Internet DRAFT - draft-miller-ssh-agent
draft-miller-ssh-agent
Internet Engineering Task Force D. Miller
Internet-Draft OpenSSH
Intended status: Informational 28 February 2024
Expires: 31 August 2024
SSH Agent Protocol
draft-miller-ssh-agent-13
Abstract
This document describes a key agent protocol for use in the Secure
Shell (SSH) protocol.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 31 August 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Protocol Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Generic server responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Adding keys to the agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2.1. DSA keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.2. ECDSA keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2.3. EDDSA keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.4. RSA keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2.5. Other keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.6. Adding keys from a token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.7. Key Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Public key encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.4. Removing keys from the agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5. Requesting a list of keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.6. Private key operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.6.1. Signature flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.7. Locking and unlocking an agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.8. Extension mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.8.1. Query extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Forwarding access to an agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. Advertising agent forwarding support . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. Requesting agent forwarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.3. Agent connection requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Protocol numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Message numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1.1. Reserved message numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. Constraint identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3. Signature flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. New registry: SSH agent protocol numbers . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. New registry: SSH agent key constraint numbers . . . . . 18
6.3. New registry: SSH agent signature flags . . . . . . . . . 19
6.4. New registry: SSH agent extension request names . . . . . 19
6.5. Additions to SSH Extension Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6.6. Additions to SSH Connection Protocol Channel Request
Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
6.7. Additions to SSH Connection Protocol Channel Types . . . 20
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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1. Introduction
Secure Shell (SSH) is a protocol for secure remote connections and
login over untrusted networks. It supports multiple authentication
mechanisms, including public key authentication. This document
describes the protocol for interacting with an agent that holds
private keys. Clients (and possibly servers) can use invoke the
agent via this protocol to perform operations using public and
private keys held in the agent.
Holding keys in an agent offers usability and security advantages to
loading and unwrapping them at each use. Moreover, the agent
implements a simple protocol and presents a smaller attack surface
than a key loaded into a full SSH server or client.
This agent protocol is already widely used and a de-facto standard,
having been implemented by a number of popular SSH clients and
servers for many years. The purpose of this document is to describe
the protocol as it has been implemented.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Protocol Overview
The agent protocol is a packetised request-response protocol, solely
driven by the client. It consists of a number of requests sent from
the client to the server and a set of reply messages that are sent in
response. At no time does the server send messages except in
response to a client request. Replies are sent in order.
Agents MAY implement support for only a subset of operations or
available key types, and MAY additionally refuse abitrary operations
in particular contexts. For example, an agent may allow only local
clients of an agent to add or remove keys, or make particular subsets
of keys available to a given client. For this reason, clients of the
agent SHOULD be prepared to fail gracefully if any operation is
refused.
Note that this protocol is separate to and incompatible with the one
described in the similarly-named [draft-ietf-secsh-agent-02].
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3. Protocol Messages
All values in the agent protocol are encoded using the SSH wire
representations specified by [RFC4251]. Messages consist of a
length, type and contents.
uint32 length
byte type
byte[length - 1] contents
3.1. Generic server responses
The following generic messages may be sent by the server in response
to requests from the client. On success the agent may reply either
with:
byte SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
or a request-specific success message. On failure, the agent may
reply with:
byte SSH_AGENT_FAILURE
SSH_AGENT_FAILURE messages are also sent in reply to requests with
unknown types.
3.2. Adding keys to the agent
Keys may be added to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED messages. The latter variant allows
adding keys with optional constraints on their usage.
The generic format for the key SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY message is:
byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY
string key type
byte[] key contents
string key comment
Here "type" is the specified key type name, for example "ssh-rsa" for
a RSA key as defined by [RFC4253]. "contents" consists of the public
and private components of the key and vary by key type, they are
listed below for standard and commonly used key types. "comment" is
an optional human-readable key name or comment as a UTF-8 string that
may serve to identify the key in user-visible messages.
The SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED is similar, but adds a extra field:
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byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
string type
byte[] contents
string comment
constraint[] constraints
Constraints are used to place limits on the validity or use of keys.
Section 3.2.7 details constraint types and their format.
An agent should reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key was
successfully loaded as a result of one of these messages, or
SSH_AGENT_FAILURE otherwise.
An agent MAY support only a subset of the key types defined here and
may support additional key types as described below. If an agent
does not recognise the type name in a request to add a key, then it
MUST fail gracefully and respond with a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE reply.
3.2.1. DSA keys
DSA keys have key type "ssh-dss" and are defined in [RFC4253]. They
may be added to the agent using the following message. The
"constraints" field is only present for the
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message.
byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
string "ssh-dss"
mpint p
mpint q
mpint g
mpint y
mpint x
string comment
constraint[] constraints
The "p", "q", "g" values are the DSA domain parameters. "y" and "x"
are the public and private keys respectively. These values are as
defined by [FIPS.186-4].
3.2.2. ECDSA keys
ECDSA keys have key types starting with "ecdsa-sha2-" and are defined
in [RFC5656]. They may be added to the agent using the following
message. The "constraints" field is only present for the
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message.
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byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
string key type
string ecdsa_curve_name
string Q
mpint d
string comment
constraint[] constraints
The values "Q" and "d" are the ECDSA public and private values
respectively. Both are defined by [FIPS.186-4].
3.2.3. EDDSA keys
[RFC8709] defines Ed25519 and Ed448 with key type names "ssh-ed25519"
and "ssh-ed448" respectively. These may be added to the agent using
the following message. The "key constraints" field is only present
for the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message.
byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
string "ssh-ed25519" or "ssh-ed448"
string ENC(A)
string k || ENC(A)
string comment
constraint[] constraints
The first value is the EDDSA public key ENC(A). The second value is
a concatenation of the private key k and the public ENC(A) key. The
contents and interpretation of the ENC(A) and k values are defined by
[RFC8032].
3.2.4. RSA keys
RSA keys have key type "ssh-rsa" and are defined in [RFC4253]. They
may be added to the agent using the following message. The "key
constraints" field is only present for the
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message.
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byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED
string "ssh-rsa"
mpint n
mpint e
mpint d
mpint iqmp
mpint p
mpint q
string comment
constraint[] constraints
"n" is the public composite modulus. "p" and "q" are its constituent
private prime factors. "e" is the public exponent. "iqmp" is the
inverse of "q" modulo "p". All these values except "iqmp" (which can
be calculated from the others) are defined by [FIPS.186-4].
3.2.5. Other keys
Agents and their clients MAY support additional key types not
documented here. Vendor-specific key types should use the domain-
qualified naming convention defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC4251].
3.2.6. Adding keys from a token
Keys hosted on smart-cards or other hardware tokens may be added
using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY and
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED requests. Note that
"constraints" field is only included for the
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED variant of this message.
byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY or
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED
string id
string PIN
constraint[] constraints
Here "id" is an opaque identifier for the hardware token and "PIN" is
an optional password on PIN to unlock the key. The interpretation of
"id" is not defined by the protocol but is left solely up to the
agent.
Typically only the public components of any keys supported on a
hardware token will be loaded into an agent so, strictly speaking,
this message really arranges future private key operations to be
delegated to the hardware token in question.
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An agent should reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys were
successfully loaded as a result of one of these messages, or
SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if no keys were found. The agent should also
return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if the token "id" was not recognised or if
the agent doesn't support token-hosted keys at all.
3.2.7. Key Constraints
A number of constraints and may be used in the constrained variants
of the key add messages. Each constraint is represented by a type
byte followed by zero or more value bytes.
Zero or more constraints may be specified when adding a key with one
of the *_CONSTRAINED requests. Multiple constraints are appended
consecutively to the end of the request:
byte constraint1_type
byte[] constraint1_data
byte constraint2_type
byte[] constraint2_data
....
byte constraintN_type
byte[] constraintN_data
If an agent does not recognise or support a requested constraint it
MUST refuse the request and return a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message to the
client.
The following constraints are defined.
3.2.7.1. Key lifetime constraint
This constraint requests that the agent limit the key's lifetime by
deleting it after the specified duration (in seconds) has elapsed
from the time the key was added to the agent.
byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME
uint32 seconds
3.2.7.2. Key confirmation constraint
This constraint requests that the agent require explicit user
confirmation for each private key operation using the key. For
example, the agent could present a confirmation dialog before
completing a signature operation.
byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM
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3.2.7.3. Constraint extensions
Agents may implement experimental or private-use constraints through
a extension constraint that supports named constraints.
byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION
string extension name
byte[] extension-specific details
The extension name MUST consist of a UTF-8 string suffixed by the
implementation domain following the naming scheme defined in
Section 4.2 of [RFC4251], e.g. "foo@example.com".
3.3. Public key encoding
Keys previously loaded into an agent are referred to by their public
key blob, which is the standard SSH wire encoding for public keys.
SSH protocol key encodings are defined in [RFC4253] for "ssh-rsa" and
"ssh-dss" keys, in [RFC5656] for "ecdsa-sha2-*" keys and in [RFC8709]
for "ssh-ed25519" and "ssh-ed448" keys.
3.4. Removing keys from the agent
A client may request that an agent remove all keys that it stores:
byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES
On receipt of such a message, an agent shall delete all keys that it
is holding and reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS.
Specific keys may also be removed:
byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY
string key blob
Where "key blob" is the standard public key encoding of the key to be
removed (Section 3.3).
An agent shall reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key was deleted or
SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it was not found.
Smartcard keys may be removed using:
byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY
string reader id
string PIN
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Where "reader id" is an opaque identifier for the smartcard reader
and "PIN" is an optional password or PIN (not typically used).
Requesting deletion of smartcard-hosted keys SHOULD cause the agent
to remove all keys loaded from that smartcard.
An agent shall reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key was deleted or
SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it was not found.
3.5. Requesting a list of keys
A client may request a list of keys from an agent using the following
message:
byte SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES
The agent shall reply with a message with the following preamble.
byte SSH_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER
uint32 nkeys
Where "nkeys" indicates the number of keys to follow. Following the
preamble are zero or more keys, each encoded as:
string key blob
string comment
Where "key blob" is the standard public key encoding of the key
(Section 3.3) and "comment" is a human-readable comment encoded as a
UTF-8 string.
3.6. Private key operations
A client may request the agent perform a private key signature
operation using the following message:
byte SSH_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST
string key blob
string data
uint32 flags
Where "key blob" is the key requested to perform the signature
(encoded as per Section 3.3), "data" is the data to be signed and
"flags" is a bitfield containing the bitwise OR of zero or more
signature flags (see below).
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If the agent does not support the requested flags, or is otherwise
unable or unwilling to generate the signature (e.g. because it
doesn't have the specified key, or the user refused confirmation of a
constrained key), it must reply with a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message.
On success, the agent shall reply with:
byte SSH_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE
string signature
The signature format is specific to the algorithm of the key type in
use. SSH protocol signature formats are defined in [RFC4253] for
"ssh-rsa" and "ssh-dss" keys, in [RFC5656] for "ecdsa-sha2-*" keys
and in [RFC8709] for "ssh-ed25519" and "ssh-ed448" keys.
3.6.1. Signature flags
Two flags are currently defined for signature request messages:
SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 and SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512. These two flags
are only valid for "ssh-rsa" keys and request that the agent return a
signature using the "rsa-sha2-256" or "rsa-sha2-512" signature
methods respectively. These signature schemes are defined in
[RFC8332].
3.7. Locking and unlocking an agent
The agent protocol supports requesting that an agent temporarily lock
itself with a pass-phrase. When locked an agent should suspend
processing of sensitive operations (private key signature operations
at the very least) until it has been unlocked with the same pass-
phrase.
The following message requests agent locking
byte SSH_AGENTC_LOCK
string passphrase
The agent shall reply with SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if locked successfully
or SSH_AGENT_FAILURE otherwise (e.g. if the agent was already
locked).
The following message requests unlocking an agent:
byte SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK
string passphrase
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If the agent is already locked and the pass-phrase matches the one
used to lock it then it should unlock and reply with
SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If the agent is unlocked or if the the pass-
phrase does not match it should reply with SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. An
agent SHOULD take countermeasures against brute-force guessing
attacks against the pass-phrase.
3.8. Extension mechanism
The agent protocol includes an optional extension mechanism that
allows vendor-specific and experimental messages to be sent via the
agent protocol. Extension requests from the client consist of:
byte SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION
string extension type
byte[] extension contents
The extension type indicates the type of the extension message as a
UTF-8 string. Implementation-specific extensions should be suffixed
by the implementation domain following the extension naming scheme
defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC4251], e.g. "foo@example.com".
An agent that does not support extensions of the supplied type MUST
reply with an empty SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message. This reply is also
sent by agents that do not support the extension mechanism at all.
The contents of successful extension reply messages are specific to
the extension type. Extension requests may return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
on success or some other extension-specific message.
Extension failure should be signaled using the
SSH_AGENT_EXTENSION_FAILURE code - extensions should not use the
standard SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message. This allows failed requests to
be distinguished from the extension not being supported.
3.8.1. Query extension
A single, optional extension request "query" is defined to allow a
client to query which, if any, extensions are supported by an agent.
byte SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION
string "query"
If an agent supports the query extension is should reply with a list
of supported extension names.
byte SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
string[] extension type
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4. Forwarding access to an agent
The agent protocol may be forwarded over a SSH connection, using the
[RFC4254] connection protocol, allowing agent forwarding to be
requested for any session channel, using a model that is similar to
the connection protocol's support for X11 Forwarding (Section 6.3 of
[RFC4254]). This feature is OPTIONAL for SSH protocol and agent
implementations.
Note that the deployed integration with the SSH protocol uses vendor-
specific names.
4.1. Advertising agent forwarding support
Support for agent forwarding may be advertised by a SSH protocol
server using the [RFC8308] extension mechanism using the name "agent-
forward" in the SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO message.
string "agent-forward"
string "0" (version)
Note that this protocol substantially predates the existence of the
[RFC8308] extension mechanism and several widely-deployed SSH
implementations that support agent forwarding do not advertise their
ability to do so. Clients MAY opportunitically attempt to request
agent forwarding in the absence of an [RFC8308] advertisment using
the vendor-specific names mentioned below. Likewise, servers MAY
implement the vendor-specific names in addition to the one described
here.
4.2. Requesting agent forwarding
A client may request agent forwarding for a previously-opened session
(Section 6.1 of [RFC4254]) using the following channel request. This
request is sent after the channel has been opened, but before a
shell, command or subsystem has been executed.
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
string channel_id
string "agent-req" or "auth-agent-req@openssh.com"
boolean want_reply
Where channel_id is the identifier for an established session channel
(as returned from a previous SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN request, and the
want_reply flag indicates whether the server should respond with a
confirmation of whether the request was successful (as specified in
Section 5.4 of [RFC4254])
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If a SSH server accepts this request, typically it will arrange to
make a endpoint (e.g. a listening socket) available and advertise
this fact to the subordinate session. Most implementations on Unix-
like systems do this by providing a user-private listening Unix
domain socket and recording its location in an environment variable
$SSH_AUTH_SOCK.
As mentioned previously, many deployed implementations only support
the former, pre-standardisation "auth-agent-req@openssh.com" request
name. The latter "agent-req" name SHOULD only be used if support was
explicitly advertised as per Section 4.1.
4.3. Agent connection requests
After a client has requested that a session have agent forwarding
enabled, the server later may request a connection to the forwarded
agent. The server does this by requesting a dedicated channel to
communicate with the client's agent.
byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
string "agent-connect" or "auth-agent@openssh.com"
uint32 channel_id
uint32 local_window
uint32 local_maxpacket
The channel_id, local_window and local_maxpacket fields should be
interpreted as specified by Section 5.1 of [RFC4254].
As above, the latter "agent-connect" open type name SHOULD only be
used if support was explicitly advertised as per Section 4.1.
A client SHOULD be prepared to handle multiple concurrent active
agent connections. A client MAY accept agent connection requests
(subject to authorisation) without a prior agent forwarding request
having been made to support the situation where agent forwarding
without opening a session is desired. Similarly, a client MAY
continue to accept agent connection requests after the session for
which agent forwarding was requested has closed.
A client MUST refuse unauthorised agent connection requests, i.e.
when agent forwarding was not desired or requested but a a server
sends an agent connection request anyway.
Note the connection request provides no way to identify which session
channel a given agent connection request relates to. This implies
that a SSH connection can functionally forward access to only a
single client-side agent concurrently using this protocol.
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5. Protocol numbers
5.1. Message numbers
The following numbers are used for requests from the client to the
agent.
SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11
SSH_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17
SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18
SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20
SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21
SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22
SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION 27
The following numbers are used for replies from the agent to the
client.
SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5
SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6
SSH_AGENT_EXTENSION_FAILURE 28
SSH_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12
SSH_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14
5.1.1. Reserved message numbers
The following message numbers are reserved for implementations that
implement support for the legacy SSH protocol version 1: 1-4, 7-9 and
24 (inclusive). These message numbers MAY be used by an
implementation supporting the legacy protocol but MUST NOT be reused
otherwise.
The range of message numbers 240-255 are reserved for organization-
local extensions to the agent protocol and MUST NOT be used by
generic implementations.
5.2. Constraint identifiers
The following numbers are used to identify key constraints. These
are only used in key constraints and are not sent as message numbers.
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SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION 255
5.3. Signature flags
The following numbers may be present in signature request
(SSH_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST) messages. These flags form a bit field by
taking the logical OR of zero or more flags.
SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 2
SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512 4
The flag value 1 is reserved for historical implementations.
6. IANA Considerations
This protocol requires three registries be established, one for
message numbers, one for constraints and one for signature request
flags.
6.1. New registry: SSH agent protocol numbers
This registry, titled "SSH agent protocol numbers" records the
message numbers for client requests and agent responses. Its initial
state should consist of the following numbers and reservations.
Future message number allocations shall require specification in the
form of an RFC (RFC REQUIRED as per [RFC5226]).
+===========+==========================================+===========+
| Number(s) | Identifier | Reference |
+===========+==========================================+===========+
| 1 | reserved | Section |
| | | 5.1.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 2 | reserved | Section |
| | | 5.1.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 3 | reserved | Section |
| | | 5.1.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 4 | reserved | Section |
| | | 5.1.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 5 | SSH_AGENT_FAILURE | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 6 | SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS | Section |
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| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 7 | reserved | Section |
| | | 5.1.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 8 | reserved | Section |
| | | 5.1.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 9 | reserved | Section |
| | | 5.1.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 10 | reserved | Section |
| | | 5.1.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 11 | SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 12 | SSH_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 13 | SSH_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 14 | SSH_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 15 | reserved | Section |
| | | 5.1.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 16 | reserved | Section |
| | | 5.1.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 17 | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 18 | SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 19 | SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 20 | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 21 | SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 22 | SSH_AGENTC_LOCK | Section |
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| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 23 | SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 24 | reserved | Section |
| | | 5.1.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 25 | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 26 | SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 27 | SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 28 | SSH_AGENT_EXTENSION_FAILURE | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
| 240-255 | Reserved for organizational use | Section |
| | | 5.1 |
+-----------+------------------------------------------+-----------+
Table 1
6.2. New registry: SSH agent key constraint numbers
This registry, titled "SSH agent key constraint numbers" records the
message numbers for key use constraints. Its initial state should
consist of the following numbers. Future constraint number
allocations shall require specification in the form of an RFC (RFC
REQUIRED as per [RFC5226]).
+========+===============================+=============+
| Number | Identifier | Reference |
+========+===============================+=============+
| 1 | SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME | Section 5.2 |
+--------+-------------------------------+-------------+
| 2 | SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM | Section 5.2 |
+--------+-------------------------------+-------------+
| 255 | SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION | Section 5.2 |
+--------+-------------------------------+-------------+
Table 2
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6.3. New registry: SSH agent signature flags
This registry, titled "SSH agent signature flags records the values
for signature request (SSH_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST) flag values. Its
initial state should consist of the following numbers. Note that as
the flags are combined by bitwise OR, all flag values must be powers
of two and the maximum available flag value is 0x80000000.
Future constraint number allocations shall require specification in
the form of an RFC (RFC REQUIRED as per [RFC5226]).
+========+========================+=============+
| Number | Identifier | Reference |
+========+========================+=============+
| 0x01 | reserved | Section 5.3 |
+--------+------------------------+-------------+
| 0x02 | SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 | Section 5.3 |
+--------+------------------------+-------------+
| 0x04 | SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512 | Section 5.3 |
+--------+------------------------+-------------+
Table 3
6.4. New registry: SSH agent extension request names
This registry, titled "SSH agent extension request names" records the
names used in the generic extension request message
(SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION). Its initial state should consist of the
following names.
Future constraint number allocations shall require specification in
the form of an RFC (RFC REQUIRED as per [RFC5226]).
+================+===============+
| Extension Name | Reference |
+================+===============+
| query | Section 3.8.1 |
+----------------+---------------+
Table 4
6.5. Additions to SSH Extension Names
IANA is requested to insert the following entries into the table
Extension Names [IANA-SSH-EXT] under Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
Parameters [RFC4250].
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+================+=============+
| Extension Name | Reference |
+================+=============+
| agent-forward | Section 4.1 |
+----------------+-------------+
Table 5
6.6. Additions to SSH Connection Protocol Channel Request Names
IANA is requested to insert the following entries into the table
Connection Protocol Channel Request Names [IANA-SSH-CHANREQ] under
Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters [RFC4250].
+================+=============+
| Extension Name | Reference |
+================+=============+
| agent-forward | Section 4.2 |
+----------------+-------------+
Table 6
6.7. Additions to SSH Connection Protocol Channel Types
IANA is requested to insert the following entries into the table
Connection Protocol Channel Types [IANA-SSH-CHANTYPE] under Secure
Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters [RFC4250].
+================+=============+
| Extension Name | Reference |
+================+=============+
| agent-connect | Section 4.3 |
+----------------+-------------+
Table 7
7. Security Considerations
The agent is a service that is tasked with retaining and providing
controlled access to what are typically long-lived login
authentication credentials. It is by nature a sensitive and trusted
software component. Moreover, the agent protocol itself does not
include any authentication or transport security; ability to
communicate with an agent is usually sufficient to invoke it to
perform private key operations.
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Since being able to access an agent is usually sufficient to perform
private key operations, it is critically important that the agent
only be exposed to its owner and their authorised delegates.
The primary design intention of an agent is that an attacker with
unprivileged access to their victim's agent should be prevented from
gaining a copy of any keys that have been loaded into it. This may
not preclude the attacker from stealing use of those keys (e.g. if
they have been loaded without a confirmation constraint).
Given this, the agent should, as far as possible, prevent its memory
being read by other processes to direct theft of loaded keys. This
typically include disabling debugging interfaces and preventing
process memory dumps on abnormal termination.
Another, more subtle, means by which keys may be stolen are via
cryptographic side-channels. Private key operations may leak
information about the contents of keys via differences in timing,
power use or by side-effects in the memory subsystems (e.g. CPU
caches) of the host running the agent. For the case of a local
attacker and an agent holding unconstrained keys, the only limit on
the number of private key operations the attacker may be able to
observe is the rate at which the CPU can perform signatures. This
grants the attacker an almost ideal oracle for side-channel attacks.
While a full treatment of side-channel attacks is beyond the scope of
this specification, agents SHOULD use cryptographic implementations
that are resistant to side-channel attacks and MAY take additional
measures to hide the actual time spent processing private key
operations.
Forwarding access to a local agent over a SSH connection (Section 4)
inherently creates a transitive trust relationship. SSH
implementations SHOULD NOT forward use of an agent by default and MAY
implement additional controls over key visibility and use for
forwarded agent connections.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC4250] Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4250, January 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4250>.
[RFC4251] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, DOI 10.17487/RFC4251,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251>.
[RFC4253] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, DOI 10.17487/RFC4253,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4253>.
[RFC4254] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
Connection Protocol", RFC 4254, DOI 10.17487/RFC4254,
January 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4254>.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
[RFC5656] Stebila, D. and J. Green, "Elliptic Curve Algorithm
Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer",
RFC 5656, DOI 10.17487/RFC5656, December 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5656>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8308] Bider, D., "Extension Negotiation in the Secure Shell
(SSH) Protocol", RFC 8308, DOI 10.17487/RFC8308, March
2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8308>.
[RFC8332] Bider, D., "Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in
the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol", RFC 8332,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8332, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8332>.
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[RFC8709] Harris, B. and L. Velvindron, "Ed25519 and Ed448 Public
Key Algorithms for the Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol",
RFC 8709, DOI 10.17487/RFC8709, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8709>.
[FIPS.186-4]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-4, July 2013.
8.2. Informative References
[IANA-SSH-CHANREQ]
IANA, "Connection Protocol Channel Types",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/>.
[IANA-SSH-CHANTYPE]
IANA, "Extension Names",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/>.
[IANA-SSH-EXT]
IANA, "Connection Protocol Channel Request Names",
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/>.
[draft-ietf-secsh-agent-02]
Ylonen, T., Rinne, T. J., and S. Lehtinen, "Secure Shell
Authentication Agent Protocol", January 2004,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-secsh-
agent-02>.
Acknowledgements
This protocol was designed and first implemented by Markus Friedl,
based on a similar protocol for an agent to support the legacy SSH
version 1 by Tatu Ylonen.
Thanks to Simon Tatham and Niels Möller who reviewed and helped
improve this document.
Author's Address
Damien Miller
OpenSSH
Email: djm@openssh.com
URI: https://www.openssh.com/
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