Internet DRAFT - draft-mglt-ipsecme-keep-old-ike-sa
draft-mglt-ipsecme-keep-old-ike-sa
IPSECME D. Migault (Ed)
Internet-Draft Francetelecom - Orange
Intended status: Standards Track July 05, 2013
Expires: January 06, 2014
KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA Extension
draft-mglt-ipsecme-keep-old-ike-sa-00.txt
Abstract
This document considers a VPN Client setting a VPN with a security
gateway where at least one of the peer has multiple interfaces.
With the current IKEv2, the outer IP addresses of the VPN are
determined by those used by IKEv2 channel. As a result using
multiple interface requires to set an IKEv2 channel on each
interface, and then on each paths if both the VPN Client and the
security gateway have multiple interfaces. Setting multiple IKEv2
channel involves multiple authentications which MAY each require
multiple round trips and delay the VPN establishment. In addition
multiple authentications unnecessarily load the VPN client and the
authentication infrastructure.
This document presents the KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA extension, where an
additional IKEv2 channel from an already authenticated IKEv2 channel.
The newly created IKEv2 channel is set without the IKEv2
authentication exchange. The newly created IKEv2 channel can then be
assigned to another interface using MOBIKE.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 06, 2014.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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Table of Contents
1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. Payload Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
8. Acknowledgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
9.2. Informational References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix A. Document Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appendix B. Setting a VPN on Multiple Interfaces . . . . . . . . 8
B.1. Setting VPN_0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
B.2. Creating an additional IKEv2 Channel . . . . . . . . . . 10
B.3. Creation of the Child SA for VPN_1 . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B.4. Moving VPN_1 on Interface_1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
B.5. Reduced Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Requirements notation
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
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2. Introduction
This document considers a VPN End User setting its VPN with a
Security Gateway, and at least one of the peers has multiple
interfaces. Figure 1 represents the case where the VPN has multiple
interfaces, figure 2 represents the case where the Security Gateway
has multiple interfaces, and figure 3 represents the case where both
the VPN End User and the Security Gateway has multiple interfaces.
With figure 1 and figure 2, one of the peer has n = 2 interfaces and
the other has a single interface. This results in the creating of up
to n = 2 VPNs. With figure 3, the VPN End User has n = 2 interfaces
and the Security Gateway has m =2 interfaces. This can lead to up to
m x n VPNs.
+------------+ +------------+
| | Interface_0 : VPN_0 | |
| =================== | Security |
| VPN | v | Gateway |
| End User | ============== |
| ========================^ | |
| | Interface_1 : VPN_1 | |
+------------+ +------------+
Figure 1: VPN End User with Multiple Interfaces
+------------+ +------------+
| | Interface_0 : VPN_0 | |
| | ============= Security |
| VPN | v | Gateway |
| End User =================== | |
| | ^ ============ |
| | Interface_1 : VPN_1 | |
+------------+ +------------+
Figure 2: Security Gateway with Multiple Interfaces
+------------+ +------------+
| | Interface_0 Interface_0' | |
| ================================= Security |
| VPN | \\ // | Gateway |
| End User | // \\ | |
| ================================= |
| | Interface_1 Interface_1' | |
+------------+ +------------+
Figure3: VPN End User and Security Gateway
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with Multiple Interfaces
With the current IKEv2 [RFC5996], each VPN requires an IKEv2 channel,
and setting an IKEv2 channel requires an authentication.
Authentication can involve multiple round trips like EAP-SIM
[RFC4186] as well as crypto operations that MAY delay the
connectivity.
This document presents the KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA extension. The main idea
is that the peer with multiple interfaces sets an first authenticated
IKEv2 channel. Then it takes advantage of this authentication and
derives as many parallel IKEv2 channels as VPNs. On each IKEv2
channel a VPN is negotiated. This results in parallel VPNS. Then
the VPN End User moves the VPNs to their proper places using MOBIKE.
Alternatively, the VPN End User can also move the IKEv2 channels and
then negotiate the VPNs.
[I-D.mglt-mif-security-requirements] provides a problem statement for
IPsec and multiple interfaces.
[I-D.arora-ipsecme-ikev2-alt-tunnel-addresses] and
[I-D.mglt-ipsecme-alternate-outer-address] have been proposed so
tunnel outer IP address can differ from those of the IKEv2 channel.
The advantage of the KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA extension is that is requires
very few modification to already existing IKEv2 implementation.
Then, it is reusing already existing and widely deployed protocol
such as MOBIKE [RFC4555]. Finally by keeping a dedicated IKEv2
channel for each VPN, it eases reachability tests.
3. Terminology
This section defines terms and acronyms used in this document.
- VPN End User: designates the End User that initiates the VPN with
a Security Gateway. This End User may be mobile and moves its
VPN from on Security Gateway to the other.
- Security Gateway: designates a point of attachment for the VPN
service. In this document, the VPN service is provided by
multiple Security Gateways. Each Security Gateway may be
considered as a specific hardware.
- Security Association (SA): The Security Association is defined in
[RFC4301].
4. Protocol Overview
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The goal of the document is to specify how to create a new IKEv2
channel. IKEv2 [RFC5996] specifies the CREATE_CHILD_SA that makes
possible to rekey an IKE_SA, create or rekey a new Child SA.
The difference between rekeying an IKE_SA and creating a new IKE_SA
is that the old IKE_SA MUST NOT be deleted, either by starting a
Delete exchange or removing the IKE_SA without the Delete exchange.
Note that IKEv2 [RFC5996] Section 1.3.2 or Section 2.18 does not
explicitly mentions that the old IKE_SA MUST be deleted. However,
there are currently no signaling advertising the IKE_SA has not been
deleted. The purpose of this document is to avoid this uncertainty
when rekeying the IKE_SA. In other words, the document avoids that
one peer expects a additional IKE_SA to be created whereas the other
simply proceed to a replacement of the old IKE_SA.
Currently, one MAY check whether or not the old IKE_SA has been
deleted or not by waiting a for a given time and then initiate and
empty INFORMATIONAL exchange using the old IKE_SA. The absence of
response MAY indicate the old IKE_SA has been removed.
This document introduces KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA Notify Payload. The
initiator sends the KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA Notify Payload in a
CREATE_CHILD_SA request for rekeying the IKE_SA. The KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA
Notify Payload is placed before the concerned SA and indicates what
is expected for the old IKE_SA. Motivation of this draft is to
indicate the old IKE_SA MUST NOT be deleted once the new IKE_SA is
rekeyed. Alternatively, the initiator MAY use the KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA
Notify Payload to indicate the old IKE_SA is not expected to be re-
used.
Initiator Responder
-------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR, SK {N(KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA) SA, Ni, KEi} -->
The responder finds a KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA, if it does not understand the
extension it ignores the payload as defined in [RFC5996]
Section 3.10.1. Similarly, the KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA Notify Payload MUST
be ignored if the CREATE_CHILD_SA request does not concern a IKE_SA
rekey. If the initiator wants to check whether the IKE_SA has been
deleted or not, it SHOULD proceed to additional empty INFORMATIONAL
exchange as described in [RFC5996] Section 2.4. In this case, the
responder's response will be:
<-- HDR, SK {SA, Nr, KEr}
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In any other case, the responder understands the KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA
Notify Payload and the CREATE_CHILD_SA request concerns a IKE_SA
rekey. The responder MUST proceed to the IKE_SA rekey. If the
KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA indicates the old IKE_SA MUST be kept, the responder
MUST keep the old IKE_SA active. Alternatively, if it indicates the
old IKE_SA is not supposed to be used, the responder MAY delete the
old IKE_SA after a given time out. The responder MUST respond and
indicate if the old IKE_SA has been kept or not. The exchange will
be:
<-- HDR, SK { N(KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA)
SA, Nr, KEr}
5. Payload Description
Figure 7 illustrates the KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA Notify Payload packet
format.
1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Payload |C| RESERVED | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Protocol ID | SPI Size | Notify Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Q| RESERVED | Code Values | RESERVED |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA Notify Payload
- Next Payload (1 octet): Indicates the type of payload that follows
after the header.
- Critical Bit (1 bit): Indicates how the responder handles the
Notify Payload. In this document the Critical Bit is not set.
- RESERVED (7 bits): MUST be set as zero; MUST be ignored on
receipt.
- Payload Length (2 octet): Length in octets of the current payload,
including the generic payload header.
- Protocol ID (1 octet): set to zero.
- SPI Size (1 octet): set to zero.
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- Notify Message Type (2 octets): Specifies the type of notification
message. It is set to KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA in this document.
- Question Bit (1 bit): set to one by the initiator and set to zero
by the responder.
- RESERVED (7 bits): set to zero.
- Code Values: Code that indicates what action is expected to be
done with the newly negotiated IKE_SA.
Code Values
-----------------------
Keep Old IKE_SA 0
Unused Old IKE_SA 1
Unassigned 2-255
6. IANA Considerations
The new fields and number are the following:
IKEv2 Notify Message Types - Status Types
-----------------------------------------
KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA - TBD
7. Security Considerations
The protocol defined in this document does not modifies IKEv2. It
signalizes what has been implementation dependent on how to manage an
old IKE_SA after a rekey.
8. Acknowledgment
The ideas of this draft came from various inputs from the ipsecme and
discussions with Tero Kivinen and Michael Richardson.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
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[RFC4555] Eronen, P., "IKEv2 Mobility and Multihoming Protocol
(MOBIKE)", RFC 4555, June 2006.
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC
5996, September 2010.
9.2. Informational References
[I-D.arora-ipsecme-ikev2-alt-tunnel-addresses]
Arora, J. and P. Kumar, "Alternate Tunnel Addresses for
IKEv2", draft-arora-ipsecme-ikev2-alt-tunnel-addresses-00
(work in progress), April 2010.
[I-D.mglt-ipsecme-alternate-outer-address]
Migault, D., "IKEv2 Alternate Outer IP Address Extension",
draft-mglt-ipsecme-alternate-outer-address-00 (work in
progress), February 2013.
[I-D.mglt-mif-security-requirements]
Migault, D. and C. Williams, "IPsec Multiple Interfaces
Problem Statement", draft-mglt-mif-security-
requirements-03 (work in progress), November 2012.
[RFC4186] Haverinen, H. and J. Salowey, "Extensible Authentication
Protocol Method for Global System for Mobile
Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-
SIM)", RFC 4186, January 2006.
Appendix A. Document Change Log
[RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication]
-00: First version published.
Appendix B. Setting a VPN on Multiple Interfaces
This section is informational and exposes how a VPN End User as
illustrated in Figure 1 can builds two VPNs on its two interfaces
without multiple authentications. Other cases represented in figure
2 and 3 are similar and can be easily derived from the case. The
mechanism is based on the KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA extension and the MOBIKE
extension [RFC4555].
B.1. Setting VPN_0
First, the VPN End User negotiates a VPN using one interface. This
involves a regular IKEv2 setting. In addition, the VPN End User and
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the Security Gateway advertise they support MOBIKE. At the end of
the exchange, VPN_0 is set as represented in figure 4.
+------------+ +------------+
| | Interface_0 : VPN_0 | |
| =================== | Security |
| VPN | v | Gateway |
| End User | ============== |
| = | |
| | Interface_1 | |
+------------+ +------------+
Figure 4: VPN End User Establishing VPN_0
The exchange is completely described in [RFC4555]. First the
negotiates the IKE_SA. In the figure below peers also proceed to NAT
detection because of the use of MOBIKE.
Initiator Responder
-------------------------------------------------------------------
(IP_I1:500 -> IP_R1:500)
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni,
N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) -->
<-- (IP_R1:500 -> IP_I1:500)
HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr,
N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)
The initiators and the responder proceed to the authentication
exchange, advertise they support MOBIKE and negotiate the SA for
VPN_0. Optionally, the initiator and the Security Gateway MAY
advertise their multiple interfaces using the ADDITIONAL_IP4_ADDRESS
and/or ADDITIONAL_IP6_ADDRESS Notify Payload
(IP_I1:4500 -> IP_R1:4500)
HDR, SK { IDi, CERT, AUTH,
CP(CFG_REQUEST),
SAi2, TSi, TSr,
N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
N(ADDITIONAL_IP*_ADDRESS)+ } -->
<-- (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I1:4500)
HDR, SK { IDr, CERT, AUTH,
CP(CFG_REPLY),
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SAr2, TSi, TSr,
N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
N(ADDITIONAL_IP*_ADDRESS)+}
B.2. Creating an additional IKEv2 Channel
In our case the the initiator wants to set establish a VPN with its
Interface_1 between the VPN End User and the Security Gateway. The
VPN End User will first establish a parallel IKE_SA using a
CREATE_CHILD_SA that concerns an IKE_SA rekey associated to a
KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA Notify Payload. This results in two different IKE_SA
between the VPN End User and the Security Gateway. Currently both
IKE_SA are set using Interface 0 of the VPN End User.
In this section we consider the creation of the additional IKE_SA as
a separate exchange. However, they are several situations where this
extra round trips MAY be avoided. First if the VPN End User knows
multiple interfaces MAY be involved, it can combine this exchange
with the previous one (IKE_AUTH, CREATE_CHILD_SA concerning the
creation of the SA). Secondly, the Security Gateway MAY also start
the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to create an additional IKE_SA. This
reduces the delay to half a round trip.
The CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to create an additional IKE_SA MAY be
combined with the IKE_AUTH exchange exchange if the VPN End User
estimates with a high probability that multiple interfaces MAY be
involved in the communication. This MAY be the case if the VPN End
User has multiple interfaces, or if the VPN End User guesses that the
Security Gateway has multiple interfaces. In the case the
KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA Notify Payload is not supported by the Security
Gateway or that the Security Gateway has only one interface, this
will result in rekeying the IKE_SA, and thus does not compromise the
communication.
Similarly, the CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange to create an additional
IKE_SA MAY be initiated by the responder and combined with the
IKE_AUTH exchange if the Security Gateway wants to reduce the number
of round trips, and supposes the VPN End User will use its multiple
interfaces. Note that the Security Gateway knows if multiple
interfaces are involved in the communication. What remains uncertain
is whether the VPN End User has the ability to use these multiple
interfaces simultaneously.
Initiator Responder
-------------------------------------------------------------------
(IP_I1:4500 -> IP_R1:4500)
HDR, SK { N(KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA),
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SA, Ni, KEi} -->
<-- (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I1:4500)
HDR, SK { N(KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA),
SA, Nr, KEr}
B.3. Creation of the Child SA for VPN_1
Once the new IKEv2 channel has been created, the VPN End User MAY
initiate a CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange that concerns the creation of a
Child SA for VPN_1. The newly created VPN_1 will use Interface_0 of
the VPN End User.
It is out of scope of the document to define how the VPN End User MAY
handle traffic with its multiple interfaces. The VPN End User MAY
use the same IP inner address on its multiple interfaces. In this
case, the same Traffic Selectors (that is the IP address used for
VPN_0 and VPN_1) MAY match for both VPNs VPN_0 and VPN_1. The End
User VPN SHOULD be aware of such match and be able to manage it. It
MAY for example use distinct Traffic Selectors on both VPNs using
different ports, manage the order of its SPD or have SPD defined per
interfaces. Defining these mechanisms are out of scope of this
document. Alternatively, the VPN End User MAY uses a different IP
address for each interface. In the latter case, if the inner IP
address is assigned by the Security Gateway, the Configuration
Payload (CP) MUST be placed before the SA Payload as specified in
[RFC5996] Section 2.19.
The creation of VPN_1 is performed via the newly created IKE_SA as
follows:
Initiator Responder
-------------------------------------------------------------------
(IP_I1:4500 -> IP_R1:4500)
HDR(new), SK(new) { [CP(CFG_REQUEST)],
SAi2, TSi, TSr } -->
<-- (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I1:4500)
HDR(new), SK(new) { [CP(CFG_REPLY)],
SAr2, TSi, TSr}
The resulting configuration is depicted in figure 5. VPN_0 and VPN_1
have been created, but both are using the same Interface:
Interface_0.
+------------+ +------------+
| | Interface_0 : VPN_0, VPN_1 | |
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| =================== | Security |
| VPN ================= v | Gateway |
| End User | v ============== |
| = ================== |
| | Interface_1 | |
+------------+ +------------+
Figure 5: VPN End User Establishing VPN_0 and VPN_1
B.4. Moving VPN_1 on Interface_1
In this section, MOBIKE is used to move VPN_1 on interface_1. The
exchange is described in [RFC4555]. All exchanges are using the new
IKE_SA. Eventually, the VPN End User MAY check if the Security
Gateway is reachable via Interface_1. The exchanges are described
below:
Initiator Responder
-------------------------------------------------------------------
(IP_I2:4500 -> IP_R1:4500)
HDR(new), SK(new) { N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }
<-- (IP_R2:4500 -> IP_I1:4500)
HDR(new), SK(new) {
N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) }
(This worked, and the initiator requests the peer to switch to new
addresses.)
(IP_I2:4500 -> IP_R1:4500)
HDR(new), SK(new) { N(UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES),
N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP),
N(COOKIE2) } -->
<-- (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I2:4500)
HDR(new), SK(new) {
N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP),
N(COOKIE2) }
This results in the situation as described in figure 6.
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+------------+ +------------+
| | Interface_0 : VPN_0 | |
| =================== | Security |
| VPN | v | Gateway |
| End User | ============== |
| ========================^ | |
| | Interface_1 : VPN_1 | |
+------------+ +------------+
Figure 6: VPN End User with Multiple Interfaces
B.5. Reduced Exchange
The previous sections detail the various exchanges between the VPN
End User and the Security Gateway. This section shows an example
where the number of exchanges are limited, thus limiting the delay to
set up a multiple interface VPN communication.
Initiator Responder
-------------------------------------------------------------------
(IP_I1:500 -> IP_R1:500)
HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni,
N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP) -->
<-- (IP_R1:500 -> IP_I1:500)
HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr,
N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)
(IP_I1:4500 -> IP_R1:4500)
HDR, SK { IDi, CERT, AUTH,
CP(CFG_REQUEST),
SAi2, TSi, TSr,
N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
N(ADDITIONAL_IP*_ADDRESS)+,
N(KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA),
SA, Ni, KEi} -->
<-- (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I1:4500)
HDR, SK { IDr, CERT, AUTH,
CP(CFG_REPLY),
SAr2, TSi, TSr,
N(MOBIKE_SUPPORTED),
N(ADDITIONAL_IP*_ADDRESS)+},
N(KEEP_OLD_IKE_SA),
SA, Nr, KEr}
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<-- (IP_R1:4500 -> IP_I2:4500)
HDR(new), SK(new)
{ [CP(REQUEST)],
SAi2, TSi, TSr,
N(UPDATE_SA_ADDRESSES)}
(IP_I2:4500 -> IP_R1:4500) -->
HDR(new), SK(new) { [CP(CFG_REPLY)],
SAr2, TSi, TSr}
Author's Address
Daniel Migault
Francetelecom - Orange
38 rue du General Leclerc
92794 Issy-les-Moulineaux Cedex 9
France
Phone: +33 1 45 29 60 52
Email: mglt.ietf@gmail.com
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