Internet DRAFT - draft-moonesamy-traffic-peeking
draft-moonesamy-traffic-peeking
INTERNET-DRAFT S. Moonesamy
Intended Status: Informational
Expires: November 26, 2014 May 25, 2014
Traffic peeking
draft-moonesamy-traffic-peeking-03
Abstract
In June 2013, a news article revealed that the National Security
Agency obtained direct access to the systems of several service
providers from the United States through an undisclosed surveillance
programme called PRISM. This document discusses about the practice
of traffic peeking.
Status of this Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Traffic peeking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. IETF Protocols without encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Encrypting traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
7.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Appendix A: Electronic Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix B: Implementation of the Dual Elliptic Curve DRBG . . . . 10
Author's Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
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1. Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Iain Ross Learmonth for his review and
contributions to this document.
2. Background
In June 2013, a news article [Guar1] revealed that the (United
States) National Security Agency obtained direct access to the
systems of several service providers from the United States through
an undisclosed surveillance programme called PRISM [Guar2][Europa].
The surveillance programme intercepted traffic flowing through
communication links used throughout the world. According to a news
article published in October 2013, the National Security Agency had
also been wiretapping traffic flowing through private networks
between the datacenters used by Google and Yahoo [Wash1]. According
to a news article [Guar3] millions of Yahoo webcam images were
intercepted by GCHQ. Between 3% and 11% of the Yahoo webcam imagery
harvested contained "undesirable nudity".
In 2007, Dan Shumow and Niels Ferguson discussed about the
possibility of a backdoor in a Dual Elliptic Curve pseudorandom
number generator [Rump] (see Appendix B for more information). In
September 2013, the (United States) National Institute of Standards
and Technology reported that concern has been expressed about the
Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation
(Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm published in one of its standards (SP 800-
90/90A) [NIST]. ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 recommended [JTC] that users of
the ISO/IEC 18031:2011 standard [ISO8031] take note of the concerns
relating to the default application specific parameters that are
provided in Annex D of that international standard. According to a
news article [Reuters] published in December 2013 RSA received U.S.
$10 million in a deal that set the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic
Random Bit Generation as the preferred, or default, method for number
generation in the BSafe software [RSA].
3. Traffic peeking
RFC 1958 [RFC1958] states that "it is highly desirable that Internet
carriers protect the privacy and authenticity of all traffic, but
this is not a requirement of the architecture". "Tussle in
Cyberspace: Defining Tomorrow's Internet" [Tussle] states that
"peeking is irresistible". Given that most Internet traffic is not
encrypted, there isn't any significant barrier to hamper an entity
with even modest resources, let alone the resources of a nation's
government, to peek on the traffic of Internet carriers. As data
storage is becoming rapidly more affordable the next step would be to
go beyond traffic peeking and archive all the data. [Tussle] argued
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that "if there is information visible in the packet, there is no way
to keep an intermediate node from looking at it. So the ultimate
defense of the end to end mode is end to end encryption".
3.1. IETF Protocols without encryption
There are several widely deployed IETF protocols which generate plain
text (unencrypted) traffic. The specifications of these protocols
usually have a Security Considerations section to discuss the
security issues. The list of specifications mentioned below lists a
selection of IETF protocols vulnerable to traffic peeking but is
definitely not an exhaustive list.
The File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [RFC0959] is sometimes used for
transferring files. The specification does not provide any guidance
about encrypting the traffic generated by the protocol.
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [RFC2616] is widely used to
access the web. The protocol is sometimes used to provide web
access to email. Section 15 of RFC 2616 [RFC2616] does not provide
any guidance about encrypting the traffic generated by the protocol.
The Internet Message Access Protocol, Version 4rev1 [RFC3501] is
widely used to read email messages. Section 11 of RFC 3501 [RFC3501]
states that "protocol transactions, including electronic mail data,
are sent in the clear over the network unless protection from
snooping is negotiated". Details about negotiating encryption are
provided; there isn't any recommendation about when encryption
should be used. It could be argued that for accessing email, users
have an expectation of the privacy of their messages and so
encryption should be used unless it is technically or legally
infeasible to do so. RFC 3501 does not reflect this.
Similarly, the Post Office Protocol, Version 3 [RFC1939] is used to
read email messages. Section 13 of RFC 1939[RFC1939] does not
provide any guidance about encrypting the traffic generated by the
protocol but does acknowledge that "use of the PASS command sends
passwords in the clear over the network" and "use of the RETR and TOP
commands sends mail in the clear over the network".
The Simple Mail Transfer Protocol [RFC5321] is used for sending email
messages. Section 7 of RFC 5321[RFC5321] states that "SMTP mail is
inherently insecure". It is mentioned in the section that "real mail
security lies only in end-to-end methods".
3.2. Encrypting traffic
Encrypting traffic "might just be the first step in an escalating
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tussle between the end user and the network provider, in which the
response of the provider is to refuse to carry encrypted data"
[Tussle][Torrent]. In this case, protocols preferring encryption
still have an advantage over those that don't as they can present the
user with a warning that it will be necessary to fallback to an
unencrypted communication. This allows the user to adjust their
expectations of how private a communication will be.
The end user relies on the organizations recommending the standards
and software vendors as it is not possible for the average person to
evaluate whether the encryption mechanism used will protect the
traffic from peeking [Apple][Etisal][Mums][Ossl]. It is to be noted
that some encryption standards are incorporated by reference in
standards used for the Internet [IAB]. There is a brief discussion
about electronic surveillance in Appendix A.
4. Security Considerations
Entities exchanging traffic over the Internet should assume that any
traffic which is not encrypted can be intercepted given that peeking
is irresistible. There is a risk that encrypted traffic will not
provide any protection if it is stored indefinitely as the ability to
recover the traffic is preserved [Netcraft].
5. Conclusion
The security dilemma exists when "many of the means by which a
country tries to increase its security decrease the security of
others"[Jervis]. It is up to designers and implementers of a
protocol to see whether the encryption standard they use will provide
a level of the security which they consider acceptable. Even where
it is not possible to use encryption to prevent peeking,
recommendations can still be provided to implementers to ensure that
there is awareness of the security methods, or lack of, being used to
protect the traffic generated by the protocol.
It is in the interest of a network provider or a provider of a
service to collaborate with the relevant government. The end user
will usually be at the losing end of the bargain in a tussle between
the end user and government when it is claimed that traffic peeking
is a matter of national interest.
6. IANA Considerations
[RFC Editor: please remove this section]
7. References
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7.1. Informative References
[RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the
Internet", RFC 1958, June 1996.
[RFC0959] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "File Transfer Protocol", STD
9, RFC 959, October 1985.
[RFC1939] Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3",
RFC 1725, November 1994.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[RFC2804] IAB and IESG, "IETF Policy on Wiretapping", RFC 2804, May
2000.
[RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION
4rev1", RFC 3501, March 2003.
[RFC3924] Baker, F., Foster, B., and C. Sharp, "Cisco Architecture
for Lawful Intercept in IP Networks", RFC 3924, October
2004.
[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
October 2008.
[Athens] Prevelakis V. and Spinellis D. "The Athens Affair. IEEE
Spectrum 44", July 2007.
[Apple] Apple Inc., "About the security content of iOS 7.0.6",
February 2014, <http://support.apple.com/kb/HT6147>
[Dual] Checkoway S., Fredrikson M., Niederhagen R., Green M.,
Lange T., Bernstein D. J., Maskiewicz J. and Shacham H.,
"On the Practical Exploitability of Dual EC in TLS
Implementations". 5 , and Hovav Shacham
[Etisal] "Etisalat's BlackBerry patch designed for surveillance",
July 2009, <http://www.itp.net/561962-etisalats-
blackberry-patch-designed-for-surveillance>
[ETSI] European Telecommunications Standards Institute, Lawful
Interception (LI); Requirements of Law Enforcement
Agencies", TS 01 331 V1.3.1, October 2009.
[Europa] European Commission, "PRISM scandal: The data protection
rights of EU citizens are non-negotiable", June 2013,
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<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-
536_en.htm>
[Fbnz] Facebook, Australia & New Zealand, "Comments on
Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security)
Bill", July 2012,
<http://www.parliament.nz/resource/0001672174>
[Guar1] The Guardian, "NSA Prism program taps in to user data of
Apple, Google and others", June 2013,
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-
giants-nsa-data>
[Guar2] The Guardian, "NSA Prism program slides", November 2013,
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/
nov/01/prism-slides-nsa-document>
[Guar3] The Guardian, "Optic Nerve: millions of Yahoo webcam
images intercepted by GCHQ", February 2014,
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-
webcam-images-internet-yahoo>
[Hunz] Huawei Technologies (New Zealand) Company Limited,
"Submission from Huawei Technologies New Zealand Limited
on the Telecommunications (Interception Capability and
Security)", June 2013,
<http://www.parliament.nz/resource/0001672362>
[IAB] IAB, "NIST Cryptographic Standards and Development
Process", April 2014, <http://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-
uploads/2014/04/IAB-NIST7977-20140407.pdf>
[ISO8031] ISO, "ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Information technology --
Security techniques -- Random bit generation", November
2011
[Java] RSA, The Security Division of EMC, "RSA BSAFE Share for
JavaTM Platform", January 2013,
<https://community.emc.com/docs/DOC-4741>
[Jervis] Jervis R., "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma", World
Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2, January 1978
[JTC] ISO, "A Cautionary Note on the Use of ISO/IEC 18031:2011",
<http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/open/16315553>
[Mcaf] McAfee, "Patches resolve RSA BSafe Dual Elliptic Curve
DRBG algorithm vulnerability - Security Bulletins ID:
SB10067", March 2014,
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<https://kc.mcafee.com/corporate/index?page=content&id=SB10067>
[Msnz] Microsoft New Zealand Limited, "Comments on
Telecommunications (Interception Capability and Security)
Bill", June 2013,
<http://www.parliament.nz/resource/0001678514>
[Mums] Mumsnet, "Mumsnet and Heartbleed as it happened", April
2014, <http://www.mumsnet.com/features/mumsnet-and-
heartbleed-as-it-happened>
[Netcraft] Netcraft, "SSL: Intercepted today, decrypted tomorrow",
September 2013,
<http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/06/25/ssl-
intercepted-today-decrypted-tomorrow.html>
[NIST] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "NIST
opens draft Special Publication 800-90A, Recommendation
for Random Number Generation using Deterministic Random
Bit Generators, for review and comment", September 2013,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistbul/
itlbul2013_09_supplemental.pdf>
[Ossl] OpenSSL Project, "OpenSSL Security Advisory - TLS
heartbeat read overrun", April 2014,
<https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140407.txt>
[Reuters] Reuters, "Secret contract tied NSA and security industry
pioneer", December 2013,
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-
security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220>
[RSA] RSA, The Security Division of EMC, "RSA response to media
claims regarding NSA relationship", December 2013,
<https://blogs.rsa.com/news-media/rsa-response/>
[Rump] Shumow D., Ferguson N., "On the possibility of a Back Door
in the NIST SP800-90 Dual Ec Prng", August 2007,
<http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf>
[Torrent] TorrentFreak, "https://torrentfreak.com/uk-internet-
filter-blocks-vpns-australia-to-follow-soon-130905/",
September 2013, <https://torrentfreak.com/uk-internet-
filter-blocks-vpns-australia-to-follow-soon-130905/>
[Tussle] Clark D., Wroclawski J., Sollins K., Braden R., "Tussle in
cyberspace: Defining tomorrow's Internet", 2002.
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[USGov1] United States Government Printing Office, "47 U.S.C. 1008
- Payment of costs of telecommunications carriers to
comply with capability requirements"
[Wash1] The Washington Post, "NSA infiltrates links to Yahoo,
Google data centers worldwide, Snowden documents say",
October 2013,
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-
centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-
say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-
d89d714ca4dd_story.html>
Appendix A: Electronic Surveillance
Electronic surveillance is sometimes referred to as "wiretapping". A
well-known electronic surveillance case is the Athens affair [Athens]
which targeted the conversations of specific, highly placed
government and military officials. The scope of that activity is to
a large extent unknown. The following is a brief discussion of the
topic in IETF RFCs, standards and legislation.
The IETF decided not to consider requirements for wiretapping as part
of the process for creating and maintaining IETF standards [RFC2804].
It was the belief of the IETF that "in the case of traffic that is
today going across the Internet without being protected by the end
systems (by encryption or other means), the use of existing network
features, if deployed intelligently, provides extensive opportunities
for wiretapping". It was noted that "the end systems take adequate
measures to protect their communications".
It was the belief of the IETF that "mechanisms designed to facilitate
or enable wiretapping, or methods of using other facilities for such
purposes, should be openly described". RFC 3924 [RFC3924] describes
the Cisco Architecture for Lawful Intercept in IP Networks.
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute, Technical
Committee Lawful Interception (TC LI) [ETSI], publishes standards
about lawful interception. The standards specify the network or
service protocols necessary to provide handover of lawfully
intercepted data and traffic, as well as the physical or logical
point at which the interception has to take place (the handover
interface) both for packet data and circuit-switched communications.
In Europe, the Council Resolution of 17 January 1995 on the lawful
interception of telecommunications (96/C 329/01) enables its member
states "to conduct the lawful interception of telecommunications",
subject to national law and interpreted in accordance with applicable
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national policies. Most countries have a legal framework which
"generally obliges all providers of public electronic communications
networks and services to cooperate". This includes the obligation to
install interception equipment, usually without compensation.
In the United States, the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act requires telecommunications carriers (including
broadband Internet access providers and providers of VoIP services)
"to ensure that equipment, facilities, or services that allow a
customer or subscriber to "originate, terminate, or direct
communications," enable law enforcement officials to conduct
electronic surveillance pursuant to court order or other lawful
authorization". The legislation provides for the payment of costs of
telecommunications carriers to comply with capability requirements
[USGov1].
Article 3 of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime about illegal
interception requires the countries ratifying the treaty "to adopt
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish
as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed
intentionally".
The New Zealand Parliament updated its legislation about Interception
Capability and Security last year. Several entities provided
comments about the legislation where it was proposed
[Fbnz][Hunz][Msnz]. It is to be noted that the entities operate in
several jurisdictions.
Appendix B: Implementation of the Dual Elliptic Curve DRBG
The Dual EC DRBG was implemented in OpenSSL, an open source general
purpose cryptography library, in 2011 at the request of a paying
customer. The implementer was "well aware at the time of the dubious
reputation of the algorithm". It was mentioned that cryptography in
the United States Federal government is heavily constrained by
standards [NIST] and vendors selling products to that government
don't have much of a choice. RSA BSafe Dual Elliptic Curve DRBG
implementation was used in McAfee Software [Mcaf] and Share for Java
[Java]. "Depending on the design choices in the implementations, an
attacker can recover TLS session keys within seconds on a single CPU
or may require a cluster of more than 100,000 CPUs for the same task
if a different library is used" [Dual].
Author's Addresses
S. Moonesamy
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76, Ylang Ylang Avenue
Quatre Bornes
Mauritius
Email: sm+ietf@elandsys.com
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