made available. "Obscured"
means that data has been altered for the purposes of not readily
revealing the actual identifier information.
In addition to privacy risks to the information of identifiers,
there are also potential privacy risks for those who query
identifier data. For example, the fact that a SLN employee performs
a particular query may reveal information about the employee's
activities that he or she would have preferred to keep private.
IIIDAP supports the use of HTTP over TLS to provide privacy
protection for those querying identifier data, unless operational
constraints make it impossible to meet this requirement.
5. Security Considerations
This document describes the security services provided by IIIDAP and
associated protocol layers, including authentication, authorization,
availability, data confidentiality, and data integrity.
As an HTTP-based protocol, IIIDAP is susceptible to code injection
attacks. Code injection refers to adding code into a computer system
or program to alter the course of execution. There are many types of
code injection, including SQL injection, dynamic variable or
function injection, include-file injection, shell injection, and
HTML-script injection, among others. Data confidentiality and
integrity services provide a measure of defense against man-in-the-
middle injection attacks, but vulnerabilities in both client- and
server-side software make it possible for injection attacks to
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succeed. Consistently checking and validating server credentials can
help detect man-in-the-middle attacks.
There is a risk of too promiscuous, or even rogue, CAs being
included in the list of acceptable CAs that the TLS server sends the
client as part of the TLS client-authentication handshake and
lending the appearance of trust to certificates signed by those CAs.
Periodic monitoring of the list of CAs that IIIDAP servers trust for
client authentication can help reduce this risk.
The Transport Layer Security protocol [RFC8446] includes a null
cipher suite that does not encrypt data and thus does not provide
data confidentiality. This option MUST NOT be used when data
confidentiality services are needed. Additional considerations for
secure use of TLS are described in [RFC9325].
Data integrity services are sometimes mistakenly associated with
directory service operational policy requirements focused on data
accuracy. "Accuracy" refers to the truthful association of data
elements (such as names, addresses, and telephone numbers). Accuracy
requirements are out of scope for this protocol.
Additional security considerations are described in the
specifications for HTTP [RFC9110], HTTP Basic and Digest access
authentication [RFC9110], HTTP over TLS [RFC9110], and additional
HTTP status codes [RFC6585].
6. IANA Considerations
7. References
References to IIIDAP are subject to the latest edition.
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6585] Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status
Codes", RFC 6585, April 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6585>.
[RFC9110] Fielding, R., Ed., M. Nottingham, Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed.,
" HTTP Semantics", RFC 9110, June 2022,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110>.
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7.2. Informative References
[RFC4732] Handley, M., Ed., Rescorla, E., Ed., and IAB, "Internet
Denial-of-Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December
2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4732>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI
36, RFC 4949, August 2007,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC8446] E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, August 2018,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9325] Y. Sheffer, P. Saint-Andre and T. Fossati "Recommendations
for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 9325,
November 2022,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9325>.
[IDENTIFIER-RESPONSES]
Ma, C., "JSON Responses for the Industrial Internet
Identifier Data Access Protocol (IIIDAP)", Work in
Progress, draft-mcd-identifier-access-responce, December
2023.
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Authors' Addresses
Chendi Ma
CAICT
No.52 Huayuan North Road, Haidian District
Beijing, Beijing, 100191
China
Phone: +86 177 1090 9864
Email: machendi@caict.ac.cn
Chen Jian
CAICT
No.52 Huayuan North Road, Haidian District
Beijing, Beijing, 100191
China
Phone: +86 138 1103 3332
Email: chenjian3@caict.ac.cn
Xiaotian Fan
CAICT
No.52 Huayuan North Road, Haidian District
Beijing, Beijing, 100191
China
Phone: +86 134 0108 6945
Email: fanxiaotian@caict.ac.cn
Meilan Chen
CAICT
No.52 Huayuan North Road, Haidian District
Beijing, Beijing, 100191
China
Phone: +86 139 1143 7301
Email: chenmeilan@caict.ac.cn
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Zhiping Li
CAICT
No.52 Huayuan North Road, Haidian District
Beijing, Beijing, 100191
China
Phone: +86 185 1107 1386
Email: lizhiping@caict.ac.cn
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