Internet DRAFT - draft-moran-fud-manifest
draft-moran-fud-manifest
FUD B. Moran
Internet-Draft M. Meriac
Intended status: Informational H. Tschofenig
Expires: January 19, 2018 ARM Limited
July 18, 2017
Firmware Manifest Format
draft-moran-fud-manifest-00
Abstract
This specification describes the format of a manifest. A manifest is
a bundle of metadata about the firmware for an IoT device, where to
find the firmware, the devices to which it applies, and cryptographic
information protecting the manifest.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on January 19, 2018.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Manifest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. PayloadInfo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Condition and Directive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Aliases and Dependencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Device Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5.1. Vendor ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5.2. Device class ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.5.3. Device ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Manifest ASN.1 Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Mailing List Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
A firmware update mechanism is an essential security feature for IoT
devices to deal with vulnerabilities. While the transport of
firmware images to the devices themselves is important there are
already various techniques available, such as the Lightweight
Machine-to-Machine (LwM2M) protocol offering device management of IoT
devices. Equally important is the inclusion of meta-data about the
conveyed firmware image (in the form of a manifest) and the use of
end-to-end security protection to detect modifications and
(optionally) to make reverse engineering more difficult. End-to-end
security allows the author, who builds the firmware image, to be sure
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that no other party (including potential adversaries) to install
firmware updates on IoT devices with adequate privileges. This
authorization process is ensured by the use of dedicated asymmetric
keys installed on the IoT device: for use cases where only integrity
protection is required it is sufficient to install a trust anchor on
the IoT device. For confidentiality protected firmware images it is
additionally required to install either one or multiple symmetric or
asymmetric keys on the IoT device. Starting security protection by
the author is a risk mitigation technique so firmware images and
manifests can be stored on untrusted respositories.
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the high-level
firmware update architecture [Architecture]. This document is
structured as follows: In Section 3 we describe the main building
blocks of the manifest and Section 4 contains the description of the
ASN.1 of the manifest.
2. Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
2119 [RFC2119].
To describe the components of the manifest we use the terms
structures and attributes. The manifest has a hierarchical structure
and top level components are called structures and the attributes are
the components within them.
3. Components
The key components of a manifest are shown in Figure 1 and are
explained in the sub-sections below.
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+-------------------+ +-----------+
| Manifest | | Condition |
+-------------------+ +-----------+
| manifestVersion | | type |
| text | | value | +-----------+
| nonce | +-----+-----+ | Directive |
| timestamp | | +-----------+
| conditions ------+----------+ | type |
| directives ------+----------------------+ value |
| aliases ---------+-----------------+ +-----------+
| dependencies ----+--------------+ |
| payloadInfo-+ | | |
+--------------|----+ +-----+--+-----------+
| | ResourceReference |
| +--------------------+
| | hash |
| | uri |
| +---------+----------+
| |
+--------------+-----+ |
| PayloadInfo | |
+--------------------+ |
| format | |
| encryptionInfo | |
| storageIdentifier | |
| size | | +------------+
| payload ----------+-----------------+-----+ integrated |
+--------------------+ +------------+
Figure 1: Components of a Manifest.
3.1. Manifest
The Manifest structure is the top-level construct that ties all other
structures together. In addition to the structures explained in
subsections below it contains:
- a version number (in the 'manifestVersion' attribute)
- a textual description about the update, including the version /
vendor / model of the device (in the 'text' attribute). This
information is optional.
- a timestamp indicating when the manifest was created (in the
'timestamp' attribute).
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3.2. PayloadInfo
The PayloadInfo structure contains information about the firmware
image. The 'format' attribute contains the firmware image type (such
as rawBinary, hexLocationLengthData, ELF). The 'size' attribute
offers information about the size of the firmware image in bytes. If
the size of the obtained firmware image differs from the size stated
in the manifest then the obtained image MUST be consider corrupted.
The 'nonce' attribute contains a (short) random value to ensure that
a given manifest is unique. This separates the function of the
timestamp, which is provided for rollback protection, from the
function of the nonce, which is for uniqueness. Keeping these
functions separate ensures that a number of edge cases are catered
for, for example: the creation of manifests quickly enough that they
have the same timestamp. The 'storageIdentifier' attribute indicates
where the image should be placed on the device. This value useful,
for example, when an IoT device contains multiple microcontrollers
(MCUs) and the decision needs to be made to which MCU to send which
firmware image.
Most importantly, however, the PayloadInfo structure contains a
reference to the firmware image (in the 'reference' attribute) or the
image is embedded inside the PayloadInfo structure (within the
'integrated' attribute). A referenced image first needs to be
fetched by the device before the update can be applied. The
'reference' attribute contains a 'hash' and a 'uri' attribute: the
value in the 'hash' attribute allows the device to determine whether
it has already obtained this firmware image and, since it is included
in the digitally signed manifest, it protects the firmware image
against modifications. The 'uri' attribute references the image.
Finally, a firmware image may be encrypted and information about how
to decrypt is provided in this payload in the 'encryptionInfo'
attribute. The following options are provided:
- No encryption (mode="none"). In this case the firmware image is
not encrypted and only integrity protected.
- Encryption using a symmetric key (mode="preSharedKey"). The
assumption is that the symmetric key is pre-provisioned (in an
out-of-band fashion) on the IoT device and also available to the
developer.
- Encryption using a symmetric key derived via a key derivation
function (mode="preSharedKeyKdf"). This option is a variation of
the symmetric key encryption mode whereby a key derivation
function is applied to the pre-provisioned key before it is used
for encrypting the firmware image.
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- Encryption using a symmetric key found in the 'KeyTable' attribute
(mode="keyTable"). This mode is tailored to use cases where a
single encrypted firmware image is transmitted to many IoT
devices.
Depending on the selected mode different information has to be
conveyed in the manifest.
- When encryption using a symmetric key is selected then the 'KeyId'
attributes provides information for identifying the appropriate
symmetric key.
- When encryption using a symmetric key derived via a key derivation
function is selected then the following three parameters are
provided by the 'KdfParameters' attribute: KDF algorithm, nonce,
and a key id. The computed function KDF(key, nonce).
- When encryption using the key table is selected then the
'KeyTable' attribute is used. Figure 2 shows the concept
graphically where the firmware image is encrypted by a symmetric
key and this symmetric key is encrypted with the public key of
each of the devices.
+.............................+
. .
. Manifest .
.
. +----------------------+ .
. | Key Table | . *****************
. +----------------------+ . * *
. | +----------------+ | . * Firmware *
. | |{K}Pub(Device A)| | . * Image *
. | +----------------+ |<-------> * (encrypted *
. | | . * with key K) *
. | +----------------+ | . * *
. | |{K}Pub(Device B)| | . *****************
. | +----------------+ | .
. +----------------------+ .
. .
+.............................+
Figure 2: Key Table.
3.3. Condition and Directive
The Condition and the Directive structures together allow "If <...>
Then <...>" rules to be expressed.
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It offers the following functionality:
- Apply an update before a given date only (Directive.applyAfter)
- Apply an update immediately (Directive.applyImmediately)
- Apply an update only to devices that match the vendorId, classId,
deviceId attributes
- Apply an update only if the device system time is before the time
indicated in the Condition.lastApplicationTime.
3.4. Aliases and Dependencies
In some situations an IoT device may require more than a single
firmware update image. To express the requirement that more than a
single image has to be installed on a device the dependencies
structure is used, which is of type ResourceReference (as used by the
PayloadInfo structure).
Aliases are used to refer to alternative locations of firmware
images. This is useful in environments where organizations cache
firmware images (and their corresponding manifests) on premise to
avoid the need to fetch imagines from repositories maintained by the
developer's organizations (such a device manufacturer or an OEM).
3.5. Device Identification
A device is identified by at least three identifiers:
- A vendor identifier
- A device class identifier
- A device identifier
3.5.1. Vendor ID
The vendor ID is a 128-bit number that conforms to RFC-4122, type 5.
This number is used by the device to verify manifests.
The Vendor ID should be derived from the manufacturer's domain name
using the algorithm defined in Section 4.3 of RFC-4122.
A vendor ID is typically compiled into a firmware image since it is
static for the lifetime of the firmware.
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3.5.2. Device class ID
The device class is a 128-bit number that conforms to RFC-4122, type
5. This number is used by the client to verify manifests. The
Device Class ID SHOULD use the Vendor ID as the namespace, but the ID
within the namespace can be arbitrary.
A class ID is also typically compiled into a firmware image since it
is static for the lifetime of the firmware.
3.5.3. Device ID
The device ID is also a 128-bit number that conforms to RFC-4122.
The device ID can come from a variety of sources. For example, a
device may obtain this identifier during the manufacturing phase
(together with other configuration information and manufacturer-
provided credentials). In this case, we recommend using RFC-4122,
type 1, where the node ID is the factory tool ID, which provides
traceability of a device back to the origin of manufacture. A device
ID can also come from on-device resources, such as device unique-ID
registers or device identifiers in CPUs. Our recommendation is to
provide unique CPU resources to a generator function similar to the
one used for the class_id. In this example, the device_info may be a
combination of several components, such as:
- MAC address
- Device unique identifier
Where multiple sources of unique identity are available, they should
all be provided to the UUID function, since it combines them to
create a single, unique identifier.
4. Manifest ASN.1 Format
-- Manifest definition file in ASN.1 (v. 1.0.0-alpha)
ManifestSchema DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
Uri ::= UTF8String
Bytes ::= OCTET STRING
UUID ::= OCTET STRING
Payload ::= OCTET STRING
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL }
KeyId ::= OCTET STRING
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KdfParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
kdfAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
kdfNonce OCTET STRING,
keyId KeyId
}
WrappedKey ::= SEQUENCE {
deviceSubjectKeyIdentifier OCTET STRING,
key OCTET STRING
}
KeyTable ::= SEQUENCE {
keyWrapAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
keySize INTEGER,
payloadKeyDigest OCTET STRING,
subjectKeyIdentifier OCTET STRING,
table CHOICE {
uri UTF8String,
integrated SEQUENCE OF WrappedKey
}
}
EncryptionInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
mode ENUMERATED {
none(0), preSharedKey(1), preSharedKeyKdf(2), keyTable(3)
},
config ANY DEFINED BY mode,
encryptedPayloadHash OCTET STRING
}
PayloadInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
format CHOICE {
enum ENUMERATED {
rawBinary(1), hexLocationLengthData(2), elf(3), bsdiff(4)
},
objectId OBJECT IDENTIFIER
},
encryptionInfo EncryptionInfo OPTIONAL,
storageIdentifier OCTET STRING,
size INTEGER,
payload CHOICE {
reference ResourceReference,
integrated OCTET STRING
}
}
ResourceReference ::= SEQUENCE {
hash OCTET STRING,
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uri Uri
}
ConditionValue ::= CHOICE {
int INTEGER,
raw OCTET STRING
}
Condition ::= SEQUENCE {
type ENUMERATED {
vendorId(1),
classId(2),
deviceId(3),
lastApplicationTime(4),
vendorSpecificMinimum(2147483648)
},
value ConditionValue
}
DirectiveRule ::= CHOICE {
int INTEGER,
bool BOOLEAN,
raw OCTET STRING
}
Directive ::= SEQUENCE {
type ENUMERATED {
applyImmediately(1),
applyAfter(2),
restartComponent(3),
restartSystem(4),
installationHandler(5),
vendorSpecificMinimum(2147483648)
},
rule DirectiveRule
}
TextField ::= SEQUENCE {
type ENUMERATED {
description(0), version(1), vendor(2), model(3)
},
value UTF8String
}
Manifest ::= SEQUENCE {
manifestVersion ENUMERATED {
v1(1)
},
text SEQUENCE OF TextField OPTIONAL,
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nonce OCTET STRING,
digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
timestamp INTEGER,
conditions SEQUENCE OF Condition,
directives SEQUENCE OF Directive,
aliases SEQUENCE OF ResourceReference,
dependencies SEQUENCE OF ResourceReference,
payloadInfo PayloadInfo OPTIONAL
}
END
Below is the manifest format in the ASN.1 2015 format.
-- Manifest definition file in ASN.1:2015 (v. 1.0.0-alpha)
ManifestSchema DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
Uri ::= UTF8String
Bytes ::= OCTET STRING
UUID ::= OCTET STRING
Payload ::= OCTET STRING
KeyId ::= OCTET STRING
KdfParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
kdfAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
kdfNonce OCTET STRING,
keyId KeyId
}
WrappedKey ::= SEQUENCE {
deviceSubjectKeyIdentifier OCTET STRING,
key OCTET STRING
}
KeyTable ::= SEQUENCE {
keyWrapAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
keySize INTEGER,
payloadKeyDigest OCTET STRING,
subjectKeyIdentifier OCTET STRING,
table CHOICE {
uri UTF8String,
integrated SEQUENCE OF WrappedKey
}
}
PAYLOADENCRYPTION ::= CLASS {
&mode ENUMERATED {
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none(0), pre-shared-key(1), pre-shared-key-kdf(2), key-table(3)
} UNIQUE,
--OpenType-- &Config
} WITH SYNTAX { MODE &mode, CONFIG &Config}
EncryptionOptions PAYLOADENCRYPTION ::= {
{MODE none, CONFIG NULL} |
{MODE pre-shared-key, CONFIG KeyId} |
{MODE pre-shared-key-kdf, CONFIG KdfParameters} |
{MODE key-table, CONFIG KeyTable}
}
EncryptionInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
mode PAYLOADENCRYPTION.&mode ({EncryptionOptions}),
config PAYLOADENCRYPTION.&Config ({EncryptionOptions}{@mode}),
encryptedPayloadHash OCTET STRING
}
PayloadInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
format CHOICE {
enum ENUMERATED {
undefined(0), raw-binary(1)
},
objectId OBJECT IDENTIFIER
},
encryptionInfo EncryptionInfo OPTIONAL,
storageIdentifier OCTET STRING,
size INTEGER,
payload CHOICE {
reference ResourceReference,
integrated OCTET STRING
}
}
ResourceReference ::= SEQUENCE {
hash OCTET STRING,
uri UTF8String
}
CONDITION ::= CLASS {
&type ENUMERATED {
vendorId(1),
classId(2),
deviceId(3),
lastApplicationTime(4),
vendorSpecificMinimum(2147483648)
},
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&Value
} WITH SYNTAX {TYPE &type, VALUE &Value}
ConditionTable CONDITION ::= {
{TYPE vendorId, VALUE OCTET STRING} |
{TYPE classId, VALUE OCTET STRING} |
{TYPE deviceId, VALUE OCTET STRING} |
{TYPE applyBefore, VALUE INTEGER} |
{TYPE vendorSpecific, VALUE OCTET STRING}
}
Condition ::= SEQUENCE {
type CONDITION.&type ({ConditionTable}),
value CONDITION.&Value ({ConditionTable} {@type})
}
DIRECTIVE ::= CLASS {
&type ENUMERATED {
applyImmediately(1),
applyAfter(2),
restartComponent(3),
restartSystem(4),
installationHandler(5),
vendorSpecificMinimum(2147483648)
},
&Rule
} WITH SYNTAX {TYPE &type, RULE &Rule}
DirectiveTable DIRECTIVE ::= {
{TYPE applyImmediately, RULE BOOLEAN} |
{TYPE applyAfter, RULE INTEGER} |
{TYPE restartComponent, RULE BOOLEAN} |
{TYPE restartSystem, RULE BOOLEAN} |
{TYPE installationHandler, RULE OCTET STRING} |
{TYPE vendorSpecific, RULE OCTET STRING}
}
Directive ::= SEQUENCE {
type DIRECTIVE.&type ({DirectiveTable}),
rule DIRECTIVE.&Rule ({DirectiveTable} {@type})
}
TextField ::= SEQUENCE {
type ENUMERATED {
description(0), version(1), vendor(2), model(3)
},
value UTF8String
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}
Manifest ::= SEQUENCE {
manifestVersion ENUMERATED {
v1(1)
},
text SEQUENCE OF TextField OPTIONAL,
nonce OCTET STRING,
digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
timestamp INTEGER,
conditions SEQUENCE OF Condition,
directives SEQUENCE OF Directive,
aliases SEQUENCE OF ResourceReference,
dependencies SEQUENCE OF ResourceReference,
payload PayloadInfo OPTIONAL
}
END
5. IANA Considerations
Editor's Note: A few registries would be good to allow easier
allocation of new features.
6. Security Considerations
This document is about a manifest format describing and protecting
firmware images and as such it is part of a larger solution for
offering a standardized way of delivering firmware updates to IoT
devices. A more detailed discussion about security can be found in
the architecture document [Architecture].
7. Mailing List Information
The discussion list for this document is located at the e-mail
address fud@ietf.org [1]. Information on the group and information
on how to subscribe to the list is at
https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/fud
Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.ietf.org/mail-
archive/web/fud/current/index.html
8. Acknowledgements
We would like the following persons for their support in designing
this mechanism
- Geraint Luff
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- Amyas Phillips
- Dan Ros
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
9.2. Informative References
[Architecture]
Moran, B., "A Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of
Things Devices", July 2017.
9.3. URIs
[1] mailto:fud@ietf.org
Authors' Addresses
Brendan Moran
ARM Limited
EMail: Brendan.Moran@arm.com
Milosch Meriac
ARM Limited
EMail: Milosch.Meriac@arm.com
Hannes Tschofenig
ARM Limited
EMail: hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net
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